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Abstract 
In 2008 the neoliberal economic ideas steering the course of global economic governance 
seemingly collapsed as the world entered into the greatest financial and economic crash 
since the Great Depression. Initially a range of precipitating causes were offered including 
lax monetary policy and a miss-pricing of risk, common to which was an assumption that 
although severe, the downturn was limited to policy failures in a relatively stable economic 
framework, and therefore constituted a crisis for neoliberal global economic governance.  
As the downturn intensified however, there developed a consensus that the situation 
facing policymakers was not simply a crisis for neoliberal global economic governance, but 
more fundamentally a crisis of neoliberalism which was now interpreted as a major 
precipitating cause. Therefore just as the failure of Keynesianism presaged a shift to 
neoliberalism, so too was there an expectation that its failure would exert a similarly 
transformative dynamic.    
Against this backdrop this research investigates the extent to which the neoliberal 
economic ideas steering the course of global economic governance are characterised by 
change or continuity. This is explored through the examination of an institution commonly 
assumed a bastion of neoliberalism, the IMF, and with specific reference to two areas 
synonymous with neoliberal economic ideas, monetary and fiscal policy, and financial 
sector liberalization.  
The research points to two reasons to suggest the potential for change. Firstly, many of the 
neoliberal economic ideas advocated by the IMF were cognitively falsified by the severity of 
the economic downturn. Secondly, as the downturn unravelled, the IMF advocated a range 
of policy interventions that had been considered largely anathema only months previously.  
Nevertheless, the key finding of this research is that to suggest this was the beginnings of a 
major shift was to miss-read the intentions of those tasked with responding to the crisis 
who were more concerned with preserving, as opposed to altering, the status quo. As a 
result, it is demonstrated that the IMF remains committed to the neoliberal economic 
philosophy (assumptions made regarding the efficacy of the market as opposed to state 
intervention) which has vital implications for the way in which economic problems continue 
to be interpreted and responded to, and the kinds of policies considered appropriate.  
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Introduction 
In 2008 the neoliberal economic ideas steering the course of global economic governance – 
a set of assumptions regarding the appropriate means by which to organise economic 
activity – appeared to collapse as the world witnessed what has been broadly 
contextualised as the worst financial and economic downturn since the Great Depression 
(Hay, 2011:2). Beginning initially in the sub-prime mortgage market of the US financial 
sector, the downturn quickly precipitated a broader credit crunch which spilled over into 
the real economy, negatively affecting economic growth and employment the world over.  
Initially, the collapse was variously conceptualised as the result of lax monetary policy 
(Carmassi et al, 2009), a values crisis (Friedman and Friedman, 2008), or a mispricing of risk 
worldwide (Greenspan, 2008). Although clearly saying something different, common to 
these diagnoses was an assumption that, although serious, the downturn was the result of 
flawed policies deployed in an otherwise effectively functioning overall framework. As time 
progressed however, there developed something of a consensus that its implications were 
far more fundamental; that is, a major failure of neoliberal economic ideas and policies.  
This rendered as fallacy the assertion that neoliberalism provided the sole, inevitable, most 
efficacious, one best way by which to steer the global economy, and instead, drew our 
attention to actual existence of the potential for a range of political-economic alternatives, 
with each characterised ‘by divergent interpretations of the opportunities or constraints 
presented, a view of what should and should not be subject to discussion or regulation, and 
ideas as to how best to strategically organize the direction of collective action’ (Cerny, 
2008:5).  
Certainly, with the downturn increasingly recognised as one of the three great crises of 
capitalism along with the Great Depression of the 1930s and Great Inflation of the 1970s, 
(Gamble, 2009:452), both of which precipitated substantive change, it was not uncommon 
to assume that the present downturn would exert a similarly transformative dynamic in the 
economic ideas steering the course of global economic governance. Indeed, Blyth (2012:10) 
suggested that ‘if there was ever a perfect case for a “paradigm shift”... surely this was it’.  
In light of this discussion this research addresses two key questions. 
 Given their evident failings, to what extent are neoliberal economic ideas 
characterised by change or continuity?  
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In answering this question, this research draws on the IMF as a case study to demonstrate 
how - although the failure of neoliberal economic ideas provided the pre-conditions from 
which to enact a major transformation in the economic ideas steering the political 
economy, the ways in which economic problems continue to be interpreted and responded 
to, and therefore the kinds of policies considered necessary - change has not been 
forthcoming.  
This claim is substantiated through reference to two policy areas synonymous with 
neoliberal economic ideas in the IMF. Firstly, the research draws on the example of 
economic policy to demonstrate how during the most acute phase of the downturn the IMF 
broke with orthodoxy by calling for substantial fiscal stimulus in order to shore up 
aggregate economic demand, a move considered at the time as having the potential to 
exert a transformative dynamic in economic policymaking in the IMF.  
This potential notwithstanding, this research suggests that such a shift never materialised 
as calls for fiscal stimulus, from their earliest inception, were couched in orthodox 
assumptions of the need for fiscal sustainability. Therefore as the most acute phase of the 
downturn passed, the IMF called for major fiscal adjustment through the enactment of a 
range of policies consistent with as opposed to those provided by neoliberal frames of 
reference.   
Secondly, the research draws on the example of financial sector liberalization and 
deregulation, and in doing so, demonstrates how the hands-off regulatory approach was 
interpreted by senior officials within the IMF as a major precipitating cause of the 
downturn (Strauss-Khan, 2008c). As a result, space seemingly opened up for more 
significant government intervention into the functioning of financial markets through the 
enactment of a range of policies considered off-the-table only months prior. This raised 
expectation of the potential for a major transformation in the manner in which the efficacy 
of government interventions into banking and financial sectors were once again 
understood. 
Nevertheless, just as was the case with economic policy, this research suggests that such a 
shift never materialised. Rather, banking and financial sector reforms continued to be 
couched within the broader context of continuing adherence to belief in the efficacy of 
neoliberal economic ideas. As a result, there was no major change in the manner in which 
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economic problems were interpreted and responded to as the IMF, once the most acute 
phase of the downturn had passed, called for caution in the regulatory debate.  
 
 Why did the monumental failure of neoliberal economic ideas not lead to a 
broader crisis of the neoliberal order?  
The starting point here, in light of the preceding discussion, is that the failure of neoliberal 
economic ideas did not lead to a crisis in the constructivist sense in which the moment of 
failure is inter-subjectively interpreted by actors as requiring altered structures (change). 
Indeed, for it to be seen as such would require that adherence to neoliberal economic ideas 
be interpreted as a precipitating cause of the downturn, yet this is currently not the case. 
That constructivist approaches are typically deployed to account for the processes by which 
crises bring about significant transformations might appear to suggest that they lack an 
adequate conceptual framework with which to account for questions related to continuity. 
As a result, rational choice approaches with their emphasis on stability and continuity 
might appear, superficially, well positioned to provide us with a suitable explanatory 
account. 
Nevertheless, a key assumption of this research is that a constructivist approach provides 
us with a more interesting and fruitful avenue of enquiry by which to understand the 
mechanisms deployed by the IMF to construct continuity in economic ideas. In the process 
of outlining the case for such an approach, this research takes up the challenge by Schmidt 
(2011:111) 'to find less deterministic and more dynamic ways of thinking about continuity'.  
By way of substantiating this claim it is suggested that, just as actors seek to effect change 
through crisis construction and the provision of narratives of what went wrong, so too are 
those seeking to defend and maintain the status quo engaged in this ‘war of competing 
narratives’ (Hay, 1999:336). Indeed, that actors ‘typically confront resistance from 
defenders of the status quo’ (Chwieroth, 2010:501) means there is nothing to suggest that 
those motivated by change will be successful in their endeavours to shape responses. 
This acknowledgement is certainly not controversial. However, what is missing from much 
of the constructivist literature is an analysis of the means by which actors engage in such a 
process. For the purposes of this research, two are explored, both of which are inherently 
constructivist. On the one hand, the historical analogy literature associated with 
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International Relations (IR) is drawn upon to demonstrate how the IMF sought, during the 
initial stages of the downturn, to reduce unravelling uncertainty. It did so by interpreting 
events through existing knowledge structures (neoliberal economic ideas) which provided a 
mechanism by which to compare the unfolding turmoil with similar instances from the past 
to both help deal with indeterminacy in the present, and crucially, to derive policy lessons.    
On the other hand, the sociology literature is drawn upon to highlight the importance of 
framing which is shown to have been deployed as a means to assign meaning to unfolding 
events. In doing so, it is demonstrated how the IMF played a crucial diagnostic role in 
drawing attention to the importance of particular problems, along with a prognostic role in 
advancing policy solutions to the problems so-defined. 
 
Case study justification 
This research draws on the IMF as a case study. The rationale for doing so is three-fold. 
Firstly, the IMF was tasked by the G20 group of state leaders with playing an important part 
in diagnosing and responding to the global economic downturn. Moreover, at the G20 
leader’s summit at London in early 2009, the resources made available to the IMF were 
increased significantly so that it would be suitably positioned to respond to requests of 
assistance by countries struggling to cope with the worst effects of the downturn. Together 
therefore, we can see how the IMF was accorded a pivotal role in developing responses.  
Secondly, the IMF is located in a broader architecture of global economic governance which 
seeks to coordinate broad agreement on policy priorities. Moreover, it plays a critical role 
in providing cognitive justification, and thereafter communicating, the economic ideas 
developed in the coordinative discourse through the dissemination of research which seeks 
to persuade other actors of the efficacy of problem definitions and policy positions. In 
doing so the IMF constitutes ‘an important conduit of influence for economic ideas’ (Clift, 
2013:1). 
Thirdly, that the IMF has often been referred to as a bastion of neoliberalism makes it a 
particularly fruitful case study (Peet, 2009). Nevertheless, neoliberal economic ideas cover 
a large range of areas. As a result, in order to illuminate this research, focus is placed on 
two policy case studies, monetary and fiscal policy; and financial sector liberalization and 
deregulation, each of which have become synonymous with neoliberal/IMF policy 
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discourse, and were characterised by varying degrees of failure during the current 
downturn.  
In the case of the former, policy-makers seeking to influence economic output have two 
main tools at their disposal – monetary policy, in which central banks indirectly target 
activity by influencing the money supply through, for example, adjustments to interest 
rates and bank reserve requirements; and fiscal policy, in which governments influence 
economic activity by changing the level and types of taxes, and the extent of spending.  
The relative weighting allocated to each approach has typically waxed and waned. Post 
World War 2, fiscal policy was considered the macro-economic policy tool in the IMF. 
Nevertheless, by the 1980s, monetary policy had assumed prominence as the primary 
means by which to manage the economy (particularly during downturns/recessions) and 
therefore became a key focus of policy advice to countries borrowing from the IMF.   
The oscillation from fiscal to monetary policy was premised in large part on new research. 
This was summarised by former First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF Stanley Fischer 
(1993:2) who noted that fiscal policy: arrived too late due to implementation lags; was 
distorted by political constraints; reduced private investment by raising interest rates; and 
was largely redundant as monetary policy was capable of maintaining a stable output gap.  
Although it would be unwise to confuse correlation with causation, an assumption was 
made within the IMF that the privileging of monetary policy in managing the economy 
(manipulating the policy rate to counter recessions) and a solid anchoring of inflationary 
expectations had helped to reduce the effects of shocks on the economy. Economic ideas 
therefore, ostensibly supported  by empirical evidence, led Blanchard et al (2010) and 
Vinals (2009) to note that better policymaking had delivered higher economic growth and 
stability. 
This notwithstanding, as the downturn unfolded, fiscal policy again assumed prominence in 
IMF policy advice. Indeed, from advocating monetary policy interventions during the initial 
phase of the downturn, the IMF rejected orthodoxy and, for the first time in its history, 
called for globally coordinated fiscal stimulus in order to shore up ailing demand, and in 
doing so seemingly reverted to an apparently discredited set of Keynesian economic ideas.  
This move, along with the fact that economic policy has been shown to be characterised by 
shifts in ‘conventional wisdom’ following major events such as wars and major financial 
crises (Cukierman, 2013:1), meant the current downturn appeared to offer an opportunity 
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with which to affect a similarly transformative dynamic. Together therefore, we can see 
how economic policy provides this research with a particularly fertile ground for study. 
In the case of the latter, although controls over financial activity were initially advocated by 
the IMF, financial sector liberalization and deregulation came to develop an inextricable 
synonymy with IMF policy discourse. Then Managing Director of the IMF Michel Camdessus 
(1997:1) summarised the benefits, including that they: give countries new opportunities to 
quicken the pace of investment, job creation, and growth; give investors a wider range of 
investments along with higher returns on savings; and promote a more efficient allocation 
of resources worldwide, thereby contributing towards stronger world growth.  
These apparent benefits notwithstanding, financial liberalization and deregulation has been 
accompanied by an increasing number of financial and economic crises. In response, and in 
recognition that crises were an increasingly inescapable part of the contemporary global 
financial landscape, global economic governance institutions advocated the creation of two 
Basel accords (Basel 1, 1988; and Basel 2, 2004) which encouraged banks to hold a greater 
degree of capital so that they would be suitably positioned to meet their financial 
obligations in the event of a downturn. These were supported by the IMF which provided 
technical assistance to member states in the implementation stage.  
The two Basel accords were underpinned by a micro-prudential approach to regulation 
(MicPR) which was grounded in an assumption that minimising the risk of failure by 
individual institutions through deposit insurance and other safety nets, along with special 
insolvency and resolution mechanisms, would make the financial system as a whole more 
resilient. Moreover, it was thought that regulating banks (no matter how minimally) would 
ensure that lending outside the core would capture systemic risks, and that, applying 
regulation to non-banks (and financial instruments) would be costly, reduce innovation, 
and actually increase systemic vulnerabilities by inhibiting the ability of markets to transfer 
risk. 
It was therefore assumed that banks should be allowed to engage in almost any form of 
financial activity so long as it had robust risk management systems and sufficient earnings 
to support underlying risks. In short, such an approach would, it was suggested, liberalise 
the powers of well-managed banks to spur innovation and economic growth (Zamil, 
2009:1).  
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This notwithstanding, that the origins of the downturn were in the banking and financial 
sectors at the very heart of global financial capitalism (the US) before spreading globally led 
many (Brown, 2009; Stiglitz, 2009) including senior IMF officials (Strauss-Kahn, 2008c), to 
deduce that the hands-off approach of the preceding years was fundamentally flawed.  
Therefore, just as the renewed emphasis on fiscal interventions constituted a potentially 
fundamental shift in economic ideas in the IMF, so too was a similar assumption made of 
the need for a fundamental overhaul in the regulation of the banking and financial sectors 
in order to prevent a recurrence. Although a number of areas of reform were highlighted, 
including the need for greater liquidity ratios and regulation of globally significant banks, 
this is explored through the most developed area, Basel 3, which seemingly created space 
for much greater government intervention into the functioning of financial markets.  
 
Methodological approach 
Although it has been suggested that there is no intellectual reason why a rational choice 
approach be particularly amenable to a quantitative methodology, nor that a constructivist 
approach should be especially well suited to a qualitative methodology, (or that they are 
mutually exclusive), Farrell and Finnemore (2008:60) have nevertheless demonstrated that 
near-zero constructivist IR/IPE research employs quantitative techniques. This suggests an 
especially strong correlation between a constructivist approach and a qualitative 
methodology.  
This research proceeds in a broadly similar vein in acknowledging that although ‘both 
qualitative and quantitative methods may be used appropriately with any research 
paradigm’ (Guba & Lincoln, 1994:105) generally speaking a quantitative methodology is 
particularly useful in conjunction with orthodox theory whereas a qualitative methodology 
is especially amenable to the constructivist approach taken to this research.    
With this in mind, the research questions posed above are addressed through a qualitative 
methodological approach. This is however, ‘a broad umbrella term that covers a wide range 
of techniques and philosophies’ (Hennink et al, 2011:8) including  in-depth interviews, 
focus group discussions, observation, visual methods, life histories and biographies among 
others, but is nevertheless limited for this research to a text analysis of official IMF 
documents.  
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This approach taken to this research is therefore interpretive, relying on less formal 
methodologies which are de-emphasised to make room for a wide range of analytical 
concerns, each typified by differing methodological approaches (Cohen, 2007:200). In 
particular however, this research draws on insights provided by post-modernist/post-
structuralist approaches and hermeneutics.  
Firstly, post-structuralism and post-modernism have contributed to the understanding that 
there is no clear window through which to observe an objective reality as any gaze is 
always filtered through, for example, the lenses of language and social class (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2000:19). As a result, such approaches are critical of attempts to ground 
knowledge in objective and essential foundations. Rather, an assumption is made that to 
make sense of an action we have to interpret it in the wider prior discourse of which it is a 
part, as actions are only understandable in an episteme or framework of meaning which 
helps to construct individuals and their beliefs.  
This approach is therefore concerned with the analysis of ideas and discourses and how 
these perform within and frame practices and institutions. It is important in drawing our 
attention to the fact that conceptions and interpretations of reality presented in texts are 
socially constructed within the wider context characterised by social, historical and cultural 
particularities within which, for our purposes here, the IMF operates (Hennink et al, 
2011:15).   
The broader context is therefore critical precisely because it provides us with 'a set of 
ideas, concepts and rules about how one thinks and talks about a topic' (Yates, 2003:233) 
as well as the knowledge a group (for our purposes here, global economic institutions) have 
about a particular topic (the appropriate means by which to steer the international political 
economy).  
Moreover, these ideas and system of knowledge include the construction of specific 
interpretations and understandings of concepts which together are a product of, contain 
language forms and practices defined by, and help to recreate and support that very 
system. Viewed in such a manner, knowledge does not reflect a purported social reality, 
but produces meaning, creates social reality, with different discourses and languages 
dividing up that world in order to give it meaning (Richardson, 2000:928-929).  
For our purposes here, we can therefore see how these systems of knowledge provide IMF 
staff with an interpretive lens which provides a perspective that makes assumptions 
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regarding how the international political economy should be understood and studied. In 
doing so particular demands are made on staff (implicit or otherwise), including the kinds 
of questions they seek to answer, thereby simultaneously guiding and constraining work 
that will be conducted (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000:18-19). 
This approach suggests that subjects experience the world in ways which depend on the 
influence of social structures on them. However, this is accompanied with the caveat here 
that they are also endowed with sufficient agency to alter these structures by adapting, 
developing, or rejecting existing ideas and institutions. Moreover, also engaged in attempts 
to shape the broader context are those motivated by seeking to entrench the status quo by 
engaging in persuasive struggles that draw on existing interpretations, understandings and 
conceptions. Together therefore, we observe here a discursive sphere in which actors 
compete to shape shared meanings which act as the subsequent background for action.  
The approach taken here therefore allows us to overcome a problem often directed at 
methodological approaches which study text, that is, they are typically assumed to 
interpret texts without contexts. In doing so, it is demonstrated how the commitment of 
global economic governance institutions (including the G7/20 and IMF), to a particular set 
of neoliberal economic ideas addresses this criticism by noting that it is not just ideas or 
text that is important (what is said), but also context (by who, when, and where) and 
purpose (what is the aim of such research in terms of the policies advocated) (Schmidt, 
2008:305).    
Secondly, further to the preceding discussion, this research incorporates insights derived 
from hermeneutics which takes as its point of departure the inherent subjectivity of 
perceptions of reality. Doing so suggests the potential for a range of perspectives, with 
each characterised by a multiplicity of meanings and competing interpretations (Hodder, 
2000:879; Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006:390). Viewed in such a manner, the producer of a 
text ‘is merely an interpreter whose own account has no greater claim to ‘truth’ than 
anyone else’s account. There can never be a final accurate representation’ (Devine, 
2002:203) of reality, simply differing interpretations.    
An assumption is therefore made that the production of knowledge is shaped by the 
researchers’ perspective. This serves to demonstrate that what is often presented by the 
IMF as common sense is in fact incomplete and only held provisionally as we do not 
perceive the world without pre-established conceptual boxes and traditions which 
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structure perspectives, as the preceding discussion demonstrated (Bevir & Rhodes, 
2002:135).  
That is, researchers’ positionality, the cognitive-emotional dimensions, the impacts of 
interests on judgements means that research is inherently complex as meaning does not 
exist independently of our understanding of it, but is reflective of our interpretation of it.  
The approach deployed here therefore rejects positivist assumptions of knowability and 
the analogy that such scholars postulate between the natural/physical worlds, and the 
social world, which is shown to be false. That is, unlike rocks and atoms, humans 
communicate, share, interpret and contest meaning such that our institutions, ideas, 
policies and language are shown to be human creations that do not exist independently of 
us (Yanow, 2006:7).  
In doing so, an assumption is made that research is not, nor can ever truly be, value-free in 
which researchers have no influence on data collection or interpretation. If we accept this 
premise, then it becomes clear that research is in fact undertaken, and guided by, a set of 
beliefs and feelings about how the world is, how it should be understood, and most 
pertinently for this research, how it should be studied (Denzin & Lincoln, 2013: 19-23).  
As a result, research produced by the IMF contains but one particular array of signifying 
elements that set the parameters of a cognitive window through which a text is seen. That 
is, the intended meaning of research is to direct attention as well as restrict the 
perspectives available to its intended audiences. Viewed in such a manner, texts are 
understood here as structurally located choices of concepts following certain shared rules 
and conventions. In essence, they are tools used in composing and constructing a particular 
discourse.   
By drawing on the hermeneutic approach this research therefore highlights the social, 
cultural, and most particular for our purposes here, institutional dynamics associated with 
the production of texts. Indeed, accepting the absence of an objectively identifiable ‘real 
world’ means that it is not possible for IMF research to claim a privileged position that 
enables it to engage in the production of authoritative knowledge. Rather, the approach 
taken here draws attention to textual claims to authority, that is, the incomplete 
knowledge claims made by the IMF.   
This approach is inductive, thereby allowing for the capture of inter-subjective meanings, is 
historical in that it aims to develop an historical narrative, deconstruct and de-naturalise 
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the economic ideas and knowledge constructs which the IMF uses to legitimate its actions, 
and allows for an exploration of the manner in which texts contribute to understanding 
reality. Moreover, it creates space for alternative ideas and understandings, and by 
implication, the potential for change as well as continuity (see for example Kincheloe & 
McLaren, 2000:286).    
 
Data selection 
The preceding discussion provides us with an interpretive methodological approach which 
draws our attention to the fact that to better understand the intent, background and 
history of those engaged in the production of research, it is necessary to locate it within the 
broader context in which it is produced (Yanow, 2006:15). As a result, given that knowledge 
is not simply ‘out there’ as some inert form of nature, it is necessary to study texts, or more 
specifically for our purposes here, research output and speeches derived from the IMF, as 
texts do not just represent themselves, but are socially constituted and constructed.  
This nevertheless begs the question as to how an interpretive approach might apply to and 
help us to understand the kinds of claims that the IMF makes, namely, which texts 
produced by the IMF are most likely to provide satisfactory answers to our research 
questions.  
Here the research borrows from Weldes (2006:178) the distinction between “high” and 
“low” data. Although there are obvious synergies between the two, the former is the focus 
of this research as it is that which circulates among elite institutions of the coordinative 
discourse, whereas the latter is more commonly associated with popular and mass culture.   
Superficially at least, this may appear an onerous task given the IMFs considerable research 
output. This includes for example: the IMF’s bi-annual flagship publication the World 
Economic Outlook (WEO); five Regional Economic Outlooks (REOs) produced by the various 
area departments; Special Issue Papers (SIPs) that accompany Article IV consultation 
documents produced by area departments; Occasional Papers (OPs) that feature 
nontechnical analyses of economic and financial subjects of current importance to the IMF; 
and Policy Discussion Papers (PDPs) and Staff Discussion Notes (SDNs) that showcase new 
policy analysis and research by IMF departments. Indeed, in all, the IMF produces over five 
hundred pieces of original research per year, equivalent to between four and five thousand 
for the period covered by this research (IEO, 2011:7). 
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Nevertheless, the policy case studies selected for the purposes of this research narrow the 
issues for analysis, and by implication, the number of texts that can be considered suitable 
for selection. As a result, analysis is focused primarily on the bi-annual publications the 
Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) and Fiscal Monitor, Working Papers and Policy 
Papers, and playing a supplementary role, speeches made by senior IMF officials.  
Firstly, the analysis of fiscal policy draws upon research presented in the Fiscal Monitor 
(FM) which was established in 2009 by the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) of the IMF. It 
arose specifically in response to the fiscal effects of the economic downturn (the use of 
fiscal stimulus and its negative implications for sovereign debt burdens) as a means by 
which to both track fiscal responses by member states, and crucially for the purposes of 
this research, seek to influence the direction of action by providing policy relevant analysis.  
Secondly, the analysis of financial sector liberalization and deregulation draws on the 
Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR), created in 2002, and produced by the Monetary 
and Capital Markets Department (MCMD) of the IMF, its aim being to be a centre of 
excellence for all aspects of financial, capital market, and monetary work. In doing so, the 
GFSR, in tracking emerging risks and highlighting what the IMF perceives as being the most 
salient vulnerabilities and threats to global financial stability, forms the main surveillance 
vehicle of the IMF. Moreover, and of particular importance for this research, the GFSR, 
particularly through its analytic chapters which address topics relevant to current policy 
discussion, plays a critical part in drawing attention to the IMFs evolving views on lessons 
from the downturn, as well as providing policy relevant analysis (Kiguel, 2011:1).  
Thirdly, this research draws on Working Papers and Policy Papers produced by FAD and 
MCMD Departmental Directors and staff members, along with other senior officials 
including Managing Directors, Deputy Managing Directors and Research Director. Focusing 
on research conducted by such officials allows us to stay as true as possible to the official 
stance taken by the IMF. Moreover, in doing so this research overcomes a problem 
highlighted by the IEO (2011:3) that a number of Working Papers produced by junior staff 
members have the potential to be released without official authorisation, and as a result, 
they can, in theory at least, produce analysis that is inconsistent with official IMF 
responses.  
Finally, speeches by senior officials within the IMF are an especially useful supplementary 
source of enquiry as, like research, ‘they are precisely intended to sell a particular 
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representation’ (Weldes, 2006:181) of established problem definitions and policy priorities. 
Therefore, speeches do more than simply say things, they have both a practical and social 
function inasmuch as they are similarly rife with, and help to communicate, the dominant 
discourse to as wide an audience as possible in order to help ensure its propagation. 
By exploring these texts, this research draws on two types of economic research (“high” 
data) carried out by the IMF, each of which is critical in helping to determine the extent to 
which it is possible to adjudicate between change and continuity in economic ideas.   
Firstly, the GFSR and Fiscal Monitor are surveillance and policy oriented. As a result, they 
allow for the potential to determine at one level the extent to which policy priorities 
changed during the economic downturn when considered against those advocated prior. 
This approach has been characteristic of much of the academic literature that has sought to 
adjudicate the extent to which the IMF is characterised by change or continuity (see Babb, 
2009; Ban & Gallagher, 2014; Grabel, 2011; Guven, 2012 Wilson & Grant, 2013).  
Secondly, Policy Papers, and in particular Working Papers, are academic in style inasmuch 
as they feature original research by IMF staff and therefore seek to generate new 
knowledge to deepen understandings of policy frameworks. That is, they are empirical, 
descriptive, theoretical and more technical than other research products (IEO, 2011:1-4). In 
this regard, analysis of their content throughout this research affords us the opportunity to 
go beyond an investigation of the policy realm, to providing a much deeper exploration of 
the extent to which the underlying economic philosophy (assumptions made regarding the 
efficacy of free markets in the functioning of the political economy), and manner in which 
economic problems are interpreted and responded to, are characterised by change or 
continuity.     
Taken together therefore, textual evidence derived from this research enables us to 
explore the central representations offered by elites (Weldes, 2006:181). This allows for 
the generation of a portrait that illuminates a well rehearsed set of narratives that provide 
justification for particular policy priorities, and which are intimately linked to problem 
definitions and the broader underlying economic philosophy. Indeed, it is this research that 
helps to create, advocate, communicate and hold together the prevailing discourse. 
The preceding discussion however does lead us to an important question. To what extent 
can we take this research, along with speeches by prominent officials, as a reasonable 
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proxy for IMF thinking so that we are suitably placed to adjudicate between continuity and 
change? In answering this question it is suggested that we can for two important reasons.  
Firstly, it is suggested here that the broad research agenda in the IMF is shaped by a 
number of key actors within and beyond the IMF. On the one hand, outside of the IMF the 
G7 plays a crucial role in steering the broad direction, and thereby setting the general 
agenda, of global economic governance institutions by emphasising broad principles. 
Moreover, it exercises the power of instigation for more technical institutions, including the 
IMF, for which it relies on, and has the power to endorse, more specialist knowledge 
present in its research output.  
On the other hand, the Executive Directors within the IMF can shape agendas and endorse 
research which is presented and discussed by the Board (IEO, 2011:19). This is crucial as, 
having access to all of the IMFs research output, the Board act as active consumers, 
particularly of the analytical chapters of the WEO and GFSR which are routinely presented 
to and discussed by its members. In a similar fashion, the Managing Director and Deputy 
Managing Directors assume an important role in planning and coordinating research. 
Finally, research conducted by the IEO (2011b) has shown that in the functional 
departments with which this research is concerned, top-down direction is common. The 
FAD for example was shown to be increasing its control from the centre over time, 
maintaining a list of important research topics, while issues were discussed with senior 
staff and priorities were set in collaboration with senior management. In a similar fashion, 
research undertaken by the MCMD was consistent with a prioritised agenda at the time 
senior members of staff were interviewed. Together, this suggests a particularly important 
role for the most senior officials in shaping the general direction of its research output. 
Second, given the foregoing discussion, an assumption underpinning this research is that 
there is very little, if any, scope for IMF staff to exercise a considerable degree of 
intellectual innovation and thereby contribute to the broader economic debate in a 
manner that is inconsistent with senior officials. Rather, it has been suggested that IMF 
staff exhibit a strong tendency to tailor research plans and conclusions to fit with the 
existing economic philosophy, problem definitions and policy positions (see for example 
BWP, 2011a:1).  
Research conducted by the IEO (2011:10) supported this assumption by showing how 
almost two thirds of IMF staff in response to an IEO questionnaire, stated that research and 
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conclusions had to be aligned in a manner consistent with official IMF views. The corollary 
of this however is that the potential for alternative, more heterodox approaches are 
essentially evacuated at the earliest stage of policy discussions. In doing so, this helps us to 
understand the considerable degree of consistency among IMF research output. 
The research findings provided by the IEO were further compounded with personal e-mail 
correspondence undertaken during the course of this research with officials from the Fiscal 
Affairs and Monetary and Capital Markets Departments. When questioned of the extent to 
which individuals considered whether or not economic ideas in the IMF were characterised 
by change or continuity, respondents at no point deviated from the official line provided by 
the IMF. Rather, they consistently stated that the most appropriate means by which to 
understand its position was to be found in official publications including Working Papers 
and Policy Papers produced by senior IMF officials.  
Taken together therefore, this suggests that there was little or no scope for intellectual 
innovation, and thereby space, in which to push for more fundamental challenges, and 
more significantly, changes, to extant economic orthodoxy as a result of the downturn. 
Rather, research produced by IMF staff continued to exhibit a considerable degree of 
consistency in the manner in which economic problems were understood and the kinds of 
policies considered desirable, which are themselves a reflection of the broader underlying 
economic philosophy. As a result, we are suitably placed to state with some degree of 
conviction that such research can indeed be taken as a viable proxy for IMF thinking. 
 
Outline of the research 
With the preceding discussion in mind, this research proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 
sketches out the efficacy of a constructivist IR/IPE approach as the most efficacious means 
by which to explore the research questions posed above. Doing so allows for the 
development of an approach which both accords a causal role to ideas; and provides a 
dynamic view of change (or continuity) in the context of crisis.   
In the first of the context chapters Chapter 2 situates the IMF in historical context by 
offering a brief historiography of its creation and initial remit, with emphasis on the 
Keynesian economic ideas underpinning its creation and the system of fixed but adjustable 
exchange rates. Thereafter it is demonstrated how the end of the Bretton Woods System in 
1973 along with rising inflation and declining growth rates precipitated a  shift in the raison 
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d’etre of the IMF and the economic ideas underpinning policy actions which were 
increasingly informed by the  neoliberal economic philosophy and problem definitions.   
This notwithstanding, it is demonstrated how beginning with the developing country debt 
crisis of the early 1980s, the IMF was drawn back into crisis management and lending. In 
doing so, policy advice was increasingly underpinned by neoliberal economic ideas which 
were deployed in order to stabilize affected economies through monetary/fiscal discipline, 
and provide longer-term structural adjustment policies aimed at correcting underlying 
economic problems. Key in this process was the assumption that countries approaching the 
IMF had pursued un-sustainable policies and would require a greater degree of 
intervention than was the case in balance-of-payments crises that had characterised the 
post-war period.  
The second of the context chapters, Chapter 3 serves two purposes. Firstly, a background 
to the financial and economic downturn is provided. In doing so, it is suggested that, 
although initially conceptualised as the result of policy failures in an otherwise effectively 
functioning economic framework, the downturn can be best interpreted as the result of 
two policy failures inherent to neoliberalism, economic policy, and financial sector 
liberalization.   
Secondly, the chapter outlines the manner in which events were interpreted and 
responded to by the IMF and in doing so, suggests that responses be best understood as 
having progressed through a series of related yet distinct phases. The first of these was 
limited to failings in the banking and financial sectors; the second phase occurred as events 
spilled over into the real economy, negatively affecting economic growth and employment; 
and the third phase occurred as fiscal interventions during the second phase substantially 
increased sovereign debt, thereby raising solvency concerns. Understanding the downturn 
like this is crucial to this research as each phase: required a diverse set of policy 
interventions; had important implications for the manner in which economic problems 
were interpreted and responded to; and had differing implications for the economic 
philosophy in the IMF.  
In the first of the case studies, Chapter 4 turns the attention of the research to fiscal and 
monetary policy. In doing so, it is demonstrates how, during its first phase the banking and 
financial sectors were characterised by declining bank liquidity amid rising uncertainty 
which ultimately precipitated a slow-down in economic activity. In response the IMF, in a 
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manner consistent with neoliberal orthodoxy, advocated the deployment of conventional 
monetary interventions (reducing the policy rate), and latterly, unconventional monetary 
policies (UMPs) (forward guidance of the policy rate) as the first line of defence.  
Given their inability to stem the turmoil, and prevent the transmission of the banking and 
financial deficiencies to the real economy however (the second phase), the chapter charts 
how the IMF broke with orthodoxy and ‘for the first time in its history, called for a global 
fiscal expansion across all countries’ (Cottarelli, 2013:1), a move interpreted at the time as 
a potentially epoch-shaping shift in economic philosophy in the IMF (Clift, 2013).  
Chapter 5 however suggests that the failure of monetary policy interventions (conventional 
or otherwise) and subsequent call for fiscal stimulus notwithstanding, as attention turned 
towards sovereign debt sustainability (the third phase) it became increasingly evident that 
the IMF continued to retain a normative commitment to the prevailing economic 
philosophy and the manner in which economic problems are interpreted and responded to.  
As a result, despite the failure of existing economic ideas there was no wider crisis resulting 
in changed structures underpinned by new economic ideas. Indeed, the IMF, if anything, is 
shown to have attempted to frame the third phase (sovereign debt concerns) in such a 
manner that the further entrenching, not retreat from, policies consistent with neoliberal 
economic ideas were necessary to reduce excessive sovereign debt burdens.   
In the second of the case studies, Chapter 6 highlights how, as the banking and financial 
sector deficiencies began to unravel during the first phase of the downturn, it was apparent 
that allowing banks to increase leverage and lower capital buffers while increasing their 
exposure to risk was severely misguided and that it would be necessary to move towards a 
financial system characterised by less leverage and greater capital ratios. Initially however, 
the IMF framed the unfolding turmoil as being the result of supervisory, not regulatory, 
failures which were resolvable within existing frames of reference, a commitment couched 
in the need to better supervise the implementation the Basel 2 capital accords.  
This notwithstanding, as the downturn spilled over to the real economy (the second phase), 
it was apparent that simply supervising the implementation of the existing Basel accords 
would be insufficient, and that more substantive regulation would be required in order to 
prevent a recurrence. As a result, the IMF advocated the creation of a new set of rules 
(Basel 3) which would double capital requirements and introduce additional conservation 
and counter-cyclical buffers to counter the system-wide vulnerabilities of banks. This 
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suggested a much greater role for the state in the regulation of the banking sector and with 
it, the potential for a shift in the prevailing economic philosophy in the IMF.  
This ostensible shift notwithstanding, Chapter 7 suggests that as focus turned towards 
sovereign debt sustainability concerns (the third phase) two developments suggested that 
the regulatory landscape was, in fact, equally, if not more liable to be characterised by 
continuity as it was change. Firstly, as the global economy improved, risks to financial 
stability subsided, bank capital needs declined or were declining substantially, and 
attention turned towards the rapid accumulation of public debt, thereby contributing to a 
re-focusing of the reform agenda (GFSR, 2010:2). Secondly, as 2011 progressed, a subtle 
but noticeable shift in IMF research output emerged which, concerned with addressing the 
cost implications of additional regulations, called for caution in the capital adequacy 
debate.  
Although there therefore appeared to be a clear direction within the IMF for reform during 
the second phase, implementation was becoming increasingly spoken of as something for 
the future. Against this backdrop, Kodres and Narain (2010:4) of the MCMD suggested two 
potential regulatory scenarios: (1) having skirted economic collapse, the official community 
allows complacency to set in, allowing reforms to languish; and (2) the severe effects of the 
downturn lead public bodies to respond vigorously, contributing to over-regulation to such 
an extent that certain markets simply disappear. The chapter demonstrates how it is the 
former of these scenarios that played out.  
Finally, by way of conclusion it is noted that the downturn has induced some policy change 
in the IMF. On the one hand, the recognition that counter-cyclical fiscal policy is more 
efficacious than was thought prior seemingly implies the potential for a more substantial 
role for government intervention during times of severe economic dislocation. Similarly, of 
banking and financial regulation, the shift to Basel 3 seemingly represented an important 
step in recognising the inadequacy of the previous framework and implied the potential 
scope for greater government intervention into the functioning of financial institutions.  
Notwithstanding this ostensible shift, an assumption is made that on a more fundamental 
level the IMF continues to retain a normative commitment to the prevailing economic 
philosophy and the manner in which economic problems are interpreted and responded to.  
On the one hand, although the IMF acknowledged the efficacy of fiscal policy interventions, 
this was only recommended in exceptional circumstances such as those analogous to the 
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current downturn. As a result, there was no suggestion that counter-cyclical fiscal policy 
might become a more significant part of the future policy mix. Rather, the IMF has 
consistently made clear that monetary policy retains primacy for the functioning of the 
economy and management of less severe downturns.  
Likewise, on the other hand, the new Basel accords remain very much entrenched within 
prior intellectual frames of reference, albeit with some minor modifications. Indeed, of the 
financial sector, the IMF very much remains an institution committed to financial sector 
liberalization and deregulation and thereby only a minimal scope for state intervention. 
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Chapter 1                                                                                                                                 
Theoretical approach 
 
‘Everything conspires to make us forget the socially constructed’                                                                                                                                                                                   
(Pierre Bourdieu) 
 
Introduction 
This research is an enquiry into the nature of continuity in economic ideas, along with an 
exploration into the manner in which this has been constructed by the IMF. In this respect, 
a constructivist IR/IPE approach, with its emphasis on the dynamic roles played by ideas, 
identities, interests, and assumptions made regarding the inter-subjective bases of 
everyday reality as key in shaping political economic process and outcomes is well suited to 
this end.  
These basic insights and their relevance to this research is fleshed out hereon in by drawing 
on Schmidt’s (2008, 2010) distinction between an institution’s coordinative discourse (the 
role played by apex policy forums in developing the economic philosophies and problem 
definitions steering global economic governance); and communicative discourse (the means 
by which the IMF provides justification for their associated policy priorities which are 
subsequently disseminated through research output and speeches by senior officials).   
 Thereafter, outlining a constructivist approach to crisis and change serves as a pre-cursor 
to developing an argument that suggests that a constructivist conceptual vocabulary 
centred upon the politics of framing, narratives, the interpretation of events, and the role 
of persuasion leaves us ideally placed to understand continuity in economic ideas in the 
IMF.  
In particular however, two methods deployed by the IMF to construct continuity are 
explored, both of which are inherently constructivist. Firstly, drawing on the concept of 
historical analogy associated with IR literature, it is demonstrated how actor’s reason 
through historical analogy to reduce uncertainty associated with seemingly novel problems 
to make the political-economic environment more knowable, and to derive policy lessons. 
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Secondly, drawing on the sociology literature associated with framing, it is demonstrated 
how actors seek to assign meaning to unfolding events. Notably, framing is shown as 
having two key functions, firstly, as a diagnostic tool in assigning meaning to events, and 
secondly, as a prognostic tool in advocating particular policies to deal with the problem so 
defined. 
 
Constructivist approach to global governance analysis 
Not in and of its self a theory in the sense of subjecting hypotheses to empirical testing, 
constructivism can be best understood as an approach to IPE characterised by certain 
ontological assumptions, chief among which is a conception of social science that is, social 
(Kratochwil, 2001:15). While accepting the presence of a material world, constructivism 
draws our attention to the fact that many purported material facts of the international 
political economy are actually ‘shaped by human action and interaction which depends on 
normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world’ (Adler, 1997:322).  
By drawing our attention to the fact that the building blocks of the international political-
economy ‘are ideational as well as material’ (Ruggie, 1998:33, emphasis added), a 
constructivist approach eschews both the notion of contextually predetermined ideas and 
interests at one end of the theoretical spectrum, along with the contrasting assumption 
that ‘only ideas matter and can be studied’ (Adler, 1997:321). Rather, actors are 
understood as not being solely motivated by a set of material and/or objective interests, 
but instead act on a range of reasons such that one cannot distinguish objective interests 
from ideas. What is important for constructivists is developing a greater understanding of 
the manner in which interests come to be perceived as such and subsequently acted upon 
(Schmidt, 2008:317). 
The commitment to a social ontology has implications the form of epistemology deployed 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994:108). That is, with states understood as being socially constituted, an 
approach premised on the accumulation of objectively identified knowledge is viewed as 
untenable as the social scientist is in fact confronted with a second order reality as actors 
inhabit a social world affected by social constructions of reality (Marsh & Furlong, 2002:19).  
For this reason, constructivists typically deploy an interpretive epistemological approach to 
study. At base, this draws our attention to the importance of interpretation that is, 
establishing an understanding of that world. Eschewing the possibility of establishing causal 
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relationships between phenomena, emphasis is instead placed upon providing a deeper 
understanding of what system we have, how it came about, and what opportunities exist 
within it for change or continuity (Schmidt, 2011:12; Marsh & Furlong, 2002:20).  
Given the foregoing discussion, a constructivist approach rejects the view of institutions as 
self-reinforcing historical paths (historical institutionalism), all-defining cultural frames 
(sociological institutionalism), and static rule-following structures of incentives (rational 
choice approaches). Rather, arising in repudiation of what Blyth (2003:695) has termed 
their ‘static bias’, constructivist insights provide us with is a view of institutions as 
constraining structures and enabling constructs of meaning. That is, drawing on their 
‘background ideational abilities’ (Schmidt, 2008:314), institutions are shown to be ‘shaped 
by human action in such a way as to alter the parameters of subsequent action’ (Hay, 
2002:186), disposing its direction towards the achievement of outcomes operating to the 
advantage of certain actors at the expense of others. This is achieved through a dual 
process of conduct-shaping (direct power), and context-shaping (indirect power) (Nye Jr, 
1990:180).   
On the other hand however, the opportunity for contesting the context in which actors find 
themselves through processes of deliberation and contestation in order to communicate 
critically about institutions to bring about change (or more adequately affect continuity) is 
present in actors’ ‘foreground discursive abilities’ (Schmidt, 2008:314; 2010). Here, actors, 
through a political project of ‘strategic social construction’ (Chwieroth & Sinclair, 2010:6) 
are able to, particularly during times of economic and/or political failure, re-shape the 
broader context of what is considered socially, politically, and economically possible.   
The means by which these insights inform this research are explored hereon. In doing so, 
Schmidt’s (2008) distinction between the coordinative discourse (how economic ideas are 
coordinated in a broader institutional context) and communicative discourse (the means by 
which they are legitimated and disseminated) is drawn upon to demonstrate the 
importance of power and position while taking into account the power of ideas. Thereafter, 
a discussion is undertaken regarding the role of crises in affecting change and continuity. 
 
Coordinative discourse: Overcoming the materialist/ideational divide 
The coordinative discourse (Schmidt, 2008, 2010) draws the attention of this research to 
the importance of the groups at the centre of policy construction who advocate a particular 
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set of economic ideas – understood for the purposes of this research as assumptions 
regarding the appropriate form and function of the global economy. This is ‘the substantive 
dimension of ideas and discourse’ (Schmidt, 2010:3) provided by state leaders or apex 
policy forums who engage in the creation and maintenance of global economic governance 
institutions. 
The concept of the coordinative discourse is especially useful in drawing our attention to 
the fact that the IMF does not function as a stand-alone actor, but rather operates as part 
of a broader architecture of global economic governance incorporating, among others, the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the World Bank, and Financial Stability Board 
(FSB).     
The G7/20 in particular however is shown throughout this research to be crucial in 
providing the economic ideas that act as a crucial roadmap with which to steer the course 
of global economic governance. Indeed, Blyth (2002:32) has suggested that the economic 
ideas held by such participants of how the world is put together are essential, as in their 
absence it would be impossible to act in the international political economy in any 
meaningful sense.  
Guided by these economic ideas, the G7/20 exercises its power in a number of key ways. 
Firstly, it serves a ‘directional function’ by ‘setting agendas for the wider governance 
machinery, and pushing general governance trajectories’, (Baker, 2008:105-107) through 
statements/communiqués which emphasise broad principles shared by members. 
Secondly, it has the power of instigation in setting broad agendas for more specialist bodies 
such as the IMF and FSB. Finally, it exercises a power to endorse the findings of the 
technical reports produced by these bodies for which it relies on for specialist research 
(Baker, 2008:107-108)  
Although economic ideas are often talked about as if they were one concept, this research 
follows the likes of Schmidt (2008) and Mehta (2011) in distinguishing between three levels 
of generality which allow global economic governance institutions to interpret and act in 
the international political economy: economic philosophies, problem definitions, and policy 
priorities. Economic philosophies, those most relevant to actors constituting the 
coordinative discourse, include ideas about how to understand the purpose of public policy 
in light of underlying, inter-subjectively held assumptions regarding the relative efficacy of 
states and markets in the functioning of the international political economy.  
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These ideas are crucial because they exercise a broad influence by determining the context 
within which actors find themselves. In doing so, they constitute the underlying, sometimes 
taken-for-granted assumptions that reside in the background of policy debates, providing 
the inter-subjective knowledge which creates the ‘bubble’ in which policy-makers act, and 
are rarely contested except during times of political and/or economic dislocation.  
In this respect, economic philosophies play a critical role in constraining the normative 
range of solutions that can be viewed as politically acceptable or legitimate, concerned as 
they are, with broad-based attitudes and normative assumptions about what is desirable or 
otherwise within the broader confines of the coordinative discourse. 
Following Campbell (1998:384) however, it is suggested that although some ideas are held 
as so taken-for-granted that they are invisible, the concept of an economic philosophy so 
understood for the purposes of this research is not as strong. Rather, it is interpreted here 
as having the potential to be visible to actors, yet taken-for-granted in the somewhat 
milder sense that they remain largely accepted and unquestioned background 
assumptions. 
This concept is therefore crucial as, drawing on the constructivist premise that there exist 
multiple pathways by which to organise the international political economy, the notion of 
the economic philosophy provides us with an inter-subjectively held interpretive 
framework which, for the purposes of this research, implies a more or less shared condition 
among members of the nature of the efficacy of markets. Moreover, drawing on the 
economic philosophies held in the coordinative discourse, we are provided with an 
explanatory account of why political economic problems become identified as such.  
That is, the notion of a narrowly-defined interpretive framework implies a drastic reduction 
of complexity to a small number of significantly articulated problems to be addressed. The 
corollary is that when they become so defined, ‘a whole range of problems which could be 
logically associated with policy, will not be taken into account’ (Jobert, 1989: 377) given 
their evacuation at an early stage by political-economic elites in the coordinative discourse.  
Inasmuch as this is true, we can see how the economic philosophies held are critical in 
‘defining the problems to be solved... the issues to be considered; the goals to be achieved’ 
(Schmidt, 2008:306). In performing this function, problem definitions constitute broad 
constraints ‘on the range of solutions that actors perceive and deem useful for solving 
problems’ (Campbell, 1998:389) because they have a major influence on the direction of 
36 
 
subsequent action (Jobert, 1989:382). Problem definition effects are therefore profound 
precisely because they identify the nature of an issue and frame the context in which new 
events are interpreted; define the range of collective discourse on which problem 
definitions are bound; and guide decision-makers in the appropriate means to resolve 
them.  
This approach therefore overcomes a weakness in existing literature which is biased 
towards ideas that ultimately contribute to policy, yet which in doing so, neglect the point 
that an absence of policies can also mean an inattention to other facets of (background) 
power because analysis is limited to what actually makes it onto the agenda. Yet by 
drawing attention to the importance of the underlying economic philosophy in the 
coordinative discourse and demonstrating how it impacts upon problem definitions, we are 
able to show why it is that some policies make it to the table while others are excluded 
(Mehta, 2011:31). 
Following Schmidt (2010) and Blyth (2002) policies, problem definitions and economic 
philosophies are shown to exist, and be typically justified, at two levels of generality: 
cognitive (ideas justified in terms of interest based logics and necessity) and normative 
(ideas legitimated by their appeal to values and appropriateness). These can be given equal 
weighting, or alternatively, one or the other may be emphasised in the act of persuasion.  
This research for example shows how the G7/20 is guided by, and concerned primarily with 
the purveyance of normative ideas, most notably a belief in the efficacy of free markets as 
opposed to an active state in managing the economy (Schmidt, 2011:6). That there is 
nothing inherent in their assumed efficacy to suggest that they are de facto correct 
however draws our attention to the fact that the normative ideas held by actors in the 
coordinative discourse are inherently political, particular to time and space, and socially 
contingent.  
These ideas nevertheless play a critical function in attaching values to action in the political 
economy, legitimating economic philosophies through appeal to their appropriateness. In 
doing so, normative ideas speak to how policies mesh with underlying ideals, and how 
problem definitions resonate with the deeper economic philosophy, whether they be 
newly emerging or long-standing. Acknowledging this allows us to overcome a problem 
with much IPE literature which ‘tends to be more concerned with cognitive ideas that 
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provide guidelines for political action...  rather than on normative ideas that attach values 
to political action’ (Schmidt, 2011:5; see also Schmidt, 2008:307).  
Drawing on their common adherence to a particular economic philosophy and problem 
definitions, this research shows how the G7, along with other global economic governance 
institutions, propagate the coordination of a particular discourse – a set of assumptions 
regards the proper functioning of the global economy – to construct the broader context 
within which actors find themselves (Epstein, 2010:175; Broome & Seabrooke, 2012).  
In doing so, the discourses held provide them ‘with an interpretive framework, which 
describes and accounts for the workings of the economy by defining its constituent 
elements and “proper” (and therefore “improper”) interrelations’ (Blyth, 2002:11). As a 
result discourse, imbued with a cohesive set of economic ideas about how best to organise 
global governance, frame and de-limit the possibilities for action (Epstein, 2008:2). Indeed, 
it is within the confines of these ‘normative parameters’ (Baker, 2008:106) that politicians 
and policymakers are bound together, allowing them to interact and function socially. 
The coordinative discourse is therefore crucial to this research in drawing attention to the 
constitutive nature of global economic governance by ‘defining the set of practices that 
make up any particular consciously organized social activity – that is to say, they specify 
what counts as that activity’ (Ruggie, 1998:22). Eschewing emphasis on antecedent actors 
and their behaviour, focus is placed on the way in which the economy is ‘embedded in 
broader social, political, and legal institutional frameworks that make it possible to conduct 
economic relations – that are constitutive of economic relations’ (Ruggie, 1998:23). As a 
result, the G7/20, IMF and others exist and exhibit important causal effects by influencing 
the direction of the international political economy as a socially constructed devices.  
Inasmuch as this is true, the institutions of global economic governance are able to draw on 
their power and position, or ‘background ideational abilities’ (Schmidt, 2008, 2010) to 
shape the broader context of what is considered socially, politically, and economically 
possible. Understanding their role in such a manner helps us to overcome ‘a tendency 
within the scholarship interested in the “social construction of” to evacuate power’ 
(Epstein, 2008:8-9).  
Rather, the preceding discussion demonstrates how material practices and the ideational 
and discursive realms are in fact ‘tightly bound up and mutually constitutive’ an assumption 
which ‘moves the debate beyond a dichotomy carried over... from the old divide between 
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ideationalist and materialist lines of explanation’ (Epstein, 2008:5). That is, discourses have 
very real effects such that it makes no sense to consider them as “immaterial”.   
Although power is therefore key in this research, it is nevertheless understood for our 
purposes as residing in the capacity of actors in the coordinative discourse to produce 
predictability and order among actors within a socially structured community. Indeed, 
exercised effectively by actors, change is often very hard to enact (Hopf, 1998:180).    
 
The communicative discourse: Shaping actor’s interests 
Just as the coordinative discourse is crucial in drawing our attention to the manner in which 
the economic ideas steering the course of global economic governance are produced, so 
too does Schmidt (2008, 2010, 2011, 2012) draw our attention to the importance of the 
manner in which they are communicated and disseminated through the communicative 
discourse. 
Here, when speaking of the IMF in particular, we can see how it engages in such an 
endeavour through the production of Annual Reports, bi-annual World Economic Outlook 
and more specialist publications, the Global Financial Stability Report and Fiscal Monitor. 
These are themselves informed by a range of technical Working Papers, Staff Position 
Notes and Policy Papers and publications by IMF staff in high ranking economic journals.  
These are subsequently distributed to, and are most read and cited by, member country 
authorities in policy discussions (particularly on macroeconomic issues), central banks, 
regulatory ministries, academia, businesses, think-tanks, the media, along with other 
international organizations (IEO, 2011:4; IEO, 2011a; 2011b:10-12). 
The economic ideas developed here are further communicated and legitimated through 
conferences and seminars, the participants of which typically include representatives of 
other global economic governance institutions, senior government officials, central 
bankers, private market actors and senior academics. That the IMF is so heavily engaged in 
such a process is testament to the recognition that, absent communication, the impact of 
the coordinative discourse would be limited, and exhibit only a trivial effect on 
policymakers. The rationale for communicating a particular set of economic ideas to a 
larger audience is therefore simple, to contribute to the convergence of the prevailing 
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economic philosophy, problem definitions, thereby forming the basis of new policy 
practices (Schmidt, 2008:310).  
These premises are especially pertinent to this research. That is, given the severity of the 
financial and economic downturn, it would be insufficient from a constructivist perspective 
to simply state that economic ideas were characterised by continuity because doing so 
reflected the normative orientation of those actors constituting the coordinative discourse. 
Although this is of course a crucial part of the story, it is perhaps even more important that 
the discourse centring on the need for continuity be justified cognitively so as to persuade 
states that doing so was consistent with their interests, hence the importance of the IMF.   
Therefore, while accepting the importance of the role of the communicative discourse, this 
research adds to the work of Schmidt (2008) in two respects. Firstly, it is suggested that the 
communicative discourse functions not simply as a communicative tool, but as a means by 
which to shape how actors perceive their interests. Secondly, we explore the means by 
which this is achieved, that is, through the production and dissemination of IMF research.  
On the one hand, this research views interests as being less about structural determination 
and more about ‘the construction of “wants” as mediated by beliefs and desires – that is, 
ideas’ (Blyth, 2002:29), or more specifically for our purposes here, economic ideas (Blyth, 
2003:702). Such interests are nevertheless “real” because actors act upon such under-
standings and alter them as a result of those thoughts, and in this respect agents can be 
considered ‘sentient’ (Schmidt, 2010:7). Viewed in such a manner, following Abdelal et al 
(2005:29) interests are understood here as constituting the ‘output side of construction’.   
Although this is a general premise accepted by constructivists, they nevertheless differ over  
the means by which institutions instantiate ideas and interests, that is, which of the various 
‘input mechanisms’ of social construction to deploy (Abdelal et al, 2005:29). Of these, three 
typically prevail: socialization, manipulation and persuasion, with each being influenced by 
the manner in which the world is viewed as hanging together and changing or continuing. 
On the one hand, socialization draws on the notion that ideas spread evolutionarily 
through interactions with groups through decentralised and consensual processes of 
deliberation (Abdelal et al, 2005:33-35; Adler & Haas, 1992). On the other hand, 
manipulation suggests that ideas are imposed on others but that recipients “rationalise” 
them to the point that they are rarely questioned, ultimately becoming part of a socially-
constructed landscape.   
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The approach taken to this research however draws on Schmidt (2010:17) who suggests 
that, ‘change in interests can come from persuasion’, that is, through the communicative 
discourse provided by the IMF. It suggests that economic ideas are brought into the 
political economy and states persuaded of their efficacy to such an extent that they alter 
the manner in which they perceive their interests, and ultimately, their behaviour (Schmidt, 
2008). This suggests that actors relate to new ideas in a relatively conscious and/or 
internalised way.  
To this however an important caveat is added. That is, in the act of persuading others of 
the benefits of a particular course of action this process has involved, on the part of the 
IMF, the evacuation of alternatives. Therefore, although the act of persuading is important, 
there is a need to acknowledge that the approach taken by the IMF is not entirely benign. 
Indeed, consistent with Epstein (2008:9) it is suggested that being persuaded can include 
'having no choice but to talk (and act) in a certain way’, because other ways have been 
actively evacuated, ‘a possibility which is never really acknowledged in the emphasis on 
persuasion’.  
On the other hand, if we accept that persuasion takes place, this leaves us with the 
question of how are actors persuaded that undertaking a particular course of action is in 
their interests? The answer is shown here as laying in large part on the role played by 
research.  
It is here that the IMF plays a crucial role in the production of cognitive ideas which speak 
to the logic and necessity of economic philosophies ‘as actors have to be persuaded to 
accept, or at least pay heed to, the arguments and messages’ (Baker, 2008:108) developed 
by actors in the coordinative discourse. This is more likely if they are based on data and 
evidence as opposed to political exhortation. Indeed, senior staff have sought to distance 
themselves from this charge by touting the IMF as ‘a neutral, expertise-based institution’ 
(Best, 2003:363) which derives legitimacy from the production of apolitical technical 
knowledge.  
In doing so, the IMF seeks to articulate cause-and-effect relationships, often citing 
numerical indicators as an important aspect of adding credibility to knowledge claims. 
Doing so, it is suggested, adds credence to attempts to limit the choices faced by actors by 
defining the range of problems to be addressed, a process which by its very nature ‘has 
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significant implications for the types of policy solutions that will seem desirable’ (Mehta, 
2011:27).  
Indeed, once a problem definition and objectives are given, the context in which states 
identify their interests and pursue their policy preferences is defined. In this regard, we can 
see how the IMF is crucial in providing the cognitive justification required to articulate a 
particular set of policy priorities over the range of all of the available alternatives.  
This approach overcomes a propensity ‘to treat ideas and interests as radically different 
and unrelated concepts’ (Blyth, 2002:17) by demonstrating how economic ideas and 
associated research plays a crucial part in leading states to (re)define how they perceive 
their interests. In doing so, an assertion is made, consistent with Adler and Bernstein 
(2005:301), that the most far-reaching effect of institutions – read here, the IMF - might 
not simply be to define problems, but more deeply, lead to ‘the reproduction or 
transformation of identities and interests’ on the basis of which the utility of particular 
policies are identified and pursued.   
Drawing attention to the manner in which the IMF undertakes this activity allows us to go 
over and above the concept of ‘power over’ more closely associated with the coordinative 
discourse. Rather, the addition of ‘power of’, exercised in the communicative discourse, 
allows for influencing states in less direct ways. Taken together therefore, power is shown 
to be a disposition (in the sense of ordering) that depends on knowledge, and ‘productive 
in the sense of defining the order of global things’ (Adler & Bernstein, 2005:294).  
This shows how control over knowledge is critical as the IMF calling a certain way to 
organize the political economy rational and optimal is a way of claiming power (Babb, 2012; 
Haas, 1992). That is, once a claim to rationality is accepted and experts deemed to speak 
the truth, the scope for alternative economic philosophies, problem definitions and 
thereby the kinds of policies considered desirable, becomes inherently limited (Kratochwil, 
2001:19).  
Doing so however both prevents actors from acquiring the critical analysis enabling them to 
separate ideas consistent or otherwise with their interests, and implies the communicative 
discourse is not as benign as that postulated by Schmidt (2008) who suggests that ideas are 
subject to complex processes of deliberation and/or contestation in an institutional 
context.  
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The approach taken here is therefore crucial in drawing our attention to the fact that many 
of the purported common sense knowledge claims derived from IMF research 
(subsequently iterated in the coordinative discourse) are in fact ‘social/institutional facts’ 
(Searle, 1995:6) collectively constructed within given institutional contexts (Schmidt, 2011; 
Palan, 2000). This demonstrates how ‘knowledge systems cannot be transcendental and 
universally valid, but must be systems of power grounded in particular sets of social 
relations’ (Amin & Palan, 2001:565), which for our purposes here, is provided by actors in 
the coordinative discourse. 
A constructivist approach is therefore useful for the purposes of this research precisely 
because it ‘concerns itself with the nature, origins, and functioning of social facts’ (Ruggie, 
1998:13) and in doing so, draws our attention to the fact that knowledge claims derived 
from dry, ostensibly apolitical IMF research are in fact grounded in broader normative 
parameters, existing in a particular time, and embodying particular values and interests.  
Crucially therefore, by drawing attention to the contingent nature of economic ideas and 
the knowledge claims with which they are associated, constructivists point to the potential 
for agents to alter (or be in such a position as to maintain) the existing social, political and 
economic order through social action (Bevir & Trentman, 2004:5-19; Schmidt, 2010, 2011).  
Taken together therefore a constructivist approach is crucial to this research precisely 
because it ‘attempts to specify the macro-structural dimension of international politics in a 
manner that shows it to be space-time contingent: that is to say to make transparent the 
fact that “structure” is the aggregation of specific social practices that are situated in time 
and space; to specify what the characteristic forms of those practices are; and to discern 
how they may become susceptible to change’ (Ruggie, 1998:26). This shows the 
importance of exploring how the economic ideas steering global economic governance 
become embedded; as well as the social/contingent nature of the knowledge claims they 
make.  
 
Institutional and ideational change 
The preceding discussion shows how the economic ideas steering the course of global 
governance, and their associated knowledge claims, are socially contingent and temporally 
bound. As a result, constructivist approaches have much to offer on the potential for actors 
to re-shape the context in which they find themselves. This overcomes the subordination of 
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agency to structure by noting how institutions are constraining structures, and constructs 
created and subsequently changed (or maintained) by states. The question remains 
however, under what circumstances might we expect ideas and institutions to change?  
Here, crises are typically held up as moments of great transformation. For rational choice 
approaches crises are viewed as exogenous shocks occurring as a result of, for example, a 
downturn in the business cycle, which agents automatically respond to in predictable ways. 
Constructivists however suggest that crises are not given, and that agents do not react 
predictably to them and have therefore sought to endogenise the processes of change 
(Widmaier, 2005:557). In particular, attention has focused on how moments of political 
economic failure are inter-subjectively interpreted by actors as a crisis requiring decisive 
intervention to rid the system of its accumulated pathologies to effect change (Hay, 1999).  
Understanding the concept of crisis in such a manner is crucial to this research. That is, by 
defining crisis as a moment of thorough-going change, a clear distinction is made between 
political-economic failure (the accumulation of contradictions which provide the conditions 
for crisis, yet which have the potential to result in transformed or un-transformed 
structures), and the moment of crisis in which agents inter-subjectively interpret such 
failure as requiring decisive intervention (change) (Thompson, 2009:137).  
This literature related to failure, crisis and change is premised on a number of core themes. 
Firstly, that particularly during times of political economic failure, rather than the systemic 
context being characterised by risk, it is instead characterised by one of uncertainty.  
Here, Knight (1958:233) defines uncertainty as a situation in which actors sample the past 
yet become even more wrong about the future since underlying dynamics invalidate our 
ability to draw conclusions from past behaviour; in particular, it is not possible to assign a 
specific probability to future outcomes because the situation is in a high degree unique.  
Secondly, what actors’ interests are (structural location will not tell us) has little meaning 
under uncertainty (Abdelal et al, 2005:15). Rather, interests must be defined in terms of 
the ideas actors have about the causes of the uncertainty they are facing ‘precisely because 
they reduce uncertainty and give content to interests’ (Blyth, 2001:3) by defining a moment 
of failure as a crisis and projecting the institutions that will ultimately resolve it.  
Thirdly, the preceding two themes stress the importance of assigning meaning to events as 
it is only possible to react to crises once they have been interpreted through frameworks of 
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understanding. Crises do not therefore dictate an obvious solution. Rather, moving from 
one set of ideas and institutions to another is an endogenous process (Blyth, 2002:8).  
Crises are therefore not politically meaningful without processes of construction. As a 
result, building a narrative is a requisite for policy action as only by interpreting political-
economic failure (‘what went wrong?’), and proposing solutions (‘what to do about it?’) can 
policy-makers create the space for policy change. For this reason, ‘much of the political 
argument is fought at the level of problem definition’ (Mehta, 2011:27; see also Baker, 
2015:344).  
Key in this process in persuading actors of the benefits of a particular course of action is 
research which, in addition to helping instantiate a set of economic ideas, can similarly be 
used to bring about competition in ideas, and ultimately change, by exposing the inefficacy 
of existing ideas which were responsible for bringing about political-economic failure. 
Indeed, drawing on new research apex policy forums postulate that new economic 
knowledge represents an advance over the old in terms of the prospects it offers for 
economic growth and development. Research therefore plays a crucial part in hastening 
the day when policy- makers might accept the desirability of alternative economic ideas by 
demonstrating the falsity of existing premises and efficacy of alternatives (Kreuger, 
1997:1).  
 
Why moments of political and economic failure do not necessarily lead to change 
The preceding discussion demonstrates how constructivists have sought to endogenise 
crisis and change as a means by which to demonstrate how the social context shapes 
outcomes, that is, a shift from structural continuities and their effects on agents to a focus 
on what agents do and how they frame their actions, with particular attention paid to the 
moment in which one socially constructed order is replaced by another (Widmaier et al, 
2007:752).  
Nevertheless, it was suggested in the introduction to this research that economic ideas in 
the IMF are characterised by a considerable degree of continuity as opposed to change 
despite the evident failure of neoliberal economic ideas. It might not, therefore, be 
unreasonable to assume that ‘rational choice’s core concepts – equilibrium, transaction 
costs and path dependencies – focused on statics (why things did not change all that 
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much)’ (Blyth, 2003:695) are well placed to provide an explanatory account of why this is 
so.  
In eschewing this approach however, an assumption is made that constructivism is in fact 
better placed to help us to understand the means by which the IMF has constructed the 
current downturn in such a manner that neoliberal economic ideas continue to be 
desirable from a normative perspective and necessary from a cognitive perspective. In 
doing so a simple assertion is made that if change occurs because actors successfully 
construct and frame moments of political economic failure as a crisis, then ‘it follows 
naturally that, sometimes, the reasons things don’t change is for the same reason’ (Hope, 
2011:10).  
This assertion is entirely compatible with a constructivist approach whose central tenet is 
‘the social world, unlike the material world, is not “given” but rather socially constructed’ 
(Epstein, 2008:6). Indeed, following Hacking (1999:6) we can see how the social order that 
presents its self at any one moment in time is the result of social construction, whether this 
ultimately presents its self as change or continuity, that is ‘X need not have existed, or need 
not be as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not 
inevitable’. This suggests that a constructivist approach leaves us well placed to explore the 
means by which continuity in economic ideas in the face of failure has been achieved.  
Against this backdrop it is suggested that the moment of failure may lead to the 
destabilization of a given set of institutions and ideas, yet in doing so there exists the 
potential for a range of competing narratives of what went wrong (along with the requisite 
policy remedies). As a result, agents must ‘argue over, diagnose, proselytize’ before they 
can be suitably placed to take any meaningful action (Blyth, 2002:9; Broome et al, 2012:8).  
Indeed, Blyth (2002:39) has suggested that during moments of failure ideas are deployed 
by actors as ‘weapons’ to de-legitimate existing ideas and bring about change. 
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that proponents of existing ideas motivated 
by ensuring continuity are actively engaged in this debate and there is no logical reason to 
suggest that those motivated by change will be the winners in this ideological battle.  
That this is the case is almost self-evident. However, what is missing from the constructivist 
literature is a sufficient account of how actors engage in such a process. In response, two 
related means are posited here which are crucial to this research, each of which, although 
clearly interrelated deal with a different 'pathway' to constructivism (Abdelal et al, 2010).  
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On the one hand, the IMF is shown, particularly during the first phase of the downturn, to 
have reasoned through historical analogy to compare unfolding events with others that 
have preceded them in order to reduce increasing uncertainty. On the other hand, the 
politics of framing as a means by which to imbue meaning to unravelling events in the 
political-economy is shown to have been especially prevalent as the downturn progressed.  
 
Historical analogy 
In the case of the former, it is suggested here that a key mechanism by which the IMF 
initially sought to construct continuity was through learning from history, a process by 
which policymakers look to similar instances from the past to help them deal more 
effectively with the uncertainty associated with seemingly novel problems in the present.   
This is a process typically associated with International Relations and foreign policy analysis 
in particular. Here, the “Munich analogy” is most frequently invoked by policy-makers, 
typically as a means by which to justify military intervention, the assumption being that 
inaction leads to the kind of appeasement that led to the outbreak of World War Two. 
The historical analogy literature is characterised by two distinct strands. On the one hand, 
the analytical view draws heavily on cognitive psychology to highlight the power of ideas as 
policymakers draw on historical analogies to make sense of current dilemmas, the 
conclusions of which influence the direction of policy decisions in the present.  
This process has been summarised by Vertzberger (1986:225-227) who suggests that the 
use of history serves four broad functions. Firstly, it helps define a situation by interpreting 
information in order to construct a meaningful body of knowledge about the nature of the 
environment facing actors. Secondly, a circumscribing role is assigned to actors whose 
status is appropriate to that actor. Thirdly, a strategy is determined that defines the most 
effective range of policies for coping with events. Lastly, a justifying strategy is advocated 
to convince others that the proposed policies are logical, practical and normatively 
acceptable.  
On the other hand, the sceptics eschew the analytical view’s notion that history its self is a 
powerful determinant of policy. Rather, the sceptic view is instrumental and political. It 
suggests that policymakers draw on historical analogies to advance policies already decided 
upon. Schlesinger (1986:444) for example has observed that ‘the past is an enormous grab 
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bag with a prize for everybody’, a view which ‘diminishes the force of the argument that 
history is per se a powerful determinant of policy’. With this in mind, the sceptics deny that 
analogies serve a critical diagnostic role in helping to interpret incoming information, but 
rather serve a justificatory and advocacy, as opposed to analytical, function.  
These differences notwithstanding, the two approaches have one pervasive similarity, with 
both acknowledging that more often than not, historical analogies are used badly. 
Analytical scholars for example observe that the cognitive approach ‘prevents or delays 
recognition of the limits of validity of the lessons of history to current decision tasks’, to 
such an extent that ‘preference for information processing and decision-making by analogy, 
as well as an exaggerated perception or similitude between past events and present 
problems and information, are enhanced’ (Vertzberger, 1986:234) thereby leading to 
suboptimal policies.    
For the sceptics however, poor performance stems from the fact that analogies are 
selected as justificatory tools by policymakers for policies already decided upon at an 
earlier stage of the selection process. As a result, when resorting to historical analogy, they 
seize upon the first that comes to mind without stopping to analyse its fit or the manner in 
which it may be misleading, rather than searching for others that may be more appropriate 
(May, 1973:xi).  
With the preceding discussion in mind, a key assumption of this research is that, although 
primarily the purveyance of IR, learning from the past has demonstrable utility in the study 
of the international political economy which is an incredibly complex and uncertain arena 
of interaction. For the purposes of this research it helps us understand the means by which 
the IMF attempted to deal with increasing uncertainty during the first phase of the 
downturn.  
That is, it is suggested that the IMF, during a time of increasing uncertainty, interpreted 
incoming information through existing schemas and resorted to historical analogy to guide 
it through the indeterminacy of seemingly novel policy problems. In doing so, an attempt 
was made to posit uncertainty as more closely resembling a situation of risk which meant 
the broader environment was knowable and therefore resolvable in the frames of 
reference provided by the existing economic philosophy, problem definitions and policy 
priorities.  
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In explaining how this was so, this research draws on insights provided by the Analogical 
Explanation (AE) framework developed by Khong (1992:7-12) which synthesises insights 
derived from both the analytical and sceptic approaches. On the one hand, the AE frame-
work suggests that we (either as individuals or collectives (Vertzberger, 1986:225)) have 
limited cognitive capacities, so to cope with vast amounts of information, resort to 
“knowledge structures” including schemas (a subjective theory about how the 
social/political/economic world works). These provide the necessary categories and labels 
which enable us to order, interpret, and simplify the world to make sense of our 
environment (see for example Larson, 1985:51). Indeed, Khong (1992:25) suggests that 
events in the world are never approached as if they were sui generis, but are assimilated 
into pre-existing structures due to limited cognitive capacities. 
As a result, schemas help us to understand the origins, cuing, and function of historical 
analogies, a process by which new instances are matched to those stored in memory. In 
doing so, analogies play a diagnostic function by defining the nature of a problem by 
comparing the new situation with others from the past, and a prognostic function by 
forwarding policy solutions. This can be summarised thus: AX:BX::AY:BY. That is, event A 
resembles event B in having characteristic X. Given that A has characteristic Y, so is BY 
considered resolvable through the same policies deployed in event A (Khong, 1992:21).  
On the other hand, the preceding discussion does not preclude the potential for historical 
analogies being used sub-optimally. This is so for three reasons. Firstly, there are 
systematic biases associated with schemas and analogical reasoning which means they are 
more often than not selected on the basis of surface similarities consistent with existing 
knowledge structures. As a result, other, potentially more appropriate analogies are often 
ignored. Secondly, once invoked, the default values of the schema/analogy fill in for 
incomplete information, thereby allowing for a fuller picture of events. Nevertheless, there 
is nothing inherent in doing so to suggest such information be applicable to that particular 
context. Thirdly, the result of the preceding discussion is that schemas/analogies often lead 
to perseverance as incoming information is incorporated into existing knowledge 
structures, with discrepant information slighted or ignored. As a result, they often persist 
as even in the face of contradictory evidence, and with their basic articles of faith unlikely 
to be eroded. 
Finally, the AE approach does not deny the use of analogies for justification and advocacy. 
In fact, it allows for policymakers who are influenced by the lessons of history in arriving at 
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them, but can be expected to use those same lessons to advance their policy preferences. 
Therefore, understanding the manner in which they are selected explains why analogies 
have the potential to play an instrumental role in persuading others of the relevance of the 
lessons learned in the policy process, and why their associated policy prescriptions are so 
often suboptimal in their application (Khong, 1992:13-17).  
Taken together therefore, the approach outlined here provides this research with a 
perspective in which policymakers are shown to access analogies on the basis of surface 
similarities consistent with existing knowledge structures including schemas. This explains 
why similarities are highlighted and emphasised, while others that might contradict the 
analogy are ignored, and also helps us understand why this overall process can often lead 
to perseverance in economic philosophies, problem definitions, along with suboptimal 
policies.  
 
The politics of framing 
In the case of the latter, it has been suggested that the nature of political-economic failure 
is inherently contested, subject as it is to opposing tendencies or ‘persuasive struggles’ 
(Baker, 2015:344) as social agents seek to identify and remedy for paradigmatic and 
institutional anomalies created by a moment of failure through alternative diagnoses and 
prognoses.  
The economic ideas held by those actors who prevail in such struggles are therefore keys to 
understanding why a particular outcome prevails at the expense of available alternatives 
(Blyth, 2001:2). From this we can discern that if experts educate power-holders about what 
problems exist and what the appropriate remedies are to them, moments of political-
economic failure, constructed differently, means outcomes could have varied significantly. 
Indeed, if interests are a function of beliefs and desires, and if agents are confused about 
those desires – particularly during periods of political-economic uncertainty, then it follows 
logically that their interests must likewise be unstable (Blyth, 2002:30). This leaves actors 
open to being persuaded of what course of action is in fact consistent with their interests.   
There is therefore no a priori reason to be correct in assuming which actor or collection of 
actors might be successful in projecting a particular narrative of what went wrong and what 
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is to be done. Indeed, engaged in persuasive struggles are not only various actors pushing 
for change, but also those motivated by ensuring the maintenance of the status quo.  
In addition to historical analogy, actors also attempt to affect continuity through framing - 
the major premise of which is that 'an issue can be viewed from a variety of perspectives 
and can be construed as having implications for multiple values or considerations. Framing 
refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or 
reorient their thinking about an issue' (Chong & Druckman, 2007:104).  
This concept has acquired considerable currency in the social sciences. References made to 
it, whether for descriptive or analytical purposes are increasingly found for example in such 
areas as psychology, linguistics and discourse analysis, communication and media studies, 
and political science and policy studies (Benford & Snow, 2000:611).  
Nevertheless, the frame concept has arguably been explored nowhere as systematically 
than in sociology and most extensively to the substantive study of social movements and 
collective action where it has acquired substantial popularity, particularly from the 1990s. 
This research has taken as problematic what until this juncture had been largely ignored by 
structuralist/materialist concerns, that is, ‘meaning work – the struggle over the production 
of mobilizing and counter-mobilizing ideas and meanings’ (Benford & Snow, 2000:613).  
In doing so the literature has become increasingly interpretive, ideational, and grounded in 
the assumption that ‘meaning is pivotal’ (Benford, 1997:409) given its centrality to issues 
related to construction, interpretation, attribution of blame/causality, the mobilization of 
support, and strategic interaction. Indeed, it has been suggested that ‘whatever else social 
movement actors do, they seek to affect interpretations of reality among various 
audiences’ (Benford, 1997:410), the assumption being that meaning acts as a crucial 
prefatory to action. In this regard, framing can be viewed as inherently constructivist 
(Steinberg, 1998).  
Against this backdrop, two key insights are derived from this literature that informs this 
research. Firstly, frames – ‘the ability to define what the essence of a problem is’ (Cohn, 
2013:114) - provide a critical diagnostic function by identifying, labelling and assigning 
meaning to occurrences in the international political economy. This process, commonly 
referred to as ‘frame amplification’ (Benford & Snow, 2000:623) involves accenting and 
highlighting particular problems, issues, events or beliefs as being more salient than others. 
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Moreover, frames help to foster agreement by promoting definitions and interpretations of 
issues in an effort to render particular problem definitions meaningful, and thereby 
function to organise expectations by simplifying and condensing aspects of the real world 
'out there' (Chong & Druckman, 2007:106). As part of this process causal reasoning is key, 
particularly attributions of the root of the problem, inferences regarding the responsibility 
for treatment of the problem so-defined, as well as appeals to higher principles in the 
framing of an issue. 
The diagnostic process therefore denotes what Benford and Snow (2000:614) refer to as 
‘an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of 
reality construction. It is active in the sense that something is being done, and processual in 
the sense of a dynamic, evolving process’. This agential emphasis draws attention to the 
fact that meaning is subject to differential interpretations, and therefore, the development, 
generation and elaboration of frames is a contentious process, with all actors in the 
political economic arena engaged in reality construction through the politics of 
signification.    
The foregoing discussion implies that meaning is inherently contested, articulated and 
rearticulated to such an extent that it is not possible to simply construct and impose frames 
on their intended targets any one version of reality they would so wish (Benford, 
1997:410). Rather, it is suggested here that successful frames – those that exert a 
considerable degree of influence over the manner in which problems are diagnosed and 
responded to - must be constructed in such a manner as to be persuasive: in cognitive 
terms by providing a compelling case of their necessity and efficacy; in normative terms by 
appealing to, and most closely coinciding with or seeming to protect, actors' underlying 
values; or a combination of the two to exert a particularly broad appeal (Chong & 
Druckman, 2007:111).   
Secondly, framing plays a prognostic function, a process which involves, further to 
rendering problems meaningful and helping to foster agreement, organizing expectations 
which serve as important guides for action. This supports the premise that frames are 
constructed, by and large, to draw attention to a particular problem or situation that actors 
perceive as salient, make attributions regarding who or what is to blame, and thereafter 
articulate a set of arrangements in an attempt to affect change or continuity. This approach 
is consistent with the view that frames are both developed and deployed in such a manner 
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as to achieve a specific purpose, that is, the advancement of a particular set of policy 
priorities.  
In short, the prognostic function therefore addresses the question of what is to be done. 
Indeed, frames exist as a means by which to mobilize adherents, acquire broad support, 
and demobilise antagonists in the process, in order to push for a particular set of policy 
interventions to remedy the problem so-defined. Here, there tends to exist in reality a very 
close correspondence between the identification of the manner in which a particular 
problem was understood, and the constraining effects that this subsequently has on the 
kinds of responses that can be considered desirable. This involves articulating a proposed 
solution to the problem or at the very least a coherent plan of attack, and the required 
strategy for carrying out the plan (Benford & Snow, 2000:614-616; Pan & Kosicki, 1993:64).  
The approach taken to this research is therefore critical in drawing our attention to the fact 
that frames are not naturally-occurring or objectively identifiable but are part of a strategic 
and deliberate activity that implies the use of agency in the construction of meaning. That 
is, interpretive frames are generated, and act to, identify the nature of problems by 
attributing causality, and identifying the remedies to those very problems (Benford & 
Snow, 2000:614).  
Taken together, the two approaches discussed here, historical analogy and framing, 
demonstrate the importance of the economic ideas held by the IMF, and the means by 
which they are drawn upon and deployed to reduce uncertainty and assign meaning to 
events in order to push for continuity as opposed to change. This approach neither renders 
structure irrelevant, nor denies that agents have interests.  
What it does do is draw our attention to the fact that under conditions of uncertainty (read 
here, political-economic failure), the politics of ideas is crucial as events do not simply and 
automatically telegraph to agents their true nature, they do not imbue in actors a 
mechanical sense of what should be done to remedy for their pathologies, nor do they 
dictate what course of action is in their best interests. That this is the case creates space in 
which the IMF is able to embody - and frame, shape, and embed what is legitimate and 
appropriate – the very ideas and rules, which are themselves contested to secure their 
propagation by attempting to re-affirm the rules of the game (Rueschemeyer, 2006:245).  
In doing so, this research demonstrates how the IMF attempted to ensure that - even 
during ideological contestation – the frames established previously did not disappear. 
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Certainly, defending existing economic ideas is made easier as, although not impregnable, 
once the institutional power to discipline has been exercised, change is extremely difficult 
to enact. This suggests that ‘corrected behaviour’ (Kiersey, 2011:3) (change) need not be 
the natural corollary to the failure of institutions and their attendant ideas.  
 
Adjudicating between change or continuity 
Discussion has thus far concerned its self with the process by which continuity may be 
achieved. However, this leaves an important question as to by what means is continuity to 
be judged? Here, constructivists ‘tend to divide between a crisis-driven view of policy 
change through ‘paradigm-shifts’ and more incremental approaches to policy change in 
ideas and discourse over time’ (Schmidt, 2011:2). These tend to map out differently onto 
the three levels of generality discussed previously, policies, problem definitions, and 
economic philosophies. The approach taken here however suggests that the answer lies 
not in the policy realm, but in the ability of the IMF to continue to successfully project 
existing problem definitions, themselves a reflection of the broader economic philosophy.  
Here an assumption is made that policies can be implemented in the context of failure that 
appear to run contrary to prevailing problem definitions and economic philosophies, 
thereby suggesting that existing policies have been usurped, have simply proven to be 
wrong, or are unable to deal with pressing problems. It is therefore policy ideas that 
change most rapidly as windows of opportunity open up in the face of events as old policies 
no longer solve the problems or fit the politics for which they were designed (Schmidt, 
2011:5). The opening of a window – read an event or crisis – is mainly what drives policy 
change.  
Nevertheless, policies that appear counter-intuitive to the prevailing economic philosophy 
and problem definitions may simply represent a means by which to shore up the existing 
system as opposed to being demonstrative of more substantive change. As a result, change 
in policies need not be indicative of a more significant shift in economic philosophy.  
With this in mind, looking at the underlying economic philosophies and problem definitions 
are keys. Although premised on for example power and position, problem definitions 
typically exist during a particular time and place as they appear better able to define the 
problem of that time. This also explains why they change. Because they are less able to 
cope, or are perceived as being less able to cope with, changed realities.  
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As a result, problem definitions and economic philosophies exist for only a limited period of 
time, after which change comes from either internal or external processes or events which 
create a receptive environment for new ideas. So change often (although not exclusively) 
comes about at moments of great uncertainty when old institutions have failed and there is 
a perceived need for new ones. Here we would expect to see a radical shift in the policy 
sector to a new problem definition with different goals and broader economic philosophy.  
In eschewing the notion however that as bad economic philosophies and problem 
definitions fail, good ideas take their place, an important part of continuity suggests that 
power (the ability to shape the broader institutional context through reference to 
discourses and narratives) has an inevitable part to play in this process. That is, change 
need not correspond directly to this changed reality as entrenched interests continue to 
fight for, and demonstrate, the efficacy of existing economic philosophies and problem 
definitions. How do we know therefore when we have institutional and ideational 
continuity? New circumstances are recognised and dealt with within existing problem 
definitions.   
 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has advocated a constructivist approach as a means by which to account for 
the manner in which economic ideas become instantiated in institutions, and what 
opportunities exist for change or continuity in the context of crisis. Doing so has allowed for 
a deeper exploration of two areas key to this research, the relationship between the 
material and ideational realms, and the relationship between crisis and change/continuity.  
Firstly, it has been suggested that the co-constitutive relationship between context and 
agency (represented here as the coordinative and communicative discourses) provide both 
the broader setting within which events occur and acquire meaning, yet which present 
multiple branching points and potentially divergent courses of action.  
Secondly, the importance of the role of ideas has served the purpose of demonstrating not 
only the importance of ideational analysis in political economy scholarship, but its 
relevance in particular upon ‘the ideological face of governance’ which ‘needs to be 
understood as constituting the very fabric of the picture we are trying to build up’ (Payne, 
2005:72). That is, global economic governance is predicated upon a particular economic 
philosophy composed of an accompanying set of problem definitions and policy priorities.  
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Thirdly, drawing on the discussion on crises, three points can be made that inform this 
research. Firstly, a constructivist approach has been shown to open up space in which 
‘ideas can contest and de-legitimate existing institutions and patterns of distribution’ 
(Blyth, 2001:2) during times of political-economic failure in order to effect change.  
Secondly, the postulated need for change is liable to be subject to contestation from 
entrenched interests which seek the perpetuation of status quo institutions and ideas. As a 
result, regardless of the severity of the perceived political-economic failure, there is no a 
priori reason why one set of economic ideas should win out over the other.  
Finally, before agents can respond to a crisis they have to have some idea of what caused it 
(Baker, 2012:7). The role of the G7/IMF in particular have been shown to be crucial here, 
acting as agents for continuity through the coordinative discourse (by framing the problems 
presented by political-economic failure and the means by which it is to be resolved), and 
through the communicative discourse, (the dissemination of these very ideas). 
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Chapter 2 
The IMF in historical context 
 
It was not Keynesianism it’s self, ‘but the existence of exceptionally favourable conditions 
for growth that was responsible for the generally good economic record of the 1950 and 
1960s’ (IMF Annual Report, 1980:34) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter situates the IMF in its historical context. In doing so, three purposes are 
served. On the one hand, it charts the creation and initial remit of the IMF, underpinning 
which were Keynesian economic ideas which afforded government scope to intervene into 
domestic economies to foster growth and employment. Thereafter, it is demonstrated how 
the inflationary and growth crisis of the 1970s ultimately presaged a shift to neoliberal 
economic ideas given that Keynesianism was not only viewed as a crucial precipitating 
cause of the crisis but was, correspondingly, deemed incapable of remedying for its 
pathologies.  
On the other hand, it is demonstrated with reference to the Latin American debt crisis and 
Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) how IMF policy responses have been underscored by neoliberal 
economic ideas. In doing so, the IMF has assumed a greater role in stabilizing economies 
affected by crises than had been the case under the BWS, by insisting on structural 
adjustment measures in order to redress the un-sustainable policies that led to the crises.   
Finally, it is demonstrated how, despite its often dubious record, the IMF nevertheless 
continues to defer to the neoliberal economic philosophy, problem definitions and policy 
priorities in its crisis resolution strategy. Indeed, it is suggested that the IMF has, if 
anything, sought to further entrench reform in a range of domestic political and economic 
institutions. This is explored with reference to Financial Sector Assessment Policies (FSAPs). 
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Economic ideas I: The Bretton Woods System and Keynesianism 
The competitive devaluation of currencies and exchange and trade restrictions that 
characterised the 1930s, along with the end of World War Two, proved motivating factors 
behind the creation of the Bretton Woods Institutions (the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (now World Bank) and IMF (IMF, 2011:1).  
Although in its initial incarnation the IMF was to be controlled by its member countries, the 
discourse surrounding the need for more effective multilateral cooperation was 
coordinated by the US under the leadership of Harry Dexter White, and the UK under the 
leadership of John Maynard Keynes who, upon their combined economic, military, and 
ideological dominance controlled almost half of all contributory quotas (Sutherland, 
2014:3).  
However, the nature of events in the inter-war years in and of themselves, did not 
materially telegraph to agents the form and function that cooperation should take. Rather, 
Blyth (2002:40) draws our attention to the fact that ‘it is cognitively impossible for agents 
to construct economic institutions without having an idea as to what caused a given crisis’, 
in this case, what policymakers thought the lessons of the inter-war years had taught them.  
Although this demonstrates how ‘all forms and projects of governance are intrinsically 
ideological’ (Phillips & Payne, 2014:3) which in its self suggests that the initial remit of the 
IMF could have been radically different (had the lessons of the causes of the inter-war 
years been interpreted and diagnosed differently), governments signing up to the founding 
Articles were nevertheless guided by an inter-subjectively held consensus of the inefficacy 
of the economic philosophy, problem definitions, and policies of the inter-war years.  
Governments signing up to the founding Articles of Agreement (1944) were therefore 
driven by a collective desire to avoid financial crises, disputed commerce, wild exchange-
rate movements and political instability. The IMF therefore acted as protector of the global 
capitalist economy, promoting international trade and overseeing the international 
monetary system, yet allowed for domestic intervention to spread the risks of adjustment.  
Against this backdrop, six objectives were prescribed in the IMFs Articles: (1) to promote 
international cooperation on monetary issues; (2) to facilitate international trade; (3) to 
promote exchange stability; (4) to eliminate exchange restrictions; (5) to provide loans to 
prevent members from resorting to measures destructive of national and/or international 
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prosperity; and (6) to reduce the duration/magnitude of payment imbalances (IMF, 
1984:2).   
In doing so, the Bretton Woods System (BWS) required members to peg their exchange 
rates to the US dollar (which in turn was pegged to gold). Although there was leeway - one 
percent either side of parity - pegged exchange rates could only be adjusted on a proposal 
by the member, after consultation with the IMF, and to correct fundamental 
disequilibrium.  
Moreover, it was to provide members with financial resources to enable them to observe 
the code of conduct while correcting or avoiding payments imbalances. This was premised 
on the assumption that although fixed exchange rates provided a considerable degree of 
day-to-day certainty their rigidity made participating countries susceptible to balance-of-
payments deficits and/or crises (often referred to as currency crises) (Babb, 2007:131).  
For classical liberal economists the need to restore balance-of-payments parlance typically 
involved a period of austerity and living within diminished means. Eschewing this approach 
however, the IMF - informed by Keynesian macroeconomics which legitimated domestic 
intervention during such times - was guided by an assumption that markets alone were 
unable to bring an economy out of a slump. As a result, the IMF loaned money short-term 
to correct maladjustments without members resorting to measures inconsistent with the 
code of conduct (destructive of national prosperity) to dampen cyclical fluctuations and 
foster the consumption required for economic growth and full-employment (Babb, 2007).  
The Keynesian economic philosophy underpinning IMF policy advice therefore exhibited a 
clear commitment to an active state in managing the economy. This reflected a broad 
consensus that ‘the prosperity of nations – in particular their levels of production and 
employment – did not need to be the unplanned outcome of an uncoordinated and erratic 
system but could instead be controlled by government’ (Stewart, 1987:465).  
This had clear implications for the manner in which economic problems were interpreted 
and responded to, and the kinds of policies considered appropriate. On the one hand, the 
IMF exhibited a clear commitment to the pursuit of economic growth and full employment 
while on the other hand this opened up the potential for the kinds of policies inconceivable 
by liberal economists, that is, the deployment of fiscal stimulus and deficit spending.  
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Economic ideas II: The decline of the Bretton Woods System and shift to neoliberalism 
Although not attributable solely to the IMF, it nevertheless presided over a golden age for 
the global economy in the 1950s and 1960s characterised by sustained economic growth, 
generally low inflation rates, and the liberalization of world trade in goods and services 
which grew with the renaissance of cooperation engendered by the IMF (Bird, 2007:686).  
However, from the late 1960s signs of strain which would presage the demise of the BWS 
and Keynesian economic ideas steering global economic governance, were increasingly 
evident. Firstly, the Keynesian assumption that financial markets could not maintain a 
stable equilibrium provided a normative framework in the IMF in which capital was 
controlled. 
However, the creation of the Eurodollar market in the UK in the mid-1950s created an 
environment in which financial assets denominated in foreign currencies could be traded. 
This challenged the BWS in which central banks controlled exchange rates, something they 
could do only if they controlled capital flows (in the short-term).  
This process was deliberate, and therefore neither inevitable nor inexorable (Abdelal, 
2008). Indeed, Blyth (2003:3) draws our attention to the fact that it was the ‘regulatory 
permissiveness’ of key members (UK and US) as opposed to structural imperatives that 
weakened existing regulations by providing borrowers and lenders with alternatives to 
national regulation, the outcome of which was a shift to liberalized capital markets. 
Secondly, devaluations of the pound sterling (1967), the French franc (1969), the floating of 
the deutsche mark (1971) and a new pattern of exchange rates with wider margins agreed 
in December 1971, according to the IMF Annual Report (1972), removed a foundation 
stone of the BWS and replaced it with a system in which countries would increasingly come 
to rely on foreign exchange markets to determine their currency values. 
In doing so, the end of the BWS in 1973 precipitated a shift in the IMF towards principles 
that would guide members in the conduct of their exchange rate policies, the final details 
of which were incorporated into the Second Amendment of the Articles of Agreement 
(1978). These eliminated the role of gold and legalised existing exchange practices. It gave 
members the right to adopt exchange arrangements of their choice while placing certain 
obligations on them, over which the IMF was given extra surveillance power, the argument 
being that, since exchange rates would be determined in the market the Fund needed to 
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monitor not only exchange rate policy, but also other domestic policies affecting those 
rates (You, 2005).  
Thirdly and perhaps most pertinently for our purposes here, the Keynesian economic ideas 
underpinning IMF problem definitions and policy priorities were showing signs of strain, 
manifest in ‘the continuation of rapid and widespread inflation’, along with ‘a deceleration 
in overall growth of real GNP’ (IMF, 1970:4), commonly referred to as stagflation.  
Indeed such was its persistence that by 1972 the IMF Annual Report noted that advanced  
countries ‘must endeavour to control inflation while at the same time achieving satisfying 
levels of employment and rates of economic growth’ (IMF, 1972:1). Although stressing the 
need to control inflation, the IMF therefore continued to defer to the Keynesian economic 
philosophy with economic growth and full employment retaining primacy as policy goals.  
By 1974 however it was noted how stagflation contributed to ‘the most complex and 
serious set of economic problems to confront national governments...  since the end of 
World War 2’, and thereby ‘brought into focus the need for countries – especially the 
largest ones – to pursue a strategy to curb inflation before it leads to prolonged damage’ 
(IMF, 1974:1).  
Against this backdrop an assumption was made that tackling inflation would require an 
alternative set of economic ideas to Keynesianism which had ‘tended to shade policy risks 
on the side of growth and employment’ (IMF, 1974:10) beyond a point that could now be 
considered prudent. In doing so it was noted that policy decisions ‘must now place more 
emphasis on controlling inflation and maintaining a climate of financial stability; despite 
the correspondingly lower emphasis on growth and employment objectives’ (IMF, 
1974:10).  
Indeed, ‘obliged to re-examine postulates that they had taken for granted in the 1950s and 
1960s’ (IMF, 1980:34) there was a crucial shift away from the Keynesian focus on growth 
and employment, to an almost exclusive focus on inflation targeting. Little attention was 
therefore placed upon the kinds of policies advocated in the post-war context which were 
understood to have been fundamentally discredited by the inflation and growth crisis.  
Moreover, the IMF went even further than stating that Keynesian economic ideas were 
incapable of dealing with prevailing economic problems by suggesting that they were in 
fact a major precipitating cause of the very conditions facing policymakers. Indeed, the 
1980 IMF Annual Report (IMF, 1980:34) suggested that although Keynesianism had 
62 
 
seemingly provided a climate of stable growth, employment and good price performance, 
this was not Keynesianism its self ‘but the existence of exceptionally favourable conditions 
for growth that was responsible for the generally good economic record of the 1950 and 
1960s’. 
With this in mind, although two oil shocks in the 1970s had contributed significantly to 
inflationary pressures, the preceding discussion shows how stagflation was nonetheless 
interpreted not as a crisis for Keynesianism, but more pertinently, a crisis of Keynesianism 
its self and the problem definitions and policy priorities with which it was associated. This 
claim was however supported by a plethora of IMF research which, according to former 
IMF Deputy Director Anne Kreuger (2005:2), brought about advances in our understanding 
of the inefficacy of Keynesianism and the pressing need to reorient economic ideas. 
On the one hand, state intervention was increasingly viewed as problematic as it ‘led to 
poor choices on capital movement, disastrously high concentrations of income, 
degradation of the natural environment, corruption, and ultimately, financial ruin’ 
(Boughton, 2001:33). The Keynesian emphasis on fiscal policy was however, subject to 
particular criticism on the grounds that: it was overly ambitious and had destabilising 
effects as distortionary measures were enacted too late; measures were based on faulty 
economic forecasts; and consumers and businesses had learned to anticipate policy 
changes and therefore adapt accordingly.    
On the other hand, inflation increasingly came to be seen as the result of rapid growth in a 
government’s spending and full employment policies. An assumption was therefore made 
that financing government spending by increasing the quantity of money contributes to 
inflation, thereby making it a strictly monetary phenomenon. This meant that possible 
cures were limited. Indeed the solution was evident to those in the IMF, government would 
need to be taken out of running the economy and inflation would have to be tackled.  
We can therefore see how, just as the Keynesian economic philosophy involved explicit 
assumptions regarding the proper role of the state in managing the economy, so too did 
Krueger (1997:2) suggest that a shift to inflation targeting could not be disentangled from a 
reconsideration of the role of the state, the circumstances for which, it was suggested, 
were increasingly favourable given the bad economics and politics that characterised the 
1970s. 
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The preceding discussion notwithstanding, there was nothing inherent in the broader 
economy to suggest a problem inherent to Keynesianism, although political-economic 
failure at the time certainly contributed to an environment which increased the chances of 
it being construed as such. Nevertheless, Chwieroth (2010:496) draws our attention to the 
fact that moments of failure ‘no matter how visible or severe, do not induce an automatic 
response’. Therefore, while rising inflation and declining growth offered a reasonable proxy 
for declining economic performance, what this means to each actor can vary considerably, 
depending on what each considers sustainable, and this comes with no obvious metric.  
The point here is that these “facts” were not self-apparent phenomena that unambiguously 
telegraphed to agents what to do (Abdelal et al, 2010:10). Rather, what the apparent 
failure of Keynesian economic ideas and institutions did do was allow the IMF to construct 
a crisis narrative highlighting the declining performance of extant economic ideas, 
institutions and policies as a crisis of the status quo (particularly an over-extended state) 
requiring change. This draws our attention to the fact that the shift to neoliberalism ‘was 
not economically given, but politically orchestrated’ (Hay, 2010:1). Nevertheless, two 
factors contributed towards a particularly receptive environment for the success of this 
crisis narrative.  
Firstly, the IMF was increasingly guided by a coordinative discourse driven by the G7, a 
group formed in 1976 by the world’s leading economies (US, UK, Japan, Germany, France, 
Italy and Canada). This group, increasingly controlling IMF business, was formed as a result 
of: declining US hegemony and the need to multilaterally manage the global economy; a 
desire to exert political leadership; and the breakdown of the BWS (Payne, 2008:520).   
The G7 therefore came to play an overarching role in relation to formal global governance 
institutions (including the IMF) by seeking to coordinate, prioritise, and steer policy actions 
(Payne, 2008:525). Indeed, it was at the very first meeting in Rambouillet that the members 
agreed the underlying principles of the post-Bretton Woods regime of market determined 
exchange rates and changed the IMF’s Articles of Agreement (Baker and Carey, 2014:89). 
Most pertinently however, the economic ideas guiding G7 problem definitions and policy 
priorities were consistent with the neoliberal economic philosophy. The first Communique 
of the then G6 in 1975 for example, without directly referencing the efficacy of the market, 
nevertheless spoke in terms consistent with this approach. This, although highlighting the 
need for economic growth and employment, included ‘shared beliefs’ of the need to ‘avoid 
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unleashing additional inflationary forces’ which might threaten the economic recovery (G6, 
1975:1). Indeed, the G7 Communique of the following year went even further, calling for 
fiscal restraint by speaking of the need for ’a restoration of a better balance in public 
finances as well as of disciplined measures in the fiscal area’ (G7, 1976:1).   
Secondly, the IMF was increasingly influenced by the ‘formalist revolution’ in economics in 
the 1950s in which mathematical techniques assumed greater significance. During this time 
the technical apparatus associated with neoclassical economics became dominant, a key 
contribution of which was to abstract economic questions in order to generate workable 
models free from social specificities, and in doing so, hollow out of the self reflexivity of 
Keynesian social purpose which had stressed the inter-subjectivity of economic activity.  
This process involved a triple reductionism which ‘remain today the bread and butter of 
neoliberal economic theory and practice’ (Best, 2004:386) in the IMF. The first involved the 
reductionism to the individual and optimizing behaviour as opposed to collective agents, 
the consequence of which was an economy treated as an aggregation of individual 
elements. Secondly the economy is treated as if it were confined to market supply and 
demand absent non-economic factors. Thirdly analysis is based on the marginalization of 
historic specificity.   
These insights provided the grounding for two hypotheses that – although never intended 
as a literal description of how people actually behave – nevertheless increasingly came to 
inform economic ideas in the IMF. On the one hand the rational expectations hypothesis 
assumes the presence of rational actors maximising their utility in complete and perfect 
markets. This assumption rested on two premises. Firstly, in forming their expectations 
rational actors make efficient use of all information available to them, although potential 
random shocks - not part of anyone’s information - means that actors will behave 
consistent with the model only on average. Secondly, the model of the economy used by 
individuals in making their forecasts is the correct one – that is, the economy behaves in 
ways predicted by the model which we know is correct because they are subject to 
Darwinian processes of learning whereby inferior models disproved by events are weeded 
out (Skidelsky, 2009:34).  
These two insights (the efficient use of information and stability) give the required amount 
of information and predictability to make expectations converge on average. That is, ‘if all 
agents share the same model of the economy, and if there are no large informational 
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asymmetries, then agents’ expectations about possible future states of the economy 
should converge and promote a stable and self-enforcing equilibrium’ (Blyth, 2002a:8).   
On the other hand, the rational expectations hypothesis is transformed into efficient 
markets hypothesis which acknowledges that although the future is characterised by risk, it 
is nevertheless probabilistically measurable, and as a result share prices are always 
correctly priced, with only unpredictable shocks causing prices to differ from their ‘intrinsic’ 
values. This hypothesis ‘came to be regarded as a state-space description of actual markets’ 
(Blyth, 2012:10) from which it was deduced that: market prices are good indicators of 
rationally evaluated economic value; the risk characteristics of financial markets can be 
inferred from mathematical analysis; market discipline is an effective tool in constraining 
harmful risk-taking; and innovation is beneficial since competition weeds out those not 
delivering value (Blyth, 2012; Skidelsky, 2009:38-39). 
Taken together therefore, the 1970s can be understood as a period in which the IMF 
under-went a major transformation in the economic ideas steering global economic 
governance. That is, a shift in economic philosophy from Keynesianism to neoliberalism 
(from state intervention to a largely ‘hands-off’ approach), in the manner economic 
problems were interpreted and goals pursued (from growth and employment to inflation 
targeting), and policies considered desirable (from fiscal interventions to controlling the 
supply of money).  
Nevertheless, throughout the decade, the IMF became increasingly marginalised due to: 
members borrowing from commercial banks eager to recycle surplus oil dollars (Woods, 
2006:7); and as the shift to floating exchange rates which diminished the Fund's role as the 
guarantor of exchange rate stability and regulator of global liquidity (Bird, 1999:955). 
However, underpinned by a neoliberal economic philosophy and drawn back into 
significant lending beginning with the debt crisis of the 1980s a new era was beckoning for 
the IMF. 
 
Neoliberalism in practice I: developing country debt crisis  
The lending generated by surplus OPEC dollars requiring recycling by Western banks ended 
when the US Federal Reserve increased interest rates in 1979 to address inflationary 
pressures. Borrowers in Latin America, beginning with Mexico in 1982 left several large 
banks facing failure, leading them to increase spreads and reduce the availability of credit.  
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The range and diversity of creditors involved made it unlikely that the crisis would, or 
could, be resolved without the active involvement of an outside agent. The IMF was 
therefore called upon to coordinate and make loans to debtors to ensure that they would 
be in such a position as to repay their over-exposed credit, and thereby, avert a global 
banking crisis.  
The IMF, traditionally lender of last resort now found its self, given the drying up of private 
credit, as negotiator of first resort. Accordingly, loans were made with strict conditionality 
('the policies a member is expected to follow in order to secure access to the resources of 
the Fund' (Buira, 2003:3)) an arrangement increasingly associated with IMF loans.  
Guided by a neoliberal economic philosophy the IMF viewed problems presented by the 
Latin American crisis, and the requisite remedies to them, through an alternative analytical 
lens. In doing so, the crisis was considered different, and more serious, than the balance of 
payments crises preceding it and would require an alternative set of policy interventions.  
Underscoring this shift was the concept of un-sustainability. According to the IMFs Articles 
members are only permitted to borrow when there is a balance-of-payments need, 
although because this is never defined, the concept sustainability is often deployed (which 
is of course entirely subjective). In an attempt to offer clarity, Bird (2007:696) suggests that 
a country’s balance-of-payments is unsustainable when current policies cannot be 
continued indefinitely and that major policy change is required. This is not solely indicated 
by a current account deficit, but also depends on a country's willingness to borrow and 
creditors to lend.  
Viewed through the lens of un-sustainability, an assumption was made within the IMF that 
domestic mismanagement and bad policies (fiscal expansion, exchange rate overvaluation 
and foreign borrowing by governments) were the cause of payments problems, effectively 
something more severe than the short-term balance-of-payments problems with which the 
IMF was traditionally associated (Pastor Jr, 1989; Wade & Veneroso, 1998; Weisner, 1985).  
This enhanced the IMFs case for lending based on a greater number of conditions which 
duly rose fifty percent (You, 2005:220). Therefore although limited to matters of macro-
economics such as a government’s budget deficit, monetary policy, and inflation rate, the 
IMF started to suggest that since almost any structural issue could impact the overall 
performance of the economy, almost everything fell within its domain (Stiglitz, 2002:14).  
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As a result, policy programmes were not simply limited to stabilization (measures to 
remove inflation/fiscal gaps) through reduced government expenditure/investment; but 
included adjustment (creating the conditions for growth) such as the elimination of 
subsidies, based on the assumption that stabilization alone was futile if underlying 
problems remained.   
Given the perceived un-sustainability of policies pursued by countries approaching the IMF, 
focus initially centred on stabilization to prevent balance-of-payments crises from spiralling 
further out of control. Policies included fiscal and monetary performance criteria (similar to 
adjustment under the gold standard), the aim being to promote economic balance in order 
to attain ‘a viable payments position in a context of reasonable price and exchange rate 
stability’ and ‘a sustainable level... of economic activity’ (Boughton, 2001:557).  
Although aimed at preventing intensifying capital flight and soaring debt servicing burdens, 
key here, and assuming increased prominence in IMF programmes, was a commitment to 
maintaining the integrity of the price mechanism.  Although the importance of price 
stability was recognised as early as 1959 by IMF Managing Director Per Jacobsson (1959:22) 
who stated that ‘sound economic development is not compatible with the distortions that 
rapid or chronic inflation always creates’, it has been shown here how it was not until after 
the stagflation of the 1970s that it assumed primacy as the key problem facing 
policymakers.   
Against this backdrop, the IMF advocated a series of adjustment policies to Latin America 
including: reduction of fiscal deficits; currency devaluations to make exports competitive; 
eliminating protectionism and restraints on foreign investment; privatization to generate 
more productive enterprise and reduce the public payroll; reduced public spending to meet 
debt repayment obligations; the elimination of subsidies and government interferences; 
decreases in real wages by freezing public sector wages; and the abolition of price controls 
(such as in electricity or gas) to promote competition and efficiency (Abdel-Kander, 
2013:1).    
IMF programmes therefore came to be judged on the ability of governments to carve out a 
greater space for the market, premised on the neoliberal economic philosophy which made 
explicit assumptions that the market provided the model for efficiently managing scarce 
resources. Therefore, helping governments develop markets through privatization, trade 
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liberalization, banking system restructuring and state spending restructuring increasingly 
constituted an important part of the IMF’s work (Krueger, 1999a:4-5; Fischer, 1999:25).  
Countries only approach the IMF for assistance during a crisis, so it is difficult to determine 
how successful (or not) they would have been in re-dressing an economic downturn in the 
absence of support. However, most indicators suggest that IMF programmes during the 
debt crisis were unsuccessful to such an extent that Pastor Jr (1989:80) suggested ‘the IMF 
may be politically exhausted as a vehicle for crisis resolution and economic restructuring’. 
This conclusion was based on the fact that: growth rates plummeted from 5.8 percent on 
average between 1968 and 1980 by about half during the years IMF policies were adopted; 
inflation did not even start to decrease in the region until late 1985 thanks to the growing 
adoption of heterodox programmes, which were often deployed against IMF advice; living 
standards fell dramatically in light of IMF interventions; external debt almost doubled 
between 1981 and 1987; and per capita income growth was negative/close to zero 
between 1982 and 1987 (Kreuger, 1999:1; Lustig, 1995:4; Pastor Jr., 1989:80-97; Rodrik, 
1999:1).  
Moreover, evidence pointed towards important asymmetric distributional consequences. 
Here, Pastor Jr. (1989:97) noted that it would have been reasonable to expect, given their 
part in hastening the crisis, that bankers should have borne a large share of the adjustment 
burden. Nevertheless, Rodrik (1999:1) noted how reforms in fact weakened social 
insurance institutions, employment was less secure and public safety nets were weakened, 
all in the name of ensuring the financing of debt burdens and ensuring the solvency of 
banks.  
Programmes were therefore associated with significant declines in the real wage and 
labour share, with the urban poor and working class particularly affected by subsidy cuts, 
real wage reduction and price increases due to devaluations and the elimination of public 
services. The net result was, in most countries, the income share of the top ten percent 
increased, often substantially, while that of the bottom ten percent declined (Lustig, 
1995:4). This led Pastor Jr. (1989:100) to suggest class favouritism in the IMF as crisis costs 
were socialised, a dis-proportionate amount of which was borne by those at the low end of 
the income spectrum.  
Two broad conclusions can be drawn from the preceding discussion. On the one hand, 
advocating a reduction in fiscal deficits, decreases in real wages, and greater trade and 
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capital liberalization was problematic under benign economic conditions but were an 
especially reckless set of pro-cyclical policies during a global economic slowdown.  
On the other hand, the crisis drew attention to the fact that finance is characterised by a 
phase of over-lending in which banks aggressively seek new clients in order to protect their 
market share. Thereafter, banks collectively retreat from the market in a panic. This was a 
scenario envisaged by Keynes and was a key assumption informing economic ideas in the 
IMF in the post-war period which advocated the deployment of capital controls.  
This called into question the justification for capital liberalization which had been 
advocated by the IMF as a key component of the Latin American growth strategy. However 
rather than the beneficent view of capital flows from advanced economies financing 
development, the pattern was directly reversed as capital flows were shown to be 
inherently pro-cyclical with the “basic transfer” (net inflows of capital minus interest 
payments) becoming negative, sinking from a peak inflow of $26.4 billion in 1981 to an 
outflow of $34.7 billion in 1985 (Pastor Jr., 1989:94), thereby making new loans necessary 
for investment difficult to obtain.  
 
Financial sector liberalization and neoliberalism in practice II: Asian Financial Crisis 
Despite the Latin American debt crisis pointing to the negative consequences associated 
with financial liberalization and deregulation it nevertheless came to develop an 
inextricable synonymy with IMF policy discourse. Its necessity was constructed upon 
efficiency grounds which posit that competitive markets yield efficient equilibria (Argitis & 
Pitelis, 2008:2). This view is consistent with the belief that regulations are, by contrast, 
responsible for distorting competitive markets, thereby causing them to deviate from an 
otherwise efficient path.   
Then Managing Director of the IMF Michel Camdessus (1997:1) summarised the benefits of 
liberalized global financial markets, suggesting that they: ‘give countries new opportunities 
to quicken the pace of investment, job creation, and growth; give investors a wider range 
of investment opportunities and higher returns on savings; and promote a more efficient 
allocation of resources worldwide and thus, contribute towards stronger world growth’.  
It was against this backdrop that, from the 1980s and particularly in the 1990s, capital 
controls, once part of economic orthodoxy, were increasingly viewed as economic heresy 
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as the belief that the free movement of capital was desirable (what Chwieroth (2010:1) 
referred to as ‘the norm of capital freedom’ within the IMF), became the new orthodoxy.  
Although the role of capital mobility in particular was subject to contestation within the 
IMF - broadly delineated as it was, between gradualists who argued for sequenced 
liberalization and big bang advocates who sought rapid liberalization – differences were 
generally played out over the appropriate speed and nature of liberalization, not its 
inherent value.   
Indeed, so entrenched did the assumed efficacy of financial liberalization become, that in 
1997 the IMF’s Interim Committee called for an amendment to the Articles to enable the 
IMF to promote the liberalization of capital markets, as well as give it greater jurisdiction 
over the capital account policies of member states. This shows how the IMF was not simply 
seeking to regulate an extant activity, but more fundamentally seeking to play a 
constitutive role in shaping a particular form of financial sector liberalization and de-
regulation. That is, the IMF did more than simply analyse and respond to market forces, it 
attempted to fundamentally alter them: to paraphrase MacKenzie (2006:12) it was ‘an 
‘engine’... an active force in transforming its environment, not a camera passively recording 
it’.  
Paradoxically however, at the same time the IMF was attempting to do so, the volatility 
with which financial sector liberalization and de-regulation was increasingly associated was 
creating new forms of financial and economic crises originating from the impact of capital 
as opposed to the current account including those in Mexico, Russia, Brazil and Turkey.  
Common to all was an initial liberalisation (encouraged in large part by the IMF (Radelet & 
Sachs, 2000; Stiglitz, 2002) which permitted substantial inflows of short-term investment. 
Indeed, empirical evidence demonstrated that after premature financial liberalization, 
countries were particularly vulnerable to rapidly expanding  capital flows and their abrupt 
reversals, a problem aggravated by fragile domestic financial structures and weak financial 
regulation and supervision, a process exemplified by the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). 
 
Asian Financial Crisis  
In 1997 a financial crisis hit a number of the world’s most rapidly growing economies in 
Asia, resulting in some of the largest financial bailouts in history, yet was entirely 
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unanticipated. Indeed in affected countries macroeconomic management was good, ‘with 
generally prudent fiscal policies and high private savings rates, these countries had become 
a model for many others’ (Karunatilleka, 1999:1). IMF Managing Director Michel 
Camdessus (1997:2) for example observed that ‘the regions economic success over the last 
couple of decades can be described in many ways – as outstanding, superlative, and 
certainly admirable. But it was no miracle. Rather, it was the result of good policies’. There 
were therefore few signs of crisis, rather, bank lending actually rose to record levels in 1997 
(Wade & Veneroso, 1998:1).  
This success was premised, in part, on financial deregulation which encouraged private 
capital inflows; indeed in the run-up to the crisis the IMF recommended greater openness 
to such money which could finance investment half as cheap as it could domestically 
(Radelet & Sachs, 2000:122). Against this backdrop governments relaxed control on 
companies’ foreign borrowings, abandoned coordination of borrowings, and relaxed bank 
supervision.  
In contrast to the Latin American debt crisis - interpreted as the result of wasteful/corrupt 
borrowing undertaken by governments as opposed to private firms operating in 
competitive markets - the AFC appeared to occur in opposite conditions. That is, most of 
the debt was private, and prior to the crisis, macroeconomic fundamentals - including 
growth, inflation and government budgets – all appeared fine (Wade & Veneroso, 1998:1).  
Nevertheless the crisis highlighted the issues associated with rising asset values in countries 
which became unrealistically high as the money supply grew too quickly for the economy to 
absorb, thereby contributing to speculative booms in real estate and stock markets.  
Indeed, Deputy Managing Director of the IMF Stanley Fischer (1998:9) drew attention to 
the role of ‘lax prudential rules and financial oversight which had permitted the quality of 
banks’ loan portfolios to deteriorate sharply’. This precipitated a reckless search for yield 
and fuelled asset price inflation creating a cycle whereby: risky lending drove up the risky 
asset prices, thereby making the financial position of intermediaries seem sounder than it 
was, which encouraged banks to engage in even further risky lending. As with any bubble 
though, the fall-out when it bursts had severe effects on the real economy. Crucially, when 
it did, it very quickly became apparent that those deficits which did exist were more 
problematic than initially assumed as they were funded largely by speculative short-term 
capital.  
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Drawing to varying degrees on these lessons the IMFs response to the crisis hinged on two 
main components - stabilization and adjustment - both broadly consistent with the 
response to the Latin American debt crisis. Firstly, in return for loans, countries deployed a 
set of macroeconomic policies deemed necessary to stabilize the economy. These consisted 
of targets for the permissible size of future budget deficits and tightening monetary policy.  
On the one hand, fiscal contraction was deemed necessary to overall credibility and would 
both limit the need for overseas inflows of capital and ensure that government debt would 
not increase any more than was sustainable, with the alternative of printing money being  
‘potentially disastrous’ (Fischer, 1998:12). In Thailand and Indonesia, fiscal contraction took 
the form of IMF advocated reduced budget deficits (cuts in social spending) so that money 
could be directed to restructuring banks, through postponing state infrastructure projects, 
and removing government subsidies and VAT exemptions (Karunatilleka, 1999:15).  
On the other hand, of monetary policy, it was suggested that increasing interest rates 
would reduce the need for capital inflows and maintain export competitiveness by 
controlling domestic prices. Moreover, temporary rate increases were considered key to 
restoring confidence in the currency even if this complicated the situation of weak banks 
and corporations, because once regained, rates could return to normal levels. Taken 
together these policies, tightened monetary and fiscal policy were ‘as it should be’ (Fischer, 
1998:11).   
Secondly, accompanying rescue packages and macroeconomic prescriptions, the IMF also 
sought to implement adjustment policies to correct for perceived structural weaknesses in 
financial systems in affected economies, the aim being to remove ‘impediments to growth’ 
including monopolies, trade barriers and non-transparent corporate practices.   
While adjusted for the needs of individual countries IMF programmes included: closing 
down or recapitalising troubled financial institutions; letting foreign financial institutions 
buy up domestic ones; requiring banks to follow Western prudential standards; requiring 
international accounting standards be followed and international accounting firms to be 
used for auditing purposes; to eliminate government directed lending; and to give up 
measures to assist individual firms avoid bankruptcy (Wade & Veneroso, 1998:5). 
Here Krueger et al (2000:311) noted that if weaknesses in the banking system arose 
because banks took on too much risk yet states took only basic short–term measures to 
restore it to health and did nothing else, it would be failing in its duty to prevent a 
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recurrence. Just as in the Latin American debt crisis, so again was the notion of un-
sustainability drawn upon to provide the justification for stringent stabilization and 
adjustment policies. Although a range of factors were attributable to the crisis, the IMF 
firmly ‘put the emphasis on shortcomings in domestic policies’ (Moschella, 2010:102), 
particularly those relating to the banking sector. 
Yet again however the IMF was criticised for attaching misguided conditions to 
programmes two of which were especially controversial. On the one hand, macroeconomic 
policies were manifest in: government spending cuts through austerity which called for 
small surpluses over programme periods despite economic contraction; and higher interest 
rates which further damaged a weak banking sector, worsening and prolonging the crisis.  
On the other hand, IMF programmes required adjustment in areas that went far beyond 
addressing financial sector deficiencies. These distracted from issues of immediate concern, 
thereby creating unnecessary political opposition and damaging investor confidence by 
signalling that the crisis was worse than it was (Tagaki, 2009:118). Indeed, loan agreements 
incorporated a range of conditions and reform benchmarks than required previously 
despite observers diagnosing the crisis as one of premature financial liberalisation 
(Bhagwati, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002), rather than stemming from major structural problems.  
Again, as with the Latin American debt crisis, the economic position of countries receiving 
IMF loans worsened enormously. On the one hand, GDP declined 13 percent in Indonesia, 
10.2 percent in Thailand, 7.4 percent in Malaysia and 6.7 percent in the Republic of Korea 
in 1998 compared with the previous year. Moreover, from being stable prior, deficits were 
running negative at 1.7 percent for Indonesia, 2.8 percent in Thailand, 1.8 percent in 
Malaysia, and 4.2 percent in the Republic of Korea (ESCAP, 2002:39) a key reason being 
that expenditure was directed to debt servicing and restructuring financial institutions. 
Although to varying degrees growth returned in the year or two following the outbreak of 
the crisis, its negative consequences persisted long after the initial shock. As with the debt 
crisis, the labour market that was particularly hard hit. In an Asian Development Bank 
Briefing Note assessing the social impact of the crisis Pernia and Knowles (2003:3) noted 
that unemployment rose by between 90 and 400 percent in affected countries between 
1996 and 1998 which contributed enormously to increased instances of poverty. 
Problems in the labour market however were not simply limited to those losing their jobs, 
but had important consequences for those that remained employed. On the one hand, in 
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light of the crisis, firms cut wages and reduced employment benefits. Moreover, Pernia and 
Knowles (2003:4-6) observed that many people were now involuntarily working less hours 
and many older workers were being encouraged to take early retirement.  
On the other hand under-employment increased substantially, with a common theme 
among crisis-hit countries being that the share of jobs in the lower paid agricultural sector 
increased as many were lost in the manufacturing and services sectors. This put further 
downward pressure on wages which were already low compared with other sectors 
(ESCAP, 2003:39). Taken together therefore, just as it had done in light of the Latin 
American debt crisis, ‘critiques of the IMF’s international crisis management role were 
given renewed political momentum and greater urgency’ (Broome, 2010:43) due to its 
handling of the AFC. 
 
Understanding neoliberal policy continuity 
The two crises discussed here (among others) seemingly destabilised many of the cognitive 
assumptions, and had normative implications, for the neoliberal economic ideas under-
pinning IMF policy priorities. Firstly, ‘excessive exposure to external capital flows and the 
fact that in large part they were not oriented to productive uses were major factors in the 
build-up of economic crises in developing and emerging economies... beginning with the 
Latin American debt crises in the 1980s’ ( UN Trade and Development Report, 2014:122).  
Indeed, the Latin American debt crisis and AFC demonstrated perfectly the inherent pro-
cyclicality of capital flows, that is, how they flow out of a country during a recession 
precisely when it needs it most, yet flow in during a boom, thereby exacerbating 
inflationary pressures. This made developing countries subject to the rational and irrational 
whims of the investor community, to their irrational exuberance and pessimism, a scenario 
explained by Keynes who spoke of the “animal spirits” of the investor community (Stiglitz, 
2020:100).  
Secondly, the policy space to respond to crises was shown to be limited as governments 
resorted to external borrowing and felt compelled to bail out private debtors and socialise 
the losses associated with doing so. As a result, fiscal retrenchment exacerbated broader 
economic problems once manifest and had severe consequences for those groups least 
able to shoulder the burden of adjustment. Nevertheless, fiscal austerity, privatization and 
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market liberalization were consistently advocated as ends in themselves, regardless of their 
consequences, as opposed to being the means to a more equitable and sustainable growth. 
These conclusions precipitated a broader debate over how the IMF’s international crisis 
management role, and the neoliberal international financial architecture centred on the 
belief in the efficacy of the market it sought to promote, should be reformed (Broome, 
2010:44; Broome et al, 2012). At the very least the crises showed that the policies most 
conducive to growth were not universally applicable but dependent on an array of 
variables including a country’s culture and stage of development. Indeed, Stiglitz (2004:3) 
noted that IMF statements to the contrary, there is no logical reason to believe that 
markets left alone will be efficient as no country has developed by simply opening itself up 
to investment. 
This was a point not entirely missing on IMF staff members. Kreuger (2004:1) for example 
suggested that various crises, culminating in the AFC, ‘forced some pretty radical 
rethinking’ about the best ways to prevent and resolve them. This was manifest in the 
creation of the G20 in 1999, an annual meeting of finance ministers and central bank 
governors, which sought ‘to provide a new mechanism for informal dialogue in the 
framework of the Bretton Woods institutional system, to broaden the discussions on key 
economic and financial policy issues among systemically significant economies’ (G20, 
1999:1).  
This notwithstanding, no attempt was made to re-think the merits, or otherwise, of the 
neoliberal economic philosophy, nor was there any substantive effort made to reconsider 
the way in which economic problems were interpreted and responded to, and therefore, 
no shift in the kinds of policies pursued. Rather, Camdessus (1998:1) suggested that there 
would in fact be ‘no new machinery, no more government intervention’. 
Indeed, policy failures were explained away by the IMF by placing the blame at the feet of 
policymakers in developing economies, arguing that the underlying economic ideas were 
correct, but were imperfectly implemented due to technical governance failures (Killick et 
al, 1998). The IMF did not therefore abandon its core assumptions, despite the myriad 
pathologies presented by crises, but instead turned its attention to the implementation and 
monitoring of a greater range of neoliberal policies that would prevent or mitigate the 
worst effects of crises, and leave governments better placed to deal with their fiscal 
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implications. Although the fact that it did appears puzzling, two reasons as to why are 
offered hereon in.   
 
Understanding the nature of the IMF’s response to financial crises 
In order to understand why, despite the differences between the two crises discussed here 
they were interpreted and responded to in a broadly similar fashion, it is necessary to 
revisit the neoliberal economic ideas underpinning IMF problem definitions and policy 
priorities. Earlier in this chapter a number of developments in economics were highlighted 
that came to guide IMF actions including the rational expectations hypothesis, and it is 
adherence to this hypothesis, it is suggested here, that is implicit in IMF responses to the 
crises discussed.  
Rational expectations assume rational actors maximising their utility in complete markets. 
In doing so, an assumption is made that, in forming their expectations, actors make 
efficient use of the information available to them, although the potential for random 
shocks is not precluded as they are not part of actors’ information. Consequently, the 
efficient use of information provides actors with sufficient predictability to make 
expectations converge on average. This assumes that absent major informational 
asymmetries, actors’ expectations about the future state of the economy should converge 
to promote a stable equilibrium.  
What therefore, does this tell us about the nature of, and responses to, the crises discussed 
above? Given the foregoing it might be expected that holding the neoliberal economic 
ideas the IMF does, the crises would have come as a surprise. However, although the exact 
timing may have, those buying into rational expectations premises, including the IMF, 
accept their presence. Given this assertion, the IMF (1999:2) derived two key lessons from 
the crises. The first highlighted the need to increase information available to market actors, 
and the second, the importance of sound macro-economic fundamentals including low 
debt levels.   
  
Learning the lessons of crises I: Increasing the provision of information 
Should we accept the assumption of the presence of rational actors and therefore that the 
theory of markets corresponds to the actual condition of markets, it is entirely unsurprising 
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that the key function of states is understood as being to provide actors with an information 
rich environment. After all, should equilibrium be built into the system then, it would be 
natural to assume that disequilibrium is primarily, albeit not necessary exclusively, down to 
informational imperfections. With the problem defined in narrowly circumscribed, 
functionalist terms as a lack of information, the solution was obvious ‘more information, 
better information, more transparent institutions’ (Best, 2003:375; Blyth, 2002a:11).    
This approach was exemplified in light of the AFC by the G7 (1998:1) which observed that 
‘weaknesses in the financial sectors in some Asian countries increased their vulnerability to 
external shocks’, yet ‘had information about these developments been more widely 
available earlier, the international markets and International Financial Institutions might 
have been better placed to assess the risks’. The G7 was therefore clear about what it saw 
as the principal causes of the crisis, weak financial systems and a lack of transparency. As a 
result, solutions centred upon the need for better information, disclosure and 
transparency. 
Similar conclusions were drawn by the IMF which pointed towards ‘a lack of information as 
a central cause’ (Best, 2010:32) which would therefore be crucial in preventing the effects 
of those in the future. Stanley Fischer (1998:15) for example noted that ‘we have to do 
everything we can to provide the information and incentives that will encourage rational 
investor behaviour’. In a similar vein Managing Director Michel Camdessus (1999) 
suggested that ‘a lack of transparency has been found at the origin of each recurring crisis 
in emerging markets’, and they would continue to be inefficient, and would remain 
vulnerable ‘in the absence of adequate, reliable, and timely information from all quarters’. 
As a result, the central IMF response placed considerable emphasis on the importance of 
information, along with great faith in the ability of markets to use it effectively.  
By adopting this approach the G7 and IMF make the implicit assumption that the reason 
liberalized financial markets have proven inefficient, turbulent, and precipitating causes of 
the two crises discussed here is not inherent to their very nature. Rather, the crisis 
response suggests that financial markets can be subject to exogenous shocks whose worst 
effects can be mitigated through the increased provision of information which would allow 
for the adequate capture and calculation of risks, thereby leaving markets better placed to 
respond to signals and underlying economic fundamentals.    
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Learning the lessons of the crisis II: Macro-economic stability 
The need to increase the provision of information so that rational actors would be better 
placed to respond to signals and mitigate the worst effects of crises, was only one of the 
key lessons learned from the crises. Indeed, this was considered a part of a broader 
strategy incorporating the second lessons, the need for a stable macroeconomic 
framework. 
As a result the IMF has, if anything continued to broaden the scope of its policy concerns to 
include supplementary elements deemed key in contributing to stability and growth. This is 
demonstrable in its pressing - when a country’s economic problems are considered deep 
seated - for the imposition of sound domestic financial systems, improvements in the 
quality of expenditure, increased transparency and accountability in government affairs to 
avoid policy mistakes that might waste national resources, and for deregulation and de-
monopolization to create a level playing field for private sector activity (Fischer, 1998:6-8). 
In particular however, Kreuger (2004:2) has stressed the importance of a country being 
suitably positioned to meet its debt servicing obligations during a crisis. Key here was an 
assumption that it was better for governments to enter a crisis with low levels of sovereign 
debt so that increasing fiscal demands would not excessively increase debt-to-GDP as this 
had the potential to increase interest rates on sovereign debts to un-sustainable levels.  
This lesson was derived from the crises discussed here which Krueger et al (2003:316) 
suggested demonstrate how increase in domestic interest rates ‘increases the prospective 
fiscal deficit because interest-carrying costs of the debt increase’. This is exacerbated by 
slowing economic activity, tax collections falling below prior estimates and increased fiscal 
expenditures. This therefore reinforced, in the eyes of those in the IMF, the need to 
provide a stable macro-economy and particularly, the need to control government 
finances.  
Indeed, the need for increased fiscal responsibility has been an increasingly important 
element in arguments for a confidence-building strategy ‘on the grounds that market 
operators and rating agencies usually attach great importance to fiscal balances when they 
assess credit risk’ (UN Trade and Development Report, 2014:126). This view has driven the 
assumption that integration into global capital markets has a positive impact on fiscal 
discipline, and by implication, on macro-economic stability.  
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Implications for IMF understanding of crises: the role of FSAPs 
The manner in which these respective crises were interpreted by the IMF implied that it 
was emerging economies’ domestic problems in financial systems and 'lack of fit with the 
global financial system rather than the system itself’ (Best, 2010:30) that was the key 
problem. By implication, what were needed were clearer, more universal rules to ensure 
global financial stability. This diagnosis not only implied a rejection of the need for a shift 
away from neoliberal economic ideas and policies, but in fact suggested the need for 
domestic political and economic institutional reforms in order to bring emerging market 
economies in line with the standards that existed in the most advanced countries where 
the prospects for financial and economic crises on a similar scale were considered 
negligible.  
Of particular note in this regard was the establishment of the Financial Sector Assessment 
Programmes (FSAPs) introduced in 1999 in the aftermath of the AFC. These were aimed at 
addressing structural weaknesses in emerging economies, and providing better information 
to market participants. This represented an important change in the strategies deployed by 
the IMF in their efforts to better govern finance and development in both the national and 
international contexts as although the over-arching objective of helping to stabilize the 
international financial system was not new, the scope of the objective was novel.  
FSAPs, by relying ‘less on explicit coercion and more on the construction of new norms to 
achieve their ends’ suggests that IMF actions can be best interpreted as part of a broader  
‘constructivist strategy’ (Best, 2005:194-195). Understanding the production of FSAPs in 
such a manner allows us to foreground the politics, and thereby agency, associated with 
the production of reforms which can be viewed ‘not simply as a technical process but also 
as a political and normative strategy designed to establish legitimacy for a particular form 
of international financial governance’ (Best, 2005:200). This process was not regulative in 
the sense of seeking to regulate an extant activity, but was inherently constitutive in its 
attempt to re-shape the terms through which market participants interpret state actions. 
As a part of this process the IMF therefore proposed a new approach, one that would 
stabilise financial liberalization by imposing new domestic norms and institutions, 
effectively embedding finance from the top-down (Best, 2003:373).  
FSAPs are premised on the assumptions that financial sector development is an important 
means to spur economic growth, and that well-regulated financial systems are essential for 
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macro-economic and financial stability in a world of increased capital flows. The aim of 
FSAPs is therefore to develop a set of international standards that the IMF believes all 
states should adopt, and to support member countries’ efforts to strengthen their financial 
system by ‘facilitating early detection of financial sector vulnerabilities, identification of key 
development needs, and to prioritize policy responses and provide technical assistance 
when needed to strengthen supervisory and reporting frameworks’ (Krueger, 1999a:6).  
Key in this regard was an attempt by the IMF to increase the flow of timely and accurate 
data by encouraging countries to move towards greater transparency and disclosure; and 
acknowledge that it will be necessary to strengthen the standard of this information, for 
example, by providing data on forward transactions by central banks. Doing so, it is 
believed, leads to better informed investor decisions and better policies by governments.  
The consequences for domestic financial systems were apparent. Here, the IMF was 
important in helping to coordinate and communicate, along with the World Bank, BIS, and 
international standard-setting bodies, a set of standards and best practices in the banking 
area that have worked well in other countries and could be adapted and applied in others.  
As a result, effective surveillance of national financial systems, ‘along with a harmonization 
and international convergence of key components of financial policies' it was suggested, 
will help minimise risks and promote development of the financial system (FSAP Handbook, 
2005:1). This constituted an attempt to make the financial systems of developing countries 
closer resemble those of the West who were thought better placed to respond to the risks 
of increased financialization, and therefore served as a model for financial practice. 
In addition to the need to implement a range of financial sector policies however, it was 
also observed that there are important and ‘close two-way linkages between financial 
sector soundness and performance, on the one hand, and macroeconomic and real sector 
developments, on the other hand’ (FSAP Handbook, 2005:1). As a result, adhering to the 
importance of both was considered necessary for overall financial and economic stability. 
On the one hand Kose et al (2007:7) have suggested that financial sector liberalization and 
deregulation by increasing the potential costs associated with weak domestic policies, and 
by implication enhancing the benefits of the pursuit of good ones, would help to impose 
discipline on macroeconomic policies. That is, because ‘liberalization makes a country more 
vulnerable to sudden shifts in global investor sentiment, it can signal a country’s 
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commitment to better macroeconomic policies as a way of mitigating the likelihood of such 
shifts and their adverse effects’. In particular it is shown to produce better monetary policy. 
Indeed, it was suggested that keeping a close eye on broader macroeconomic 
developments would play an important part in drawing attention to the potential for future 
financial crises. This would include, analysing macroeconomic forecasts, financial sector 
indicators, along with tax policies, which ‘would help to form a view on the likelihood of 
shocks to the financial system from the broader economic environment’ (FSAP Handbook, 
2005:7).  
Assuming particular importance however, and playing ‘a major part of the Fund’s role’, was 
‘working with members to reduce fiscal deficits’ both during good times and crises, so that 
governments were better placed to absorb their impact, a process described as ‘difficult, 
but essential’ (Krueger, 2003:5). This was to be achieved through more efficient tax 
structures with fewer exemptions and a broader base but at lower rates, and effective 
budgeting and expenditure controls which were considered particularly essential. 
Taken together therefore, the IMF retained its primary focus on inflation targeting, sound 
money, prudent fiscal policies, open markets and respect for property rights and good 
governance as preconditions for macroeconomic stability and growth, a commitment 
which continues to constitute the core of Fund supported programmes.  
The IMF is almost exclusively concerned with the provision of cognitive justification for 
policies consistent with the neoliberal economic philosophy and problem definitions, and 
FSAPs, presented as a neutral, technical enterprise with emphasis on better data collection 
and transparent institutions were largely couched in such a manner.  
Moreover however, in this instance, the act of persuading states of the necessity of such 
reforms, Best (2003:75) suggests that ‘if we attend to the language of its advocates, it 
becomes clear that this new governance strategy is actually self-reflexively normative’. 
That is, the IMF has also framed the need for reforms in ‘powerfully normative terms as 
part of a new “global ethics” in which states take responsibility for their contribution to 
global financial stability’ (Best, 2005:195) through the adoption of sound economic policies. 
This was typified by successive Managing Directors within the IMF who have spoken in 
explicitly normative terms of the need for “solidarity and responsibility” (Camdessus, 
1997), “global ethics” (Kohler, 2002) and a need to do what is “morally right” (de Rato, 
2004).    
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The up-shot of doing so demonstrate that the approach taken by the IMF ‘was not purely 
technical and value-neutral; they aimed to reconstitute these economies to conform with 
the market-dominated models’ (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004:47). In doing so, what FSAPs 
leave states with is in fact a narrowly constituted system, with an intellectual and technical 
language which specifies approved categories and terms which form the basis of 
discussion.  
Using these however restricts what is thought by specifying the parameter of what was is 
acceptable in the financial sector liberalization debate. This intellectual language ensures 
that politicians and policy-makers are talking about the same thing by defining only a 
limited space of communication. As a result, what actors are left with is a series of Anglo-
American laissez-faire prescriptions for sound economic practices rather than a broadened 
scope for alternatives better oriented towards domestic contingencies that might actually 
be better placed to achieve their aims.  
In doing so, the IMF ‘clearly excluded several alternative economic strategies from the 
outset’ (Best, 2005:196) and in doing so has sought to internationalize and institutionalize 
not only a particular set of practices, but also a specific vision of what an appropriate 
economic order should look like. As a result, the new standards can be shown to have had 
as much to do with power and normative assumptions about what is right as it is to reduce 
uncertainty. However, power in this instance is not simply the power to exert ones will over 
others, but lay in the constructivist aspect of the initiative that it seeks to instantiate, that 
is, the constitutive nature of a particular set of rules and practices. Crucially, this 
constructivist strategy is not simply an attempt to alter behaviour, ‘but more profoundly to 
redefine what it means... to be good economic subjects both domestically and globally’ 
(Best, 2005:196). 
In seeking to foster a broad convergence of economic governance practices, the IMF 
therefore sought to play a much greater role in shaping domestic policies than it has so 
previously. Most of these are however, based on industrialised countries current practices 
and therefore designed with no substantive input from developing economies. 
Viewed in this regard, new standards do more than simply create clarity for existing agents 
inasmuch as they ‘are intended to constitute new state interests and identities, to create a 
particular kind of “normal state” that is defined in large measure by its support for a 
particular kind of free-market economy’ (Best, 2005:202). Consequently, while the ultimate 
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goal of contributing to domestic growth along with international financial stability, the aim 
was to do so in very narrowly circumscribed terms and at a very significant cost to 
particular states (those can least afford to partake in such an undertaking).   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has served two purposes. On the one hand it has drawn attention to the initial 
remit of the IMF which was premised on a particular interpretation of the causes of the 
negative consequences associated with the inter-war years and what this meant for policy-
makers. At this juncture problem definitions and policy priorities were provided for by the 
Keynesian economic philosophy which stressed an important role for the state in managing 
the economy. Thereafter, it was shown how the inflationary and growth crisis, interpreted 
as a crisis of Keynesianism, ultimately presaged a shift to neoliberal economic ideas which 
have informed IMF problem definitions and policy priorities in crisis contexts since.  
On the other hand, it was demonstrated how the IMF has altered the manner in which it 
has responded to financial crises, that is, through greater involvement in not only 
stabilizing crisis-hit countries, but by seeking the implementation of a range of adjustment 
policies, both of which were more closely associated with adjustment under the gold 
standard as opposed to the BWS. The record in doing so however was shown to be dire. 
Nevertheless, the IMF did not deviate from the prevailing set of neoliberal economic ideas, 
but instead called for greater information, transparency and disclosure so that markets 
would be better placed to react to signals to prevent the worst effects of crises, a key 
assumption of which was that, had the financial sectors of crisis-hit countries more closely 
resembled those of the West, they would have either been prevented, or better mitigated. 
The preceding discussion notwithstanding, the following chapter addresses the nature and 
causes of the current downturn. In doing so, it is demonstrated how although variously 
conceptualised initially, two failures, financial sector liberalization and deregulation, and 
monetary policy, suggested the potential for a crisis of as opposed to for, neo-liberal 
economic ideas.  
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Chapter 3 
Contextualising the failure of neoliberal economic ideas 
 
‘Markets do not always know better than governments; private greed does not procure 
public benefits; hedge funds and investment banks are not wealth creators, they are wealth 
destroyers; a rising tide does not invariably float all boats’                                            
(Marquand, 2011) 
 
Introduction  
In 2008 advanced economies were faced with what has been contextualised as ‘the 
greatest crisis in the history of financial capitalism’ (Turner, 2009:2), characterised by 
contracting global growth, recessions in developed economies, and the deployment of 
substantial fiscal stimulus to shore up ailing economies. Against this backdrop, this chapter 
demonstrates how, on the one hand the downturn was initially interpreted as being the 
result of inadequate policies deployed in an otherwise relatively stable economic 
framework.  
On the other hand, it is demonstrated how, as the downturn intensified, there developed a 
broad consensus that the failure of neoliberal economic ideas were in fact a major 
precipitating cause of the increasingly dire economic environment facing policymakers. This 
is explored with reference to two key failings, financial sector liberalization and 
deregulation which was the crucial precipitating cause of the downturn, and of monetary 
policy to prevent the transmission of the financial sector failings to the real economy.   
Finally, it is suggested that although the failure of neoliberal economic ideas provided the 
pre-conditions for a crisis narrative, change has not been forthcoming. In helping to 
understand why, it is suggested that the financial and economic downturn progressed 
along three phases, each requiring a distinct response and each having differing 
implications for the neoliberal economic philosophy, problem definitions, and policy 
priorities, the implications of which are explored in chapter’s four to seven. The first phase 
was limited to the banking and financial sectors; the second phase occurred as banking and 
financial sector pathologies spilled over into the real economy; and the third phase 
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occurred as fiscal stimulus undertaken during the second phase led to soaring sovereign 
debt burdens.      
 
Contextualising the downturn                                                                                                                         
In the latter half of 2008 the Western banking system faced collapse. What began as a 
disturbance in a relatively small segment of American finance, the subprime mortgage 
market, cascaded quickly beyond both the housing market and US borders, disrupting 
much of the world’s financial system and casting a pall over economic growth prospects.  
In the US, mortgage companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed under the 
conservatorship of the US Federal Housing Finance Agency with the pledge of government 
finance as needed, Lehman Brothers collapsed into bankruptcy, and Merrill Lynch was sold 
to Bank of America. Similarly, UK banks were nationalized or part nationalized, mergers and 
acquisitions were facilitated by the government, and banks received significant state 
financed cash injections. This was, to varying degrees, a scenario replicated the world over.     
Banking and financial sector pathologies quickly spilled over to the real economy, causing 
world economic activity to contract in 2009 for the first time since the end of World War 
Two. The US for example, the world’s foremost economic power, witnessed a dual crisis of 
doubling unemployment and contracting gross domestic product (GDP) (Jones, 2009:2). 
Likewise, in the UK, annual GDP declined in both 2008 and 2009 (World Bank, 2014) as a 
result of its enormous housing bubble and reliance on financial sector growth. In the 
Eurozone, overall GDP declined in both 2009 and 2012 (Eurostat, 2014), with Portugal, 
Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain proving particularly vulnerable to the economic downturn. 
In addition to the Northern core, many of the world’s peripheral economies were adversely 
affected. In sub-Saharan Africa per capita GDP declined from 3.1 percent in 2008 to -0.6 
percent in 2009 (IMF, 2009:2) with the poorest countries within the region being especially 
hard hit due to the decreasing demand for exports and collapse of commodity prices on 
which the least developed countries relied on most heavily.    
Although Chapter 2 observed the increasing prevalence of financial and economic crises in 
the contemporary era, they have tended to remain limited to what Broome et al (2012:10) 
have referred to as ‘an “other” geographical realm’, and have as a result, remained limited, 
relatively speaking, in their scope or relevance. The current downturn can therefore be 
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considered unique inasmuch as although its origins were the industrialised countries, the 
negative effects thenceforth permeated economies the world over.  
In tracing how the downturn came about, a typical narrative proceeds along the lines that 
in the 1990s, developing countries borrowed to finance investment. However, financial 
crises such as those in Asia (1997), and Russia (1998) created a situation in which 
developing countries sought to shore up their balance sheets by saving more and 
borrowing less. This, coupled with a number of oil producing countries carrying large 
surpluses due to increasing commodity prices, created a situation in which developing 
countries went from borrowing $88 billion in 1996 to lending $205 billion by 2003 (Jones, 
2009:3). Capital markets, suddenly awash with cash, and with interest rates low, sought 
increasingly profitable investment opportunities, and it was in stocks and shares, and 
property that investors sought solace.   
As property prices continued to rise, this was coupled with an increasing utilisation of 
mortgage backed securities, the so-called ‘greatest financial innovation of the 20th Century’ 
(Shah, 2009:4), which although present for a number of years, became the financial 
instrument of choice in light of the dot.com bust (Sinclair, 2009:451). Banks were able to 
slice and dice their loans into saleable assets and thus sell them, and any associated risk on. 
In doing so, it was argued that securitisation would make the banking and overall financial 
system more resilient (Turner, 2009:42). However with the prime mortgage market 
heading toward saturation and with interest rates at historically low levels, investors were 
prompted to search for yield further down the credit quality curve (Anderson, 2009:2). 
Consequently, by 2006 one fifth of US mortgages were sub-prime yet this was deemed 
unproblematic as property prices continued upon a seemingly relentless upward trajectory 
(Jones, 2009:6).  
It seemed to be a foolproof plan and, somewhat unsurprisingly, investors sought a greater 
piece of the pie. Traditional high street banks therefore entered into investment banking, 
transferring their business models in order to compete with the less regulated institutions 
of the shadow banking system which, in turn, got into high street banking to such an extent 
that it grew as large as the formal banking system albeit bereft of comparable regulatory 
structures. Such was their apparent success however that anyone questioning the logic of 
this approach was deemed to be anti-capitalist or simply socialist (Shah, 2009:25).  
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By 2006 however, with the tendency towards low interest rates reversing, 16 percent of 
sub-prime lenders on variable rate mortgages in the US entered into default (Jones, 
2009:6). Initially, it was unclear to what extent banks had been affected by the collapse in 
the sub-prime market or the extent to which other banks were backed by bad, or so called 
‘toxic’ debt. Bereft of credible information and with banks cautious of lending to one 
another, the inter-bank interest rate on short term loans increased from 0.2 - 0.4 percent 
prior to the downturn up to 3.5 percent in 2008 (Jones, 2009:7). Lending was therefore 
either at a premium or non-existent, thus signalling a classic liquidity crisis.  
At this juncture, it was apparent that the market was ill-equipped to handle the crisis with-
out disastrous consequences, not just for the financial sector, but the economy in general. 
Indeed, having seemingly falsified the belief that market discipline and self-regulation 
would provide an excessive brake on risk-taking by unregulated institutions, banking and 
financial sector pathologies contrastingly illustrated the inadequacy of market discipline. As 
a result, as economies faltered, governments were faced with no viable alternative other 
than to assist banks financially or facilitate mergers and acquisitions in addition to injecting 
significant fiscal stimulus in an attempt to redress the ensuing economic downturn. 
 
Conceptualising the downturn 
This generally accepted narrative of the origins of the downturn notwithstanding, there 
nevertheless existed an initial lack of consensus on how best to conceptualise its nature, 
thereby leading to myriad technical explanations. For Carmassi et al (2009) the result was 
lax monetary policy (supplemented by excessive leverage and reckless bets on asset price 
increases), without which the unfolding turmoil would not have been possible. In making 
this assertion, the authors singled out the role played by the Federal Reserve in repeatedly 
intervening to counter negative bubbles over the course of a decade by aggressively cutting 
interest rates. Such an asymmetric monetary policy however, both played an important 
role in bringing about convergent expectations of ever-rising asset prices, and created a 
gigantic moral hazard problem in which all agents expected to be rescued from their 
mistakes.  
Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan (2008:507) however suggested that ‘the 
fundamental problem had been the under-pricing of risk worldwide’. Here, Greenspan 
noted that in June 2007 the yields of CCC-rated junk bonds in the United States had shrunk 
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to little more than 4 percent over yields on ten-year US treasuries which were vastly safer. 
By contrast, in October 2002, the yields of the two were more appropriately risk weighted 
and separated by 23 percent (Greenspan, 2008:507-508).  
This mispricing of risk was, according to Greenspan (2008:510-513), driven in large part by 
developing country growth, particularly in China whose citizens chronically save more of 
their incomes than do those in developed nations. The resulting rise in what economists 
call saving propensity swamped the financial markets as planned capital investments did 
not keep pace with savings. As a result, long-term interest rates, both nominal and real, fell 
dramatically around the world, as did inflation, and drove the prices of assets up sharply.  
As a result, investment banks and private equity funds were all awash with cash thanks to 
massive increases in liquidity. It was against this backdrop that investors reached out to 
acquire lesser-grade assets in order to enhance returns that had been squeezed by the 
decline in long-term rates. Yet it was the failure to properly price such risk that typified the 
downturn as when markets eventually trashed the rosy ratings, a blanket of uncertainty 
descended on the investment community with banks hiking inter-bank lending rates. As a 
result, when the downturn hit, its suddenness was a shock, but the fact of it was not.   
Friedman and Friedman (2008) however suggested that the financial collapse 
demonstrated what can go wrong when firms do not behave ethically or socially 
responsible. At base, the authors noted that the context within which this kind of corporate 
behaviour flourished was derived from a widespread, yet misplaced interpretation of the 
work of Adam Smith, which appeared to suggest that self-interest and the invisible hand of 
the market-place constituted the most efficacious means to allocate scarce resources. This 
resulted, in a system that for corporations was synonymous with the maximization of 
profits and/or shareholder wealth.  
However, raw self-interest without a foundation of morality was not what Adam Smith was 
about. Indeed, the authors suggest that the financial meltdown showed quite clearly what 
happens when everyone is solely concerned with their own self-interest. This, the authors 
suggest, was the most important lesson of the downturn: unethical behaviour has severe 
adverse economic/political consequences. An assumption was therefore made that the 
financial collapse could not have occurred if all parties were socially responsible, were not 
motivated by greed, and were compensated/incentivised in the perverse manner they 
were.  
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These conceptualisations draw our attention to the fact that a given set of economic and 
political pathologies can support a multitude of differing and competing interpretations 
and narratives of what went wrong, which actors and policies were at fault, and crucially, 
what policies are required to place the system back on a sound footing (Hay, 1999, 2013a). 
In this particular instance however, those above all foresaw the need for intervention to 
redress existing policies that were generally of the correct order but would need some 
tinkering so as to guarantee the continued functioning of an otherwise stable 
financial/economic order.  
Carmassi et al (2009) for example suggested that all that was required to avoid a repeat 
was to correct the policy faults of lax monetary policy, and to a lesser extent, excessive 
leverage. An assumption was therefore made that there was no need for intrusive rules 
constraining non-bank intermediaries and financial innovation. Rather, the message 
remained, keep things simple. Similarly, Friedman and Friedman (2008:4) suggest that one 
of the key lessons from of the downturn is that ‘we should recognise that what we have 
experienced is not the breakdown of an economic system. This is a values meltdown more 
than anything else’.  
Although these conceptualisations represent useful explanatory tools of the origins of the 
present downturn, they nevertheless belie a more pressing need to identify the more 
fundamental, underlying problems that created the current situation (Boone et al, 2009:8).  
In seeking to provide a deeper understanding of its origins, an assumption is made, in a 
manner consistent with Krugman (2009) for example that the shift from the Keynesian to 
neoliberal economic ideas was the critical precipitating factor. Against this backdrop, the 
financial, and latterly economic, downturn can be shown to rest on the culmination of two 
key failings central to neoliberal economic ideas. The first of these was the failure of 
banking and financial sector deregulation and liberalization. The second was the failure of 
monetary policy to prevent its transmission to the real economy and a broader economic 
downturn.   
This had profound implications for the economic ideas underpinning the neoliberal 
economic philosophy (assumptions regarding the efficacy of the market), the manner in 
which economic problems are interpreted and responded to (an emphasis on monetary 
policy as a means by which to control inflation and mitigate the most severe effects of 
economic downturns), and the kinds of policies pursued (financial sector liberalization). 
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Drawing attention to the failure of neoliberal economic ideas as a precipitating cause of 
banking and financial sector pathologies, and the broader economic downturn, carries with 
it an important implication: that what we are seeing is not simply the result of an 
exogenous shock punctuating an otherwise stable economic order, or following Sinclair 
(2009:451), ‘a deviation from the normal state of the market’. Rather, it is understood for 
our purposes here, consistent with Hay (2013:4) as, more fundamentally endogenous, 
arising from the internal puncturing of the neoliberal model of growth. It is therefore not 
possible to place responsibility onto emerging markets whose financial sectors were not 
aligned with those of the West as this was a problem created by the very financial sectors 
of those considered best place to avoid such shocks in the first place. Indeed, responsibility 
for this downturn can be placed squarely at the feet of the neoliberal economic ideas and 
practices advocated by global governance institutions, including most notably, the IMF 
(Best, 2010:31 ). 
 
Failure I: Financial sector liberalization and deregulation 
In understanding the first of the failures it is useful to draw on the work of Crotty (2008:3) 
who has noted that the deeper cause of the current turmoil ‘is to be found in the flawed 
institutions and practices of what is often referred to as the New Financial Architecture 
(NFA)’ or for the purposes of this research, financial sector liberalization and deregulation 
associated with neoliberal economic ideas. That is, the integration of modern day financial 
firms and markets with an associated regime of light government regulation. Although 
having existed for twenty five years Crotty notes that a ‘perfect calm’ between 2003 and 
2007 characterised by low interest rates, low loan default rates, high profits and rising 
stock prices, all contributed to the excesses that ultimately precipitated the financial 
collapse.  
In particular, firstly, innovation created financial products that were so complex and 
opaque they could not be priced correctly and therefore lost liquidity when the perfect 
calm ended. Indeed, financial innovation reached such a point that structured financial 
products including mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and collateralised debt obligations 
(CDOs) were so complex that they ‘destroyed the transparency necessary for any 
semblance of market efficiency’ (Crotty, 2008:25), being as they were, characterised by 
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asymmetric information and unequal bargaining power that allowed banks to generate 
high profits.  
In reality, dealers in structured financial products deliberately ensured that clients did not 
know the true price of what was being traded, rather, a lack of transparency was at the 
very heart of the profitability of structured products as clients were denied access to up to 
date prices due to complex pricing structures. This blew out of the water the claim that 
financial markets, left alone, would provide enough information for risk to be optimally 
priced.  
Moreover, the crucial foundation of the narrative claim that commercial banks would 
distribute almost all risky assets associated with innovative financial products to capital 
markets and hedge whatever risk remained through credit default swaps turned out to be 
completely false. On the one hand, rather than shrinking as the narrative predicted, on-
balance-sheet assets of large global banks increased from $10 trillion to $23 trillion 
between 2000 and 2006 (Crotty, 2008:31), the cause of which was increased bank holdings 
of MBSs and CDOs, the exact securities that the narrative claim suggested would be sold to 
markets.  
CDOs were especially attractive since they could be held off-balance-sheet with no capital 
reserve requirements. These were kept for four main reasons. First, to convince potential 
investors of their safety; second, substantial shares of the riskiest products were kept to 
maximise compensation by maximising short-term profits; thirdly, the time lapse between 
bank’s receipt of a mortgage and the sale of the MBS/CDO was sufficiently long that at any 
point in time banks held or warehoused substantial quantities of these securities; fourthly, 
when banks found the safest or ‘super senior’ tranches of mortgage backed securities hard 
to sell because their yield was low, they simply kept them themselves (Crotty, 2008:32-33). 
On the other hand, under the prevailing regime, regulators allowed giant banks to measure 
and manage their own risk and set their own capital requirements which, given perverse 
incentives, naturally led to excessive risk-taking. Indeed, in 1996 the BIS sanctioned the 
idea that as of 1998 regulators should shift responsibility for setting limits on giant banks’ 
risk from regulatory authorities to the banks themselves. This edict was a core component 
of the Basel 2 regulatory regime in which banks would manage risk through a statistical 
exercise known as Value at Risk (VAR), allowing banks to set their own capital 
requirements.  
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VAR is an estimate of the highest possible loss in the value of a portfolio of financial assets 
and liabilities over a fixed time interval with a specific confidence level. However, there 
were three fundamental flaws in this model of risk assessment: firstly, there is no period of 
historical data that can generate a reliable result; secondly, VAR assumes that substantial 
‘shocks’ to the financial system that occur every five or six years cannot possibly take place; 
finally, the assessment of asset price correlations based on historical data used in VAR 
calculations becomes grossly unrealistic when the system fails (Crotty, 2008:38).      
Secondly, financial sector liberalization and deregulation was shown to encourage perverse 
incentives that create excessive risk, exacerbate booms, and generate severe downturns. 
This is especially so during financial upturns as risks build up, creating even higher leverage 
and financial stability. Indeed, Crotty (2008:19), following Keynes, suggests that the 
financial sector is one that is particularly susceptible to herd behaviour (see Chapter 2). This 
was perhaps best exemplified by Citigroup Chief Executive Chuck Prince’s comment that ‘as 
long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance’ (quoted in Financial Times, 
2007:1). 
In this particular instance, the financial collapse demonstrated for example how contracts 
to manage large portfolios can be lost by a firm if its returns fall below the industry 
average. As a result, when the asset bubble took hold institutional investors had a strong 
incentive to follow others in pursuit of capital gains, even at the risk of absorbing losses 
when the bubble burst. Therefore, even managers convinced the bubble will deflate must 
follow the herd as not doing so would risk losing business. If they follow the herd and the 
bubble bursts however, all firms suffer losses and so none will lose their competitive 
advantage. This explains why such a range of institutions became major investors in 
securities markets.  
Thirdly, the preceding discussion shows how such flaws have major implications for the 
theoretical foundations of neoliberalism. On the one hand the banking and financial 
collapse demonstrated the extreme gap between theoretical assumptions and real world 
markets, notably, that capital markets are efficient and price risk and return correctly; and 
liquidity is always perfect (assets can be sold any time at their equilibrium price) (Crotty, 
2008:14). 
Rodney Bruce Hall (2009:453) for example has observed, following Minsky, that contrary to 
the efficient markets hypothesis, ‘market prices of financial assets do not reflect “correct” 
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prices based on current information, but market actors acquire financial assets on the 
shared expectation that they will rise’. As a result, rather than calculating utilities in 
accordance with rational expectations actors instead operate on the basis of shared social 
and economic understandings that they derive from one another. This ultimately leads to 
periods of excessive credit creation in the economy and the mispricing of financial risk. 
On the other hand, this has important implications for the manner in which actors are 
perceived to act on the basis of rational expectations. Indeed, unfolding financial sector 
pathologies demonstrated that actors act upon the basis of inter-subjective expectations. 
That is, they look to each other for signals as to how to react to market events. When these 
shared understandings are disappointed, they panic, thereby contributing to volatility. The 
current turmoil is therefore but one example in which the behaviour of market participants 
diverges from the behaviour predicted by rational expectations theory (Hall, 2009:454-
455).  
In doing so, it was demonstrated that: agents can not know the future because it does not 
yet exist, they have to make guesses based on some process of extrapolation based on the 
past; as a result, in a world of uncertainty, risk aversion is endogenous and varies with the 
cycle, that is, investors got both more optimistic and less risk averse during the boom years 
which caused leverage to rise as the boom accelerated; yet when the downturn broke out, 
pessimism set in and risk aversion and liquidity preferences spiked, thereby causing 
investors to sell risky assets. This destroyed liquidity in troubled markets to such an extent 
that assets could only be sold at a large capital loss (in 2007 for example Wachovia Corp. 
bought a CDO for $600,000 but within a few months was willing to accept just one 
twentieth of this initial price) which accelerated the rate of price decline (Crotty, 2008:30). 
Taken together therefore, on a fundamental level, the banking and financial sector collapse 
problematised many cognitive assumptions underlying the neoliberal economic philosophy 
including: the “efficient market hypothesis”; the “rational expectations paradigm”; and the 
“self-regulation of markets and institutions”. In this respect, it appeared evident that the 
collapse was not simply a failure for neoliberal global economic governance, but was a far 
more fundamental failure of neoliberal economic ideas, the manner in which economic 
problems are identified and interpreted, and the kinds of policies considered appropriate.  
That is, the banking and financial collapse demonstrated that: markets do not know better 
than governments; private greed does not procure public benefits; investment banks and 
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hedge funds are not wealth creators, they are wealth destroyers; a rising tide does not float 
all boats as wealth has not trickled down from the ultra rich to the rest; such a model is 
monstrously unjust and morally unsustainable; and the financial innovations of the past, 
premised on the notion that risk is knowable and calculable, does not constitute a scientific 
basis upon which to form a calculable probability (Marquand, 2011; Abdelal et al, 
2010:233). 
 
Failure II: Monetary policy 
Although banking and financial sector regulatory failures were readily apparent, 'linking the 
explosive banking and financial crash of 2008 to macroeconomic policy and problems is a 
less straightforward intellectual case to make' (Baker, 2015:359), despite it being assigned 
‘a central role’ (Bernanke, 2010:1) in the downturn. Indeed, that a number of failings have 
been attributed to it means that the nature of the lessons to be learned is controversial.  
Firstly, it has been suggested that monetary policy failed to prevent the banking and 
financial collapse. This line of critique proceeds along the lines that monetary policy did not 
pay sufficient attention, and therefore did not seek to effectively counter, the unfolding 
house price bubble. Proponents of this view therefore limit their calls for an expanded 
mandate and a greater role for monetary policy in preventing and controlling bubbles. 
Secondly, it has been suggested that monetary policy failed because rates were kept too 
low for too long a length of time. This, the argument proceeds, contributed to an 
abundance of cheap money which, particularly during the first half of the decade helped 
cause a house price bubble. Those highlighting these failings typically daw on the example 
of simple policy rules, namely the Taylor Rule which provides ‘the most commonly cited 
evidence that monetary policy was too easy during the period from 2002 to 2006’ 
(Bernanke, 2010:7).  
These two approaches highlight how policies could have been deployed more effectively to 
prevent the economic downturn. Accordingly, an assumption is made that monetary policy 
could have been much more proactive. Nevertheless, the focus here is on a third failure, 
the actual functioning of monetary policy of the kind often advocated by the IMF to deal 
with developed country downturns. This typically takes the form of interest rate reductions 
as the signs of an economic slowdown present themselves, as was the case in initially 
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dealing with the downturn as banking and financial sector pathologies affected the real 
economy.   
However, in the case of the current downturn, interest rate reductions ran into trouble as 
rates quickly fell to, or very near to, the zero lower bound (ZLB), thereby limiting the role of 
monetary policy as the first line of defence. Moreover, increasingly unconventional 
monetary policies also failed in their ability to prevent the financial and economic 
downturn from becoming a far more serious collapse in economic demand. In helping to 
explain why this is so, it is useful to draw on research presented in the IMF’s October 2008 
GFSR.  
It was a commonly assumption that, for developed countries at least, cutting the bank 
policy rate (typically an overnight rate) during times of economic slowdown/recession 
would be transmitted through interbank and money-market interest rates, so influencing 
consumer and business lending rates and by implication, domestic demand. However this 
transmission mechanism failed to operate in a manner consistent with conventional 
thinking during the current downturn thanks largely to the inter-connections between 
money and other credit markets that have developed over the past two decades. This 
shows how disruptions to money and funding markets can have important adverse macro-
economic consequences.  
Although structural changes in the financial sector of the last twenty five years or so did not 
appear to have undermined the traditional monetary policy transmission mechanism, these 
changes had in fact set the stage for the alteration in the transmission mechanism which 
were particularly evident beginning in summer 2007 (GFSR, 2008a:81). The most important 
of these changes has been the increasing prevalence of near-banks, the shift of banks 
towards market financing, and the shortening of long-term liabilities through the late-
1990s. 
In the first of these, near-bank financial institutions (including issuers of asset-backed 
securities and other structured products, finance companies, securities brokers and 
dealers, and funding corporations) have gained a significant share of financial 
intermediation, and now account for an increasing share of the financial sector, the 
corollary of which has been a corresponding declining share for banks, particularly 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  
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In the second of these, banks have been moving away from deposits to more unreliable 
market-based financing. In doing so, “core deposits” have been replaced by a range of 
other managed liabilities. This has links with an originate to distribute financial model that 
relies heavily on sound short-term market liquidity management. Similarly, the share of 
deposits held by households has declined over time, while simultaneously, deposits held by 
non-financial corporations and financial intermediaries have increased. Moreover, 
financing through repurchase agreements and issuance of debt securities have expanded, 
indicating that banks are increasingly exposed to developments in money markets (GFSR, 
2008a:84). 
Finally, bank liability maturities have shortened and become more volatile in the process. 
These short-term markets became more important for banks and near-banks through the 
1990s as a more flexible way of managing their asset and liability structures. In doing so, 
banks have tapped an increased share of funding through repo agreements. The problem 
with doing so, however, is that short-term market financing costs are more volatile than 
the traditional main financing source of core deposits. 
With the preceding discussion in mind, the GFSR (2008a:85) has suggested that ‘the 
dramatic alteration in the interest rate transmission mechanism brought on by the market 
turbulence that erupted in July 2007 can be seen in the changing costs and composition of 
bank and near-bank financing’. That is, interest rate spreads and the volatility of banks’ 
short-term financing rose to levels exceeding those of previous downturns, immediately 
raising marginal financing costs, and in so doing, cut off some banks from the markets.  
Banks and near-banks were therefore left with no viable option other than to tap longer-
term financing, despite the higher costs associated with doing so. The result however was 
that the spreads over treasury securities of comparable maturities of longer-term bank 
financing instruments shot up to levels far above previous cyclical highs such that banks 
significantly tightened lending standards for most categories of loans (GFSR, 2008a:86). 
This evidence did not fundamentally challenge the assumption that the medium to longer-
term pass-through of policy rate cuts was mostly stable over time, as a relatively smooth 
long-run transmission of policy rate changes to market interest rates testified. What it did 
do however was suggest short-term pass-through coefficients were inherently problematic.  
Indeed, particularly from mid-2007 (about the time the turbulence began), three-month 
rates, most notably LIBOR (the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate) ‘jumped substantially at 
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the same time as the extraordinary increase in money market spreads and the collapse of 
the structured credit market in response to subprime mortgage market distress’, which, 
along with being even more pronounced for near-banks, pointed towards ‘evidence of a 
dramatic alteration in the predictability of interest rate transmission’ (GFSR, 2008a:91).  
This suggested that the early linkages of interest rate transmission were impeded by the 
financial nature of the downturn which became disconnected from actual rates. This helps 
to explain why, despite the substantial decline in policy rates and interest rates on 
securities for example, the cost of credit to households and businesses rose, sometimes 
substantially.  
Given the foregoing, ‘the tightening of credit standards and the failure of the cost of credit 
to households and businesses to fall despite the sharp easing of monetary policy has led to 
a common view that monetary policy has not been effective during the recent financial 
crisis’ (Mishkin, 2008:1). Indeed, contrary to existing assumptions regards the transmission 
effects of monetary policy interventions, the economy went into a tailspin. Therefore, its 
use was likened to pushing on a string. This led to two conclusions. Firstly, if monetary 
policy is in-effective, there was no reason to use it to cope with the downturn. And 
secondly, easing monetary policy during a financial collapse can be counter-productive 
because it can weaken the credibility of monetary authorities to keep inflation under 
control.  
In light of the failures detailed here, the comment by Romer (2009:12) that ‘the system 
that allowed our current crisis to occur cannot be permitted to continue’ became 
commonplace, and was also supplemented with calls in some quarters for the need for a 
shift away from prevailing neoliberal economic ideas (Johnson, 2009:4). This reflected a 
widely held assumption of the time that the downturn ‘was likely to induce profound 
changes in economic theory, philosophical outlook, and institutional structure’ (Sheng, 
2009:375).  
Indeed, it was argued that ‘at the very least the prospect of a substantial redrawing of the 
importance of finance and the scale of its activities... as well as much tighter regulation... 
were widely anticipated as the minimum changes that would be needed’ (Gamble, 
2009:70). Certainly, it was assumed that banking and financial sector pathologies, along 
with the protracted economic downturn had been at the very least as severe as other 
similar periods of political-economic failure (the Great Depression of the 1930s and 
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stagflation of the 1970s) that presaged a crisis, and therefore major transformation of their 
respective orders. 
 
IMF responses as a multiphase event 
Having highlighted the failure of two areas synonymous with neoliberal economic ideas, 
the empirical chapters that follow provide an assessment of the extent to which these have 
impacted upon the neoliberal economic philosophy, problem definitions and policy 
priorities in the IMF. Before doing so however, three considerations are noteworthy.  
Firstly, how the IMF interpreted unfolding events was hugely important as at its Sao Paulo 
Summit, the G20 noted that ‘we must draw policy lessons from the current crisis... to 
minimise the risk of a future crisis’, and that ‘given its near universal membership and core 
macro-financial expertise, the Fund should play a leading role in this task’ (G20, 2008:5). 
Moreover, the G20 group of state leaders increased the funds available to the IMF so that it 
would be ably positioned to respond to requests for assistance by countries. Taken 
together we can see how the IMF was accorded a key position in responding to unfolding 
events.  
Secondly, differing diagnoses of the downturn implied the need for alternative policy 
interventions. Certainly, in not being given by their material conditions, the failure of neo-
liberal economic ideas are differently experienced by agents, so what failure meant to 
some might not be as obvious to others, yet this discursive process is crucial as the 
diagnosis that sticks not only shapes the response, but shows what is (im)possible to others 
(Abdelal et al, 2010:233). The question therefore is how has the IMF interpreted such 
failures, how has it spoken of what they are, and what models has it suggested might 
legitimately be brought to bear in terms of response.  
Thirdly, given the foregoing, understanding how the IMF has conceptualised the unfolding 
turmoil will play an important part in helping us to determine the extent to which 
neoliberal economic ideas continue to be perceived as the superior means by which to 
respond to the downturn. Namely, can the solutions to questions posed by the failure of 
regulation, and then of monetary policy to contain the economic turmoil, be understood 
with the cognitive tools currently available, or does there exist an opportunity for cognitive 
innovation (the possibility for transformation)? That is, given the commitment in the IMF to 
the efficacy of neoliberal economic ideas to what extent has it so far refrained from serious 
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discussion regarding a potential shift to an alternative growth model, electing instead to 
respond within the intellectual frames that defined the orthodoxies of previous decades?  
Answering this question should go some way towards determining the extent to which the 
failure of neoliberal economic ideas constitutes a progression towards a serious political-
economic crisis (an inter-subjectively held consensus of the need for altered structures 
(change)). That is, although failure has seemingly de-legitimated existing economic models, 
new ideas can nevertheless be hard to accept and old ideas difficult to abandon.  
Moreover, institutional structures not only nurture ideas and secure their propagation, 
they also protect and conserve them (Rueschemeyer, 2006:245). As a result, there exists 
the potential for future rules and regulations to embody past fallacies as any change, or 
continuity, remains inherently political (Abdelal et al, 2010:236). Existing institutions may 
therefore seek to protect dominant ideas, nip alternative ideas in the bud by the force of 
tradition, and assist vested interests so as to stop an opening for change; and they may 
hinder innovative ideas either for normative or material reasons (Rueschemeyer, 
2006:244).  
Similarly however, the preceding discussion demonstrates how moments of failure can 
throw causal interdependencies into doubt and open up alternative interpretations of 
economic problems which direct collective action in an altogether different direction. That 
is, moments of political-economic failure produce new lessons from which collectively we 
learn, and cultivate economic growth in new ways. These differences aside, ‘whether new 
political or economic policies will emerge from the crisis, and what forms they may take are 
among the most important political and social questions’ (Brand & Sekler, 2009:5).  
In outlining how the IMF has interpreted the downturn, an assumption is made that 
responses are best understood as having progressed through a series of over-lapping yet 
distinct phases, with each requiring a different set of policy interventions and each having 
different implications for the neoliberal economic philosophy. This is an approach that has 
been increasingly deployed to make sense of, and better understand the nature and 
implications of, the current downturn.  
Payne (2014) for example has done so in order to analyse the response of the G20 to un-
ravelling events. Here, three stages are observed beginning in 2008 when the G20 called 
for coordinated global fiscal stimulus to stem the economic downturn in rejecting 
orthodoxy by calling on the deployment of the power and resources of the state. The 
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second phase came in 2010 during which time according to Payne (2014:3) ‘the politics of 
the crisis had changed in quite significant ways’ as the neoliberal old guard began to strike 
back in response to the Keynesian policies advocated previously. The third phase however, 
came in 2013 as many observers suggested that, although effective during the first phase 
of the downturn, progress made by the G20 completely stalled.  
This was an process deployed by Gamble (2014:51-75) who similarly suggested that the 
international economy has passed through four phases since 2007. The first of these, 
beginning in 2007 – 2008, ultimately led to the events of September and October 2008. The 
second phase was dominated by the recession in 2009 and the first signs of the recovery in 
2010. In the third phase, the recovery was shown to be disrupted by over-zealous austerity 
and the euro-zone crisis in 2011 and 2012. The fourth phase, beginning in 2013, has been 
characterised by strong signs of a second economic recovery in Western countries.   
In a broadly similar vein, a key assumption of this research is that the IMF response can be 
viewed as a multiphase event with each having important, albeit very different 
implications, for the neoliberal economic philosophy, problem definitions and policies. The 
first phase explored ran from summer 2007 until September 2008 and was linked to 
failures in the banking and financial sectors; the second phase came immediately 
thereafter as their effects spilled over into the real economy as monetary policy failed to 
stem its transmission and fiscal stimulus came to the fore; and the third phase was 
characterised by a shift in emphasis in 2010 as attention turned to the negative 
consequences associated with sovereign debt burdens, accrued as a result of fiscal 
interventions during the second phase.  
 
Phase one: banking and financial sector implications  
In July 2007 global credit markets deteriorated as a re-pricing of credit risk sparked 
increased banking and financial sector volatility and a broad loss of market liquidity. 
Initially, rising delinquencies on US subprime mortgages, in the context of a major housing 
correction led to a spike in yields on securities collateralised with such loans and led to a 
sharp widening in spreads on structured credits. Moreover, from mid-August, rising 
uncertainty about the amount and distribution of associated valuation losses and concerns 
about the off-balance-sheet exposures of financial institutions further added to market 
strains.  
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The result was a drying up of high-yield corporate bond issues, a sharp contraction in the 
asset backed commercial paper market, a dramatic disruption of liquidity in the inter-bank 
market, and stress on institutions funded through short-term money markets with three 
month interbank rates shooting up far in excess of policy targets. This occurred as banks 
sought to conserve their liquidity in the face of pressures to absorb assets from off-
balance-sheet vehicles for which they were unable to obtain funding. Correspondingly 
yields on government paper declined sharply as investors looked for safe havens in which 
to invest.  
Initial responses took two forms: policies to stabilize the financial system; and policies to 
prevent a repeat. In the case of the former, faced by mounting market disruptions, the 
WEO (2007:2-4) advocated that central banks in the major advanced economies: inject 
liquidity through open market operations to stabilize overnight interest rates; facilitate 
access to discount windows; and extend deposit insurance coverage to reassure depositors.  
These interventions notwithstanding, the WEO (2007:6) noted that market liquidity would 
be restored in the following months as the inter-bank market reverted to more normal 
conditions. Adverse market developments were therefore considered ‘an inevitable return 
to greater market discipline after a period of very low risk spreads and lax credit conditions, 
which should ultimately strengthen the foundations of global growth’ (WEO, 2007:8-9).  
As a result, the IMF continued to exhibit a large degree of confidence in the soundness of 
underlying economic fundamentals to such an extent that even as the banking and financial 
pathologies worsened, the WEO (2008:6) suggested that financial market turbulence would 
not significantly impact on economic activity. Rather, the suggestion was that growth 
would continue at a solid pace thanks to the strong balance sheets and capital positions of 
financial institutions, and the healthy situation in labour markets and house-hold net 
wealth.  
As events worsened however, concern for macro-economic feedback effects grew thanks 
to reduced capital buffers and uncertainty about the size and distribution of bank losses. 
These combined with normal credit cycle dynamics to weigh heavily on household 
borrowing, the business environment, and asset prices, all of which combined to feed back 
into employment and output growth. As a result, the GFSR (2008:x) urged that monetary 
policy interventions should function as the first line of defence in combating the downturn.   
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In the case of the latter however, the GFSR (2008) highlighted a number of key themes that 
had contributed to banking and financial sector pathologies. These included: the fact that 
private sector risk management, disclosure, financial sector supervision and regulation all 
lagged behind innovation and the changing nature of risk models, thereby leaving scope for 
excessive risk-taking, weak underwriting, and asset price inflation; and a collective failure 
to appreciate the extent of leverage taken on by institutions and the associated risks of a 
dis-orderly unwinding. Crucially, these problems were not limited to the source of the 
down-turn (US) but, having played out to varying degrees elsewhere, suggested that 
weaknesses in risk management systems and prudential supervision were systemic in their 
nature. 
It was therefore suggested that although there was a need to decrease financial system 
fragility, this should be conducted in such a manner that would not impede its efficiency 
through over-regulation. Indeed, given some of these initial conditions such as 
securitization and complex derivative securities ‘should not and will not go away’ 
(Blanchard, 2009:20) the challenge facing policy-makers at this juncture was understood as 
being to prevent the complexity associated with financial innovation from turning into 
dangerous opacity.  
A fundamental part of remedying for this problem was, according to the MCMD (2009:3) 
the need for the collection and dissemination of more and better information and 
improved disclosure of risks (particularly ‘off balance sheet risks’) which had been largely 
limited due to legal constraints. Behind this was the notion that that risk could be correctly 
priced, but that markets were impeded from discovering these correct prices by 
information or incentive failures. Making information available to investors and counter-
parties, it was thought, would be sufficient for them to assess the risks of their investments 
and would, by implication help to restore confidence by reducing uncertainty regards the 
prices of assets.  
In a broadly similar vein, the GFSR (2008:xii) suggested that some of the ways the private 
sector could usefully contribute would be through: enhanced disclosure including providing 
timely and consistent reporting of exposures and valuations; disclosure strategies that 
would correct the risk management failings that may have contributed to losses and 
liquidity difficulties; and review distorted managerial compensation structures.  
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Taken together, these assumptions reflected the observation made in the GFSR (2008a:xiv) 
that, although the public sector had an important role to play, ‘private sector financial 
institutions will nevertheless continue to play a crucial role in identifying and rectifying 
deficiencies in order to place financial intermediation on a more sound footing’. 
 
Phase two: economic downturn 
As 2008 progressed however threats to systemic stability increased, dislocations in 
securities markets intensified, and there were significant bank balance sheet adjustments 
and growing concerns about counterparty credit risks. One of the main channels for such 
macro-financial linkage was tightening bank lending standards in both the US and Western 
Europe as banks sought to decrease their leverage in the face of reduced market tolerance 
for balance-sheet risk, increasingly expensive bank capital, and reduced access to 
wholesale funding. These problems intensified financial strains which were beginning to 
take an increasingly heavy toll on economic activity (Baldacci & Gupta, 2009:1; WEO, 
2008a).  
This occurred despite central bank interventions in markets and IMF advocacy of aggressive 
policy easing and unconventional monetary policies (UMPs) such as bond purchases and 
forward guidance on the policy rate. Indeed, solvency concerns intensified, triggering 
banking and financial sector bankruptcies, forced mergers, and public interventions which 
led to a drastic re-shaping of the financial landscape and slowdown in economic growth.  
Blanchard (2009:5-10) suggested that four factors related to the financial sector in 
particular had combined to turn a price decline into a broader economic downturn. Firstly, 
assets were created, sold, and bought that appeared much less risky than they were. 
Secondly, securitization led to complex and hard to value assets on the balance sheets of 
financial institutions. Third, securitization led to greater connectedness between financial 
institutions within and across countries. Fourth, leverage increased as financial institutions 
financed their portfolios with less capital. These consequences were amplified by the 
modern version of bank runs and the need by financial institutions to maintain an adequate 
capital ratio. 
At this juncture the WEO (2008a:1) observed the downturn had ‘entered a tumultuous new 
phase’. Similarly, in a 2008 interview Blanchard (2008:2) noted that ‘the financial crisis has 
now evolved into a broader economic crisis, triggered by a freeze of the credit market, 
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large wealth losses, and a loss of confidence’, the result being a sharp fall in private 
demand. Indeed, such was its severity that Blanchard suggested that it could, in the 
absence of major policy interventions, exceed anything seen since the Great Depression in 
the 1930s.  
As the downturn unfolded therefore, there was an assumption within the IMF that a purely 
market response was increasingly unfeasible. Indeed, piecemeal interventions to aid 
private sector strains had not succeeded in restoring market confidence and re-starting 
credit and money markets. Rather, financial market strains increased in an environment 
marked by declining asset values, exacerbated by pro-cyclical forces such as ratings 
downgrades, the challenges of distinguishing good from bad assets, and strong from weak 
institutions, all of which were combing to spill over to, and adversely affect, the real 
economy.  
Although during the first phase, there was still very much a sense within the IMF that the 
broader economic context could be characterised by increased uncertainty, as the second 
phase progressed it became increasingly evident that, given what the WEO (2009) termed 
‘an exceptionally uncertain environment’, evidenced by the inefficacy of status quo policies 
and institutions to prevent a more severe economic downturn, that a substantive shift in 
the kinds of policies advocated by the IMF thus far would be required.   
The GFSR (2008a:50) therefore noted that if a resolution was to be achieved that limited 
damage to the financial system and broader economy, ‘the authorities will need to play a 
major role in it’, the ultimate goal being to mitigate the feedback loops between the 
financial system and the broader economy. In this regard, Blanchard and Vinals (2008:xii) 
suggested that, although private sector solutions continued to be preferred, emergency 
government fiscal policy interventions ‘must play a crucial part in providing short-term 
support to the global economy’. At this juncture there was therefore a clearly observable 
political economy which, in contrast to the first phase, recognised that market responses 
alone would be insufficient and that the resources of the state would need to be deployed.  
Although largely eschewed as a policy approach within the IMF, its advocacy was justified 
in light of research presented in the October 2008 WEO. This observed that past episodes 
of financial stress involving shocks to the banking sector are typically followed by deeper 
than usual business cycle downturns and more protracted recoveries as the main 
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transmission channel from financial sector shocks to downturns in activity was a 
contraction in net lending to the business and household sectors.  
 
Phase three: sovereign debt crisis 
By the latter part of 2009 and particularly into 2010 however, there was a definite sense 
within the IMF that, following the implementation of unprecedented policy actions, 
although potential downside risks still existed, the global economy had turned a corner (see 
for example, GFSR, 2010; WEO, 2010). This was characterised most evidently by the 
rebounding of financial markets; banks raising capital once again; and wholesale funding 
markets reopening; all of which contributed towards the abatement of extreme tail risks.  
At this juncture the attention of the IMF turned from the fiscal support advocated during 
the second phase to the transfer of financial risks to public balance sheets, which, 
combined with the financial burden of fiscal stimulus ‘raised concerns over crowding out 
the private sector and the sustainability of public sector finances’ (GFSR, 2009a:xv). The 
concern here was that record sovereign debt issuance could push up interest rates, 
exacerbate short-term strains in funding markets as investors required higher yields to 
compensate for potential future risks, thereby limiting room for policy manoeuvre in many 
advanced economies, and hurting the nascent recovery. As a result, an assumption was 
made that deteriorating public finances could compromise sovereign creditworthiness.  
Indeed, by the early part of 2009 a Staff Position Note by the Fiscal Affairs Department 
(FAD) noted that economic downturn was ‘having major implications for the public finances 
of most countries’ (FAD, 2009a:3). It was therefore suggested that discretionary fiscal 
stimulus, although cushioning the global economy from the worst effects of the downturn, 
was nevertheless giving rise to a fiscal deterioration that was especially strong for advanced 
economies, where the increase in debt and contingent liabilities was on as pervasive and a 
scale not seen since the end of the Second World War. Indeed, government debt was 
projected to rise by 20 percent of GDP in 2008-09 alone (FAD, 2009a:3). This fiscal outlook 
raised issues of fiscal solvency which had the potential to trigger adverse market reactions.   
These vulnerabilities, according to the GFSR (2009:xv) ‘underscored the need to... reduce 
the private risks now borne by sovereign balance sheets’. It was therefore suggested that 
countries should mitigate this risk by designing, articulating, and communicating medium-
term fiscal consolidation plans that take into account their financial sector stabilization 
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policies and contingent liabilities (GFSR, 2009a; GFSR, 2010). These, it was suggested, 
should include clear time-frames to bring down gross debt-to-GDP ratios over the medium 
term as well as contingency measures if the deterioration in public finances was greater 
than expected. Here therefore there was a perceived clear alteration in the global risk 
profile. 
An assumption was therefore made at this juncture that most advanced economies should 
embark on fiscal consolidation in 2011. Although the IMF noted that the pace would vary 
depending on country circumstances, the suggestion was that for countries facing large 
increases in risk premiums, and where urgency was greater, consolidation would need to 
proceed immediately, and at a slower pace for countries with sufficient fiscal space.  
As a result, the problem presented by the third phase of the downturn appeared to have 
presaged a shift back towards the kinds of neoliberal policies advocated by the IMF 
previously. Firstly, the calls for a retreat from fiscal stimulus echoed prior assumptions that 
the appropriate role for fiscal policy was solvency and sustainability. Secondly, the IMF 
advocated a series of adjustment policies that would provide an enabling framework in 
which growth would once again flourish. This included the need to address aging-related 
pressures which, if left un-addressed, had the potential to dwarf the fiscal costs incurred by 
the downturn; and labour market reforms which would contribute towards a growth-
friendly environment (see for example, Blanchard & Vinals, 2010:xii; GFSR, 2010:xii).  
 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has sought to provide a background with which to understand the origins and 
causes of the current downturn. In doing so, two points were made. On the one hand, it 
has been demonstrated that, having been variously conceptualised as the result of failures 
specific to the policy realm, the economic ideas steering global economic governance were 
not understood as being fatally flawed and that minimal tinkering was all that was required 
to restore an otherwise effectively functioning political-economic system back to normalcy. 
On the other hand it was suggested that two policy areas synonymous with the neoliberal 
economic ideas underpinning global economic governance were fundamentally implicated 
in the downturn. It was therefore asserted, in a manner consistent with Wilson and Grant 
(2011:6) that the dominance of the neoliberal economic ideas at the start of the downturn 
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were not mere coincidence ’but rather the GFC was the result of them’. Consequently, the 
downturn could be more appropriately interpreted as a crisis of neoliberalism its self.  
It was therefore assumed that at a minimum, neoliberal economic ideas had been at least, 
if not considerably more, discredited than Keynesianism had been in the 1970s. As a result, 
it was a commonly-held assumption that we should similarly have anticipated that so too 
would the current failure of neoliberal economic ideas bring about changes in political 
coalitions, policy thinking, political strategy, and ultimately, political change.  
Secondly, this chapter has demonstrated how the downturn can be best understood as a 
multiphase process with each drawing attention to a particular interpretation of the 
prevailing problem. The following chapters, drawing on the phases outlined here, explores 
the implications for the prevailing neoliberal economic philosophy, problem definitions and 
policy priorities in the IMF with reference to monetary and fiscal policy, and financial sector 
liberalization and deregulation.  
In doing so it is demonstrated that, during its first phase, perceptions regarding the efficacy 
of the neoliberal economic philosophy were not implicated to any significant degree as the 
downturn was interpreted through existing frames of reference. As a result,  the kinds of 
policies advocated by the IMF continued to be justified in line with current expectations.  
During its second phase however, the global economy had become so uncertain that there 
was a recognition within the IMF that much of what it thought it knew about economic 
policy and financial sector liberalization and deregulation had been fundamentally 
challenged and that substantive reform in a number of areas would be required. 
This notwithstanding, a key assumption of this research is that, as the downturn entered its 
third stage, (a shift in focus to the implications of soaring sovereign debt burdens) it 
became increasingly evident that many of the policies advocated during the most acute 
phase (the second phase) had been simply deployed in order to save neoliberal economic 
ideas from its follies rather than being representative of a more significant shift.  
As a result, it is demonstrated in the chapters that follow, consistent with Hay (2010, 2013), 
that despite the severity of the failures of neoliberal economic ideas, it is not yet possible 
to talk of a broader crisis of neoliberalism in the IMF as this would require that actors inter-
subjectively interpret neoliberalism as being responsible for the turmoil. The following 
chapters show however that as yet, there is very little evidence to suggest that this is the 
case.  
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 Chapter 4 
Economic Policy I 
‘There is no perfectly static state in the history of life. Change is the norm.’                                                                                                              
(Orion Lewis and Sven Steinmo) 
 
Introduction 
In 2008 the IMF deferred to prevailing neoliberal economic ideas in its advocacy of the 
deployment of a range of conventional, and latterly, unconventional monetary policies 
(UMPs) in an attempt to contain the economic downturn brought about by turbulence in 
Western banking and financial systems. Given their inability to successfully do so however, 
the IMF broke with orthodoxy and ‘for the first time in its history, called for a global fiscal 
expansion across all countries’ (Cottarelli, 2013:1) to help stimulate aggregate demand, and 
in doing so, deferred to a distinctive political-economy privileging state intervention. This 
was a move interpreted at the time as having the opportunity to usher in a potentially 
epoch-shaping shift in the neoliberal economic ideas steering IMF policy actions. 
Chapters 4 and 5 chart this ostensible shift and the implications for neoliberal economic 
philosophy in the IMF. They do so through a text analysis of research produced by 
knowledge-based experts within the IMF who have ‘published a series of reports and 
papers... with the aim of contributing to the broader public debate’ (Moschella, 2010:136).  
On a broad level the in-house bi-annual publications World Economic Outlook (WEO) 
tracking short and medium term global economic developments; and Global Financial 
Stability Report (GFSR) created with the intention of strengthening IMF surveillance of 
developments in financial markets (GFSR, 2002:iii), provide the broader context within 
which to explore the interpretation of, and initial responses to, the downturn.  
More specifically however, the following two chapters draw on research produced by the 
Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) of the IMF. This includes the bi-annual Fiscal Monitor which 
was created in the aftermath of the economic downturn to track fiscal responses and 
provide policy advice; and IMF Working Papers, Policy Papers and Staff Position Notes 
produced by FAD Department Director Carlo Cottarelli, senior officials Emanuele Baldacci 
and Antonio Spilimbergo among others, and Research Director Olivier Blanchard.  
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These publications are crucial sources of investigation as they attempt to influence the 
broader public debate in a manner consistent with existing economic ideas. This is the 
“high” data of policy documents/statements that circulates among elite institutions, 
policymakers, academics and the media as part of a broader communicative discourse. Its 
incorporation allows for the opportunity to track initial IMF interpretations and responses 
to the unfolding turbulence and the kinds of policies considered necessary (Weldes, 
2006:178).   
Moreover, acting as an important supplement to this research, this chapter and the next 
also incorporate the means by which knowledge is communicated through the speeches of 
major public figures of the IMF to a broader audience. That these are similarly rife with, 
and help to instantiate, dominant neoliberal economic ideas makes it possible to track IMF 
representations of the downturn and associated policy responses. This includes speeches 
by Managing Directors Dominique Strauss-Kahn and latterly Christine Lagarde, First Deputy 
Managing Director John Lipsky, Research Director Olivier Blanchard and FAD Department 
Director Carlo Cottarelli. Against this backdrop, this chapter proceeds as follows.  
Firstly, the chapter details the unravelling of the downturn which, limited in its first phase 
to the banking and financial sectors (understood here as ranging from summer 2007 to 
autumn 2008), was largely restricted to concerns related to a decline in mortgage markets, 
deteriorating liquidity in financial markets and only a general slowdown in economic 
activity. In a manner consistent with prevailing neoliberal economic ideas, the IMF called 
for the deployment of monetary policy as the first line of defence in the form of interest 
rate cuts, and, thereafter, unconventional monetary policies (UMPs) in the form of central 
bank interventions into money markets. Therefore, during the first phase, the IMF is shown 
as being characterised by a considerable degree of continuity in the policy interventions it 
advocated, which although increasingly unconventional, continued, by and large, to be 
derived from neoliberal frames of reference. 
Secondly, the chapter demonstrates how, given both the inefficacy of conventional and 
UMPs to prevent the spill over of the downturn into the real economy, (the second phase 
beginning in autumn 2008) the IMF broke with orthodoxy in advocating a range of policy 
interventions that stood in contrast to those associated with neoliberal economic ideas, 
most notable among which was the call for globally coordinated fiscal stimulus. In doing so, 
it is demonstrated how these interventions, in more closely resembling those economic 
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ideas associated with Keynesianism, led to the suggestion that the severity of the downturn 
might precipitate a significant shift in the economic ideas steering IMF policy priorities.  
This notwithstanding, Chapter 5 demonstrates that this shift never materialised for the 
simple reason that the IMF never abandoned its faith in the efficacy of the neoliberal 
economic philosophy. Rather, fiscal stimulus was deployed in order to save neoliberalism 
from its follies, not act a pre-cursor to major change, to suggest otherwise would be to 
misinterpret the intentions of the IMF at the time. Indeed, it is demonstrated that during 
the third phase (beginning in late 2009/early 2010) as attention turned to soaring sovereign 
debt burdens, the IMF not only called for major fiscal adjustment, but the entrenching of a 
host of policies consistent with the neoliberal economic philosophy and problem 
definitions. 
 
Phase 1:  Monetary efforts to shore up the banking and financial sectors 
It was assumed that an approach to economic management centred on monetary policy 
had helped foster a considerable degree of economic stability characterised by low 
inflation and steady economic growth. This led to an overwhelming optimism within the 
IMF that an economic environment typified by severe economic disorder had been largely 
eradicated.     
So entrenched had this assumption become that, despite problems in the US economy in 
2007, such as rising stress in the sub-prime mortgage market and signs of deterioration in 
Alt-A mortgages – those that lay somewhere between prime and sub-prime - (and which 
could impact on the broader housing market), the WEO (2007:2) suggested that global 
economic risks remained largely encouraging, demonstrable in fast global economic 
growth. 
Paradoxically however, at the same time the IMF was lauding the apparent stability of the 
financial system, market disruptions were becoming increasingly pronounced, 
characterised by a re-pricing of credit risk which sparked further financial volatility and a 
loss of liquidity. This added to uncertainty regarding structured product’s valuations which 
led to ‘rating migration’, thereby channelling uncertainty to a broader range of products, 
and leading investors to demand wider spreads to compensate for uncertainty about how 
risks were managed and allocated (GFSR, 2007a:1). Moreover, banking and financial sector 
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pathologies extended, albeit only marginally at this stage, into a slowdown in broader 
economic activity.  
Indeed, as 2008 progressed, further losses, falling asset prices, and a deepening economic 
downturn contributed to serious doubts about the viability of a broad swath of the 
financial system. Deleveraging accelerated and become disorderly – marked by a rapid 
decline in financial institutions’ share prices, higher costs of funding, and depressed asset 
prices. The result was the failure of institutions as markets became unwilling or unable to 
provide capital or absorb assets, thereby creating a near lock-up of money markets (GFSR, 
2008a:xi). 
Moreover, macroeconomic feedback effects grew as uncertainty about the size and 
distribution of banking and financial institutions’ losses, along with normal credit cycle 
dynamics weighed heavily on business investment and household borrowing, in turn 
feeding back into output growth and employment. As a result, the GFSR (2008:1) cautioned 
that ‘the potential for a significant economic slowdown’ had increased substantially.  
  
Problem definition 
The capacity of the IMF to deal with the sheer volume of information generated regarding 
the form and severity of banking and financial sector pathologies, along with their potential 
impact on economic growth was inherently limited. As a result, the IMF deferred to existing 
schemas - a 'subjective "theory" about how the social or political world works' (for our 
purposes here, neoliberal economic ideas) so as to 'order, interpret, and simplify' (Khong, 
1992:13) the unfolding economic downturn. That it did so reminds us that the IMFs initial 
response to the downturn ‘must be understood as social, political, and ideological’ (Snyder, 
1991:14) as opposed to being considered part of a rational response to external stimulus.    
Operating on the assumption therefore that the IMF did not respond to unravelling events 
in an obvious and predictable way but that the ideas held ‘profoundly shape the way 
external demands or shocks are interpreted’ (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004:9), the corollary 
was that neoliberal economic ideas held by the IMF carried with them default settings for 
variables which privileged the elucidation of information consistent with existing ideas, and 
provided a proto-type against which specific examples and lessons from previous economic 
downturns could be drawn. In highlighting this process, an acknowledgement is made, 
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consistent with Blyth (2002:26), that it was the economic ideas held by the IMF that played 
a critical part in helping to reduce the increasing political-economic uncertainty. 
Noting this allows us to demonstrate how these ideas shed light on and provided the basis 
by which to relate to the downturn, and how, hamstrung by existing economic orthodoxy, 
the analogies invoked and lessons learned ultimately proved inadequate in themselves to 
prevent a much more severe economic downturn (Snyder & Diesling, 1977:293).  
Drawing on these economic ideas, during the first phase of the downturn, the IMF drew on 
the lessons of the past (or what they thought those lessons taught them, its self an entirely 
subjective exercise) to reduce the uncertainty and guide their initial response. In particular, 
a number of assumptions were made (implicit or otherwise) through reference to historical 
analogies that compared the unfolding economic downturn to others that had preceded it.  
In doing so, the IMF sought to invoke the lessons of the past so as to display the unravelling 
economic environment as one characterised by measurable risk as opposed to uncertainty 
(Knight, 1957:215). Indeed, by drawing on the lessons of previous economic downturns we 
show how the analogies invoked suggested that at that juncture, events, being comparable 
with a larger group of similar instances from the past, were more knowable. This meant the 
downturn could be more readily characterised as a situation of risk rather than uncertainty 
which is so unique as to be not readily assimilated with a larger number of like-instances. 
The means by which this was undertaken can be explained through reference to the 
schematic provided by Khong (1992) outlined in Chapter 1: AX:BX;AY:BY. In this instance 
however A (the economic downturn) was interpreted as analogous to event B (the dot.com 
boom for example) in having characteristic X (a downturn brought about by an asset boom 
and bust); B had characteristic Y inasmuch as it was viewed resolvable through monetary 
policy interventions, namely, a reduction in the policy rate to stimulate economic activity. 
So too therefore was it thought that AY (the current economic downturn brought about by 
an asset boom and bust) was resolvable through a similar set of policy interventions.  
Lessons learned from the past in the form of historical analogies (themselves a derivative of 
the frames provided by neoliberal economic ideas) can be understood as interpretive 
devices called upon by the IMF to perform three tasks which help us understand why initial 
responses took the form they did. Firstly, they played a diagnostic role in defining the 
nature of the problem by comparing unfolding events with previous instances with which 
the IMF was more familiar. The second and third followed this diagnostic by outlining the 
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stakes involved and implied necessary solutions to the problem so-defined (Khong, 
1992:20).  
On the basis of the preceding discussion we can see how the economic downturn 
generated a number of simplifying expectations about its nature, which, viewed as 
analogous to others, meant it could be treated in a similar manner. In particular, two 
inferences both guided the IMFs response, and sought to persuade member states that the 
overall global economic environment could still be characterised as one of risk as opposed 
to uncertainty.  
Firstly the WEO (2007:xii) noted that the chances of local disturbances resulting in global 
spill-over’s were low as history showed that slowdowns were rarely attributable to 
country- or sector- specific developments, but occurred when an event adversely affected a 
number of countries simultaneously. Further mitigating for this potential, it was noted that: 
house-hold finances were in a solid position; equity gains over the last year returned 
household net worth to previous peaks; and low interest rates led to reasonable debt-
servicing costs.  
Secondly, and most pertinently, it was noted that forward-looking monetary policy would 
reduce the output effects from any potential shocks just as it had done during previous 
economic downturns, such as the dot.com boom and subsequent bust. This reflected the 
“lean versus clean” (Blanchard et al, 2013:3) assumption that it was better to clean the 
mess left by a bubble bursting through reductions in the policy rate than it was to lean 
against bubbles which were inherently difficult to track and thereafter to effectively 
counter. 
The September 2007 WEO perhaps best exemplified the IMFs confidence in these 
simplifying assumptions by not only exalting their efficacy, but in positing that, thanks to 
advances in our economic knowledge, their success was without historical precedence.  
In particular, it was noted that: institutional quality had led to greater political and 
economic stability in policymaking; better macroeconomic policies dampened output 
fluctuations; more developed financial systems had smoothed consumption and 
investment plans; and the increased durability of expansions reflected long-term sources. 
Against this backdrop, the potential for severe economic dislocations of the type played out 
in the past were considered, if not entirely precluded, then certainly only minimal (WEO, 
2007a:Ch5).  
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Given these assumptions, banking and financial sector volatility in 2007 and into 2008, 
along with an associated slowdown in economic activity, were interpreted by the IMF as 
nothing more than a modest correction to rising asset prices as opposed to a fundamental 
change in market sentiment. Rather, the unfolding turbulence was understood as being 
rooted in weakening credit discipline, increased financial sector leverage and investor 
complacency.  
This demonstrates the impact that learning the lessons of the past by interpreting events 
through existing economic ideas had on influencing the manner in which banking and 
financial sector pathologies, and the economic downturn were initially diagnosed, why 
responses took the form they did, and why the downturn was so readily interpreted and 
constructed by the IMF as a crisis for, rather than of, neoliberal economic ideas.  
 
Policy priorities 
Against this backdrop, existing beliefs continued to provide the underpinnings of a shared 
account of the nature of the functioning of the economy and framed initial policy 
responses to the downturn in a manner consistent with existing economic orthodoxy, most 
notably regards the perceived efficacy of conventional monetary policy interventions. 
This was exemplified in a 2008 speech by Strauss-Kahn (2008) who urged that monetary 
policy should continue to operate as the first line of defence to stave off a greater 
downturn in the real economy. The 2008 WEO (2008:38) echoed this call in suggesting that, 
in the US and EU, uncertainty about the impact of financial turbulence and the 
deterioration in labour market conditions justified ‘rapid interest rate cuts and a continuing 
bias toward monetary easing until the economy moves to a firmer footing’, despite 
relatively high inflation.  
This completely contradicted the policy advice given to developing countries which was in 
‘general agreement that when asset prices fall sharply – for example, after the bursting of 
an asset price bubble – monetary policymakers should react promptly and aggressively to 
contain inflation and stabilise output’ (WEO, 2008:122) through policy rate rises.  
This is exactly what the IMF had advocated to developing countries during previous 
financial crises such as that in Asia (see Chapter 2), deemed as it was, necessary to stem 
capital outflows regardless of the consequences for businesses that might be at risk of 
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closure if they were even only moderately leveraged (Stiglitz, 2002). Indeed, Strauss-Khan 
(2008:4) again suggested that emerging economies ‘will need to raise policy interest rates 
in line with rising risk premia to stem outflows and bolster confidence in their currencies'.  
Although this suggested advanced country exceptionalism, interest rate cuts were justified 
for advanced economies by the IMF as, although inflation was rising at its fastest pace since 
the 1990s (Lipsky, 2008:3), it was noted that ‘measures of underlying inflation – price 
indices excluding food and fuel prices, inflation expectations, and labour costs – have been 
broadly contained’ (WEO, 2008a:4, emphasis added). Moreover, the WEO (2008a:21) noted 
three trends would mitigate inflationary risks in advanced economies that were not 
applicable to developing economies: real wage flexibility; more secure anchoring of 
inflationary expectations by vigilant central bankers; and declining energy use and 
economic activity.  
As 2008 progressed however overall risks increased as the downturn spread to cross-
border credit and funding markets, exacerbating anxieties of the impact that the reversal of 
the housing boom on financial markets and systemically important financial institutions. 
More-over, the deterioration of credit injected greater uncertainty into the financial 
system, the outcome of which was to curtail inter-bank liquidity, weaken capital adequacy, 
and prompt a re-pricing of risk, the result of which was increased demand for central bank 
liquidity. 
Against this backdrop of market-wide funding pressures and the inability of conventional 
monetary easing to stem the unfolding turmoil despite the fact that policy rates were at, or 
near to, the zero lower bound (ZLB), the IMF called for the deployment of a range of UMPs 
to prevent a serious financial meltdown. In doing so, calls were made for central banks to 
inject liquidity into money markets in order to increase the volume of long-term financing 
and provide standing credit facilities. The argument that states should confine themselves 
to providing a steady, stable increase in the money supply consistent with long-term 
growth was clearly abandoned in the face of the unfolding turmoil. Nevertheless, these 
measures did have monetary policy implications, analogous as they were to central banks’ 
traditional roles of lenders of last resort as they aimed to both combat financial system 
dysfunction (including runs and multiple equilibria) and prevent an even greater collapse of 
confidence.  
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Although the over-arching goal of monetary authorities therefore remained unchanged, 
the instruments adopted were unconventional in their breadth and scale as unprecedented 
liquidity was provided to a broader set of recipients, and with a wider aim, to support 
market functioning. Therefore, at this stage, although termed unconventional, the policies 
retained many similarities with conventional monetary policy as the fundamental 
objectives remained unaltered: namely, to support price and financial stability (IMF, 
2013a:6-7).  
The deployment of first round UMPs notwithstanding, as 2008 progressed further financial 
sector losses, falling asset prices, and a deepening economic downturn contributed to an 
even deeper sense of financial sector mayhem, manifest in a rapid decline in share prices 
and increased costs of funding. The result was the failure of institutions, increasing concern 
regarding counterparty risks, and a near lock-up of global money markets (GFSR, 2008a:xi). 
Again, the IMF acquiesced to its advocacy of the deployment of monetary policy, with 
Lipsky (2008) suggesting that the first line of defence remained with monetary authorities 
who would continue to play a critical role in helping economies find their footing. 
Nevertheless, the inability of conventional monetary policy and UMPs to prevent events 
from continuing to deteriorate provided the motivation for calls within the IMF for a 
second round of UMPs (Strauss-Kahn, 2009b). These policies, still monetary in their nature 
were unlike in their first guise unconventional in their instruments and operational targets 
as central banks resorted to forward guidance in the policy rate, and even less 
conventionally, to bond purchases.  
 On the one hand, forward guidance on the policy rate was communicated to market actors 
and signalled a shift in policy to maintaining low rates for a longer period than would have 
been warranted by central banks’ usual reaction functions. On the other hand, large-scale 
asset purchase programmes (LSAPs), a process of buying up bonds, was advocated to 
reduce the stock of longer-term bonds in investors’ portfolios, inducing them to accept 
lower returns to hold scarcer assets. The assumption was that LSAPs would reduce interest 
rates along the term structure which would contribute towards stimulating economic 
activity. 
Although these policies were increasingly unconventional, such was its continuing belief in 
the ability of neoliberal economic ideas to prevent a more serious collapse, the IMF 
continued to reason through historical analogy that past episodes of financial stress such as 
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that being played out had not had a major impact on economic activity as segments of the 
financial system were, in part, able to compensate for difficulties in others. Moreover, 
historical evidence, it was noted, showed bank lending rose during expansions and declined 
during contractions while conversely, the price of bank credit rose during a slowdown, 
imbuing banks to tighten lending standards (with the opposite being true during an 
upturn).  
Indeed, the WEO (2008:9-16) noted that ‘current changes in lending standards, demands, 
and spreads were exhibiting patterns in line with historical experience’, an assertion which 
contributed to the IMF’s interpretation of the unfolding turbulence as a credit squeeze as 
opposed to a more serious credit crunch. Reasoning by historical analogy and diagnosing 
the turbulence like so constituted an attempt to reduce the uncertainty generated by 
banking and financial sector pathologies by linking them with a series of ostensibly similar 
events.  
However, this was an inherently political exercise. It was a process employed by the IMF as 
a means by which to define a series of disparate events as being analogous to others that 
have preceded it. This search for repetition was therefore key because it allowed for 
relative continuity in the policy realm, thereby promoting a sense of certainty about the 
future, regardless of how accurate a depiction of the unfolding turbulence this might have 
been.   
Indeed, the diagnosis of the unfolding downturn in its initial phase, not historically 
dissimilar from previous downturns, meant the policy interventions advocated by the IMF, 
even at this stage, continued to be drawn from existing neoliberal frames of reference. 
Consequently, the IMF continued to exhibit faith in central bank interventions to remedy 
for unfolding pathologies by suggesting that they were neither paradigmatic nor 
institutional. 
Indeed, this interpretation of the downturn as a moment of instability puncturing an 
otherwise stable economic environment led Lipsky (2008:6-7) in a 2008 speech to suggest 
even at this juncture that a more serious downturn could still be avoided. This was 
premised on the assumptions that: declining oil prices were contributing to a reversal in 
adverse terms-of-trade effects and the erosion in purchasing power, and real wages being 
felt in most advanced economies; the US housing market would bottom out during 2009 
allowing affordability measures to return to levels consistent with past experience; while 
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credit conditions were tightening in the US and Europe, IMF analysis highlighted that a 
slowdown in credit provision need not forestall an economic recovery; and resilient 
domestic demand and growth in emerging economies would make an important 
contribution to global growth.  
 
Implications of lessons from the past for continuity in neoliberal economic ideas 
We would certainly not expect that the neoliberal economic ideas through which incoming 
information was interpreted during the first phase of the downturn be abandoned by the 
IMF at the first sign of discrepant information. Indeed, Jervis (1976:159) has suggested that 
if every observed anomaly were taken at face value 'research would instantly degenerate 
into a wild-goose chase after imaginary fundamental novelties'. In a similar vein, Hay 
(2008:69) notes that the earliest phases of political-economic failure are ‘more likely to 
result in the vehement reassertion, expression, and articulation of prior conceptions’. This 
suggests that, during the initial onset of the downturn, there were good reasons for the 
IMF not to abandon its commitment to neoliberal economic ideas in the face of events.  
Indeed, to take on board incoming information through an alternative set of economic 
ideas would not only constitute an admission that the IMFs expectations were mistaken in 
major respects, but also that problem definitions and policy prescriptions either had failed, 
or were destined to do so. Particularly given that neoliberal economic ideas have become 
accepted to varying degrees the world over (Payne, 2005) these are difficult admissions to 
make and help us understand why initial responses took the particular form they did.  
Viewed in such a manner, it would not be accurate to suggest that in the earliest stages of 
the economic downturn the IMF could automatically 'be condemned for cognitive 
distortion or self-defeating blindness' (Jervis, 1976:172). Nevertheless, the key point here is 
that as the first phase progressed, as banking and financial sector pathologies intensified 
and the economic downturn progressed, incoming data and policy responses were 
increasingly stretched to fit with existing economic ideas, a process exemplified by the 
advocacy of a range of UMPs. As a result, the IMF's ability to correctly identify the 
mounting risks ‘was hindered by a high degree of groupthink, intellectual consistency, and 
a general mindset that major financial crises in large advanced economies were unlikely' 
(BWP, 2011:1).  
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This was not a trait exclusive to the IMF, but in many respects reflected the problems 
associated with interpreting incoming information through the lens provided by existing 
economic ideas, the implications this had for drawing on lessons from the past by 
reasoning through historical analogy and why they are more often that not used sub-
optimally (Khong, 1992; Jervis, 1976; May, 1974; Snyder, 1991). Three reasons are 
especially noteworthy. 
On the one hand, we can see in this instance how the analogies invoked and lessons 
learned – the assumption that, just as monetary policy interventions had been sufficient to 
stem previous downturns in advanced economies so too would they be sufficient again - 
were selected on the basis of what were in fact incredibly superficial surface similarities.  
The outcome was that the kind of conclusions drawn form IMF interpretations about what 
the downturn meant, and what policies could be considered appropriate, were inherently 
limited and ultimately insufficient to deal with its particularities. Indeed, not probing more 
widely in search of alternative analogues meant that less obvious but perhaps more 
relevant lessons may have been derived. However being guided by superficial similarities, 
themselves the result of adherence to neoliberal economic ideas, meant the scope for 
misinterpreting incoming data increased substantially (Snyder & Diesling, 1977:317; Jervis, 
1976:191).  
The problem with this approach therefore was that the initial downturn was 
conceptualised as ‘merely a moment of instability puncturing an otherwise stable financial 
environment with a temporary mishap’ (Brassett et al 2010:1) which prevented the 
potential for an earlier diagnosis of a signal event highlighting deeper changes and 
probable contradictions, tensions and fallacies inherent to the neoliberal economic ideas 
guiding IMF actions.  
On the other hand, by drawing on what were only superficial surface similarities, incoming 
information continued to be assimilated in line with extant neoliberal economic ideas. This 
demonstrates why IMF staff was more receptive, and sensitive to, incoming information 
consistent with the neoliberal economic ideas they held and the analogies they invoked. 
The corollary of this however was that discrepant information that would have pointed 
towards a more serious downturn was marginalised given the reluctance to accept 
evidence contrary to existing expectations. Rather, an attempt was made to 'fit new 
information into... patterns of expectations' (Snyder & Diesling, 1977:325). Indeed, 
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retaining their belief in the efficacy of neoliberal economic ideas in the face of seemingly 
discrepant information suggested that, despite appearing otherwise, the basic theory 
continued to hold true.  
By adopting this approach, information that did not fit was slighted, ignored or twisted to 
confirm (or at the very least not contradict) neoliberal economic ideas and their validity. 
This was a scenario inherent to interpreting information through the lens of existing 
economic ideas: they often persist stubbornly even in the face of evidence contrary to their 
normative and cognitive underpinnings; and shows how the past was considered such a 
strong guide for future action that great faith continued to be placed in their capacity to 
guide policymakers of the appropriate means by which to rid for unfolding pathologies. The 
consequence however was that instead of correct perceptions, the IMF was characterised 
by increasingly 'strained interpretations and tortuous arguments' (Jervis, 1976:154).  
As a result, although there exists no clear metric by which to determine the point at which 
holding on to existing neoliberal economic ideas becomes disparaging discrepant 
information beyond a point of reasonable comprehension, it was increasingly evident that 
as the first phase unravelled IMF policy responses had become increasingly incapable of 
dealing with the particularities of the economic downturn, despite its evident defects.  
Finally, the implications of adhering to lessons from the past was that the analogies drawn, 
by slighting or ignoring information that ostensibly contradicted them, meant that the IMF 
was predisposed to particular courses of policy action consistent with prevailing neoliberal 
economic ideas as opposed to one of the many other options that were available. 
By electing not to do so, the analogues invoked and lessons learned by the IMF meant that 
policies - hamstrung by existing economic ideas and limited by what was considered 
appropriate - not only failed to illuminate the uniqueness of the downturn, but also led to 
policy actions which would prove insufficient to stem the flow of banking and financial 
sectors pathologies from having major adverse consequences for the real economy.   
Indeed, the kinds of policies advocated increasingly involved violations of generally agreed 
rules for treating economic downturns, most notable among which were unconventional 
monetary policies as conventional monetary policy easing was hindered by the ZLB. 
Nevertheless, that the IMF continued to hold onto such ideas in the face of contradictory 
evidence of the utility of an exclusively monetary policy approach to managing the 
downturn leads us to conclude that the approach taken was becoming difficult to justify.  
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This demonstrates how, drawing on the constructivist assumption that moments of 
political-economic failure require being interpreted and diagnosed as a crisis through 
discourse and changes in the way situations are defined, there was no attempt by the IMF 
to define the economic downturn in such terms. That is, there was no direct sense of crisis 
as attempts were made by the IMF to continue to posit the efficacy of prior economic ideas 
and policies.   
The preceding discussion therefore leaves us well placed to state that despite the advocacy 
of monetary policy in both its conventional and unconventional guises, the economic 
down-turn did not fundamentally challenge the efficacy of the neoliberal economic 
philosophy in the IMF during its first phase. Rather, policy responses were consistent with 
those provided by neoliberal economic ideas as monetary policy and central bank 
interventions continued to assume prominence as the first line of defence despite the 
declining economic downturn.   
Nevertheless, it is demonstrated hereon in that during the second phase (beginning in 
autumn 2008), despite piecemeal adjustments, and with increasing evidence of the 
inefficacy of existing problem definitions and associated policy prescriptions, sufficient 
negative evidence accumulated 'to disorganise the original neat pattern of expectations' 
(Snyder & Diesling, 1977:325). Therefore, although the IMF had initially clung onto extant 
expectations, these appeared to be significantly destabilised during the second phase. 
  
Phase 2: Fiscal efforts to shore up the ‘real’ economy 
Although in its first phase pathologies were largely limited to the banking and financial 
sectors, it was noted as early as the April 2008 WEO that macroeconomic feedback effects 
were a growing concern as the size and uncertainty of bank losses, and normal credit cycle 
dynamics were likely to weigh heavily on house-hold borrowing and business investment, 
in turn, feeding back into employment and output growth. However, no suggestion was 
made of the need for major globally-coordinated fiscal interventions into the economy. 
Rather, consistent with neoliberal economic ideas, it has been demonstrated that 
monetary policy and central bank interventions continued to be advocated as the first line 
of defence.  
Nevertheless, by the autumn of 2008, it was clear that monetary policy and central bank 
interventions alone would be insufficient to stem the banking and financial sector failings 
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and prevent the economic downturn from worsening further. Rather, in developed 
economies policy rates were already at, or close to, the ZLB so there was no scope to 
reduce them further. Indeed, the economic environment had become so uncertain in terms 
of what the IMF thought it knew regarding monetary policy that events now forced ‘the re-
examination of intentions, of conceptions about how the world works’ (Seabrooke, 
2008:2). 
At this juncture, the IMF was therefore faced with a situation that went far beyond a still 
knowable economic environment that could by any reasonable proxy be characterised by 
risk. Rather, as the second phase unfolded it was evident that the economic environment 
was in fact characterised by considerable uncertainty, a situation in which it had become 
impossible to form a similar group of instances on which to draw (Knight, 1958:253). That 
is, the IMF was faced with a fundamental uncertainty in forming expectations the 
consequence of which was that it was impossible to make probabilistic calculations of 
events as their ability to form meaningful estimates of future events diminished (Widmaier 
et al, 2007:750). 
Indeed, the declining performance of status quo institutions and policies destabilised inter-
subjectively held beliefs regarding the efficacy of monetary policy as the primary (or only) 
tool with which to manage economic downturns. On the substantive dimension it therefore 
became harder for the IMF to cognitively justify the prevailing set of economic ideas and 
associated policy prescriptions in terms of their interest-based logic and necessity. That is, 
if cognitive ideas demonstrate how policies offer solutions to problems, how problem 
definitions define the problems to be solved and identify the methods by which to solve 
them, clearly prevailing cognitive ideas had proven ineffective at dealing with the 
downturn.  
This was especially evident at the end of 2008 as plummeting domestic demand made it 
apparent that the unfolding turmoil was more than a simple downturn in the sub-prime 
mortgage market and a liquidity event. Rather, banking and financial sector pathologies 
precipitated a fall in aggregate demand to such an extent that the global downturn was 
interpreted as having the potential, if unchecked, to exceed anything seen in recent history.  
It was therefore apparent that although monetary policy (both conventional and 
otherwise) would continue to be critical in meeting policy challenges, it had proven in its 
self in-sufficient to prevent the downturn from worsening further. That is, low rates had 
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become un-responsive (akin to pushing on a string) as the fundamental underlying engines 
of the economy were unable to exert any kind of a significant pull (Strauss-Kahn, 2008a:1; 
2008b).  
It was against this backdrop that, in a 2008 interview Blanchard noted that in the absence 
of more significant intervention, we may see some of the vicious cycles observed in the 
past. These concerns were manifest regarding the transmission of the downturn from the 
banking sector to the real economy and were exacerbated by worries that a further fall in 
demand would lead to an increase in risk that deflation, rising debt, and feedback loops to 
the financial sector may materialise, thereby contributing to already pessimistic 
expectations. 
During the onset of crises in developing countries the IMF called on national authorities to 
implement ‘a substantial rise in interest rates’ to make it more attractive to hold domestic 
currency, and fiscal adjustment to ‘cover the carrying costs of financial sector restructuring’ 
(Fischer, 1998:170-171) and stabilise the balance-of-payments, ease external adjustment, 
and bolster market confidence (Chari & Henry, 2013:8-9). This was consistent with IMF 
assumptions that ‘positive confidence effects could dominate the adverse mechanical 
effects of cuts in spending or increases in revenues, thereby leading to ‘expansionary fiscal 
consolidation’’ (IMF, 2013b:20; see also Davies, 2006). 
These policy interventions were informed by a significant body of research in the IMF which 
suggested that discretionary fiscal policy had only a limited role to play in managing 
downturns, with fiscal multipliers in advanced economies existing typically in the region of 
between zero to 0.5, and made assumptions consistent with this evidence (WEO, 2008).  
Part of this literature however found evidence of negative multipliers. Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1990, 1996) for example showed that a number of fiscal adjustments were correlated with 
expansions in private demand in the short-term, providing evidence of “expansionary fiscal 
contraction”. Consequently, for the management of business cycle fluctuations in 
particular, monetary policy was postulated as the central macro-economic tool.  
Nevertheless, as the economic downturn unfolded, Lipsky (2008) went from suggesting in 
September 2008 that direct intervention should function only as a third line of defence, to, 
in November 2008, proposing that fiscal expansion should play a central role in managing 
the downturn. In doing so, Lipsky called for governments to deploy fiscal stimulus – active 
changes in policies that affect government expenditures, taxes and transfers – in order to 
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support efforts taken by central banks to prevent declining economic activity, and add to 
aggregate demand in order to support private consumption. Similarly, Strauss-Kahn 
(2008d:3) noted that ‘as often for the Fund, the solution to global economic problems is 
mostly fiscal but with a twist – it is fiscal expansion, not fiscal contraction, that we need’.  
Although material events ‘can be viewed in a range of fashions, legitimating varying policy 
responses’ (Widmaier, 2005:555), calls for fiscal stimulus were not limited to the IMF but 
constituted part of a coordinative discourse which transcended individual beliefs of the 
need for intervention. This included, most notably, the newly created G20 group of state 
leaders which, at its November 2008 Washington Summit urged countries to take ‘vigorous 
efforts and take whatever further actions are necessary to stabilise the financial system’, 
while ‘using fiscal measures to stimulate domestic demand to rapid effect’ (G20, 2008a:2).  
Although the US had already enacted a fiscal stimulus package of its own in early 2008 in 
the form of the Economic Stimulus Act there was an acknowledgement that to be effective 
fiscal stimulus would require coordination among all major countries. The London Leaders 
Statement for example noted that doing so would ‘strengthen the impact of the 
exceptional policy actions announced so far’ (G20, 2009:2) and should be implemented 
immediately.    
This move seemingly constituted a significant shift in neoliberal economic ideas in the IMF 
which had long slighted the potential efficacy of fiscal interventions in favour of monetary 
policy. In this instance however, the IMF, in calling for substantial globally-coordinated 
fiscal stimulus, deferred to an altogether different political economy that called upon the 
power and resources of the state to bring about economic stability and support aggregate 
demand.  
This was acknowledged in a speech by Strauss-Kahn (2009a:5) who noted that IMF 
advocacy of fiscal stimulus appeared contradictory as it was ‘a novelty coming from an 
institution associated with belt-tightening’. Indeed, Strauss-Kahn (2010d:3) retrospectively 
observed that ‘everyone was surprised to see the IMF, previously so liberal, become 
“Keynesian”’.  
In doing so however, in referencing the experience of the 1930s, Strauss-Kahn (2008a:1) 
noted that it was important to learn the lessons of history and not react in a piecemeal 
way, hamstrung by old-fashioned orthodoxies, and instead suggested that it was important 
to act imaginatively, and be prepared to break with precedence and try new approaches.  
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As a means by which to justify, and persuade member states of the efficacy of, deploying 
substantial fiscal stimulus however, the analogy between unfolding events and the Great 
Depression was frequently invoked in order to convey the potential for a downturn of 
similar severity in the absence of exceptional policy measures (Strauss-Kahn, 2008a; 2009b; 
Spilimbergo et al, 2008). In doing so, speeches were 'dominated by historical analogies, 
whereby a sense of how bad things have been', and could be, arose 'from comparing the 
situation directly to other notable moments of financial meltdown’ (Brassett et al, 2010:1).  
Constructivist approaches are crucial in drawing our attention to the fact that the moment 
of failure can support a multitude of competing narratives of what went wrong and thereby 
what to do. Indeed it is because 'agents do not monotonically decode the material world 
around them and act uniformally' (Blyth, 2007:774) that states’ interests are considered 
indeterminate as they are unsure of what course of action is in fact in their interests. As a 
result, persuasive practices typically come to fore, offering convincing interpretations of 
what went wrong, along with suggestions of what to do in the form of policy prescriptions.  
Nevertheless, we can see how in this instance an inter-subjectively held consensus in and 
beyond the IMF developed of the need to reorient policies away from neoliberal 
orthodoxy. That is, at this juncture actors collectively concurred that decisive intervention 
could, indeed should, be made to rid the system of its accumulated pathologies (Hay, 
1999:317-324).     
 
The role of research in underpinning the shift to fiscal interventions 
Notwithstanding this ostensible shift, it is insufficient from a constructivist perspective to 
simply state that as seemingly bad economic ideas failed others automatically took their 
place. To do so would provide us with little “value added” over and above a rational choice 
approach which shows how, during times of crises, actors move from one equilibrium to 
another based on a set of pre-determined exogenous interests. Therefore, what is required 
is a greater understanding of the means by which the IMF sought to persuade member 
states of the benefits of significant coordinated stimulative fiscal actions, particularly given 
that its effects had been postulated as minimal, even inefficacious, prior to the downturn.  
With this in mind it is demonstrated how the advocacy of policies closely resembling those 
associated with Keynesianism was informed by a plethora of new research in the IMF, and 
particularly the Fiscal Affairs Department, which provided the cognitive justification for this 
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apparent gestalt flip. This showed how at the present juncture: the concern over 
implementation lags was unnecessary; fiscal multipliers were higher than usual; and given 
its financial nature, fiscal policy would actually shorten the economic downturn. 
Firstly, eschewing conventional thinking it was suggested that the decline in private sector 
demand would be prolonged, lasting for several quarters, something typical for downturns 
emanating from the financial sector (Baldacci & Gupta, 2009). Similarly, Leigh and Stehn 
(2009:1) showed that while responding less quickly than monetary policy, ‘discretionary 
fiscal policy is more timely than conventional wisdom would suggest’, particularly in 
“Anglo-Saxon” countries, the source of the downturn. Therefore, Blanchard and Cottarelli 
(2008:3-4) suggested that fiscal stimulus could rely more than was usual on state financed 
spending.  
Secondly, Ban (2014:12) suggests that research by Spilimbergo et al (2008) represented 
‘the defining moment in the balance of epistemic power’ as it ‘spurned as irrelevant’ 
existing orthodoxy. It was here that Spilimbergo et al (2008:4-5) argued the downturn, 
exemplified by macroeconomic conditions not experienced in decades, meant existing 
estimates of fiscal multipliers (the ratio of a change in output to an exogenous change in 
the fiscal deficit) were less reliable in informing which measures would be effective. This 
provided a strong argument for not relying exclusively on monetary policy (Blanchard and 
Leigh, 2013:19-20).  
In explaining why, Almunia et al (2010), and Cohen et al (2012) suggested that, firstly, 
during the downturn, central banks in advanced economies cut policy rates to close to zero, 
a constraint which inadvertently increased the size of fiscal multipliers. Secondly a key 
feature of the downturn was the reduced availability of credit. This implied consumption 
and investment depended more strongly on current than on future income and that fiscal 
multipliers would be larger than typically assumed (IMF, 2013b:19; Corsetti et al, 2012).   
Thirdly, research had assumed the impact of fiscal policy to be similar across different 
states of the economy, but new studies suggested that multipliers may be larger during 
periods of slack. Importantly since results were based on pre-crisis data, findings reflected 
mechanisms distinct from the ZLB and financial sector weaknesses. Instead, the authors 
appealed to the Keynesian notion that, during downturns, fiscal policy is less likely to crowd 
out private spending. Aurbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) for example, found that 
multipliers related to government spending fluctuate across the business cycle: from 0-0.5 
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during expansions to 1-1.5 during recessions, which suggested the efficacy of fiscal policy 
for the current downturn.  
Finally although research pointed to the potential for “expansionary fiscal consolidations”, 
Perotti (2011) suggested that these findings were sensitive to how fiscal consolidation was 
defined, and that the most famous episodes observed in Europe in the 1980s/1990s were 
driven by external demand more than by internal private demand on the back of 
confidence effects. In the current downturn however, an IMF Policy Paper (2013b:20-21) 
noted that confidence effects had not played a major role so a key channel through which 
expansionary effects could occur – by decreasing risk premia on sovereign bonds and on 
domestic lending rates – was not at work since risk premia were already low in advanced 
economies.   
This research highlights how the kinds of knowledge claims made by the IMF prior to the 
downturn were particular to time and space, providing persuasive arguments and calling 
for a particular course of policy action. Indeed, despite becoming embedded within 
institutional and cultural contexts, sometimes so much so that they came to be viewed as 
“common sense” in the IMF, neoliberal economic ideas, and the knowledge claims with 
which they were associated, were shown to be contingent, incomplete and subject to 
refutation.  
This had profound effects for economic ideas which rested on a simplified understanding of 
monetary policy that was largely antithetical to the efficacy of fiscal stimulus. Indeed, Clift 
(2013:3) observed ‘the potential for an eventual recalibration of post-crisis economic policy 
following the dissemination of the Fund’s surprising and important research findings’.  
Under such circumstances, a constructivist approach draws our attention to the fact that 
the kinds of assumptions made regarding the appropriate role for monetary and fiscal 
policy made prior to the downturn, were meaningful practices created and re-created 
through contingent actions which were informed by a particular set of neoliberal economic 
ideas.  
It is here that the distinction made by Searle (1995) between ‘brute facts’ which exist 
independently of our conception of them; and ‘social facts’, of which ‘institutional facts’ 
(assumptions made in an institutional context) are a sub-set, offers a particularly useful 
interjection. That is, the preceding discussion shows how ‘facts’ regarding the efficacy of 
monetary policy was shown to have rested in a temporally-bound institutional context.  
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Once this is accepted it becomes evident the ‘common sense’ assumptions surrounding 
monetary policy that prevailed in the IMF prior to the downturn be considered ‘ubiquitous 
aspects of social coordination’ (Bevir & Trentmann, 2002:21). Inasmuch as this is true a 
constructivist approach highlights the diversity of the possible forms of economic ideas 
underpinning IMF policy priorities. Indeed, rejecting the assumption that there is one best 
way to respond to financial and economic failure seemingly opened up the potential for an 
alternative range of policy interventions considered off the table prior to the downturn.   
 
Implications for the policy realm 
Had new knowledge remained within the IMF its effects would have been limited. This 
draws attention not just to the importance of the development of ideas, but their 
communication through the communicative discourse. Indeed, research produced by the 
IMF, having major implications for the way in which the benefits of fiscal stimulus were 
now perceived, was deployed in such a manner as to open a window of opportunity for the 
enactment of policies that had been inconceivable only months prior to the downturn. This 
is consistent with the constructivist notion that policy ideas are those which change rapidly 
‘when windows of opportunity open in the face of events as old policies no longer solve the 
problems or fit the policies for which they were designed’ (Schmidt, 2011:5). 
Against this backdrop, in a speech to the Board of Governors of the IMF and World Bank, 
Strauss-Kahn (2008a:3) noted the need ‘to deploy all of the instruments of modern macro-
economic policy to limit the damage to the real economy’, most notably, through fiscal 
stimulus. While exact measures would be guided by domestic political economy 
constraints, a number of principles were highlighted that should guide the scope/design of 
measures.  
Spilimbergo et al (2008:3) for example called for fiscal stimulus that was timely (reflecting 
the urgency of action); large (due to the large drop in demand); lasting (due to it being a 
potentially long downturn); diversified (due to uncertainty as to which measures would 
work); collective (undertaken by all countries with sufficient fiscal space); and sustainable 
(to avoid long-run debt increases). The challenge therefore, was to balance the seemingly 
contradictory goals of large and lasting fiscal commitments, with fiscal sustainability. 
These guiding principles were derived from lessons from history, or more accurately, what 
IMF staff thought the lessons from history had taught them, and drew on previous crises in 
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Korea (1997), Japan (1990s), the Nordic countries (1990s), and the US Savings and Loan 
crisis (1980s). From these it was deduced that, firstly, successful resolution of financial 
crises was necessary for growth as delayed interventions worsened macroeconomic 
conditions. Secondly, the solution to financial crises precedes the solution to the macro-
economic crisis. Thirdly, fiscal stimulus is necessary when financial crises spill-over to the 
corporate and household sectors, resulting in worsening balance sheets. Lastly, the fiscal 
response has a larger effect on aggregate demand if it is particular to each case 
(Spilimbergo et al, 2008).  
Against this backdrop, and translating new research into concrete, implementable policies, 
Spilimbergo et al (2008:4-7) advocated the following. Firstly, that public spending on goods 
and services has larger multiplier effects and, most important in the current context, its 
first round effects were more certain than those related to transfers or tax cuts. 
Governments were therefore advised to ensure existing programmes were not cut for a 
lack of resources.  
Secondly, the authors suggested that spending programmes, from repair and maintenance, 
to investment projects should be (re)started as quickly as possible. High profile 
programmes with good long-run justification and strong externalities were advised both 
directly and through expectations. Moreover, it was suggested that the state could take a 
larger share in public-private partnerships for valuable projects that would otherwise be 
postponed.  
Thirdly, three factors: decreases in wealth; tighter credit constraints; and uncertainty, were 
shown to adversely affect the marginal propensity to consume. Two recommendations 
were therefore made how to increase this propensity. The first was to target tax cuts or 
transfers to consumers most credit constrained such as through increased unemployment 
benefits, increases in earned income tax credits, and an expansion in safety nets where 
they are limited. The second was that clarity of policy together with a strong commitment 
to take whatever action may be needed to avoid the risk of a depression would reduce 
uncertainty, and lead consumers to decrease precautionary saving and stop waiting and 
start spending.  
Finally it was suggested that just as consumers were operating in an uncertain 
environment, so too were firms taking a wait-and-see approach to their investments. The 
challenge for policymakers, it was therefore suggested, was to avoid a situation in which 
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firms cut back their operations for lack of reasonably-priced credit. Although traditionally 
the concern of monetary policy, the authors pointed towards scope for governments to 
support firms by combining procedures that allow the restructuring of firms facing 
economic distress with government guarantees on new credit. This, so the argument 
proceeded, could be made on the implementation of a restructuring plan, an approach 
underlying IMF-supported programmes: lending plus policy adjustment (see also Blanchard 
& Cottarelli, 2008). 
 
Implications for the neoliberal economic philosophy 
The foregoing discussion is consistent with constructivist research which suggests that 
policies are the areas that change most rapidly in the context of crises as the cognitive 
ideas underpinning their justificatory and persuasive practices are shown to be unable to 
deal with the problems facing policymakers (Schmidt, 2011:2). Economic philosophies 
however are typically confined to the normative, as opposed to the cognitive, sphere, a 
reflection of ideas regarding the appropriate role of states or markets. That these ideas are 
inherently political means that they are typically those which prove most resistant to 
change.  
Nevertheless, the policies advocated by the IMF during the second phase of the downturn, 
and the ostensible break with orthodoxy with which they were associated, also appeared 
to have important implications for the neoliberal economic philosophy. Therefore, 
although often slow to change, chapter two demonstrated that significant change does and 
can occur, and the unfolding downturn appeared to present such a potential.   
That is, prior to the downturn, and during its first phase, there was an assumption within 
the IMF that fiscal policy should be limited to minimizing distortions and letting automatic 
stabilizers work. Nevertheless, that monetary policy failed both to prevent banking and 
financial sector pathologies from impacting severely on the real economy and thereafter to 
sufficiently redress the downturn, led Romer (2011:1) to note at an IMF conference in 2011 
that the downturn had ‘shattered some of the core tenets of macroeconomic 
policymaking’.  
Indeed, in a 2009 Commentary Stiglitz (2009:1) appeared to reflect something of a 
consensus of the time, suggesting that ‘we are all Keynesians now’. Freedman et al (2009:6) 
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of the IMFs Research Department for example noted that interest in Keynesian economic 
ideas was even common among those who had outright rejected its potential efficacy.  
What was happening was, according to Stiglitz, the triumph of reason and evidence over 
ideas and interests, most notably, a particular set of neoliberal economic ideas that had 
privileged the market and the de-politicization of key policy instruments. Indeed, Stiglitz 
noted that for those Keynesians who had been marginalised and shunned for more than 
three decades, the return to Keynesian economic ideas represented a moment of triumph.     
Chapter 2, which observed a shift from Keynesian to neoliberal economic ideas, draws our 
attention to the fact that the potential for such a shift is not without historical precedence. 
Indeed, Bevir and Trentmann (2002:1) note how history is characterised by two forms of 
economic coordination which have been valorised by policymakers, the market (a natural 
and spontaneous order), and state intervention (where states took control of the 
economy).  
Although the efficacy of the market had long been the dominant assumption in the IMF, 
calls for significant fiscal interventions seemingly imposed a new trajectory on the state as 
problem definitions and policy priorities again came down on the side of privileging state 
intervention (Hay, 1999:317). Indeed, that responsibility was once again placed on the 
shoulders of governments to intervene to prevent the most severe effects of the downturn 
suggested the repercussions of this shift could be pivotal given that economic philosophies 
are ‘generally portrayed as most long lasting’ (Schmidt, 2011:5; Schmidt, 2008, 2010, 2012).  
This characterisation of the downturn and its potential implications for the neoliberal 
economic philosophy highlighted the temporally bound nature of neoliberal economic 
ideas, even those so deeply held that they resided largely un-questioned in the 
background, yet whose realities had the potential to be transformed as prior assumptions 
were discredited by economic turbulence. This draws attention to the contingency of the 
socially constructed nature of the economic ideas steering global economic governance 
which were shown as being but one socially constructed economic order out of a number 
of possibilities available.   
This was consistent with constructivist approaches that have sought to correct for the re-
productive logic of much rational choice IPE (Chwieroth, 2010; Widmaier et al, 2007). The 
result is an analysis of the failure of monetary policy and shift to support for fiscal 
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interventions as an ostensible crisis of a policy area inherent to neoliberal economic ideas, 
in which it was recognised that a decisive intervention must be made.  
It is here that the second phase of the downturn was seized upon as a potential ‘epoch-
making’ moment delineating between phases of political-economic times, a deviation from 
the normal course of events (Hay, 1999:317). Indeed, Broome et al (2012:7) noted that 
efforts were immediately made ‘to paint the present juncture as an epoch-shaping 
moment: the dawn of “post-neoliberalism”, or even the arrival of “post-capitalism”’, 
according to which narratives ‘the GFC should be read as a signal event, a watershed 
moment’.  
There therefore appeared to have been a major shift from the de-politicisation of policy 
instruments acting in pursuit of a single policy goal, to a more active role for the state in 
managing the economy. In this regard, the second phase of the downturn seemingly 
provided all the pre-conditions necessary for a widely-interpreted moment of crisis in 
which economic orthodoxy in the IMF would be subject to a significant transformation.    
 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has sought to substantiate two claims. Firstly, that during its first phase, the 
IMF interpretation of the downturn was one emanating from the sub-prime mortgage 
market and a broader liquidity event as banks became unwilling or unable to lend to one 
another, ultimately precipitating a slow-down in real economic activity. In response the IMF 
advocated that monetary policy operate as the first line of defence in the form of interest 
rate easing, and latterly, two rounds of UMPs. These policies however, despite their 
increasingly unconventional nature, continued to be derived from the intellectual frames 
provided by the prevailing neoliberal economic philosophy and problem definitions.   
Secondly, as 2008 progressed it became increasingly evident that monetary policy and 
central bank interventions alone would be unable to prevent the transmission of the 
downturn from the banking and financial sectors to the broader economy (the second 
phase). In response, the IMF advocated that governments with sufficient scope to do so 
provide significant fiscal stimulus in order to stimulate aggregate demand in such a manner 
that would support private consumption to prevent further declines in economic activity.  
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It is this ostensible shift in economic ideas within the IMF that has been seized upon to 
suggest the existence of a potentially epoch-shaping shift in neoliberal economic ideas. 
Indeed, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde (2013:2) observed the potential for such 
a shift, suggesting that ‘the pride of this institution is to constantly question, challenge, 
revisit, re-examine, and test its findings and assumptions, in order to be as up-to-date as 
possible’.  
Nevertheless, Chapter 5 suggests that even if moments of political-economic failure 
demonstrate that dominant ideas and knowledge assumptions are flawed, change need not 
be the natural corollary. Indeed, a key assumption of this research is that upon entering its 
third phase (a focus on sovereign debt sustainability) the IMF sought to frame the 
downturn in such a manner that divergence from the prevailing neoliberal economic 
philosophy, problem definitions and policy interventions was postulated as neither 
desirable nor effectual.  
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Chapter 5 
Economic Policy II 
 
‘If it were done when t’is done, then ‘twere well it were done quickly’                                
(Macbeth)                                                                   
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter charted the IMF policy response during the first two phases of the 
downturn. In doing so it was demonstrated how, despite being considered resolvable with 
policies consistent with neoliberal economic ideas during its initial phase, the infiltration of 
banking and financial sector pathologies into the broader economy (the second phase) led 
the IMF to advocate a series of unorthodox policy interventions. Indeed it was assumed 
that, having ‘shaken the foundation of our economic framework’ (Lagarde, 2012a:4), the 
ostensible crisis had brought with it a potentially major shift in economic ideas in the IMF.  
Nevertheless, this chapter substantiates two key claims. Firstly that although there has 
been some change in the IMF regarding the perceived worth of a range of policies deemed 
largely ineffectual prior to the downturn (fiscal policy for example), as it entered its third 
stage in late 2009/early 2010 (a focus on sovereign debt sustainability) it became 
increasingly evident that the IMF had maintained a normative commitment to the 
neoliberal economic philosophy and the manner in which economic problems were framed 
and responded to.  
Secondly, this chapter demonstrates how the IMF has in fact sought to frame the third 
phase in such a manner that the further entrenching, as opposed to retreat from, policies 
consistent with neoliberal economic ideas are desirable from a normative perspective and 
necessary from a cognitive perspective. Therefore, although the downturn certainly 
provided a permissive context in which to effect a major transformation in economic ideas 
in the IMF, change need not be, indeed nor has it been the natural corollary.  
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Phase 3: Problem definition  
As of late 2009 the second phase of the downturn (the most acute phase) appeared to be 
over. Economic growth appeared, albeit minimal and uneven, to be recovering and acute 
risks to the financial sector had subsided. Against this backdrop, the attention of the IMF 
shifted towards ‘a new kind of problem’ (Strauss-Kahn, 2011a:2) sovereign debt, which had 
increased substantially during the previous two phases as a result of major support to the 
financial system and declining tax receipts brought about by the accompanying recession.  
Given the range of problems facing policymakers however, there was nothing inherent to 
increasing sovereign debt that meant it ought to be perceived as the predominant 
problem. Indeed, this chapter draws attention to the importance of framing in the IMF, 
that is, in terms of the diagnostic function it performed (highlighting excessive sovereign 
debt) and also the prognostic role in terms of the kinds of policies the IMF considered 
necessary to address the problem so defined (those consistent with neoliberal economic 
ideas).   
That it sought to affect interpretations of the problem by assigning meaning to increasing 
sovereign debt burdens suggests that IMF actions at this juncture be best considered part 
of a constructivist strategy (Benford, 1997:410; Oliver & Johnston, 2000:8). In doing so 
framing emphasises the intentional ways in which the IMF sought to construct 
representations to draw support from others. That it did so points to critical processes of 
social construction (Oliver & Johnston, 2000:1) and highlights that the material 'reality' 
presented by increasing sovereign debt was not a self-apparent phenomena that dictated 
an obvious response, but was identified, collated and packaged by the IMF in order to 
highlight a particular issue as being more salient than others at that moment in time 
(Benford & Snow, 2000:623).  
We therefore show how 'meanings do not automatically or naturally attach themselves to 
the objects, events, or experiences we encounter, but often arise, instead, through inter-
actively based interpretive processes' (Snow, 2004:384). Indeed, by framing the third phase 
in such a manner, by highlighting what was relevant over other problems that may have 
been equally, if not more salient, the parameters for what was going on were set and 
appropriate policy responses were limited from the outset. This highlights how framing was 
deployed by the IMF in such a manner as to act as a key dynamic for collective action.  
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This draws our attention to the discursive power of the IMF in terms of its ability to confer 
meaning on to events. That is, a primary determinant in the fixing of an objects meaning is 
the power to evacuate the meaning of what it is not. Acknowledging this point foregrounds 
both the agency and power relationships which were exercised by the IMF in such a 
manner as to fore-close all other meanings, in this case what seemingly excessive sovereign 
debt burdens meant to member states. Doing so helped to set the terms for the broader 
debate by foreclosing the possibility of any serious deliberative argument taking place, and 
essentially, negating the need for such argument to take place at all (Epstein, 2008:9-10).  
In this particular instance, Baldacci et al (2010) drew attention to soaring sovereign debt 
burdens which were projected to rise in the G-20 advanced economies from 73 percent of 
GDP at end-2007 to about 108 percent of GDP at end-2015, the largest rate since World 
War 2. This underscored a shift in narrative in the IMF (for our purposes, the third phase) 
from one of support for fiscal stimulus to the need for fiscal sustainability which, in a 2009 
speech, Lagarde (2009:2) noted was one of the major challenges facing the global 
economy.  
Similarly the Fiscal Monitor (2010:5) suggested that ‘without progress in addressing fiscal 
sustainability concerns, high levels of public debt could weigh on economic growth for 
years’, as even that insufficient to result in overt debt crises had the potential to become a 
burden on long-term growth. Indeed, Lagarde (2012:2) noted that high public debt was 
already acting as ‘a drag on the already-low growth prospects in advanced economies’.  
Interpreting the potential implications of excessive sovereign debt and drawing attention 
to the need for intervention in the manner that it did essentially constituted an attempt by 
the IMF, to draw back from exceptional fiscal support advocated during the second phase 
of the downturn. Moreover however, this was accompanied by the suggestion, consistent 
with assumptions made prior to the downturn that fiscal policy should be limited to letting 
automatic stabilizers work, and provide a stable macroeconomic framework for growth. 
Nevertheless, given the severity of the downturn, declining investment and consumption, 
stagnant or declining incomes, soaring unemployment, and the potential for their 
worsening should fiscal retrenchment be undertaken unnecessarily prematurely, it was 
crucial that the IMF persuade states that undertaking this endeavour was consistent with 
their interests.  
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Here, the IMF played a critical role in providing a convincing narrative of unfolding events. 
This included more than simply engaging in providing road maps that defined the most 
appropriate route by which to successfully navigate from A to B. Rather, the persuasive 
practices undertaken by the IMF actually sought to posit that going from point A (excessive 
sovereign debt burdens) to point B (fiscal sustainability) was a good idea and consistent 
with the interests of member states (Blyth, 2007:762; Schmidt, 2011). That the IMF 
embarked on such an endeavour draws our attention to the power of persuasion, through 
the provision of research, as a crucial mechanism of social construction.  
In doing so the IMF provided cognitive justification in the form a sustainable debt 
threshold, beyond which growth would be adversely affected. This served to reify the 
perception of the problem of excessive sovereign debt as a situation in which intervention 
ought to be made. Indeed, Strauss-Kahn suggested in a 2011 speech (2011a:2) that 
research would play an important part in guiding policymakers and it was here Cottarelli 
(2012:2) noted the need for action was provided by ‘a consistent body of literature that 
finds significant effects of high public debt on potential growth’ its self considered essential 
for fiscal sustainability.  
Kumar and Woo (2010:3) of the IMF’s FAD for example postulated the existence of an 
inverse relationship between initial debt and subsequent growth: on average, a 10 percent 
increase in initial debt-to-GDP was associated with a slowdown in real per capita GDP 
growth of around 0.2 percent each year, with the impact being marginally smaller in 
advanced economies (around 0.15 percent). Moreover, the authors found evidence of non-
linearity, with levels of debt exceeding 90 percent of GDP having negative effects on 
growth.  
These findings were broadly consistent with Carmen Reinhart and former IMF chief 
economist Kenneth Rogoff (2010:2) who similarly found that the link between growth and 
debt is relatively weak when debt resides at normal levels, yet median growth for countries 
with public debt over 90 percent of GDP are roughly 1 percent lower than would otherwise 
be the case, and with average (mean) growth rates as much as several percent lower.  
Attempts to quantify the dangers associated with excessive sovereign debt burdens were 
crucial for the IMF. That is, because analysis was based on simple numbers and a seemingly 
straightforward debt threshold above which economic growth would be compromised, an 
attempt was made to portray them, and their effects as impartial. This provided a defence 
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against accusations of politicization that might undermine credibility, rather, their 
seemingly objective nature allowed for garnering political support (Barnett & Finnemore, 
2004:69). 
This approach was therefore crucial because for frames to become naturalized, that is to 
say, for them to become part of the natural order of things, they must gain legitimacy and 
invoke some semblance of trust. They do so by being grounded in cognitive justification 
which makes their potential for becoming established all the more viable (Adler, 1997:340).   
This research had two important implications. Firstly, Strauss-Kahn (2009b:2) noted that 
‘building up fiscal space in good times is very important to allow sufficient space for fiscal 
stimulus in crisis times’. Indeed, Blanchard et al (2010:14) suggested that had governments 
been better placed to adopt a more expansionary fiscal stance, they would have been 
better placed to fight the downturn. That is, in countries with high pre-crisis ratios of public 
sector debt-to-GDP, lack of fiscal space both constrained the ability to implement timely 
counter-cyclical policies, and undermined the effectiveness and the quality of fiscal 
performance.  
Secondly, research pointed to the need to reduce fiscal debts and deficits from their 
current levels. Cottarelli (2009:2) for example questioned whether stabilising debt at its 
post-crisis level was enough, as, ‘if a debt ratio not exceeding 60 percent – as noted, the 
pre-crisis median level – was regarded by many countries as an appropriate norm before 
the crisis, it should continue to appear so after the crisis’ (see also Fiscal Monitor, 2010:3).   
The problem however, according to Cottarelli (2012), was that since the 1970s, although 
public debt in advanced economies had acted as the ultimate absorber of crises during the 
bad times, this was seldom accompanied by reductions in the good times. This was a key 
distortion of the deficit bias; budgets rarely alternated between periods of surplus and 
deficit, but rather remained in deficit. Indeed, Baldacci et al (2009:3) noted that only 12 
percent of countries suffering crises had reduced debt to pre-crisis levels after 16 years.  
Cottarelli (2012) therefore suggested that debt levels, not reached before without a major 
war, should not be allowed to follow a similar path. This reflected a growing consensus 
within the IMF and beyond that this time things should be different, and the ultimate goal 
should be a reduction of public debt ratios over time (see also Strauss-Kahn, 2011).  
These assumptions appeared all the more pertinent given the unravelling sovereign debt 
positions in the euro area which had demonstrated that while a weak fiscal position was 
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not a sufficient condition to be under market pressure, it was  a necessary condition. 
Indeed it was against this backdrop, Strauss-Khan (2010:2) noted that ‘all countries – 
especially advanced economies with a high level of debt – have to go back to fiscal 
sustainability’. 
To be sure, that fiscal adjustment was not advocated in the total absence of a recognised 
need for some degree of flexibility, has led to some confusion and debate as to the extent 
to which fiscal policy ideas in the IMF are indeed characterised by change or continuity. 
This demonstrates how the IMF did not present the need for adjustment as a ‘one-size-fits-
all’ approach, but to paraphrase Lagarde (2011a:2) ‘a moment of choice’ with each state 
having the capacity to identify the speed and context in which adjustment takes place.  
On the one hand it was recognised that, for some, a retreat to austerity (a period of living 
within diminished means) would, be simply deleterious. The G20 Toronto Declaration for 
example observed that ‘there is a risk that synchronised fiscal adjustment across several 
major economies could adversely impact the recovery’ (G20, 2010:3). This assumption was 
supported by the IMF, with Strauss-Kahn (2009c:3) cautioning that 'policymakers may 
jeopardise the recovery by exiting from crisis measures too soon’ and in doing so, mitigated 
a key concern of critics of adjustment: that it suffers from a ‘paradox of thrift’ (Jabko, 
2013:706) that if all states tighten their belts simultaneously demand plummets.  
Superficially at least, this contradicted the assertion made by the IMF that frontloaded 
consolidations were the most effective approach to restoring the health of public finances. 
This was derived from research suggesting that it would: maximise debt reduction; 
minimise uncertainty about future consolidation needs; and boost long-term growth (IMF, 
2013b).  
Nevertheless, a view emerged within the IMF that excessive frontloading might undermine 
social cohesion, weaken market confidence, and ultimately prove self-defeating. Indeed, in 
a 2012 speech, Lagarde (2012b:3) stated that IMF research 'finds that fiscal multipliers are 
quite large in downturns, meaning that an overly-aggressive adjustment today will hurt 
growth, and might actually also raise public debt ratios’. We might not therefore be 
without justification in following the Ban and Gallagher (2015:137) who note that ‘these 
changes should not be downplayed’ as these “edits” were in fact quite extensive when 
compared to assumptions made prior to the downturn (see also Ban, 2014).  
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On the other hand however it is suggested that these concessions notwithstanding, the IMF 
continues to defer to the existing neoliberal economic philosophy and problem definitions. 
That is, while acknowledging frontloaded consolidations may be self-defeating, the IMF has 
however suggested that excessive delay could be even more costly if confidence was lost in 
governments delaying adjustment, thereby leading to higher interest rates, an inability to 
service debt, and declining output. Therefore, although there were instances where the 
IMF noted cutting deficits was not an immediate priority, even here ‘programmes were 
lengthened and targets adjusted, but the underlying logic was the same’ (Blyth, 
2013a:738).  
Indeed, at his opening address to the 2010 annual meeting of the Board of Governors of 
the IMF and World Bank, Strauss-Kahn (2010:2-3) appeared to offer unequivocal 
clarification of the IMF’s position in stating that ‘I sometimes read in the newspaper that 
the message from the IMF is a bit blurred, not that clear; that the IMF doesn’t know exactly 
if it’s pushing for growth or pushing for fiscal retrenchment. Our message is clear and 
consistent. In the medium term, there is a need for fiscal sustainability. Everything has to be 
done to go in this direction in the short term’ (emphasis added; see also Lagarde, 2011a:3; 
Lipsky, 2011:2).  
In order to persuade member states of the need to do so, the IMF consistently referenced 
the context provided by excessive sovereign debt burdens as being analogous to the post 
World War Two context, the last time average sovereign debt was as high (Cottarelli, 2012; 
Cottarelli& Jaramillo, 2012; Lipsky, 2011). Notwithstanding the fact that existing debt levels 
were lower, Cottarelli (2013b:2) noted the situation facing policymakers was more grave 
as: most of the fiscal adjustments then consisted of cuts in military spending; current 
spending on pensions and health-care is rising; long-term growth prospects are lower; and 
financial repression in the 1950s facilitated the financing of public debt, restrictions not 
now in place.  
The preceding discussion shows how the potential for alternative models of policy reform 
were largely screened out by the IMF which identified the nature of the problem (excessive 
sovereign debt), along with the appropriate solution (fiscal adjustment). Despite a number 
of economic ideas regarding the relative efficacy of monetary and fiscal policy seemingly 
being destabilised, cognitively speaking, by the downturn, upon entering its third stage it 
became increasingly evident that the IMF continued to exhibit a cognitive and normative 
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commitment to the neoliberal economic philosophy which again was the frame through 
which political-economic problems were interpreted (the need for fiscal sustainability). 
That these assumptions once again assumed prominence within the IMF as sovereign debt 
positions worsened may not in themselves appear to be overtly problematic, particularly 
given their cognitive underpinnings. However, it was for two key reasons.  
Firstly, one of the most cited examples of the implications of the negative effects of 
government debt beyond a particular debt-to-GDP threshold on economic growth was that 
by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). However, this research has been shown to be replete with 
data anomalies, absences, and errors which provided a wholly inaccurate representation of 
the relationship between public debt and GDP growth rates (Herndon et al, 2013:1).  
Secondly, empirical evidence seemingly contradicted the research and pointed to the fact 
that there existed in reality a number of variables impacting on sovereign debt and growth. 
Blyth (2013) for example suggests that the GDP growth of Japan had been good in the run-
up to the downturn, despite having a debt-to-GDP ratio in excess of 150 percent. 
Moreover, that of Italy had been 105.7 percent in 2002 but was not interpreted as being 
problematic, yet by 2009, although at the same level, was suddenly perceived as being a 
major problem requiring major policy interventions to place back on a sustainable footing.  
What changed in the intervening period therefore were not debt levels, but the manner in 
which they were now framed, and therefore, the perceptions of what the IMF thought this 
now meant. This shows how, rather than ‘facts’ being endowed with a particular meaning 
to which agents respond, the shifting problem definition meant data was 'redefined and 
linked to new stories and narratives where the same numbers now mean something 
completely different’ (Kessler, 2012:282). Indeed, that data does not come with an 
information particle that flows from actor to actor, draws attention both to the power of 
interpretive processes, and the assumption that “problems” are not simply “out there”, 
they are what we make them to be, that is, ‘problems exist because we talk them into 
existence’ (Cohn, 2013:114).   
This demonstrates how, despite having seen sovereign debt increase substantially as a 
result of both financial sector bailouts and falling tax revenues brought about by the 
accompanying downturn, along with research demonstrating that excessive sovereign debt 
burdens were shown to adversely affect economic growth ‘a crisis of finance was deftly 
constructed as a crisis of the profligate state’ (Blyth, 2013:210; Gamble, 2014).  
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In lieu of this interpretation of the prevailing problem, an attempt was made by the IMF to 
influence the broader debate in which policymakers perceived their interests by providing 
cognitive justification for its continuing normative commitment to the neoliberal economic 
philosophy. The aim of doing so was to limit policy options facing policymakers by positing 
the need to return to fiscal solvency and sustainability. 
It was here again that, just as knowledge-based experts within the IMF had been at the 
forefront of providing the cognitive justification for unorthodox policy interventions during 
the second phase of the downturn, so, paradoxically, were they now engaged in providing 
contrasting narratives of the third phase. In doing so, calls centred on the need – in light of 
the research highlighting the negative implications of excessive sovereign debt burdens - 
for a return to emphasising prior assumptions regarding the appropriate role for fiscal 
policy.  
This narrative, imbued with the discourse of the neoliberal economic philosophy, therefore 
attempted to ensure that the frames in which fiscal policy problems were defined and 
responded to prior to the downturn did not disappear. On the one hand, the IMF continued 
to advocate prudent fiscal policy in the form of low budget deficits and low public debts 
which were again considered key for economic growth and poverty reduction (IMF, 2005).  
On the other hand, calls for increased fiscal space were consistent with prior assumptions 
that it was necessary for country’s to build up reserves in good times so that they could be 
drawn on during bad times. The IMF (2006; 2013b) therefore suggested that unlike highly 
indebted sovereigns, countries with low levels of debt would be able to increase their fiscal 
deficits through borrowing in such a manner that they would not lose market confidence. 
Indeed, it was observed that in the absence of such buffers, countries were often forced to 
take emergency fiscal measures that further damaged growth and social indicators.  
 
Implications for the neoliberal economic philosophy 
The rapid shift between advocating fiscal stimulus during the second phase of the 
downturn and then back towards neoliberal orthodoxy during its third phase rejects the 
assumption that it might prove to be a re-constitutive event for the IMF. Although this was 
ultimately not the case, the preceding discussion did observe something of a paradox. That 
is, the same knowledge-based experts who called for, and provided cognitive justification 
for, the deployment of fiscal stimulus were the ones who helped precipitate a call for a 
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retreat to orthodoxy during the third phase of the downturn through calls for fiscal 
adjustment.   
In accounting for why this is so, this research makes a simple assumption. The IMF, and, 
most notably, the G20, never abandoned their normative commitment to the neoliberal 
economic philosophy. As a result, the policies undertaken during the second phase can be 
more aptly understood as being more concerned with failure management, a means to 
protect the system from its follies rather than change it to any significant degree.  
This helps us to understand why economic problems were framed in the manner they were 
during the third phase, that is, they were derived, embedded in, and bounded by, aspects 
of the broader neoliberal discourse which shows how the framing process undertaken 
during the third phase was bound by existing economic orthodoxy (Snow, 2004:385).  
Indeed, as the second phase of the downturn unfolded, policymakers were faced with a 
moment of severe danger during which, to prevent a more serious catastrophe, all policy 
levers were pulled regardless of how conventional or otherwise they might have been. Of 
fiscal stimulus for example, Blyth (2013:209) noted that although the IMF had championed 
belt-tightening for developing countries, it eschewed orthodoxy and ‘turned on the money 
pumps for the developed world at the first hint of trouble’. Similarly, Gamble (2014:62) 
suggested that in contrast to developing economies ‘the advice changed and the IMF 
endorsed radical emergency measures to stabilize the financial system and to provide 
extensive and unconditional fiscal and monetary stimulus to keep the economy afloat’. 
This suggests that little time or thought was given to what the longer-term implications of 
policy actions might have been. There was certainly no intention to reconsider the efficacy 
of the neoliberal economic ideas that had driven global economic governance during the 
preceding decades. To suggest that the policies advocated during the second phase could 
be construed as anything other than an attempt to save neoliberal economic ideas from 
their follies would therefore be to misread the intentions of the IMF at that time (Gamble, 
2014).  
Although Lagarde (2009:4) described the IMF as ‘an intellectual leader during the crisis’ on 
account of its early call for fiscal stimulus, the advocacy of the deployment of fiscal 
interventions was evidently not the result of a deliberatively articulated ideational shift, 
nor was it a response to an ostensible progressive accumulation of pathologies in 
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neoliberal economic ideas as had been the case in the move away from Keynesian 
economic ides.   
It has been suggested that knowledge-based experts play a vital role in clearing the ground 
for alternative problem definitions and policies that might better address pressing 
problems (Schmidt, 2011). In this instance, this was clearly not the case as research 
highlighting the beneficial impact of fiscal stimulus followed only in late 2008 long after 
Strauss-Kahn had initially called for its deployment for states that were ably positioned to 
do so in early 2008.  
That the IMF continues to privilege prior assumptions regarding what it sees as the correct 
role for fiscal policy therefore suggests that, ‘despite having recently raised expectations 
about reforms in its fundamental policy stance, the IMF remains a long way from 
jettisoning the neoliberal principles of its governing macro-economic framework’ 
(McKinley, 2010:3).  
Rather, the IMF continues to exhibit a considerable degree of stasis in the kinds of problem 
definitions it projects, which are themselves derived from the neoliberal economic 
philosophy that existed prior to the downturn. As a result, there has been no significant 
transformation in the manner in which new circumstances are framed and responded to.  
Therefore, despite the severity of the banking and economic downturn, the advocacy of the 
deployment of fiscal stimulus, and research pointing towards the efficacy of fiscal policy 
under certain conditions, the IMF and other actors constituting the coordinative discourse 
continue to exhibit considerable faith in the benefits of the neoliberal economic 
philosophy.  
In doing so, an explicit normative assumption was once again made regarding what the IMF 
considered an appropriate role of states and markets in the management of the economy. 
This was manifest in terms of support for prior assumptions regarding the efficacy of 
monetary policy interventions on the one hand, and minimal state interventions through a 
less active fiscal policy, limited to letting automatic stabilizers work, on the other hand.  
This shows how the manner in which the IMF responded to the second phase of the down-
turn (the most acute phase) continued to be responded to within the ‘discursive fields’ 
(Steinberg, 1998:856) which the IMF drew upon to diagnose, and provide a prognosis of, 
appropriate courses of action. As a result, events continued to be interpreted through 
existing frames of intellectual reference provided by neoliberal economic ideas.   
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This was observable from as early as the April 2009 London Summit, in which the Leaders 
Statement noted after advocating the deployment of significant discretionary fiscal 
stimulus only six months prior, that ‘we are resolved to ensure long-term fiscal 
sustainability and price stability and will put in place credible exit strategies from the 
measures that need to be taken now to support the financial sector and restore global 
demand’ (G20, 2009:2).  
However, it was the 2010 G20 meeting in Toronto that signified the politics had changed 
fundamentally as the discourse shifted from the need for fiscal stimulus to sustainability, 
with states agreeing on ‘following through on fiscal stimulus and communicating “growth 
friendly” fiscal consolidation plans in advanced countries that will be implemented going 
forward. Sound fiscal finances are essential to sustain recovery, provide flexibility to 
respond to new shocks, ensure the capacity to meet the challenges of aging populations, 
and avoid leaving future generations with a legacy of deficits and debt’ (G20, 2010:2).  
This, Payne (2014:4) noted, constituted ‘the end of global Keynesianism’ as future 
meetings, despite the occasional allusion to the contrary, ‘did not seek to tackle the notion 
of ‘growth friendly fiscal consolidation’’. Rather, it was here that ‘the neoliberal old guard… 
began to strike back’ (Blyth, 2013:208), as not only were neoliberal economic ideas not 
undermined despite failings in goals and instruments, it was, in the short term, seemingly 
re-enforced.  
Early calls for the shift away from exceptional fiscal support to planning and implementing 
exit strategies were similarly reflected by senior officials in the IMF. Indeed, although the 
second phase of the downturn had placed counter-cyclical fiscal policy back at centre stage, 
from the very beginning its advocacy was couched in orthodox assumptions, tempered as it 
was with the fact that it should be balanced against the importance of fiscal sustainability.     
Lipsky (2009:2) for example noted in a 2009 speech that ‘although fiscal policy should 
remain expansionary... it is not too early to begin planning to unwind the extraordinary 
policies that have been put in place’. This was a point iterated by Strauss-Kahn (2008b, 
2009, 2010) who similarly observed that fiscal policy should be temporary, grounded in 
medium-term fiscal consolidation frameworks, and unwound at the earliest opportunity.  
We can therefore observe among the institutions of the coordinative discourse a 
continuing normative commitment to belief in the efficacy of the neoliberal economic 
philosophy, problem definitions and policy priorities. These ideas were not simply the 
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aggregation of the individual beliefs held by these institutions but were, more 
fundamentally, held as collective knowledge regarding the perceived efficacy of neoliberal 
economic ideas (Adler, 1997:327).   
The consequence of this was that by calling for a retreat from exceptional fiscal support, an 
attempt was made by the IMF and G20 to determine the broader context for action. As 
part of this process the discourse coordinated by these actors sought to steer, frame and 
set an agenda which supported calls for fiscal adjustment to address sustainability 
concerns. In doing so, an attempt was made to craft a normative consensus about the 
appropriate role of fiscal policy, and what values should inform the operating of the global 
economic system.  
As part of this process, debate was inherently limited, confined as it was to a small number 
of global economic governance institutions who held inter-subjective ideas regarding the 
appropriate role of fiscal and monetary policy. As a result, the policy debate was concerned 
not with whether or not fiscal adjustment was appropriate when unemployment was high 
and the recovery slow, but at what pace it should be carried out given high levels of debt. 
Therefore, despite assumptions to the contrary during the second phase of the downturn, 
the IMF again acquiesced to prior assumptions that discretionary fiscal policy would have 
only a limited role to play in both the day to day running of the economy and in helping to 
fight recessions, with monetary policy retaining primacy as key macroeconomic policy tool.  
Indeed, we can see that, further to the IMF emphasising the need for fiscal sustainability, 
so too has it not followed that fiscal policy might play a more important role in managing 
the economic cycle in the future. Rather the advocacy of fiscal policy was consistently 
couched in the context of the ‘exceptional circumstances’ (Blanchard, 2010:9) presented by 
the downturn as opposed to being considered a more significant part of the policy mix.  
As a result, research showing that: fiscal policy was more efficacious than was thought; and 
expansionary fiscal contraction was not as convincing as was conceived, has not had a 
substantial impact on conventional thinking in the IMF, despite allusions to the contrary.  
This suggests the seeming enlightenment regarding fiscal interventions has not translated 
into their becoming a more significant part of the management of the day to day running of 
the economy. Rather, the IMF continues to frame the appropriate form and function of the 
role of fiscal policy in much the same manner as it did prior to the downturn.  
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This was an assumption largely supported by an IMF (2013b) Policy Paper analysing the 
impact of the downturn on fiscal policy which similarly questioned whether it had implied a 
fundamental change in the way it would operate in the future. The suggestion was that ‘in 
normal times, in normal economic fluctuations monetary policies, together with the use of 
automatic stabilizers will remain a key tool to control the economic cycle’(IMF, 2013b:2).  
This was premised on evidence which suggested that although the down-sides to fiscal 
policy were not as large as envisaged, there continued to be down-sides in normal times. 
These included the risks of asymmetry (it is easier to expand than tighten) and the fact that 
there were lags in formulating and implementing fiscal measures due to awkward political 
processes (Blanchard, 2010:9). As a result, the IMF (2013:1) concluded ‘that earlier 
concerns about whether discretionary fiscal stimulus measures will be timely and reversible 
remain valid, especially during less severe recessions’.  
An assumption was therefore made that monetary policy should continue to be privileged 
in the day to day running of the economy and remain the first line of defence in fighting 
down-turns. Indeed, Blanchard (2010:10) stated that ‘it is important to start by stating the 
obvious, namely, that the baby should not be thrown out with the bathwater. Most of the 
elements of the pre-crisis consensus, including the major conclusions from macroeconomic 
theory, still hold. Among them, the ultimate targets remain output and inflation stability’.  
This echoed the point made by other senior IMF officials. Vinals (2010:1) for example noted 
that ‘in my view, the appropriate arrangements are for monetary policy to continue to be 
geared to preserving price stability’ which ‘must remain the primary objective of monetary 
policy, supported by central bank independence, as well as strong accountability and clear 
communication’. Similarly Strauss-Kahn (2010:3-4) stated in his opening address to the 
2010 meetings of the board of governors of the World Bank and IMF that, ‘let me also be 
clear: we remain an institution that believes that low and stable inflation delivers positive 
benefits for growth and macro-economic stability. That remains the IMF’s key message’, 
and as a result, ‘many tenets of the pre-crisis consensus – notably low inflation and fiscal 
discipline – remain valid’ (see also Strauss-Kahn, 2011a:1).   
As a result, although there were times when the IMF considered that discretionary fiscal 
stimulus would be important, the assumption was that those instances were limited, 
applicable only to ‘cases in which conditions are similar to those that have prevailed in the 
last few years’ (IMF, 2013d:2). This was a point iterated in the IMF Policy Paper (2013b:4) 
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which noted that fiscal policy is useful when 'conditions resemble those prevailing in 
advanced economies in the post-crisis period’; and again by division chief of the FAD 
Bernardin Akitoby who suggested that ‘fiscal policy can have powerful short-run effects on 
the economy when economic conditions resemble those that have prevailed in many 
advanced economies over the last few years’ (quoted in IMF, 2013e:1, emphasis added) 
including when policy rates were at the ZLB and the financial sector was weak.    
In deferring once again to the perceived efficacy of the neoliberal economic philosophy, 
problem definitions and policy priorities, we can see how the IMF sought to reassert prior 
neoliberal economic ideas. Indeed, Steinberg (1998:854) draws our attention to the fact 
that every social order has a particular set of ideas that privileges some stylizations over 
others, that is typified by a particular set of vocabularies, meanings, rules for using them in 
dialogue, and providing a lens for viewing an aspect of political-economic life.  
In this instance, we can see how the IMF sought to once again stabilize the flow of 
meanings for communication. That is, discourse was once again characterised by such 
concepts as fiscal sustainability, fiscal adjustment, deficit reduction and the need for sound 
finances. This discourse however, was the medium through which the IMF, along with the 
G20, once again attempted to define the common sense of political-economic life by 
objectivising and naturalizing definitions of events and their meanings for states (Steinberg, 
1998:854).  
Doing was a clear expression of power. However, it was deployed in this instance in such a 
manner as to bind the range of problems to be defined. This reminds us that an essential 
part of power is produced through discourse, that is, the capacity to construct silences in 
the process of constructing common sense. This is manifest not only in attempts to assign 
meaning, but in the capacity to construct silences, as if states are focused on one set of 
problems, their attention is turned away from others which are not subject to discussion.  
Together therefore an assumption is made that the inability of monetary interventions to 
sufficiently stem the banking and financial sector turmoil, along with the failure of 
monetary policy to prevent the transmission of the banking and financial collapse to the 
real economy, while having ‘challenged our pre-crisis views about fiscal and monetary 
interactions’ (IMF, 2013b:13; emphasis added) have not in fact changed them to any 
significant degree. 
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Policy implications  
The preceding discussion has suggested that the cognitive rationale upon which calls for 
fiscal adjustment was premised was inherently contested. Nevertheless, the remainder of 
this chapter shows how the sovereign debt narrative was framed by the IMF in such a 
manner as to advocate policies that went far beyond attempts to remedy for an economic 
downturn whose origins were specific to policies failures in the banking/financial sectors. 
Doing so draws our attention to the importance of the prognostic role associated with 
framing problems in a particular manner. That is, frames are shown as being important in 
not only performing an interpretive function in the sense of providing diagnostic answers 
to the question of what is going on, but also as being inherently agential in the sense of 
calling for a particular course of policy action to remedy the problem so-defined (Snow, 
2004:385).  
Viewed in such a manner, the framing process undertaken during the third phase of the 
downturn played a crucial part in helping to mobilize collective action. Doing so was an 
attempt to stabilize and entrench adherence to the frames provided by the IMF within the 
broader neoliberal discourse. In this regard, framing processes are fundamental for not just 
drawing attention to particular events, but in mobilizing action (Benford, 1997:410). This is 
consistent with IMF assumptions that research 'will almost inevitably carry policy messages' 
(IMF, 2011:1) as it is this which gives it real relevance for policymakers. 
Indeed, Lagarde (2011:3) stated in a 2011 speech that ‘before talking about solutions, we 
need to be clear about the problems’. Having framed the third phase (and therefore the 
problem) in a manner consistent with neoliberal economic orthodoxy as one of excessive 
sovereign debt requiring fiscal adjustment, this meant that appropriate responses were 
similarly derived from the policies provided for by neoliberal economic ideas (the solution). 
In this particular instance, by framing and diagnosing the problem as one of a sovereign 
debt excesses, this served to constrain the range of '"reasonable" solutions and strategies 
advocated' (Benford& Snow, 2000:616), which in this case took the form of the need for, 
on the one hand, fiscal adjustment, and on the other, growth-enhancing structural reforms.  
Indeed, Strauss-Kahn (2009c:3) noted that ‘advanced economies are currently on an 
unsustainable path’, and that 'significant fiscal adjustment will be essential to ensure debt 
sustainability’, the primary means by which, it was suggested, was to contain spending in 
areas related to aging related pressures, most notably healthcare. Secondly, it was 
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suggested that economic growth would be essential in restoring the solvency of sovereigns, 
and it was here that the IMF placed particular emphasis on labour market reforms.  
 
Fiscal measures to control aging related spending pressures 
The 2010 Fiscal Monitor noted that many advanced economies entered the downturn with 
relatively weak structural fiscal positions which were further eroded not only by fiscal 
measures, but by underlying spending pressures. Indeed, prior to, but increasingly so since 
the beginning of the downturn the IMF has couched concerns regarding government debt 
and contingent liabilities within broader developments taking place in the context of long-
run fiscal challenges related to aging-related spending, most notably healthcare. 
In doing so, it was suggested that without reform these ‘could amount to more than ten 
times the costs of the crisis’ (Fiscal Monitor, 2009:17; Cottarelli, 2008, FAD, 2009, 2010; 
Freedman et al, 2009:43). Indeed, the Fiscal Monitor (2011:20) noted that ‘rising spending 
on healthcare is the main risk to fiscal sustainability, with an impact on long-run debt ratios 
that, absent reforms, will dwarf that of the financial crisis’, yet addressing such pressures 
would go a long way to allaying market concerns about fiscal sustainability.  
The scale of adjustment required to restore debt-to-GDP levels were therefore understood 
as having exacerbated the need for interventions to stem unsustainable current trends. 
Indeed, Strauss-Kahn (2010:2) noted that reforming health entitlement constituted a key 
element in the quest to restore fiscal sustainability, a point iterated by Lipsky (2011) who 
stated that ‘to be credible, any advanced economy fiscal consolidation strategy must deal 
with the cost of entitlements that are a – if not the – key driver of long-term spending’.    
Together therefore, an assertion was made that policies, currently constituted, could not 
continue to provide the benefits to citizens if nothing was done, and that, while ensuring 
continued access to high-quality healthcare, entitlement reforms would be critical. 
 Against this backdrop, the Fiscal Monitor (2011) explored a variety of means of containing 
spending. These included: budget caps (budget constraints and government oversight); 
public management coordination (referrals for accessing specialised care); market 
mechanisms (competition among insurers and providers); demand side reforms (expanding 
private insurance and cost sharing); and supply controls (the regulation of the workforce).  
152 
 
Of these, the Fiscal Monitor (2011:66) noted that reforms of the market mechanism were 
most powerful, yielding a reduction in spending of 0.5 percent of GDP, with demand and 
supply reforms yielding the least efficacious results. Crucially, an assumption was made 
that such reforms need not adversely affect health outcomes as ‘most micro-level 
efficiency reforms, such as the introduction of competition can improve the responsiveness 
of the health system to patients, but also reduce the growth of spending’ (Fiscal Monitor, 
2011:9).  
Moreover, although scarcely mentioned in research on its call for fiscal adjustment, the 
IMF has in fact sought to go even further in entrenching adjustment in the broader context 
of there being needed to be grounded in fiscal rules and institutions. Doing so is consistent 
with G20 assumptions that ‘strengthened budgetary frameworks and institutions can help 
to underpin the credibility of consolidation strategies’ (G20, 2010:12).  
In particular, it has been suggested that the financial and economic downturn exposed 
short-comings in fiscal transparency standards and accounts in advanced economies which 
resulted in large unreported deficits and debt (IMF, 2013b:37). Credibility was therefore 
considered essential to anchor longer-run expectations about government solvency, hence 
the renewed emphasis within the IMF on fiscal rules, ‘a permanent constraint on fiscal 
policy through simple numerical limits on budgetary aggregates’ (FAD, 2009:4).  
In doing so, the FAD (2009:15-16) noted that fiscal rules are associated with improved fiscal 
performance. In particular, it was suggested that: fiscal rules are correlated with stronger 
cyclically adjusted primary balances; budget balance and debt rules in particular contribute 
to improved outcomes; rules implemented at higher levels of government are associated 
with greater fiscal discipline than those applied locally; and some design features have a 
noticeably beneficial impact including those with a strong legal basis and strict 
enforcement. 
Moreover, in addition to fiscal rules, Lipsky (2011:6) suggested that ‘good institutions are 
needed to underpin good policy’. In the fiscal area, institutions such as independent fiscal 
councils, using fiscal rules, strong medium-term fiscal frameworks, close monitoring of out-
turns, and coordination have been posited as keys to success with Lagarde for example 
(2012b:3) noting that successful fiscal adjustment is easier with proper fiscal institutions.  
The assumption was that fiscal institutions can help to exert a positive effect on public 
finances by: building confidence and credibility; contributing to greater fiscal transparency; 
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helping to monitor compliance; raising voters’ awareness of certain policy paths; 
influencing public debates through communications and formal appearances before 
parliamentary committees; and providing or publically assessing macro-economic and 
budgetary forecasts to be used for budget preparation (FAD, 2009; Fiscal Monitor, 2010, 
2012; IMF, 2013b).   
Aging-related spending pressures were not a concern in previous cases of major fiscal 
adjustment. Policies to mitigate for the effects of the present demographic trend therefore 
make specific policy prescriptions somewhat novel and difficult to compare. Nevertheless, 
the broader context within which measures have been framed can be seen as being very 
much consistent with the assumptions of the neoliberal economic philosophy in the IMF. 
In doing, so this approach can be understood as being problematic for two reasons. Firstly, 
Chowdhury and Islam (2012) have noted there are deleterious consequences to rule-based 
policymaking that risk democracy and development. On the one hand, in a reflection of its 
grounding in the neoliberal economic philosophy, the underlying rationale for fiscal rules 
lies, in a deep distrust in, and the need to contain the size of, government (FAD, 2009:6).  
Indeed, the Fiscal Monitor (2011) acknowledged reforms would have broader implications 
for the role of the state in the provision of healthcare and the range of services/products 
financed by the public sector. This reflected the assumption made prior to the downturn in 
a Policy Pamphlet (IMF, 2006:41) which highlighted that the kind of reforms advocated in 
the health-care sector ‘requires asking basic questions about whether government 
activities are needed, should be provided by the public sector, or could be made market 
based’. The corollary was calls for ‘an expansion of the role of the private sector’ (Fiscal 
Monitor, 2011:70, 2014) to remedy for inefficiencies that accompany government 
interventions.  
Premised on the assumption therefore that ‘an overblown and poorly managed public 
sector can result in sizable inefficiencies and crowd out private sector employment’ (Fiscal 
Monitor, 2014:26), particularly in the healthcare sector, an explicit assumption was made 
that the private sector continued to provide the sole model for the efficient management 
of scarce resources. Indeed, the proposed imposition of the healthcare sector as a private 
good – a commodity – implied that it should be traded in the market place like other 
commodities, with state subsidies/controls that distort the market being eliminated.  
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Fiscal rules can therefore be understood as an attempt to depoliticise the policy 
framework, a move necessary to eliminate discretionary intervention by politicians. This is 
posited here as problematic however as it has the potential to undermine democratic 
governance by distorting political discourse as elections are fought on competing attempts 
to demonstrate a party’s commitment to “sound” finance, not on who has a better social 
programme.  
On the other hand the primary concern with fiscal policy in the IMF is sustainability, the 
aim being to develop credible strategies to strengthen public finances which basically 
relates to budgetary aggregates. Doing so ignores fiscal policy’s developmental role by 
assuming that fiscal sustainability is a necessary and sufficient condition for growth and 
poverty reduction.  
Indeed the Policy Pamphlet notes that ‘countries with aging populations will require two 
very difficult adjustments, entailing not only changes in spending patterns but also in the 
promises that governments make’ (IMF, 2006:43, emphasis added).  
This view is clearly influenced by, and located within, the neoliberal economic philosophy in 
deferring to the notion that, without fiscal rules, deficits crowd out private investment 
and/or are offset by greater savings by private actors in anticipation of future tax rises. 
However, the stabilization view still dominates policy discourse. Indeed, Chowdhury and 
Islam (2012:4) note that this raises a fundamental question, whether the policymaking 
process should become hostage to the confidence game in which evidence-based policy-
making is replaced by amateur psychologists seeking to read the minds of markets.  
Secondly, one of the core characteristics of the neoliberal economic philosophy is the 
desire to separate the economic realm from the political, the most important manifestation 
of which has been to advocate placing control of monetary policy instruments in the hands 
of autonomous central bankers rather than those of elected politicians. The assumption 
was that it was better to leave decision-making to technocrats guided by supposedly 
impartial rules rather than let politicians make decisions based on short-term political 
calculations.  
In a similar vein, Burnham (2001:1) notes that the common motive for fiscal institutions ‘is 
a desire to adopt the good experiences of independent central banking to the fiscal 
sphere’. Therefore, although not wholly analogous to the function of central banking, the 
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rationale behind the proposed adoption of fiscal institutions exhibits a number similar 
characteristics.  
Research such as that conducted by Ebeke and Olcer (2013) for example represents part of 
a growing literature assessing the detrimental effects of fiscal policy volatility on long-term 
growth and aggregate welfare. In doing so, the authors find that during election years, 
government consumption significantly increases and leads to higher fiscal deficits as re-
election minded incumbents use fiscal policy to satisfy the median voter, despite the 
potentially adverse effects on fiscal sustainability and macro-economic stability.  
This has provided a motivating factor behind calls for the development of fiscal councils 
within the IMF, namely, to remove the political character of decision-making. In doing so, 
although state managers would retain arms length control over crucial economic and social 
processes, the assumption was that governments would benefit from the distancing effects 
of de-politicization, and markets would benefit from the credibility of policymaking.  
In reality however Flinders and Buller (2006) have noted that de-politicization is a 
misnomer as the role of politics remains almost as pronounced as it would be in the 
absence of de-politicization, it is simply the arena or processes through which decisions are 
taken that is altered. Should we accept this premise then the strategy invoked by the IMF 
can be seen as an attempt to entrench, in the context of fiscal policy, neoliberal 
institutional reforms, that is, the constitutionalization of fiscal policy-making through the 
use of rules and councils.    
Consequently, the procedures referred to as being under the rubric of de-politicization 
might not accurately be described as being any less political through the application of de-
politicization tactics. The FAD (2009:5) for example highlighted four rules that contribute to 
the fiscal sustainability: budget balance rules; debt rules; expenditure rules; and revenue 
rules. Ascertaining which one, or collection would be subject to de-politicization and be 
embedded in an institutional framework is an inherently political exercise, left as it is to 
politicians to decide what functions should be de-politicized, with what tools and tactics.   
 
Providing the foundations for growth: Accompanying structural reforms 
In addition to addressing measures necessary for fiscal adjustment, the G20 2009 
Pittsburgh Leaders Statement noted the need for ‘decisive progress on structural reforms 
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that foster private demand and strengthen long-run growth potential’ (G20, 2009a:2). This 
was iterated in the G20 Toronto Declaration in June 2010 which, drawing on IMF research, 
suggested that the implementation of ambitious reforms would, over the medium term: 
increase global output by almost $4 trillion; create tens of millions of jobs; lift even more 
people out of poverty (G20, 2010:2), and have a substantial impact on economic growth 
and welfare.  
Blanchard and Cottarelli (2010:3) therefore stated that the debt crisis presented an 
opportunity to implement a wider set of structural reforms to boost growth, suggesting 
that it had the potential to exert ‘a staggering effect on public debt reduction’. Indeed, 
Cottarelli and Jaramillo (2012:14) noted that ‘history confirms that fiscal adjustment rarely 
occurs without healthy economic growth’, a point iterated by Strauss-Khan (2010:2) who 
observed that no, or only minimal growth, increasingly constituted ‘the biggest threat to 
fiscal sustainability’ (see also Borg &Lagarde, 2012; Cottarelli, 2012; FAD, 2010; Lagarde, 
2013).  
In particular however, the discourse coordinated by the G20 and IMF stressed - thanks to 
the substantial margins of unused capacity brought about by what was increasingly 
referred to as the Great Recession (Lipsky, 2011a; IMF, 2013f) which gave rise to sluggish 
job growth and high unemployment in advanced economies - the need for labour market 
reforms.  
The most comprehensive analysis of the impact of the downturn on unemployment was an 
IMF Policy Paper titled ‘Jobs and growth: Analytical and operational considerations for the 
Fund’ (IMF, 2013f). Here, research noted the presence of (in addition to low output 
brought about by the Great Recession), ‘global megatrends that are influencing 
developments in jobs and growth’ (IMF, 2013f:5) including technological change, 
globalization, and the doubling of the global workforce as China and India opened up in the 
1980s and 1990s.   
In light of these trends the IMF (2013f:7) suggested a consensus among economists that, 
rather than taking an active role in the provision of employment like Keynesians, the best 
states could do was provide a facilitating environment for growth which was considered ‘an 
essential pre-requisite for job creation and social cohesion’, inasmuch as it fostered 
inclusive growth, and contributed to significant reductions in poverty and inequality.  
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In a manner consistent with the neoliberal economic philosophy, this approach suggested 
only a minimal role for government which would be limited to providing economic 
fundamentals including an enabling business environment, and making sure that labour 
policies did not undermine job creation. Particular emphasis however was placed upon the 
provision of ‘sound macro-economic policies – low inflation and sustainable public finances 
and external positions – as the foundation for growth and jobs’ (IMF, 2013f:41).  
On the question of whether there was a specific need for a job strategy over and above a 
growth strategy, an assertion was made that it is conventional to focus on economic 
growth as a precondition for employment rather than attempting to tackle unemployment 
directly, an approach which had proved so successful in East Asia.  
This hands-off approach notwithstanding, the IMF did not have nothing to say regards the 
appropriate form that labour markets should take. Rather, it was noted that, given over-
arching megatrends, it would be less efficient to protect people adversely affected by these 
changes and that the aim should be to ‘protect workers, not jobs’. The assumption was that 
protecting jobs that were no longer economically viable through employment protection 
legislation would simply freeze an inefficient allocation of resources (IMF, 2013f:17).  
Rather, it was suggested that workers should be protected through unemployment 
insurance (referred to as ‘flexicurity’). Indeed, evidence presented (IMF, 2013f:21) 
observed that in light of global megatrends, ‘there is a role for employment protection, but 
it should be limited’ as high employment protection levels led to high unemployment 
durations.  
Although it was acknowledged that the benefits of ‘flexicurity’ may take time to 
materialise, and have adverse short-term effects, it was suggested that those finding 
themselves out of work as a result should be provided with minimal safety nets and be 
incentivised to work through the provision of childcare and benefits commensurate with 
searching for work.  
This approach could scarcely be more distinguishable from Keynesian economic ideas, at 
the heart of which was ‘a pledge to secure full employment… through adroit use of fiscal 
policy to boost demand when recession threatened’ (Wilson & Grant, 2011:3). In doing so, 
states worked in conjunction with business and trade unions in tri-partite structures to 
protect citizens through social safety nets, reducing the costs of unemployment and old 
age.  
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This largely “hands-off” approach can be considered somewhat puzzling given that fiscal 
consolidations tend to increase income inequality, including through their effects on un-
employment, and to the extent that fiscal consolidation raises unemployment, it 
constitutes an important channel through which consolidation affects inequality. Indeed, it 
was noted that loosely speaking, about 15-20 percent of the overall increase in inequality 
due to fiscal consolidation may be occurring via the increase in unemployment (Woo et al, 
2013:3).  
The negative consequences associated with labour market reforms were not missed by 
senior members of the IMF. They were however, considered a necessary means by which 
to ensure medium to longer term prosperity. Lagarde (2012a:6) for example observed that 
‘as countries undertake the sometimes wrenching reforms that are needed, the social 
fabric is in danger of being stretched’ as ‘in many cases, it involves lowering labour costs’, 
albeit this was assumed necessary as ‘reform is essential for competitiveness and for 
creating greater job opportunities in future’ (see also Cottarelli, 2013a; Fiscal Monitor, 
2010). 
The lowering of labour costs in particular was consistent however with the kind of austerity 
advocated by the IMF in the Latin American debt crisis and AFC in which labour costs were 
reduced to improve competitiveness and growth. Its advocacy in the current context was 
however, completely at odds with comments made by Lagarde (2012a:6) who suggested 
that ‘a more equitable distribution of income can help promote economic and financial 
stability, and more lasting growth’, and latterly, that fairness was important as ‘adjustment 
usually means taking tough decisions. But it should be done in a way that protects the poor 
and most vulnerable and shares the burden fairly across the population’ (Lagarde, 
2012b:3).  
 
Consequences for reforms  
Despite stating that reforms would be beneficial at the aggregate level, short of one 
notable exception (Woo et al, 2013) which highlighted that spending-based consolidations 
tend to significantly worsen inequality, little systematic analysis has in fact been 
undertaken in the IMF of the distributional consequences associated with adjustment 
policies and structural reforms. Rather, reference has simply been made to the fact that it 
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remains important to protect the poorest and most vulnerable members of society through 
minimal safety nets. 
Even in Woo et al (2013) however, missing from the analysis was a systematic discussion of 
why debt became as large as it did and who should bear the brunt of adjustment. This is 
important however as, in the essence of fairness, this should offer plausible direction as to 
where the costs of adjustment should fall, who should bear the burden of adjustment and 
what are the associated distributional consequences that adjustment would bring.    
Indeed, given that the downturn originated in the financial sector and required significant 
bank bail-outs (the first phase), subsequently infiltrated the broader economy, thereby 
requiring the deployment of significant fiscal stimulus (the second phase), it seems almost 
perverse to say the least that responses to the third phase (an amalgam of the fiscal costs 
of the first two phases and the accompanying recession which brought about sovereign 
debt sustainability concerns) took the form they did; that is, the postulated necessity of the 
further entrenching of structural reform policies in healthcare and labour markets in a 
manner that strengthened rather than fundamentally challenged neoliberal economic 
ideas.  
This begs the question however of how the narrative underpinning this policy shift changed 
so fundamentally. Here the manner in which the IMF framed the third phase had a crucial 
part to play. Brandwein (2006:230) has noted that understanding how an event is framed 
requires the analytical isolation of taken-for-granted assumptions as these help us to 
understand why subsequent action is taken. Indeed it was here that, despite the fact that a 
number of assumptions had been discredited, cognitively speaking, during the second 
phase of the downturn, the IMF never abandoned its normative commitment to the 
neoliberal economic philosophy which privileged the importance of fiscal sustainability, and 
it was these assumptions that helped to shape the IMF understanding of the third phase as 
one of excessive sovereign debt requiring fiscal adjustment and structural reforms.   
Moreover, in addition to providing the cognitive ideas underpinning this shift, so too did 
the IMF couch the need for reforms in explicitly normative terms. In doing so, a suggestion 
was made that fiscal adjustment and structural reforms were a necessary penance to be 
paid by states and the public for their pre-crisis fiscal profligacy. This was exemplified by 
Lagarde (2012b:2) who suggested that ‘we can’t pin the blame for our fiscal woes on the 
crisis alone... as the public debt ratio was already at a post-war peak by 2007’, and iterated 
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by Blanchard and Cottarelli (2010:2) who noted that excessive fiscal burdens ‘are due not 
only to the crisis, but also how fiscal policy was mismanaged during the good times’.  
Against this backdrop, the IMF was able to construct a narrative, consistent with neoliberal 
economic ideas, which drew on the appeal of the need for fiscal adjustment through 
reference to a series of apparent “truisms” which included the notion of not spending more 
than you have; of living within your means, that proved especially intuitive.  
Indeed, that the IMF, working alongside the G20, was so readily able to construct such a 
narrative demonstrates the importance of politics in the process of crisis narration. That is, 
the sovereign debt burdens were brought about by banking and financial sector 
pathologies which spilled over into the real economy, negatively affecting economic growth 
and employment the world over. It was not a sovereign debt crisis generated by excessive 
spending for anyone other than perhaps the Greeks, and it was certainly not the result of 
unsustainable aging-related and labour market policies. That it has been couched in such 
terms however, suggests a politics of ‘bait and switch’ (Blyth, 2013:5).  
This was a point iterated by Gamble (2014:157) who observed that the losses incurred by 
sovereigns bearing the fiscal impact of the downturn were drawn upon in order ‘to frame 
the political debate about austerity, the need for belt-tightening and shrinking the size of 
the state’. The problem with this approach however is that ‘to suggest this is a fiscal crisis 
of the state would be to implicate the state directly in the generation of the fiscal shortfall 
that threatens the public programmes with which we associate it’ (Hay, 2013:8).  
However, should we recognise the problem as a fiscal crisis for the state is to make no such 
assumption. Indeed, it is to suggest that the sovereign debt which now threats public 
expenditure and associated growth-related policies cannot be attributed to any dynamic 
internal to the state its self since its origins have been shown to lie elsewhere (Hay, 
2013:8). Viewed in such a manner we can see how, had the third phase of the downturn 
been framed differently, we change our sense not only of the problems, but we also 
change the range of responses that would be considered both necessary and desirable.   
Therefore that sovereign debt levels were framed as problematic and requiring 
intervention was clearly not a politically neutral process, but can be more accurately 
conceptualised as a process of strategic social construction by the IMF. In doing so, the 
diagnosis came with a set of accompanying policies, including an opportunity to reform un-
sustainable aging-related policies through spending constraint as well as a chance ‘to 
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implement difficult, but needed, structural reforms’ under the guise of boosting GDP  
(Anderson et al, 2014:1).  
This adjustment-cum-growth objective however, while broad, represented a specific 
attempt, to implement policies geared towards: strengthening market incentives and 
raising efficiency; boosting sustainable growth; and increasing the role of market and 
competition in the economy through the implementation of policies consistent with the 
prevailing economic philosophy. Together, this demonstrates how the IMF continues to 
retain a normative commitment to free market outcomes through reduced government 
intervention.  
 
Concluding remarks 
Chapter 4 demonstrated how, during its initial phase, problems were manifest primarily in 
the banking and financial sectors, and a relative slowdown in economic growth. As a result, 
the IMF advocated a range of policies to remedy for the unfolding pathologies that were 
derived from the neoliberal frames of reference. These included lowering policy rates, 
extending the provision of central bank liquidity, and latterly, forward guidance of the 
policy rate along with large scale asset purchases by central banks. 
Given the inability of monetary policy in both its conventional and unconventional guises 
however to prevent the transmission of the downturn to the broader economy (the second 
phase) the IMF advocated an altogether different set of policy interventions. This included, 
most notably, substantial discretionary fiscal stimulus to increase aggregate consumption 
by supporting domestic demand. It was this move in particular that led to suggestions of a 
potentially epoch-shaping shift away from neoliberal economic ideas in the IMF. 
This notwithstanding, this chapter has suggested that that change which has occurred has 
been largely limited, having not been accompanied by a more fundamental shift in the 
prevailing economic philosophy or the way in which economic problems are interpreted 
and responded to. Indeed, as the downturn unfolded and entered its third stage (a concern 
in the IMF with the implications of increasing sovereign debt burdens), the manner in 
which the downturn was interpreted and responded to suggested that the IMF in fact 
continued to exhibit a normative commitment to neoliberal economic ideas. That is, this 
phase was couched in a broader context in which more policies consistent with neoliberal 
economic ideas, not those diverging substantially from it, were required, not less. 
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Chapter 6 
Financial sector liberalization I 
 
‘It is a world of change in which we live’ (Frank Knight) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter serves two purposes. On the one hand it is shown how the decision to allow 
banks to increase leverage and lower capital buffers was clearly misguided as the downturn 
demonstrated their susceptibility to declines in asset prices. During the first phase 
(understood here as running from summer 2007 to autumn 2008), responses centred on 
calls for a financial system characterised by less leverage and greater capital ratios in order 
to mitigate risk taking and absorb losses when they do occur, a commitment framed in the 
broader context of the need for greater supervision of the implementation of the pre-
existing Basel 2 capital accords. As a result, neoliberal economic ideas in the IMF are shown 
as being characterised by a considerable degree of continuity, with banking and financial 
sector pathologies postulated as being resolvable within existing frames of reference.  
On the other hand, it is suggested that as the banking and financial turbulence spilled over 
into the real economy, particularly in autumn 2008 (the second phase) it became apparent 
that simply implementing the existing Basel accords would be insufficient and that more 
substantive regulatory reform was required. Attention therefore turned to the creation of a 
new set of rules (Basel 3) that doubled capital requirements and introduced conservation 
and counter-cyclical buffers. This shift from a micro- to complementary micro-/macro-
prudential (MicPR/MacPR) approach, giving states considerable scope to intervene in 
baking/financial sectors, appeared, superficially at least, to have marked a crucial shift in 
neoliberal economic ideas in the IMF which had rested on an assumption that financial 
markets, left to their own devices, would be both efficient and self-equilibrating. 
Notwithstanding this ostensible shift, Chapter 7 suggests that as the third phase of the 
downturn began in winter 2009, it became evident that actual reforms were not as 
fundamental as it was initially envisaged they might be. Rather, it is demonstrated that, 
despite some change in the kinds of policies now on the table for discussion, reforms 
continued to be couched within the neoliberal economic philosophy that prevailed prior. 
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As was the case in Chapters 4 and 5 the means by which this is assessed is through a text 
analysis of research produced by knowledge-based experts within the IMF which has, along 
with the FSF/FSB under the guidance of the G20, sought, through the coordinative 
discourse to produce research in order to influence the direction of the capital adequacy 
debate. 
These include the bi-annual reports WEO and GFSR, along with Working Papers, Staff 
Discussion Notes and Policy Papers produced by members of the Monetary and Capital 
Markets Department (MCMD) (its aim being to be a centre of excellence for all aspects of 
financial, capital market, and monetary policy in the IMF) which communicate the 
economic ideas that underpin economic philosophies, problem definitions and policy 
priorities. This includes MCMD Directors Jaime Caruana and latterly Jose Vinals, senior 
MCMD staff Laura Kodres and Iditya Narain and others, and Research Director Olivier 
Blanchard.   
This research is therefore especially important for our purposes as it is here that the IMF 
seeks to persuade policymakers and practitioners that economic ideas constituting the 
coordinative discourse are both necessary (cognitively) and appropriate (normatively). 
Operating on the assumption however that research not only contributes to the process by 
which actors are persuaded of the benefits or otherwise of a certain course of action, both 
this chapter and the next also incorporate the means by which new knowledge is drawn on, 
and communicated through, speeches by senior IMF officials who offer another important 
source by which to gauge the IMFs interpretation of, and responses to, the downturn. This 
includes Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn and latterly Christine Lagarde, First 
Deputy Managing Director John Lipsky, and Research Director Olivier Blanchard.  
 
Phase 1: Banking and financial sector turbulence and the shift to greater capital 
adequacy 
In the run-up to the banking and financial sector turbulence academics, the banking sector, 
government officials, and international financial institutions including the IMF and Financial 
Stability Forum (FSF) (incorporating national financial authorities, BIS, World Bank, and 
others) exhibited an inter-subjectively held consensus regards the capacity of banking and 
financial institutions to manage their own risks and regulate themselves effectively.   
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Indeed, so pervasive and entrenched had the assumed efficacy of financial markets become 
that, in the run up to the first phase of the downturn regulators and supervisors failed to 
acknowledge and counter the incentives of leveraged financial institutions to take 
excessive risks through the more effective deployment of existing supervisory tools. As a 
result, banks financed their portfolios with less capital, thereby increasing the rate of 
return, reduced capital by moving assets off balance sheets in “structured investment 
vehicles”, and at times, actively sought both to deceive regulators about the levels of 
capital they were holding and the way in which they were undertaking their risk 
assessments. 
Blanchard (2009:8) for example noted that in 2006 the value of off-balance-sheet assets of 
Citigroup ($2.1 trillion) exceeded the value of assets on the balance sheet ($1.8 trillion). 
This practice was not simply limited to banks however as, in late 2006, mono-line insurers 
(those insuring against a particular risk), operating outside the perimeter of regulation, had 
capital equal to $34 billion to back insurance claims of over $3 trillion worth of assets.  
The implications were obvious. If the value of assets declined and/or became uncertain, the 
higher the leverage, the higher the probability that institutions would become insolvent. 
This is exactly what happened as, beginning in the summer of 2007, financial institutions 
that had invested heavily in securities linked to sub-prime mortgages faced enormous 
losses as international financial markets began to freeze up, thereby further compounding 
difficulties in institutions that were highly leveraged, under-capitalised and dependant on 
short-term funding. Moreover, equally as pertinent was the fact that uncertainty about the 
location of losses and the valuation of other assets led financial markets to panic further. 
The first phase of the downturn therefore demonstrated that, under the existing regime, in 
good times, capital inadequacy prevailed as risk sensitivity became dulled and measured 
risks appeared to be reduced. Senior Financial Sector Expert of the MCMD Sacasa (2008:4) 
for example noted how risk-based capital requirements were susceptible to erosion in the 
good times as risk measures tend to ignore risk build-up during upswings. This allowed 
lenders to increase leverage and credit, thereby reinforcing asset price increases, which 
ultimately generated a self-feeding spiral between leverage and asset prices.  
Conversely, when risk measures mount during down-swings and losses materialise, capital 
buffers insufficiently built-up during good times are eroded and are not easily replenished 
since external capital becomes increasingly scarce. Interactions between capital, credit, and 
166 
 
asset markets can then magnify the turmoil by forcing chain reactions of asset sales, a self-
reinforcing credit crunch and contracting economic activity. Together therefore, not only 
did regulatory rules not dampen pro-cyclicality in financial markets, they actually 
aggravated financial sector pathologies as banks held more capital as risk increased (while 
capital was already depleted), forcing them to cut back on lending, so worsening the initial 
downturn.  
Finally, had the implications of capital inadequacy been limited to individual banks, the 
impact on the broader financial system would not have been so pronounced. Nevertheless, 
the banking and financial sector turbulence drew attention to the spill-over problems that 
existing policies had played in contributing not only to local, but to broader systemic risk. 
 
Problem definition 
The banking and financial sectors at this juncture were clearly operating in a context of 
increasing uncertainty as many cognitive assumptions held regarding the efficacy of freely 
functioning markets, along with their associated policy interventions, began to unravel.  
Nevertheless, the ability to comprehend the volume of information related to banking and 
financial sector pathologies meant that the IMF deferred to a simplifying mechanism so as 
to cope with, and be better placed to process, the massive amount of incoming 
information. These were found in existing schemas (the neoliberal economic ideas held in 
the IMF) which provided a means to interpret, understand, and respond to events. Indeed, 
these ideas shaped the way the initial shock was interpreted and responded to (Barnett & 
Finnemore, 2004:9). This draws our attention to the fact that is was the economic ideas 
held by the IMF, not rational responses that guided the initial response to the increasing 
uncertainty.  
These economic ideas came with an existing set of variables which privileged incoming 
information consistent with the extant economic philosophy and problem definitions, while 
also providing a template which directed the IMF towards specific examples from which 
similar banking and financial sector downturns could be compared and drawn upon. In 
doing so, the economic ideas held by the IMF were critical in shedding light on the origins 
and functions of lessons from the past, and coloured initial images related to the downturn.  
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This approach again allows us to show how the IMF attempted to reduce uncertainty, how 
existing economic ideas provided the means by which to relate and respond to the down-
turn, and how the policies derived from the analogies invoked were ultimately insufficient. 
This approach stresses, in a manner consistent with Blyth (2002:52), the importance of the 
economic ideas held by the IMF in interpreting and responding to economic uncertainty.  
During the first phase of the downturn the IMF therefore drew on the lessons of the past 
(or more accurately, what they thought those lessons taught them) in order to guide initial 
policy responses. In particular it is shown how a number of inferences were made (implicit 
or otherwise) through reference to historical analogies - comparing banking and financial 
sector turbulence with similar episodes that preceded it – in an effort to reduce 
uncertainty.  
In doing so, the IMF invoked the lessons of the past to display the banking and financial 
environment as one of continuing risk as opposed to uncertainty. Indeed, by drawing on 
the lessons of previous episodes of financial distress it is shown how the analogies invoked 
by the IMF suggested that the current turbulence was comparable with a larger number of 
similar instances from the past, thereby making the economic environment more 
knowable.  
Again, the means by which this was undertaken can be explained through reference to the 
schematic provided by Khong (1992) AX:BX; AY:BY. Nevertheless, in this instance A (banking 
and financial sector turbulence) resembled event B (previous episodes of banking and 
financial sector volatility) in having characteristic X (being brought about by an asset boom 
and bust); A had characteristic Y in being considered resolvable through the increased 
provision of information, enhanced disclosure, and more effective market discipline. So too 
was it therefore thought that BY (banking and financial sector turbulence brought about by 
an asset boom and bust) was resolvable through a similar set of policy interventions.  
The lessons learned from the past, themselves a derivative of adherence to the frames of 
reference provided by neoliberal economic ideas, are shown as devices that serve three 
tasks: to define the problem confronting actors by comparing the situation with others with 
which the IMF was familiar; define the stakes; and imply policy solutions (Khong, 1992:20).   
In light of this discussion we can see how a number of simplifying assumptions regarding 
the nature of banking and financial sector pathologies, interpreted as analogous to other 
like-instances preceding it, were made that meant the unfolding turbulence could be 
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treated in a similar manner. Indeed, one of the key lessons drawn by the IMF was that, just 
as they had in previous financial crises, undercapitalised financial institutions had played a 
crucial role in initiating/exacerbating financial sector turbulence, thereby demonstrating 
that the existing approach to capital regulation (the funds required to absorb losses) was 
inadequate.  
In order to persuade others of the appropriateness of this diagnosis, two arguments were 
advanced that underpinned calls in the IMF for more and better quality capital. The first 
noted that capital is a buffer that absorbs losses and reduces the risk of insolvency, so 
mitigating risk factors such as collective uncertainty over counterparty risk which had a 
major propagation effect. The second argued that capital reduces limited liability-driven 
incentives of banks to take excessive risk by increasing their “skin-in-the-game”. 
Although there were several ways to mitigate this problem the most simple it was 
suggested (see for example GFSR, 2008; GFSR, 2008a; Sacasa 2008; WEO, 2008a), was to 
make capital requirements counter-cyclical – the amount of capital needed to support 
given assets would rise during booms and fall during busts. Doing so, it was thought, would 
mitigate for the fact that existing rules/practices were backward-looking, recognising risks 
too late, yet making capital adequacy requirements counter-cyclical would better reflect 
“through-the-cycle” risks, limiting pro-cyclicality; and enable supervisors to resist pressures 
from politicians or firms to let things continue on an upward trajectory without 
acknowledging that  leveraged institutions had incentives to take on excessive risks without 
internalising systemic risk.  
The acknowledgement of the failure of capital standards notwithstanding, there was still a 
sense within the IMF that the overall regulatory framework had not been fundamentally 
damaged, a point made by Strauss-Kahn (2011a:2) who retrospectively noted that the first 
phase was considered by many a failure of supervision as opposed to regulation.  
This was demonstrable in, for example, an April 2008 IMF paper (IMF, 2008:1-2) seeking to 
draw tentative lessons from the early stages of the downturn which noted that supervisory 
failures were particularly evident in: scrutinising risk management practices; not 
adequately accounting for risks associated with new financial instruments; and their failure 
to address gaps associated with the valuation and financial reporting of structured 
products. 
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Indeed, so much faith had been placed in the ability of financial institutions to manage their 
own risk portfolios that interpreting the unfolding banking and financial turbulence as one 
of regulatory as opposed to supervisory failure would have contradicted one of the key 
neo-liberal economic ideas; that markets were self-regulating and tended towards 
equilibrium.  
Viewed through the lens of supervisory as opposed to regulatory failings however, implied 
that all that was necessary to rid the banking and financial sector of their pathologies was 
intervention in the form of the greater supervision of existing regulations which was now 
considered the predominant challenge for regulators and supervisors. Interpreted in such a 
manner, substantive regulatory change was considered neither desirable nor necessary.  
Rather, an assumption was made that stronger supervision would mitigate for the fact that: 
supervision in the run-up to the downturn was weak in independence and accountability, 
industry or political capture, wrong incentive structures provided by politicians, lack of will 
to probe or take matters to their conclusion, a misalignment of incentives for supervisors to 
voluntarily cooperate, along with a lack of binding coordinating mechanisms.  
To remedy for the misalignment of incentives a paper produced by the MCMD (2008) 
noted that, in order to be effective, supervisors required: a mandate to enforce existing 
laws and regulations; the ability to investigate breaches of laws/regulations; and the 
authority to bring charges and impose sanctions as in their absence enforcement was 
meaningless. Indeed, of existing regulations Carvajal and Elliott (2009:20) of the MCMD 
noted that ‘it is not the law, but the implementation and enforcement of the law’ that was 
most important. 
For this reason, Cortavarria et al (2009:12) of the MCMD cautioned against an immediate 
and unnecessary move from a discretionary to stronger system of rules-based 
policymaking. The argument being that the prevailing regulatory framework already 
afforded supervisors considerable discretion to implement a range of policies, but that the 
downturn highlighted that policymakers can be reluctant or slow to act. Accordingly, the 
authors advocated the need to better implement existing rules rather than rushing to re-
regulate un-necessarily.  
Together, these calls were premised in large part on an assumption that the global 
economy was characterised not by uncertainty, but by risk, which continued to be an 
inherent, and important, part of the financial landscape. Therefore, indiscriminately 
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expanding the scope of regulation with the aim of reducing pro-cyclicality and eliminating 
risk-taking altogether was considered unnecessary, if not deleterious. Rather, the IMF 
continued to advocate the need to balance reducing pro-cyclicality with the need to 
adequately reflect financial risks.  
 
Policy implications  
Interpreting banking and financial sector turbulence in the manner that it did meant that, 
despite acknowledging the need for stronger capital standards, initial policy prescriptions 
did not differ significantly from those already in place. Rather, the analogies invoked 
directed policymakers to define the problem in line with the frames of reference provided 
by neoliberal economic ideas, a move which introduced choice propensities into 
policymaking, directing the IMF towards particular policy avenues at the expense of others.  
In doing so, the policies advocated by the IMF continued to be derived from the extant 
Basel 2 capital adequacy framework. Assumed as a significant improvement over its 
predecessor, Basel 1, under which banks were able to circumvent capital requirements 
insensitive to risk, it was thought Basel 2 would lead to financial stability through better risk 
management, supervision, and market discipline. The IMF (2008:6) therefore suggested 
that, implemented rigorously, Basel 2 already provided sufficient scope for improvements 
in bank regulation, and especially so in terms of the required capital buffers. This was 
supported by the FSF (2008:12) which suggested that Basel 2 was a ‘starting point for 
improving major banks’ and securities firms’ capital adequacy’ standards and as a result 
‘needs timely implementation’. 
This assumption was echoed by MCMD Director Jaime Caruana (2007:1) who in a 
December 2007 speech noted that ‘this is the time to implement Basel 2’ as it was already 
making a positive contribution in addressing risks facing banks. Indeed, Caruana and Narain 
(2008:1), along with the FSF (2008:12), noted that banking and financial sector turbulence 
had effectively occurred during Basel 1 as Basel 2 was incompletely implemented. Although 
not able to prevent the turbulence, Caruana suggested that had Basel 2 been implemented 
in all affected jurisdictions prior, the virulence could have played out far less virulently than 
it did. 
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Implications for the neoliberal economic philosophy 
Consistent with the fact that there was no significant shift in the way economic problems 
were interpreted, so too, was there no shift in the policies advocated to mitigate for the 
unfolding turbulence. Moreover there was no shift from the neoliberal economic 
philosophy in the IMF, which continued to exhibit a belief in the ability of markets to self-
regulate. Rather, the initial manner in which the prevailing problem was interpreted, along 
with the kinds of policies advocated both within the IMF and FSF, were narrowly focused 
on the production of ‘recommendations for increasing the resilience of markets and 
institutions’ (FSF, 2008:1) as opposed to fundamentally challenging their inherent efficacy. 
Indeed, there was still an assumption within the IMF that the banking and financial sectors 
(i.e. the private sector) would continue to play a significant role in remedying unravelling 
pathologies. This was a point echoed by Moschella (2010:137) who similarly observed that 
during its first phase, the IMF ‘still acknowledged that the private sector had a central 
responsibility in the good functioning of financial markets’, which perpetuated the notion 
of markets as self-equilibrating and efficient (Kessler, 2012:276). 
So, for example, despite the postulated benefits of the successful implementation of Basel 
2, the continued deference of the IMF to the perceived efficacy of the market should not 
have been entirely surprising. Rather, Basel 2 was very much conceived in institutions of 
global economic governance characterised by a distinctively neoliberal political economy 
which had placed a considerable degree of emphasis on belief in the efficacy of markets.  
Therefore, although calling for the implementation of Basel 2, Caruana (2007:2) himself 
noted that ‘supervisors should not be telling banks how to manage their business... that 
was the spirit of the intensive consultation and dialogue between the industry and 
supervisors during the Basel 2 process’. This assumption was shared by the FSF (2008:10) 
which noted that it remained ‘the responsibility of firms’ board and senior management to 
manage the risks they bear’, not regulators. Indeed, Caruana suggested that Basel 2 was a 
regulatory capital framework, not an overall guide to how banks should run their 
businesses, and as a result, they would not prevent banks from making mistakes – or 
substitute for banks’ own responsibilities for assessing and managing their individual risk 
portfolios.   
Moreover, Caruana (2007:2) noted that the current problems in the banking and financial 
sectors went far beyond the objectives of a capital adequacy framework and that Basel 2 
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should not be considered a panacea for all financial market troubles. Rather, its aim was 
limited to removing pro-cyclicality without completely negating risk-based decision-making.  
It was in a similar vein that in a 2008 paper (IMF, 2008b:4-9) drawing tentative lessons from 
the first phase of the downturn, the IMF suggested that: it should be within the purview of 
managers, not state regulators to challenge assumptions underlying risk models; attention 
should be paid to the robustness of hedging strategies and understanding a firms broader 
exposures; supervisors should encourage managers to conduct more rigorous stress 
testing; and risk management cannot be achieved solely by regulation, rather the onus 
remained on senior management in financial institutions to ensure robust internal 
governance structures. 
Against this backdrop, IMF staff acquiesced, just as they had during previous instances of 
banking and financial sector turbulence, to the prevailing economic philosophy which 
suggested the best policymakers could do was call for the collection and dissemination of 
more and better information, and the improved disclosure of risks which together would 
mitigate for increasing uncertainty. Doing so it was suggested, would restore confidence in 
the financial system regarding the prices of assets and balance sheet losses, thereby staving 
off broader systemic threats. A number of policies were advocated in a joint September 
2008 IMF/FSF paper seeking to draw lessons from the banking and financial turbulence, all 
of which were broadly similar to those advocated in the context of the AFC (see Chapter 2).  
The take-home message was the need for: greater transparency in the banking and 
financial sectors; the provision of better and timelier information; better crisis response 
mechanisms, and arrangements for dealing with financial system stress. The assumption 
was that doing so would allow market actors to see the world as it really was, thereby 
helping to transfer incalculable uncertainties into a calculable and knowable economic 
environment. Indeed, this paper observed between the IMF and FSF at this juncture ‘a 
considerable degree of consistency between these recommendations and the preliminary 
policy lessons from the crisis formulated by the Fund’ (IMF/FSF, 2008:6; see also GFSR, 
2007a). 
Therefore, just as previous episodes of banking and financial sector stress were understood 
as having been brought about and/or exacerbated, by inadequate information, 
transparency and disclosure which had hampered effective market discipline, so again was 
it suggested that their increased provision, all of which were instantiated in Basel 2, would 
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be sufficient to remedy for the effects of the current downturn. Framed in such a manner, 
and having been viewed as analogous to similar instances that had preceded it, we can see 
how the IMF interpretation of banking and financial sector pathologies was limited to a 
moment of instability puncturing what was in fact an otherwise stable economic 
environment.  
 
Implications of lessons from the past for continuity in neoliberal economic ideas 
It was suggested in Chapter 4 that we would not expect that the neoliberal economic ideas 
through which incoming information was interpreted during the initial phase of banking 
and financial sector turbulence be abandoned at the first sign of discrepant information as 
observed anomalies would lead to a search for imaginary fundamental novelties.  
Indeed, Hay (2008:9) notes that we are much more likely to see the vehement reassertion 
and articulation of prior conceptions during the earliest stages of increased uncertainty. A 
similar logic can be applied here, albeit in this instance, this was arguably most relevant in 
the very earliest stage in which banking and financial sector pathologies were manifest.  
At this juncture, to have assimilated incoming information through alternative economic 
ideas would have demonstrated that IMF assumptions regarding the efficacy of freely-
functioning markets had fundamentally failed. Given that neoliberal economic ideas were 
so deeply held both in the IMF and other institutions constituting the coordinative 
discourse, and had played such a crucial part in underpinning the hands-off regulatory 
approach to modern financial risk management, this would have been a startling admission 
to make. 
It would therefore have been premature to condemn the IMF for cognitive distortion in the 
very earliest stages of the banking and financial sector turbulence. Indeed, to suggest that 
this was the case is not the point to be made here. It is however crucial to our purposes, 
that as the first phase progressed, as banking and financial sector pathologies worsened, 
incoming information and policy responses were increasingly stretched to fit within the 
frames provided by neoliberal economic ideas. That is, the IMF's ability to identify 
mounting risks continued to be hindered by both ‘intellectual consistency’, and 
assumptions ‘that major financial crises in large advanced economies were unlikely' (BWP, 
2011:1).  
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Chapter 4 observed in the case of economic policy that this was not a trait exclusive to the 
operational functioning of the IMF, but reflected the problems of deriving the lessons of 
history by reasoning through historical analogy and interpreting incoming information 
through existing economic ideas, and why they are so often deployed sub-optimally 
(Khong, 1992; Jervis, 1976; May, 1974). Three reasons as to why are particularly 
noteworthy. 
Firstly, we can see in this instance how the lessons learned from historical analogies 
invoked – the assumption that just as the increased provision of information, enhanced 
disclosure, and more effective risk management had been considered necessary to rid the 
banking and financial sectors of their pathologies in previous episodes of turbulence, so too 
would they be sufficient again - were selected on the basis of superficial similarities  which 
were a reflection of continuing adherence to belief in the efficacy of neoliberal economic 
ideas.   
The result was that the requisite policy responses to the problem so-defined, were 
constrained from the out-set, and would therefore ultimately prove insufficient. Indeed, 
Brassett et al (2010:1) noted that doing so ‘placed unnecessary and unhelpful restrictions 
on how events surrounding the subprime crisis and its associated credit crunch have 
unfolded’. That is, by not searching beyond superficial surface similarities, the potential for 
deriving less obvious lessons from more suitable analogues was inherently limited (Jervis, 
1976:191). 
Secondly, the information generated by the banking and financial turbulence was simply 
assimilated through the frames provided for by neoliberal economic ideas. This explains 
why the IMF was so receptive to information that appeared to confirm existing 
assumptions.  
The corollary of this however was that information inconsistent with the existing neoliberal 
economic philosophy, problem definitions and policy priorities was largely marginalised as 
the reluctance to accept potentially contradictory evidence prevailed. Indeed, that 
attempts were made to fit new information in existing patterns of expectations, despite an 
increasing amount of discrepant information, carried with it an implicit assumption that 
underlying economic ideas were correct, and information to the contrary irrelevant. That is, 
beliefs regarding rational actors and efficient markets continued to predominate, with the 
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need for greater transparency, and enhanced disclosure and risk management retaining 
primacy.  
That the IMF engaged in such an endeavour was a process inherent to assimilating 
incoming information through the theoretical lens provided by existing economic ideas: 
they often persist even in the face of potential evidence pertaining to their inefficacy; and 
shows how the past acted as a guide for future action. Therefore rather than correct 
conceptions, the IMF was characterised by increasingly strained interpretations of 
unfolding pathologies.   
As a result, although it is impossible to clearly delineate between the point at which 
clinging to existing neoliberal economic ideas crossed the line into simply disparaging 
discrepant information beyond such a point that was reasonable, it became increasingly 
evident that as the first phase unravelled through 2008 that IMF policy responses were 
incapable of dealing with the particularities of the banking and financial sector pathologies. 
That is, despite quite obvious defects, the IMF nevertheless continued to defer to 
neoliberal economic ideas.  
Finally, by ignoring information that might contradict the neoliberal economic philosophy 
and associated problem definitions, the IMF was heavily influenced in the direction of a 
particular course of policy action at the expense of the many others that were available. 
In doing so, the analogues invoked by the IMF meant that policies - hamstrung by existing 
neoliberal economic ideas and what was deemed appropriate within a narrowly defined 
frame of reference - failed in two key respects. Firstly, they failed to sufficiently illuminate 
what was unique, and particularly problematic about unfolding banking and financial sector 
pathologies. Secondly, this led the IMF to advocate policy actions which would ultimately 
prove insufficient to prevent such pathologies from worsening even further.   
Indeed, proffering a particular solution in line with existing economic ideas meant that the 
potential for a genuine analysis of the causes of the downturn were precluded by enforcing 
the characterisation of banking and financial sector pathologies as abnormalities in an 
otherwise effectively-functioning broader economic framework. This therefore did not lead 
to an analysis of the extent to which the problem may well have been the very essence of 
contemporary banking and financial sector ‘normality’ its self (Brassett et al, 2010:2).  
This demonstrates how, drawing on the constructivist assumption that moments of failure 
require endogenous interpretation as a crisis through changes in the way problems are 
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defined and responded to (which requires the deployment of an alternative economic 
philosophy), no attempt was in fact made to define the pathologies afflicting banking and 
financial sectors as such. Rather, there was no direct sense of crisis as events were 
characterised by attempts by the IMF to posit the continuing efficacy of prior conceptions.   
The preceding discussion therefore places us in a position to state with some conviction 
that responses to banking and financial sector pathologies were characterised by a 
considerable degree of continuity during its first phase. That is, although there was a 
recognised need to strengthen supervision, policy priorities continued to be derived from 
frames of reference provided by neoliberal economic ideas, with market-centred responses 
continuing to assume prominence even as banking and financial sector pathologies 
worsened. As a result, no fundamental argument was made for rethinking the existing 
economic philosophy in the IMF which continued to privilege a belief in the efficacy of 
freely functioning markets.  
 
Phase 2: Problem definition 
The preceding discussion notwithstanding, by autumn 2008 the Western banking system 
faced collapse. Banks were nationalized or part-nationalised, mergers and acquisitions 
were facilitated by government, while others simply collapsed into bankruptcy. That 
“efficient markets” suddenly found themselves requiring multi-trillion dollar bail-outs from 
the supposedly “irrelevant state” led Blyth (2013:208) to comment that ‘if you ever wanted 
an empirical disconfirmation of a social science theory, this was it’.  
Indeed, the very banking and private financial institutions that had argued most 
vociferously for market-friendly regulation suddenly found themselves on the defensive 
and politically weakened as those that had essentially been allowed to self regulate were 
now highlighted as the key culprits in triggering the turbulence. Their ability to resist 
stronger regulation therefore seemingly disappeared, curtailed as it was by massive 
reliance on state support.   
The banking and financial meltdown therefore appeared likely to undermine the credibility 
of the neoliberal economic ideas that had played a major role in encouraging the creation 
of market-friendly financial standards. These included not just the free market ideology, 
but more technical economic concepts such as the rational expectations and efficient 
markets hypotheses. Indeed, the scope of the collapse suggested that the faith in markets 
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that dominated the preceding decades had been naïve at best (Skidelsky, 2009; Soros, 
2009).  
The declining performance of status quo institutions and policies therefore appeared to 
have destabilised prior assumptions on both cognitive and normative levels. In the case of 
the former, inter-subjectively held beliefs regarding the efficacy of freely functioning 
capital markets and their ability to self-regulate could scarcely have been any more 
discredited. This was evident in the fact that market prices of financial assets did not reflect 
“correct” prices based on current information, nor did actors act on the basis of rational 
expectations, but on their “inter-subjective expectations” which led to a collective panic 
(Hall, 2009:453).  
Indeed, in a 2008 speech Strauss-Kahn (2008c:1) noted that ‘the heart of the economic 
crisis lay very much at the feet of financial markets’. This admission raised expectations 
that we might see the end of the neoliberal era which had privileged the market 
mechanism, to a paradigm that rejected the discredited intellectual orthodoxy that had 
dominated prior.   
In the case of the latter however, there developed a broad consensus both that financial 
markets should not be allowed to again have the kind of adverse impact on the functioning 
of the real economy as they were currently, and that ‘we must move away from a system 
that privatises the gains and socialises the losses’ (Strauss-Kahn, 2010e:1).  
Unlike during its first phase, as the turbulence entered its second phase (banking and 
financial sector pathologies implicating economic growth in the real economy), the IMF was 
no longer faced with an environment that could in any sense be characterised by increasing 
risk which it might be able to mitigate for through the increased provision of, and access to, 
better and/or timelier information, and more stringent supervision of existing policies.  
Rather, the economic environment was characterised by a large degree of uncertainty, a 
situation in which although not entirely non-existent, there was no large group of similar 
instances on which to draw because the situation at hand was to a considerable degree 
unique (Knight, 1957:232-239). That is, the IMF was faced with a situation in which not only 
was it difficult to make probabilistic calculations of events, it was almost impossible to form 
any meaningful estimate of future events. Indeed, what the IMF thought it knew regards 
freely functioning markets had become so uncertain that it forced a fundamental re-
examination of conceptions about the appropriate role and function of financial markets.  
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In an effort to reduce the uncertainty brought about by a moment of political-economic 
failure, Blyth (2007:762) suggests that competing actors typically engage in the politics of 
crisis construction with each seeking to persuade others ‘of the correctness of one 
particular diagnosis of the crisis at hand’ and the policies required to eradicate its 
pathologies.  
In this instance however although failure in the banking and financial sectors had the 
potential to 'support and sustain a multitude of competing, indeed mutually incompatible, 
narratives' (Hay, 1999:324) of what went wrong, there developed a consensus among 
actors constituting the coordinative discourse, most notably the IMF and G20, that the 
prevailing economic narrative, centred on belief in the ability of financial markets to 
operate as self-maintaining entities, and the entire edifice of risk management techniques 
had collapsed. Indeed, Moschella (2010:141) observed among these institutions ‘a 
remarkable consensus on the failure of existing policies governing the function of the 
global financial system’ which shook the belief in the ideas behind market-led liberalization 
(see also Baker, 2015:352). 
At the Washington leaders G20 summit in November 2008 for example, a pledge was made 
‘to strengthen regulatory regimes, prudential oversight, and risk management, and ensure 
that all financial markets, products and participants are regulated and subject to oversight’ 
(G20, 2008:3). This was based on the notion that ‘major failures in the financial sector and 
in financial regulation and supervision’ were ‘fundamental causes of the crisis’ (G20, 
2009:3).  
Moreover, in the IMF, Caruana (2009:3) went from suggesting that during its first phase, 
markets would play a crucial part in helping to remedy for the pathologies presented by 
banking and financial sector turbulence, to suggesting that the scene was now set for ‘far-
reaching changes in the shape and functioning of financial markets that was now needed’.  
In a similar vein, in a 2008 speech Strauss-Kahn (2008d:6) observed the potential for a ‘new 
financial architecture’ which would reflect the collective recognition that the downturn was 
not just the result of inadequate supervision, but a more fundamental failure of regulation, 
market discipline and risk management in financial institutions. Indeed even that which 
was sufficient, supervisory enforcement, it was noted, could have been much stronger than 
“the private sector knows best” approach which had led to serious lapses in oversight in 
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the run up to the downturn (Strauss-Kahn, 2008; 2008a; 2009; 2009a; 2009d; Blanchard, 
2010).  
Against this backdrop, at its Washington Summit in November 2008, the G20 noted that 
‘the IMF, expanded FSF, and other regulatory bodies should develop recommendations to 
mitigate pro-cyclicality, including the review of how valuation and leverage, bank capital, 
executive compensation, and provisioning practices may exacerbate cyclical trends’ (G20, 
2008:7). These institutions, along with the BIS, constituted the most significant actors in the 
coordinative discourse, their aim being to maintain global financial stability and prevent a 
repeat of the errors preceding the downturn by developing/overseeing the implementation 
of internationally-agreed regulatory banking sector policies (Vinals et al, 2010:6).  
To be sure, the IMF was not at this juncture tasked with becoming a global regulator. What 
it did do however, given the nature of events in banking and financial systems, was begin to 
operate more cooperatively and collaboratively with the FSF, with their work being viewed 
as complementary and with mutually enforcing roles. That is, the IMF participates: on an 
on-going basis in meetings at the highest levels of what was renamed the Financial Stability 
Boards (FSB) including the Plenary (its sole decision-making body); in high-level standing 
committees and groups (including the steering committee); through projects and outreach 
efforts; and contributions to FSB papers/publications (IMF, 2008c, 2013f; IMF/FSF, 2008). 
The need for greater cooperation to develop internationally-agreed standards was 
premised on the fact that because ‘financial markets are global in scope... intensified 
international co-operation among regulators and strengthening of international standards, 
where necessary, and their consistent implementation is necessary’ (G20, 2008a:2). Doing 
so, it was suggested would ‘minimise regulatory arbitrage, promote a level playing field, 
and foster the widespread application of the principles of propriety’ (G20, 2010:19; see also 
G20, 2009:3). Similarly, the Chairman of the FSF (2008) noted that a lack of trust had 
prompted states to safeguard their markets, yet this could be avoided if governments 
committed to applying global standards as this would build confidence in the quality of 
cross-border regulation.  
With this in mind the G20 acknowledged the need to: extend regulation to all systemically 
important financial institutions, instruments, and markets; strengthen over-sight; improve 
risk management; and strengthen transparency (G20, 2009; G20, 2009a). An assumption 
was made however that although reform must be multi-faceted ‘at its core must be 
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stronger capital standards, complemented by clear incentives to mitigate excessive risk-
taking practices’ (G20, 2009a:8). In order to persuade members of the efficacy of such an 
approach however, the IMF provided justification for doing so based on two premises. 
Firstly, although advocated during the first phase, substantial weaknesses in the Basel 2 
rules for regulating commercial banks were increasingly apparent. A key problem was that 
as late as September 2007 the GFSR (2007a:1) had suggested that ‘systemically important 
financial institutions had began this episode with more than adequate capital to absorb the 
likely level of credit losses’, yet it became quickly evident that this was clearly not the case. 
This situation was exacerbated by the fact that banks were unable to sell assets in a down-
turn to cover their losses was mistaken, with some not even being able to sell at a loss. 
In hindsight there was therefore a sense that much responsibility had been deferred to the 
market (even during the first phase of the turbulence), yet as 2008 progressed, such was its 
severity, Basel 2 would not be sufficient to prevent a similar collapse should regulatory 
inadequacies persist and that more substantive action was required (Vinals et al, 2010:6). 
Secondly was an assertion that MicPR was necessary but not sufficient to deal with 
systemic risk. Although Basel 1 and 2 operated on the notion that ensuring the solvency of 
individual institutions would lead to resilience in the broader system, the banking and 
financial sector collapse highlighted that: problems associated with particular institutions 
have destabilising systemic implications; aggregate risk is premised on the collective, not 
individual behaviour of financial institutions which can create undesirable outcomes for the 
system as a whole; and making individual institutions safe does not guarantee systemic 
stability.  
Strauss-Kahn (2009b:4) suggested that this MicPR approach reflected the propensity of 
supervisors which was to gaze inwards, focusing on the health of domestic institutions and 
protecting domestic consumers. That the collapse had demonstrated a need to focus more 
on global systemic risks however provided the rationale for a shift in emphasis from an 
exclusively micro-, to a complementary micro-/macro-prudential approach to regulation. 
The preceding discussion suggests that, in contrast to the neoliberal economic philosophy, 
just as there appeared to have been a recognisable shift observed in Chapter 4, so too here 
was there an apparent collective recognition of the need for decisive intervention to rid 
banking and financial sectors of their accumulated pathologies to bring about substantive 
change. In doing so, there appeared to exist the potential for a similar shift to a distinctive 
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political economy calling on the power and resources of the state to bring about economic 
stability and prevent a future banking and financial sector collapse of a similar magnitude. 
 
Policy implications  
During the second phase of the downturn, the key problem so-defined shifted substantially 
from supervisory to regulatory failings. In doing so, calls for a new rules-based approach 
opened space for more substantive government intervention into financial markets. 
Indeed, by becoming the principal interpretive frame through which the problem was 
defined, global economic governance institutions tasked with responding to the collapse 
including the IMF, FSB and BIS were presented with an opportunity to instantiate 
substantial reforms.  
The shift in problem definition therefore constituted more than the provision of an 
alternative way in which the problem was ‘framed’, since, because the cognitive filter had 
been seemingly switched to an altogether different setting, a range of potential policies 
considered out of reach prior to the downturn suddenly found themselves on the table.  
These included countercyclical capital requirements; countercyclical liquidity requirements; 
caps on aggregate lending; reserve requirements; limits on leverage in asset purchases; 
loan to income ratios for mortgages; transaction taxes; additional loss absorbency related 
to systemic importance (IMF/FSB/BIS, 2011:11). Nevertheless, it was suggested by the G20 
(2009a:6) that although reforms must be multi-faceted ‘at its core must be stronger capital 
standards’ which ‘allows banks to withstand the losses that inevitably will come’.  
It is here attention once again turned to the Basel accords, yet rather than suggesting the 
need to supervise the implementation of Basel 2, the IMF, FSB and BIS sought the provision 
of a new set of rules (Basel 3) to better reflect the changed realities presented by banking 
and financial sector turbulence. Crucially not only were states persuaded of the efficacy of 
Basel 3 in cognitive terms (given the falsification of the economic ideas underpinning the 
neoliberal economic philosophy) but also normatively in respect that regardless of the 
global scope of financial activity, it fell on national tax-payers to fund financial rescues 
which carried with them enormous distributional consequences. The magnitude of the 
contextual trigger therefore exacerbated calls for the kinds of reforms unthinkable only 
months prior. 
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In doing so, Basel 3, just as Basel 2 had done, incorporated major amendments to alleviate 
the shortcomings of its predecessor through ‘the conscious need to complement the micro-
level of financial supervision with the macro-prudential dimensions’, which constituted ‘a 
fundamental turning point in the design of financial regulation’ (Caruana, 2010:3). In 
particular, the IMF (Perotti et al, 2011; GFSR, 2010) stressed the need for more stringent 
capital requirements and for banks to hold excess capital as conservation and counter-
cyclical buffers above the minimum to complement traditional moral suasion and targets 
used by regulators, along with a leverage ratio to offset deficiencies in risk-weights. 
Both MicPR and MacPR approaches would welcome this development as both perspectives 
encourage the build up of capital and liquidity buffers in the upward phase of the cycle 
when there are signs that individual institutions may be increasing leverage and relaxing 
underwriting standards and when systemic risk is rising. However, though directionally 
policymakers are likely to agree, differences arise over the timing and scale of the build up 
of buffers. In practical terms, the micro-prudential authority will scrutinise individual firms’ 
credit standards and provisioning, and will intervene through Pillar 2 mechanisms. The 
macro-prudential authority on the other hand will monitor, and act on, indicators that will 
trigger the use of countercyclical buffers or other tools that affect credit granting.  
Differences between the two approaches, while potentially negligible during the early 
stages of the up-swing, may start diverging when the cycle approaches its peak. At this 
stage MicPR indicators appear very positive, while systemic risk indicators give increasingly 
urgent warning signs. This has been referred to as the paradox of financial instability – the 
system appears strongest precisely when it can be most vulnerable as what looks like a low 
risk environment is in fact a reflection of aggregate risk taking (Osinski et al, 2013:13).  
Reflecting this assumption, although not a new minimum capital requirement, Basel 3 
suggests that outside periods of stress, banks should hold buffers of capital (a conservation 
buffer) above the regulatory minimum, funded by reducing the discretionary distribution of 
earnings such as by reducing dividends, or by raising capital from the private sector (BCBS, 
2010:54). The overall aim is to ensure that banks are in such a position as to conduct 
business as normal when their capital levels fall as they experience losses during 
downturns. 
Operating on the assumption however that initiatives to improve existing bank regulations 
by building up larger individual buffers to withstand shocks, this did not address a key 
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lesson - that it was a global systemic event in which institutions were connected through 
markets and instruments. Basel 3 therefore calls for the deployment of additional counter-
cyclical buffers to ensure capital requirements take account of the macro-financial 
environment.  
The suggested aim is to deploy these buffers when excess aggregate credit growth is 
judged to be associated with a build-up of systemic risk to ensure the banking system has a 
buffer of capital to protect it against potential losses. This would be assessed against credit 
growth (i.e. is it excessive?) and would: extend the size of the capital conservation buffer; 
consist of CET1 assets; and be phased in, reaching 2.5 percent by 1st January 2019 (BCBS, 
2010:57-60).  
The counter-cyclical capital buffer in Basel 3 was therefore designed to accumulate capital 
in boom times when systemic risk builds up so that it can be used when such risks 
materialise, thereby acting as a stabiliser during the expansion and contraction phases of 
the financial cycle. Adjudicating the right time to deploy the buffer requires that national 
authorities monitor credit growth and other indicators that may signal a build-up of 
system-wide risk. Based on this assessment, the countercyclical capital buffer will be 
deployed, thereby extending the capital conservation buffer, with banks being subject to 
restrictions on capital distributions if they do not meet the additional capital requirement 
(IMF/FSB/BIS, 2011:13).  
This would mediate for the fact that once the cycle turns, the aim of MicPR is to ensure the 
stability of individual firms, while MacPR is concerned with stabilising the broader system 
and avoiding excessive deleveraging pressures that can lead to, or exacerbate, a downturn. 
A MacPR approach would therefore be wary of potential collective contraction and undue 
pressure on asset prices which would weaken growth and undermine the systems 
resilience. So, it would advocate the release of capital buffers built up earlier as prevailing 
levels should allow for this without jeopardising confidence. Indeed, the higher the buffers 
initially, the greater the policy space for drawing on them earlier and faster (Osinski et al, 
2013:14).  
The incorporation of a counter-cyclical buffer had previously been off the table. Its 
incorporation in Basel 3 however, seemingly re-empowered regulators by providing a basic 
rationale for increased state intervention to curb and place limits on financial excesses. As a 
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result, it was retrospectively described by Kodres and Claessens (2014:8) as a first 
international attempt to institute an effective macro-prudential tool.  
The preceding reforms to international regulation and the policies advocated as part of this 
new agreement rejected the previous policy consensus centred upon disclosure, the need 
for better information, and market discipline. Indeed, ‘they primarily suggest reducing the 
scope of private-sector self-regulation, and enlarging the scope of financial regulation’, 
which signalled ‘important discontinuities with the policy ideas that had previously been at 
the heart of the international financial system’ (Moschella, 2010:145).   
Indeed, at this juncture there was an assumption, exemplified by Strauss-Kahn (2009d:1) 
that ‘this terrible crisis has... provided us with an historic opportunity to reshape the global 
economic and financial framework – and thus lay the foundations for strong and 
sustainable economic growth going forward’. Indeed, just as Chapter 4 observed that IMF 
staff, drawing on the lessons learned from history, referenced the Great Depression as a 
moment of economic uncertainty that ultimately gave rise to altered economic structures, 
so too was it invoked in this instance. Strauss-Kahn (2009d:1) for example noted that just as 
the Great Depression and World War Two helped to shape a new global order, so too did 
leaders have a similar opportunity ‘to emerge from the financial crisis and achieve 
fundamental and lasting change’. Of this opportunity Strauss-Kahn (2010d:2) suggest that 
the shift to Basel 3 constituted ‘a major step in the right direction’ towards a safer financial 
system.  
This sense of achievement was echoed in the G20 Toronto Summit Declaration which noted 
that ‘the amount of capital will be significantly higher and the quality of capital will be 
significantly higher and the quality of capital significantly improved when the new reforms 
are fully implemented. This would enable banks to withstand – without extraordinary 
government support – stresses of a magnitude associated with the recent financial crisis’ 
(G20, 2010:4). Indeed, Hannoun (2010:1), Deputy General Manager of BIS noted that Basel 
3, fully implemented, ‘will have considerably reduced the probability and severity of a crisis 
in the banking sector, and by extension, enhanced global financial stability’. 
The preceding discussion demonstrates the importance that defining the prevailing 
political-economic problem as one of regulatory as opposed to supervisory failure had for 
the kinds of policies that were subsequently considered necessary. Indeed, that policies 
that appeared to diverge substantially from those associated with extant economic ideas 
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were so rapidly deployed in the context of failure was consistent with constructivist 
approaches that highlight that such moments open windows of opportunity with which to 
effect change. 
 
Implications for the neoliberal economic philosophy 
Schmidt (2011:2-3) has noted that, as a rule, policy priorities are those which change most 
rapidly as windows of opportunity open up through which to enact change. Nevertheless, 
economic philosophies are typically confined to the normative, as opposed to the cognitive, 
sphere, a reflection of ideas regarding the appropriate role of states or markets. That these 
are inherently political means they are often held up as being those that are most resistant 
to change. 
This notwithstanding, the kinds of policies advocated by the IMF during the second phase 
of the downturn appeared to carry with them important implications for the neoliberal 
economic philosophy, that is, the perceived efficacy of markets as opposed to states. As a 
result, the second phase seemingly did more than simply open a window of opportunity in 
which to push for the enactment of policies that might be better placed to address the 
immediate problems facing policymakers. Rather, they appeared, superficially at least, to 
serve as a potential pre-cursor to a fundamental transformation in the economic ideas 
steering IMF policy priorities.  
At its Washington summit, leaders noted that ‘the IMF, with its focus on surveillance, and 
the expanded FSF, with its focus on standard setting, should strengthen their collaboration, 
enhancing efforts to better integrate regulatory and supervisory responses into the macro-
prudential policy framework’ (G20, 2008:10). This was premised on the fact that because 
MicPR focuses on the responses of banks to exogenous risks this neglects endogenous risk. 
MacPR however acknowledges that the global financial system is now so complex that 
what is suitable for individual institutions may have destabilising consequences for the 
broader system. Although recognising the health of individual financial institutions is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for financial stability, Osinski et al (2013:5) of the 
MCMD note that MacPR, by alerting relevant authorities and pushing for action, is better 
placed to capture systemic risk.  
A joint IMF/FSB/BIS Progress report to the G20 highlighted agreement among three 
defining elements of a MacPR approach. Firstly, its objective is to limit systemic risk, the 
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failure to do which was laid bare by the banking sector collapse. Secondly, its scope is the 
focus on the financial system as a whole as opposed to the individual components that take 
the broader system as given. Finally, its instruments are primarily prudential tools 
calibrated to target the source of systemic risk (IMF/FSB/BIS, 2011:4; IMF/FSB/BIS, 
2011a:2).  
The ultimate objective of MacPR is therefore to avoid the kind of output and wealth losses 
generated by the financial and economic downturn. The rationale for doing so is that 
during the up phase of a cycle, as asset prices rise, measured risk appears to fall. In 
contrast, when asset prices fall, risk appears to rise, asset sales commence, views on 
acceptable levels of debt are revised downwards, uncertainty prevails, and credit contracts 
(Baker, 2012:114).  
In order to limit the build-up of system-wide financial risk, a MacPR approach, by 
addressing negative externalities, acts as a countervailing force to the decline in measured 
risks in a boom and rise in a downturn. Indeed banking and financial sector pathologies 
highlighted the need to counter the pro-cyclicality of financial markets by implementing 
counter-cyclical regulatory policies to induce institutions to build up capital buffers in good 
times so they could be drawn down in bad times to stabilise the worst excesses of pro-
cyclicality. Doing so, it was thought, would contribute to a more stable institutional 
environment.  
With the preceding discussion in mind, Baker (2013:116) noted that the coordinative 
discourse centring on the need for a complementary MicPR/MacPR approach constituted a 
‘startlingly rapid ideational shift’, that is, a radical change in the overarching terms of policy 
discourse inasmuch as it: run contrary to the identifiable material interests of the major 
players and had therefore been on the side-lines previously; and was undertaken within an 
incredibly short time-frame.  
A MacPR approach therefore seemingly challenged the existing neoliberal economic 
philosophy and the analytical foundations of the efficient market orthodoxy that had 
dominated, through what Tsingou (2010:27) referred to as the re-politicization of financial 
regulatory policy. That is, it advanced an altogether different conception of market 
relations than that of the neoliberal economic philosophy by increasing the power of public 
authorities to intervene and set limits to financial market activities, particularly those 
considered potentially socially damaging.  
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MacPR was therefore presented as a series of new premises that refuted the old Basel 
consensus of transparency, disclosure, and risk management as the foundation for efficient 
markets. Most notably, because MacPR considers financial instability endemic and 
endogenous to the system, it has been shown to: create space for more extensive 
interventions (a reassertion of public authority over private interest); and adopt a 
normative stance that regulation should be less costly to society than to the private sector.   
This shift therefore implied a return to regulators telling banks what they should do as 
opposed to asking them what it is that they do, a move which involves a ‘reconstitution of 
power relations at the heart of financialised capitalism' (Baker, 2013:7). In this respect, the 
shift to a complementary MicPR/MacPR approach to regulation was interpreted by its 
proponents as ‘a substantial intellectual sea-change in the thinking driving international 
financial governance’ (Baker & Carey, 2014:100) which had ‘switched the principal 
cognitive filter employed by policymakers to an entirely different setting’ (Baker, 2013:7, 
19).  
The shift from the banking and financial turbulence (the first phase) to economic downturn 
(the second phase) therefore seemingly had important implications for the manner in 
which the relative efficacy of states and markets were once again understood in the IMF as 
the moment of failure was seemingly crucial in having all of the components necessary to 
impose a new trajectory upon the state (Hay, 1999:317). That is, the notion of the valorised 
financial markets portrayed as natural and self-regulating, once again oscillated back to the 
recognised need for intervention in which sates would assume a more prominent role in 
limiting the market excesses associated with banking and financial sector activity.  
Such a shift both: suggests that the economic ideas through which the turbulence was 
interpreted during its first phase was abandoned in the face of evidence which 
contradicted existing cognitive and normative assumptions regarding the relative 
efficacy/desirability of markets and states; and consequently draws attention to the fact 
that the economic ideas steering the course of global economic governance have the 
potential to be created and recreated through the action of political actors in the context of 
failure as actors’ ideas and discourse about their prior beliefs alter in response to changed 
performance/circumstances. 
Accepting the notion that the ‘common sense’ assumptions, in this instance those held by 
the IMF and others constituting the coordinative discourse regarding the efficacy of free 
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markets, prevail only during a given era, and suggests that they be best understood as 
‘ubiquitous aspects of social coordination’ (Bevir&Trentmann, 2002:21). This highlights the 
diversity of possible forms of economic ideas which in this instance was characterised by a 
consensus regarding the need for a complementary MicPR/MacPR approach that appeared 
better placed to address pressing problems.   
Taken together therefore, during the second phase, the IMF appeared, superficially at 
least, to be characterised by a large degree of change as opposed to continuity. That is, 
faced with the inefficacy of the prevailing regulatory framework to sufficiently prevent 
banking and financial sector pathologies, the IMF called for major change to the regulatory 
architecture. This shift was shown to have important implications not only for the policy 
realm but more pertinently, for the neoliberal economic philosophy and the manner in 
which the relative efficacy of states and markets were once again understood.  
This demonstrates how the kind of economic ideas advocated in the coordinative discourse 
and justified through research developed in the communicative discourse exist only in a 
particular time and space, embodying particular values, and interests. Indeed, despite 
becoming embedded within institutional contexts, sometimes coming to constitute the 
common sense of a particular era as the efficacy of freely functioning and self-regulating 
markets had done, these claims were shown to be contingent and incomplete. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Two key points can be derived from the preceding discussion. Firstly, during its initial 
phase, the effects of banking and financial pathologies were only minimal as the IMF 
interpreted the problem as one of supervisory inadequacies. It was therefore suggested 
that all that was required to bring stability to the system was the increased provision of 
information, enhanced disclosure, and the supervision of the full implementation of Basel 
2. As a result, during the first phase, neoliberal economic ideas continued to shape how 
problems were interpreted and responded to, and set the parameters of the acceptable 
policy response.   
Secondly, as banking and financial sector pathologies began to implicate the real economy 
it was evident that many of the assumptions on which neoliberal economic ideas were 
constructed were fundamentally flawed, including belief in the ability of financial markets 
to self-regulate and tend towards equilibrium. With the banking and financial sector 
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collapse being interpreted as a more fundamental failure of regulation, the IMF advocated 
the shift to Basel 3 which accorded states considerable scope to intervene in financial 
markets to prevent the most severe excesses of banking and financial market activity. 
Consequently, as the second phase unravelled there appeared something of a consensus 
that the collapse would prove to be a re-constitutive event for the neoliberal economic 
ideas steering IMF policy priorities.   
This ostensible shift notwithstanding, Chapter 7 suggests that the banking and financial 
sector collapse has not imbued in the IMF a radical change in the manner in which the 
relative efficacy of states and markets are understood. Rather, Chapter 7 demonstrates 
that the IMF continues to exhibit a considerable degree of stasis in the manner in which 
economic problems are interpreted and responded to, and thereby, the kinds of policies 
considered necessary.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
190 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
191 
 
Chapter 7 
Financial sector liberalization II 
‘Those who cannot change their minds cannot change anything’                                        
(George Bernard Shaw) 
 
Introduction  
The previous chapter made two claims. Firstly, that in its first phase, the IMF interpreted 
banking and financial sector pathologies as a problem of supervisory failure, and therefore 
resolvable with policies derived from existing frames of reference. Secondly, as the down-
turn entered its second phase the IMF appeared to be characterised by a considerable 
degree of change as the core problem facing policymakers shifted from supervisory to 
much more fundamental regulatory failures. Indeed, this ‘startlingly rapid ideational shift’ 
(Baker, 2012:3) created space for substantive state interventions into the functioning of 
markets through the enactment of policies previously considered off the table prior to the 
downturn.   
This notwithstanding, this chapter argues that, as the third stage (a shift in focus towards 
sovereign debt sustainability) progressed, it became evident that the downturn had not 
imbued major change in the IMF either in its adherence to the neoliberal economic 
philosophy, problem definitions or policy priorities. Rather, it is suggested here that the 
IMF, along with other institutions constituting the coordinative discourse, never 
abandoned their normative deference to neoliberal economic ideas, despite assertions to 
the contrary during the second phase. 
As a result, although there appeared to be a clear direction, rationale, and commitment to, 
reform, it was increasingly being talked of as something for the future. Reflecting this 
impasse, Kodres and Narain (2010:4) suggested two potential regulatory scenarios: (1) 
having skirted economic collapse, and facing strong resistance from the private sector to 
new regulation, the official community allows complacency to set in and reform is allowed 
to languish; and (2) the crisis has been so devastating that every public body wants to be 
seen as responding vigorously which could lead to over-regulation. This chapter 
demonstrates how it is the former of these scenarios that has played out. 
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Phase 3: Problem definition  
The IMF was not an institution that supported, or acknowledged an over-whelming 
necessity, to aggressively regulate the banking sector despite the severity of the afflictions 
presented by its pathologies. Rather, it remained an institution that exhibited a 
considerable degree of caution in the regulatory reform debate. As a result, although the 
IMF consistently espoused the benefits of Basel 3 (GFSR, 2012), as the third phase of the 
downturn progressed through the course of 2010, this commitment was increasingly 
couched in a broader context in which it cautioned against the potential for too-stringent 
capital adequacy reforms.  
The majority of this research came after the basic Basel 3 reforms had been agreed, yet 
before the fine details of its composition had been finalised, and before the 
implementation phase. There was however, no suggestion that the IMF was attempting to 
argue for a fundamental re-shaping of the regulatory reform agenda. What drawing 
attention to this research does do however is provide us with both an important insight 
into the extent to which the IMF remained sceptical about the potential efficacy of reforms. 
Moreover, it elucidates the manner in which the IMF approached the initial reform agenda.   
Doing so allows us to highlight, crucially, how the intellectual parameters for reform were 
inherently constrained by the IMF, and other institutions constituting the coordinative 
discourse's continuing deference to the neoliberal economic philosophy. Doing so is 
consistent with the constructivist principle that the need to reform the existing Basel 
accords, and the form that this might take, was not dictated by the nature of events, but 
was informed through interpretive processes which were themselves guided by the 
broader context of, in this particular instance, the neoliberal discourse.  
This helped to focus the attention of the IMF, and others, by specifying what was relevant 
or otherwise in the reform agenda, the result being that only one particular set of 
meanings or problem definitions acquired relevance over the range of alternative pathways 
that were invariably available at this juncture (Benford, 1997:410). We therefore show how 
the manner in which reforms were construed, and constructed, by the IMF and others was 
‘an inherently political process’ in which an attempt was made to frame the kinds of 
policies considered necessary (Blyth, 2012:8). This reminds us that meanings do not 
naturally attach themselves to events, but rather arise through interactively-based 
interpretive processes (Snow, 2004:384).  
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That the IMF and other institutions of the coordinative discourse sought to frame and set 
normative limits to the parameters of what could and could not be subject to deliberation 
was a clear expression of power. However, this power was not simply manifest in terms of 
the IMFs capacity to impose its will on others, but more importantly, in its authority to 
determine the shared meanings that set the terms of the regulatory reform debate. That is, 
it included ‘the ability to create the underlying rules of the game, to define what 
constitutes acceptable play, and to be able to get others to commit to those rules’ which 
was a more subtle and effective expression of power (Adler, 1997:336).  
The consequences of limiting the reform agenda within the normative parameters of the 
neoliberal discourse however was that as 2010 progressed and the economic environment 
was increasingly benign, practitioners and market actors sought to exploit space - in which 
after the most acute phase of the downturn was over, with reforms incomplete, and with 
underlying causes remaining insufficiently addressed - in which to draw back from the 
exceptional measures advocated during the second phase. Indeed, Strauss-Kahn (2010c:1) 
suggested that ‘as a single major challenge gives way... the policy responses might be less 
obvious, and the common sense of purpose weakening’.  
The desire for reform therefore appeared to wane as perceived benefits became distant 
memories, and the rationale less urgent as the most acute phase of the downturn faded 
into the background, replaced as it was by a seemingly more pressing problem, sovereign 
debt excesses.  This was a scenario observable in the IMF where reference to capital 
regulatory reform for example had largely disappeared from the “headline” publications 
(WEO and GFSR) by 2010 with reforms increasingly talked of as something for the future 
(Kodres & Narain, 2010:8).  
Indeed, against the backdrop of an increasingly benign economic environment and a re-
framing of the prevailing economic problem (sovereign debt excesses), the IMF shifted its 
focus (albeit much more subtly than that observed in Chapter 5) from calls for substantive 
regulatory reform, to instead providing the cognitive justification for a more cautionary 
approach to regulation broadly construed, and of capital adequacy in particular. 
The Modigiani and Miller theory (1958) suggests that, under ideal conditions, adding equity 
capital does not increase costs as, under specific conditions including perfect markets and 
no distortions introduced by government policy, the proportion of a firm’s funding coming 
from equity is immaterial to its weighted average cost of funds as investors in equity and 
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debt do not charge as much for supplying funds to a safe, as compared to a less safe, 
company. That is, investors accept a lower expected return in exchange for the reduced risk 
and volatility resulting from higher capital levels and lower probability of default.  
In practice however, higher equity levels do increase a bank’s costs, with two distortions in 
particular created by public policy interfering with the offsetting mechanism. First, virtually 
all governments provide a tax advantage to debt issuance by allowing corporate deductions 
for interest payments, but not for dividends. Secondly, there are a host of explicit/implicit 
guarantees of bank liabilities. When deposits are guaranteed by governments for instance, 
deposit rates will be insensitive to the relative safety of the bank. Increased equity will not 
create a major offsetting decrease in the rate required by depositors (Elliott et al, 2012:28).  
This discussion captures effectively the crux of the contemporary capital adequacy debate 
in the IMF. That is, although it is acknowledged that higher capital requirements reduce the 
risk of bank bankruptcies and lower leverage, requiring banks hold more and better capital 
is not cost neutral and these costs must be borne somewhere. This tension was highlighted 
in an MCMD paper which noted that although ‘reforming the regulation of financial 
institutions and markets is critically important and should provide large benefits to 
society... adding safety margins in the financial system comes at a price’ (Oliveira & Elliott, 
2012:4). This shows how the desirability of increased capital was not universally accepted 
but was in fact hotly debated.  
The research produced by the IMF did not argue against the benefits of capital buffers per 
se. Indeed, it was acknowledging of the fact that if capital requirements are mild, a bank 
subject to regulation invests more in lending and its probability of default is reduced. What 
it did do however was essentially act as a cautionary warning against too-stringent capital 
buffers, whose consequences, unintended or otherwise, according to De Nicolo et al 
(2012:3) have the potential to negate efficacy and welfare benefits which disappear and 
turn into costs.  
Against this backdrop, an attempt was made to quantify the potential problems associated 
with reforms that went too far beyond what would be desirable. Indeed, despite the fact 
that the negative effects of the market-based approach to regulation were seemingly 
interpreted as a major precipitating cause of the downturn, which in its self demonstrated 
that regulatory reforms of the banking sector were potentially beneficial, Blanchard 
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(2009:6) typified the assumption in the IMF that reforms should proceed, ‘without 
hindering too much its efficiency’. 
Similarly when deciding on when and to what extent to act Arregui et al (2013:7-8) 
observed that policymakers need to compare the possible benefits of avoiding/reducing 
the depth of a downturn with the costs of tightening intermediation in the present. That is, 
they need to consider the imperfect nature of the signal and the possibility of over-
regulation (in this case through capital buffers), as they could act on a signal that is false in 
the first place (a “false positive”). Given that the ultimate objective of policy should be to 
bolster long-term real economic activity when considered against blows arising from 
financial crises, this is where the discussion regarding cost and benefits is played out, and 
which inform future decisions.  
For its part, while acknowledging the potential efficacy of non-too-stringent regulation, IMF 
research, derived predominately from the MCMD drew attention to the importance of 
caution in the capital adequacy debate. It is presented hereon in as follows: increases in the 
cost, and reduced volume of, loans; divesting business activity; reduced GDP growth; and 
tail risk implications.  
 
Increasing cost of loans and decreasing demand for loans 
Banks exercise some control over the spread of their marginal lending and deposit rates 
with respect to the central bank policy rate. The spread between deposit and lending rates 
allow banks to make profits, part of which is distributed to shareholders, with the 
remaining profits used to cover operating costs and to accumulate capital buffers. The 
introduction of regulatory reforms calling for banks to raise their capital buffers will 
therefore, according to  Oliveira and Elliott (2012:9) change the variables that make up the 
loan pricing formula, forcing banks to make offsetting adjustments to one or more, 
ultimately increasing costs.  
In assessing the likely impact of the new capital requirements introduced under Basel 3 on 
bank lending rates and loan growth, Cosimano and Hakura (2011:2-12) infer the impact of 
an increase in capital regulations on the loan rate charged by the largest banks. In doing so, 
they find that a 1 percent increase in the equity-to-asset ratio is associated with a 0.12 
percent increase in the loan rate for the one hundred largest banks. For banks in countries 
that experienced a banking crisis during 2007-9, it is associated with a 0.09 percent 
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increase in the loan rate; and a 0.13 percent increase for those that did not. Thus, under 
normal conditions, the projected 1.3 percent increase in the equity-to-asset ratio required 
for banks under Basel 3 would increase the loan rate by 16 basis points for the 100 largest 
banks.  
These findings were broadly replicated by Elliott et al (2012:68) who noted that capital 
buffers come with additional costs, typically borne out by increases in the lending spread. 
In particular, the authors suggest that higher operating costs will be passed on to 
consumers which - given divergent national implementation strategies – will see lending 
rates likely rise by about 17 basis points for Europe, 8 basis points in Japan, and 26 basis 
points the US, with Roger and Vlcek (2011:13-14) observing even higher peak rises on 
lending spreads: 120 basis points in the Euro area and 130 basis points in the United States.  
The corollary of credit price increases would, it has been suggested, be a downward 
demand for loans. Cosimano and Hakura (2011:5-18) for example, imply a 1.3 percent 
increase (5.7% to 7%) in the equity-to-asset ratio required by Basel 3 would reduce loans 
for the 100 largest banks by 1.3 percent. Moreover a declaration of “excessive credit 
growth” requiring an additional 2.5 percent increase in the equity-to-asset ratio was 
predicted to reduce loans by 2.5 percent in the long run. Assuming a 1.3 percent increase in 
the equity-to-asset ratio to meet Basel 3 regulations, estimates imply a reduction in the 
volume of loans by 4.6 percent in banks in countries that experienced a crisis and 14.8 
percent in countries that did not.  
Under the scenario envisaged above, too stringent capital requirements and declining 
demand for loans were shown to have the potential to push banks to divest themselves of 
noncore business. Indeed, it was suggested that even without additional regulation, the 
higher cost environment and difficulty of managing complex institutions may induce banks 
to divest business lines to improve profitability by becoming more specialised. Indeed, as 
early as 2010 Kodres and Narain (2010) noted that many were already doing just this. 
This had the potential however to lead to an even further concentration of certain activities 
in the largest banks as smaller banks, particularly those operating in the commodities and 
currencies markets reduce their market share given reduced profitability. This, it was 
thought, would further contribute to the problem presented by too big to fail banks. 
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Implications of capital adequacy for GDP growth 
The increase in lending spreads and associated reduction in the volume of loans, along with 
a concentration/re-focusing of core business activities had the potential to induce a slowing 
of consumption and investment. Adequately deployed however, Roger and Vitek (2012:3-9) 
suggest that monetary policy responses would typically reduce the adverse impact of 
higher capital requirements. The option for this instrument however, was heavily 
constrained, at least over part of the implementation period. The potential for a slow-down 
in consumption and investment therefore increased, although research differed greatly in 
its estimates.          
Arguably the most comprehensive study into the cost impact of capital adequacy reforms 
on GDP was that undertaken by the Institute of International Finance (IIF, 2011), an 
association representing over 400 financial institutions globally. The study predicts 
significant increases in the price of credit, the result of which was that GDP in major 
economies was estimated to be about 3 percent smaller in 2015 than it would be in the 
absence of regulatory reforms.  
Elliott et al (2012) however suggest that the IIF study demonstrates a far larger cost to 
financial reform measures than seems plausible, particularly given it is primarily concerned 
with transition effects in the short- to medium-term. Research conducted by Elliott et al 
(2012) however analysed the long-term effects of capital buffers. In doing so results 
showed that higher capital requirements while impacting hard on all forms of banks, the 
effects on GDP growth, while still consequential, were lower than that conceived in the IIF 
study.  
Roger and Vitek (2012:3) on the other hand analysed the transitional costs of strengthening 
bank capital requirements with specific emphasis on globally systemically important banks 
(GSIBS) and with analysis focusing solely on the short- to medium-term output costs of the 
proposed measures. In doing so, the authors estimated that a synchronised global increase 
in capital requirements for all banks by 1 percent would cause a peak reduction in GDP of 
around 0.5 percent, of which, around 0.1 percent would result from international spill-
over’s with losses in emerging economies being even higher than in advanced economies. 
Should banks elect to cut risk-weighted assets (RWAs) in order to raise capital ratios 
instead of increasing the costs of loans however the impact on GDP growth, it was 
suggested, would be even greater. This is a strategy most likely to be undertaken through a 
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gradual reduction in target loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and would be followed if banks had 
very little time in which to adjust capital ratios, since this would give little time to build up 
capital through dividend cuts or widening of lending margins. The cut in bank lending 
envisaged under this strategy leads to sharp contractions in investment and consumption 
as adverse demand effects are amplified as weaker spending leads to declines in asset 
values, cutting collateral values and access to credit. As a result, economies were predicted 
to experience peak contractions in real economic activity relative to potential of around 1.3 
percent (Roger & Vlcek, 2011:12-15).  
 
Tail risk considerations 
Historically, tail risk in traditional loan-oriented depository banking was low (both project 
returns and withdrawals largely satisfied the law of large numbers), hence “skin in the 
game” effects dominated, and extra capital led to lower risk-taking. In the contemporary 
financial system however, when banks have access to tail risk projects, traditional buffer 
and “skin in the game” effects become weak, while effects where higher capital enables 
risk-taking became stronger. Therefore, due to financial innovation, the beneficial effects of 
higher capital are reduced while the scope for undesirable effects is increased.  
Underpinned by this assumption, Perotti et al (2011:3-4) reviewed the effectiveness of 
capital regulation, and in particular of excess capital buffers in dealing with tail risk events. 
In doing so, two key observations were made. Firstly, traditional buffer effects of capital 
are less powerful when banks have access to tail risk projects, the reason being that tail risk 
realizations can wipe out almost any level of capital, so limiting the effectiveness of capital 
as an absorbing buffer. Secondly “skin in the game” is restricted because part of the loss is 
never borne by shareholders. Hence, under tail risk, excess risk-shifting incentives of bank 
shareholders may exist almost independently of the level of initial or required capital. 
Elliott et al (2012) similarly highlight that banks are increasingly exposed to tail risk, which 
causes losses only rarely, but when those materialise they often exceed any plausible initial 
capital due to the following strategies: firstly, carry trades reliant on short term wholesale 
funding produce highly correlated distressed sales; secondly, the reckless underwriting of 
contingent liabilities on systemic risk were callable at times of collective distress.  
Taken together, since under tail risk banks do not internalise losses independently of the 
level of initial capital, the buffer and incentive effects of capital diminish, with higher 
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capital in fact becoming a less effective way of controlling bank risk in the contemporary 
banking system. This is a point exemplified by the collapse which demonstrated that a 
number of major banks suffering severe adverse shocks had appeared sufficiently 
capitalised prior.  
Secondly, having established that under tail risk the benefits of higher capital are limited, 
Perotti et al (2011) consider its unintended effects. In doing so, the authors note that 
capital regulation affects bank risks choices through the threat of capital adjustment costs 
when banks have to raise equity to comply with minimum capital ratios. Similar to “skin in 
the game” capital adjustment costs fall with higher bank capital because the probability of 
breaching capital ratios decreases. Indeed if highly capitalised banks internalised all losses, 
they would take risk only if that was socially optimal. This changes as tail risk is introduced 
as then, even banks with high capital never internalise all losses and may take excess risk.  
Research therefore demonstrated that tail risk can lead to insolvency whatever the initial 
bank capital, so, higher capital does not discourage risk-taking even for well capitalised 
banks. At the same time, excess capital allows banks to take on risk without breaching the 
minimum capital ratios in the case of low (non tail) returns. So under tail risks, higher 
capital may create conditions where highly capitalised banks actually take on excessive 
risks.  
Demirguc-Kunt et al, (2010:3) similarly suggest that when capital is low relative to the 
regulatory minimum banks choose a risky loan portfolio to maximise the option value of 
deposit insurance. As capital increases and future solvency becomes less likely, on the 
other hand, incentives to take on risks are curbed by the desire to preserve the bank’s 
charter value. However, when banks become so well capitalised that insolvency is remote, 
an additional increase in capital induces banks to take on more risk to benefit from the 
upside.        
Perotti et al (2011) therefore suggest that it is impossible to control all aspects of risk-
taking using a single instrument, the problem of capital buffers being that they are effective 
as long as they can minimise the chance of default, and the loss given default. However, 
innovation in finance allows intermediaries to manufacture risk profiles which let them 
take advantage of limited liability even with high levels of capital. The key to contain 
gambles with skewed returns, it was therefore noted, was to prohibit extreme bets or 
increase their ex ante costs.  
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Implications 
The up-shot of this research was not that less capital is better: banking and financial sector 
pathologies, along with their subsequent impact on economic growth, clearly 
demonstrated that this is not the case. Nevertheless, the following conclusions can be 
drawn. Firstly, its aim was to communicate the point that traditional capital regulation has 
limitations. And secondly, banks with significant excess capital may be induced to take 
excessive risk (to use or put at risk their capital), as aptly demonstrated by the downturn. 
Therefore, relying on higher and excess capital to prevent future financial crises could have 
ruinous effects. 
This research cautioning against too-stringent capital adequacy regulation provides us with 
a strong sense of how the IMF continued to be guided by neoliberal economic ideas, the 
economic philosophy of which carried with it explicit assumptions regarding the negative 
consequences associated with government interference into the functioning of financial 
markets. Indeed, this assumption played a crucial part in influencing the debate on banking 
and financial sector regulation and provided the justification for a largely hands-off 
approach to regulatory policy. 
Indeed, we can see again in this instance how, despite now acknowledging the need to 
provide some semblance of regulation, these assumptions made prior to the downturn 
were increasingly manifest in the capital adequacy debate. That is, just as IMF staff had 
seemingly been at the fore-front in calling for greater regulation, so too did they now find 
themselves helping to provide acceptable narratives of the third phase of the downturn, 
calling for caution in the capital adequacy debate. Implicit here was a continuing distrust, 
and potentially negative consequences associated with, government intervention, along 
with a continuing belief in the efficacy of freely-functioning markets.  
This research can therefore be read as an attempt to ensure that the frames through which 
regulatory standards had been perceived prior to the down-turn were not completely over-
hauled. This process was certainly made easier inasmuch as, although not impregnable, 
having become firmly entrenched as ‘institutional fact’ (Searle, 1995) in the IMF in the 
period preceding the downturn as belief in the ability of managers to manage their own 
risk portfolios had done, substantive change was, in many respects, largely precluded by 
continuing adherence to extant economic orthodoxy.  
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The kinds of arguments raised in IMF research were however, by no means uncontested. 
Indeed, one of the biggest critics, Admati, outright rejected the cognitive assumption that 
larger capital buffers are correlated with an increased cost of loans. This had obvious 
knock-on effects for research regards the decreasing number of loans and the impact on 
GDP.  
The starting point for criticism was a key argument in IMF research that ‘a pervasive view 
that underlies most discussions of capital regulation is that “equity is expensive”, and that 
equity requirements, while offering substantial benefits in preventing crises, also impose 
costs on the financial system and possibly on the economy’ (Admati et al, 2013:i).  
This, the authors suggest, is troubling as the view that equity is expensive is flawed in the 
context of capital regulation. On the one hand, Admati et al (2013:3) suggest that higher 
equity capital requirements need not affect the lending activities of banks since highly 
leveraged banks are subject to distortions in their lending decisions, while better 
capitalised banks are likely to make better lending decisions. In particular, they will have 
less incentive to take on excessive risks and will be subject to fewer problems related to 
“debt overhang” that can actually prevent them from making valuable loans. As a result, 
‘there is no reason to believe that, if overall public policy forces banks to operate with 
significantly higher and safer equity levels and if any subsidies are set in a socially 
responsible way, banks would refrain from making loans that would lead to growth and 
prosperity’ (Admati et al, 2013:3).    
On the other hand however, the authors suggest that increasing equity requirements need 
not interfere with any of the socially valuable activities of banks including lending, deposit 
taking, or the creation of “money-like”, liquid, and “informationally-insensitive” securities 
that might be useful in transactions. In fact, they suggest that the ability to provide social 
value would generally be enhanced by increased equity requirements because banks would 
be likely to make more economically appropriate decisions. By not requiring more stringent 
capital requirements however, there was every chance that banks will be free to once again 
engage in risky activity, knowing that they will be bailed out in the event of a downturn.    
Finally the authors noted that, from a normative perspective, the downturn showed that 
having a fragile financial system in which banks and other financial institutions are funded 
with too little equity is inefficient and incredibly expensive from an economic and political 
perspective. Contrastingly however, the authors suggest that the social costs of 
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significantly increasing equity requirements are, if there are any at all, very small. All 
arguments to the contrary are therefore deemed by Admati et al (2013:i) as being ‘very 
weak’ and premised on ‘fallacious claims’, based on inadequate theoretical models and 
empirical evidence. 
That this is the case once again draws attention to the fact that research undertaken by the 
IMF was driven as much by political suasion, a reflection of a continuing commitment to 
the normative ideas underlying the neoliberal economic philosophy as it was by any other 
means.  
This supports the assumption made in Chapter 1 that research is a key method by which 
the IMF attempts to shape economic knowledge and ensure congruence with dominant 
economic ideas by providing cognitive justification for particular economic philosophies 
and problem definitions. In doing so, in this instance, an attempt was made by the IMF to 
shape the context in which actors found themselves and pursued their preferences by 
dictating that action was directed to the selection of only a small number of policy options.   
 
Implications for the neoliberal economic philosophy 
Basel 3 was conceived in a wider context characterised by major failures in the banking and 
financial sectors. As a result, unravelling events 'created a sense of urgency for policy-
makers and politicians to be seen to be doing something in order to respond to rapidly 
unfolding events by taking affirmative action' (Baker, 2015:353). There therefore existed 
both an imperative and pressure to be seen to be taking immediate action.  
These calls seemingly gave rise to an inter-subjectively-held consensus among actors 
constituting the coordinative discourse that under-regulated, under-supervised and under-
capitalised banks were major precipitating causes of a banking and financial sector collapse 
that contributed to the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. Therefore, 
regulatory reforms were highlighted by prominent senior officials in the IMF, along with 
those in the G20/FSB as an area requiring overhaul (Blanchard, 2009, 2010; G20, 2008a, 
2009, 2009a; Strauss-Kahn, 2008a, 2009; Vinals, 2009).  
However, an assumption is made here that, despite allusions to the contrary during the 
second phase the IMF never abandoned its normative commitment to the neoliberal 
economic philosophy and what it considered the appropriate role of states and markets in 
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the management of the financial sector. This had important implications for the regulatory 
reform agenda, particularly Basel 3, which was from its earliest inception, limited in its 
scope by existing economic orthodoxy. Indeed, the preceding discussion shows how the 
manner in which the IMF approached the regulatory reform agenda was bounded by the 
confines of the broader neoliberal discourse. 
As a result, it is postulated that the Basel 3 reforms advocated during the second phase can 
be more accurately described as being more about managing failure in the banking and 
financial systems. That is, there was no desire on the part of the IMF and others 
constituting the coordinative discourse to significantly alter the existing regulatory and 
supervisory framework. Rather, an attempt was made to protect neoliberalism from its 
follies as opposed to attempt to significantly reorient prevailing economic ideas.  
This is demonstrable in the previous chapter which observed that, as the second phase of 
the downturn unfolded, there developed an emerging discourse around the necessity for 
the construction of a new set of capital requirements that would supersede Basel 2. At this 
juncture multiple opportunities for alternative forms of economic coordination were 
possible. As part of the process of selection, a range of actors might be expected to engage 
in the conceptualization of appropriate solutions, with each identifying the causes of failure 
and guiding policymakers of the appropriate means by which to resolve them. 
These are termed “discursive struggles” (Schmidt, 2013:5) in which actors establish 
problem definitions, define ideas, and create shared meanings on which policymakers act. 
Here the notion of authority is key as faced with conflicting opinions, politicians decide who 
to regard as authoritative, especially on matters of technical complexity including banking 
reform.   
In this particular instance, G20 leaders tasked a particular set of global economic 
governance institutions (IMF/FSF/BIS) with conceptualising the downturn and coordinating 
appropriate responses. These institutions however had played a crucial part in developing 
and seeking to entrench the market-friendly approach to banking and financial sector 
regulation and supervision that characterised the period preceding the downturn.  
Moreover, there was nothing to suggest that they had broken with economic orthodoxy in 
light of events. Rather, an assumption is made here that they continued to exhibit an inter-
subjectively held belief in the efficacy of the prevailing neoliberal economic philosophy, 
problem definitions, and policy priorities. Crucially, these economic ideas were not simply 
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the aggregation of the beliefs held by each institution which, by coincidence, happened to 
experience and interpret the political-economy in a like-wise fashion. Rather, their 
adherence to neoliberal economic ideas ‘exist as collective knowledge’, persisting ‘beyond 
the lives of individual social actors’, helping to define their social reality (Adler, 1997:327).  
As a result, a political decision was made that essentially limited the discourse in which 
discussion of the potential for alternatives took place by bounding the range of possible 
solutions and responses. Indeed, Tsingou (2010:21) noted that although there appeared to 
be a considerable degree of consensus regarding the direction of regulatory reform during 
the second phase of the downturn, much of the agenda ‘continued to be formulated by the 
same policy community of experts, operating in the same institutions... who were given the 
responsibility to see us through the crisis and its aftermath’ (Baker, 2015:340; Kessler, 
2012).  
Best (2010:39-40) likewise observed a large degree of consistency among such institutions 
who were ‘on the same page’ on global regulatory reform. Governance arrangements in 
place prior therefore continued to ‘significantly affect the scope, as well as the intellectual 
and institutional parameters of international regulatory change’ (Tsingou, 2010:22).  
Indeed, Zimmermann (2010:171) observed that although signs suggested that the previous 
regulatory consensus was cracking, a shift was unlikely as elites that dominated rule-
making prior continued to be the most important actors in developing responses. Most 
pertinently, it is suggested that these institutions - despite the cognitive falsification of key 
economic ideas underpinning regulatory standards - continued to exhibit a normative 
commitment to the neoliberal economic philosophy which made explicit assumptions 
about the extent to which financial markets should or should not be subjected to state 
intervention and regulation.  
This shows how the manner in which the IMF responded to the second phase of the down-
turn continued to be framed within the broader ‘discursive fields’ (Steinberg, 1998:856) 
which the IMF, among other actors constituting the coordinative discourse, drew upon to 
diagnose and respond thereby delimiting the appropriate course of action. As a result, we 
can see how events continued to be interpreted, even during the most acute phase, 
through the intellectual frames of reference provided by existing neoliberal economic 
ideas.   
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This was demonstrable for example at the G20s Declaration at the November 2008 
Washington Summit which noted that although ‘we must lay the foundations for reform to 
help to ensure that a global crisis such as this one does not happen again’, this was 
couched within a broader context in which it was observed that ‘our work will be guided by 
a shared belief that market principles... foster the dynamism, innovation, and 
entrepreneurship that are essential for economic growth (G20, 2008a:1). Indeed, 
adherence to these principles, it was suggested, had significantly raised the global standard 
of living, lifting millions of people out of poverty in the process.  
Against this backdrop, the G20 (2008:3) noted that ‘we will make regulatory regimes more 
effective over the economic cycle, while ensuring that regulation is efficient, does not stifle 
innovation, and encourages expanded trade in financial products and services’. This was a 
sentiment echoed at the September 2009 Pittsburgh Summit which although highlighting 
‘there are different approaches to economic development and prosperity, and the 
strategies to achieve these goals may vary according to countries’ circumstances’, this was 
couched in an assumption that countries would continue to ‘support open markets, foster 
fair and transparent competition, and promote entrepreneurship and innovation’ (G20, 
2009a:20).  
Similarly, in questioning what relevance the lessons of the downturn had for the financial 
sector, it is worth quoting at length Strauss-Kahn (2009d: 5) who suggested that ‘it would 
be tempting to conclude that the “modern” financial model should be consigned to the 
dust heap of history – and that therefore, financial development should be halted. But this 
would be the wrong conclusion. By enabling banks and capital markets to match up savers 
and investors – both within and across countries – ever more efficiently, financial 
development has played a vital role in supporting economic growth. It should be allowed to 
continue to play this dynamic role – though of course within a framework that controls 
excess risk, at the same time that it rewards innovation and effort’. These comments 
therefore suggested that, even during its most acute phase, the G20 and IMF had not 
completely abandoned their commitment to the neoliberal economic philosophy.  
As a result, within this narrowly constituted discourse, the IMF, and others, deferred to 
existing neoliberal economic ideas and their established intellectual language that specified 
approved terms of reference. Using these restricted what was thought plausible in reform 
discussions, thereby specifying the parameters of what was practical for politicians and 
policy-makers. As a result, the theoretical frames in place prior helped define not only the 
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downturn, but the vocabularies through which its possible solutions were narrated. This 
ensured that institutions constructing the coordinative discourse were talking about the 
same thing at the same level, thereby defining a very limited space of communication.  
In deferring once again to the perceived efficacy of the neoliberal economic philosophy, 
problem definitions and policy priorities, we can see how the IMF, along with other actors 
in the coordinative discourse, sought to reassert prior neoliberal economic ideas. Steinberg 
(1998:854) is useful here in drawing our attention to the fact that every social order is 
characterised by a particular set of ideas, in this instance, neoliberal economic ideas, that 
privilege some stylizations over others, that is characterised by a particular vocabulary that 
limits the scope of reasonable discussion, meanings, and provides a lens for interpretation.  
With this in mind, we can see how the IMF sought to once again stabilize the flow of 
meanings for communication. That is, discourse was once again characterised by the need 
for restraint in the capital adequacy debate, the downside to too-stringent regulation, 
along with the need not to impede too much the functioning of free markets. This 
discourse once again provided the means by which the IMF, along with the FSB and BIS, 
attempted to define the common sense along with their meanings for policymakers 
(Steinberg, 1998:854).  
Doing so however silenced and marginalised groups not adhering to the dominant 
discourse and participating in a community constituted by common knowledge and 
understandings of the basic functioning of the economy. This lack of deliberation of 
potential, more radical alternatives, however, prevented politicians, regulators and 
supervisors from acquiring the kind of critical analysis that would enable them to 
appropriately distinguish between reform ideas in keeping with the interests of their 
affected citizenries and those that were not.  
That this was the case shows how knowledge claims, in this case even those seemingly 
discredited during the downturn, had become so indelibly entrenched that they were 
normalised as ‘institutional facts’ (Searle, 1995). These ‘facts’ were nevertheless 
subsequently drawn upon to ensure that, even during the most acute phase of the down-
turn, prior assumptions were not evacuated. Indeed, these concepts helped to stabilize 
through minimal tinkering, rather than provide scope for, significant regulatory reforms. 
This goes a long way towards explaining why the bulk of reform proposals did not push for 
a more substantive overhaul of existing regulatory practices but was, in the end, more 
207 
 
about making minor adjustments within a broader context that, despite the severity of the 
downturn, nevertheless continued to be considered as being relatively stable. As a result, 
rather than wholesale changes, the opportunity for a significant turning point in financial 
regulation was never fully explored by policymakers.  
Indeed, Porter (2010:57) suggested that a striking feature of reform was the degree to 
which changes were only incremental, ‘building on existing practices rather than initiating 
or signalling dramatic alterations in governance’. As a result, ‘the key terms of the explicit 
contract between finance and the state remain unchallenged and the special role of the 
financial sector was, if anything, reinforced’ (Tsingou, 2010:22). Similarly, Baker (2015:343) 
noted that ‘many pre-crash beliefs remain prominent’ characterised by ‘evidence of 
ideational stickiness and inertia’ which meant that ‘despite some policy experimentation, 
overarching policy frameworks and their rationales have not as yet been overhauled’. 
Against this backdrop, although the suggested potential for a ‘new financial architecture’ 
Strauss-Kahn (2009d:5) had seemingly provided a permissive context in which policymakers 
and practitioners would be afforded the opportunity to ‘think imaginatively and act boldly’ 
(Strauss-Kahn, 2008c:6), the continuing normative commitment of the IMF and other actors 
of the coordinative discourse to the neoliberal economic philosophy meant reforms were, 
in the end, neither bold nor imaginative. 
The direction for reform advocated in the coordinative discourse can therefore in fact be 
considered as being representative of the paradoxical product of the common adherence 
to inter-subjectively held neoliberal economic ideas centred around normative 
assumptions regarding the efficacy of the market. This suggests that the regulatory reform 
debate was guided, and ultimately limited by, knowledge-based experts within the IMF, 
FSB and BIS who all continued to be ‘guided by a distinctly neoliberal logic’ (Major, 
2012:537). 
That the scope for regulatory reforms were severely limited by prevailing institutions and 
their attendant economic ideas therefore suggests that the process of change is not as 
benign as that postulated by Schmidt (2010, 2011) who - drawing on the concepts of 
discursive and deliberative democracy - suggests that ideas developed in the coordinative 
discourse are subject to deliberation and contestation. Rather, in this case the technical 
specifications of financial regulation were effectively articulated in opaque sub-committees 
operating in the absence of due process, with an advantage bestowed on actors best 
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informed about the policy agenda - large financial institutions with close links to the 
regulatory community.  
This meant that, despite the huge political consequences of the downturn, discussion of, 
and the intricacies of, international financial regulatory policy reform were effectively 
articulated by technocratic experts devoid of political oversight who were more interested 
in ensuring the continuity of an existing set of economic ideas and associated policies. 
 
Policy implications  
So far it has been suggested that the IMF entered the third phase of the downturn having 
not abandoned its normative commitment to the neoliberal economic philosophy. This had 
important implications for the manner in which economic problems were framed; that is, a 
shift from support for major regulatory reform to calls for caution in the reform agenda.  
What therefore, can this tell us about the policy realm, in particular Basel 3 which was 
described by Strauss-Kahn (2010) as 'a major step to fundamental regulatory reform'? The 
answer is simple. Given that Basel 3 was conceived through a narrowly circumscribed 
neoliberal economic philosophy, despite suggestions to the contrary, reforms were not as 
comprehensive or imaginative as suggested. Paradoxically, this is demonstrable in the two 
areas that the IMF has held up as a cornerstone of Basel 3: the quantity and quality of 
capital; and its key macro-prudential component, the counter-cyclical buffer. 
 
Quantity and quality of capital 
In the case of the quantity and quality of capital, the notion of extra capital was considered 
paramount, being as it was, assumed capable of absorbing large losses in the event of an 
economic downturn. Indeed, Basel 3 operated on the assumption that if a well capitalised 
bank got into trouble, its shareholders would suffer, but depositors and the taxpayers who 
insure the deposits, and the rest of the financial system, would be protected. Nevertheless, 
the editors of Bloomberg (2012:1), in a special Editorial, noted that although equity of 7 
percent constituted an improvement over Basel 2, it was still far less than was necessary. 
In a similar vein, Admati (2013:2) observed that regulatory changes would allow banks to 
fund up to 97 percent of their assets with borrowed money with some investments having 
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the potential to be made entirely by borrowed funds. As a result, Basel 3 continued to set 
insufficient capital requirements, and in doing so, maintained a failed approach to adjusting 
the requirements to risk. Indeed, the prevailing consensus, perhaps nowhere more evident 
than in the IMF based on the preceding research, was that ‘regulations everywhere appear 
to be based on the false notion that banks should have “just enough” equity’ (Admati, 
2013:2), as opposed to instead seeking to force banks’ investors to bear more of their own 
risk, and thereby care about managing it more effectively. 
Helleiner (2014:107-108) similarly noted that although minimum capital ratios were set 
higher than before the downturn, they were still only as high as the ratios held by many 
financial institutions that found themselves in grave danger during its most acute phase. As 
a result, there existed the potential for banks operating under Basel 3 to end with capital 
requirements no higher than Lehman's the day before it failed.  
Indeed, the Chairman of the FSB noted in a report to the G20 that many large 
internationally active banks were on course to meet Basel 3 capital requirements almost 
five years in advance of the deadline (FSB, 2014:2). The reason for doing so might simply be 
that banks have taken on board the need for reform and have implemented regulatory 
changes sooner rather than later. The more likely scenario however is that capital 
requirements were set at such a low that they were readily implementable in a very short 
time-frame.  
Furthermore, Helleiner (2014:107-108) argues that Basel 3 has been heavily criticised for 
allowing banks to continue to use internal models for risk weighting of assets. However, 
this was one of the most “market-friendly” features of Basel 2, the consequences of which 
were revealed starkly by the downturn. Therefore, the risk of banks using models that 
deliberately lowered their capital requirements endured after the downturn. Indeed, a 
study commissioned by the BCBS in early 2013 showed enormous variations in capital held 
against the same assets by different banks because of assumptions made in models. This 
led some regulators to worry that banks were continuing to distort the intention of the 
rules in much the same manner that they had done under Basel 2. 
Policymakers were therefore shown to have been very timid in their handling of the 
manner in which risks are assessed, electing to maintain significant proportions of some of 
the most dangerous aspects of Basel 2 ‘with the new Basel 3 rules taking only a baby step 
toward real change’ (Rogoff, 2012:2). As a result, elegant models continue to be defended, 
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in spite of the fact that the downturn demonstrated that were in fact deeply flawed models 
of perfect markets that created an illusion of safety for a system that is highly risk prone. 
The editors of Bloomberg (2012:2) similarly observed that even under the new regime, 
some supposedly risk-free assets would continue to require little or no capital backing. 
Indeed, Basel 3 sets a floor of just 3 percent for equity as a proportion of total assets 
whereas in fact a much higher figure – as high as 20 percent of assets according to the 
authors – was required, although the consensus seems to be to recoil in horror at such a 
suggestion. Indeed, so dissatisfied were the authors with Basel 3, they suggested the need 
for regulators to start from scratch in order to develop much more stringent standards.  
Taken together therefore, it would not be without merit to suggest that in spite of the 
massive de-legitimisation that has taken place as a result of the downturn, the IMF has, 
along with other global economic governance institutions and private actors, limited the 
degree of regulatory constraint to which financial institutions have been subject. That is, 
rather than seek to overhaul the international regulatory architecture as it seemed there 
was a considerable degree of recognition/approval of the need to do, the IMF, FSB, BIS and 
others appear happy to set only the most minimum of standards and ultimately leave it to 
national policymakers and regulators to implement according to domestic constraints.  
What is especially remarkable about the continuity observed here, according to Morgan 
(2011), ‘is that all this has happened within three years of a massive financial crash… where 
banks are extremely unpopular. Nevertheless, those motivated by continuity were able to 
retain some key parts of the business model which contributed to all this. In spite of all the 
contestation, law has been reshaped only to a minimal extent and the power of financial 
institutions, despite its weakening in the aftermath of the crash, has been reasserted’.    
 
The counter-cyclical buffer 
In addition to the preceding critique, Shin (2010:1) has questioned the efficacy of the 
macro-prudential aspect of Basel 3, the counter-cyclical capital buffer, noting that it is ‘is 
almost exclusively micro-prudential in its focus, concerned with the solvency of individual 
banks, rather than being macro-prudential, concerned with the resilience of the financial 
system as a whole’. Here, Shin notes the repeated references to greater “loss absorbency” 
of bank capital, suggesting that this is almost certainly inadequate in achieving a stable 
financial system for two reasons.  
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Firstly, Shin (2010:1) suggests that loss absorbency does not address directly excessive 
asset growth during booms. That is, during a boom, high bank profitability and low risks 
bolster bank capital ratios. However, experience shows that rapid loan growth is achieved 
only at the expense of lowering lending standards. This calls into question the philosophy 
of relying on capital ratios while neglecting the importance of asset growth. Indeed, Shin 
suggests that although larger capital cushions would have mitigated the shock to the real 
economy, the experience of countries such as Spain suggests that forward-looking 
provisioning may not be sufficient and that other tools (such as caps on loan-to-value 
ratios) become increasingly important. 
Secondly, preoccupation with loss absorbency diverts attention from the liabilities side of 
banks’ balance sheets. Here, excessive asset growth is mirrored on the liabilities side of the 
balance sheet by shifts in the composition of bank funding. The core funding available to 
the banking sector is retail deposits of household savers. In a lending boom, when credit 
grows rapidly, the pool of retail deposits is not sufficient to fund the increase in bank credit 
and other sources of funding are tapped to further fund lending. As a result, the proportion 
of non-core liabilities of banks serves as a useful indicator of the stage of the financial cycle 
and the degree of vulnerability of the banking system to a downturn of the financial cycle. 
Taken together, an assumption is made that these are closely related to systemic risk and 
interconnectedness between banks, yet addressing them would go a long way towards 
mitigating systemic risks and the cross-exposure across banks. 
Offering an alternative line of critique, Repullo and Saurina (2011:3) suggest that a key 
element of the proposal was to identify a macro-economic variable or group of variables in 
order to assess the extent to which in any given jurisdiction there was a significant risk that 
credit had grown to excessive levels. For each jurisdiction, when the variable breached pre-
defined thresholds this would give rise to a benchmark buffer requirement. This could then 
be used by national jurisdictions to expand the size of the capital conservation buffer. This, 
however, was problematic for two reasons. 
First was the variable its self. An IMF/FSB/BIS Progress Report (2011:5-6) found countries 
were deploying a range of measures to assess systemic risks, including: aggregate 
indicators of imbalances drawing on macro-economic or balance-sheet data to signal the 
build-up of risks in the financial system and broader economy; indicators of market 
conditions which may lead to generalised distress such as spreads; and metrics of 
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concentration of risk within the system which look at the potential channels of contagion 
and amplification.  
That various measures prevail is consistent with the assumption that optimal choices ought 
to be country and context specific. What this does do however, is render problematic the 
claim made in the Report (2011:19) that cooperation on macro-prudential policies requires 
‘strong institutional mechanisms to promote a common understanding of threats to global 
financial stability and adequate policy actions’, along with associated ‘steps to ensure that 
macro-prudential frameworks in individual countries are mutually consistent’.      
Secondly, the countercyclical buffer was considered the most significant macro-prudential 
component of Basel 3. However that it was not part of a rules-based regime draws 
attention to the fact that the implementation of one of the most innovative features of 
Basel 3 was again left open to potential circumvention as the implementation of rules were 
deliberately left to the discretion of national authorities (Helleiner, 2014:12). So for 
example, a key assumption was that it was authorities themselves who would advocate the 
release of the counter-cyclical capital buffer ‘based on incipient signs of strains’ 
(IMF/FSB/BIS, 2011:13). 
If reaching common agreement on an appropriate variable has proven difficult however, 
then so too is ascertaining the point at which that variable suggests the need for policy 
intervention, which is its self an inherently subjective exercise dependent on a range of 
domestic political economy constraints and considerations. Indeed, it has been shown 
throughout this research that purportedly material 'facts' of the political-economy come 
with no obvious metric, and that events and their associated implications, are inherently 
contested. Similarly, in this particular instance, it is ‘in both the build-up and release phase 
of the buffer' that 'the exercise of judgement remains critical’ (IMF/FSB/BIS, 2011:13).  
That this is the case domestically implies that reaching agreement internationally on 
timing, given the collection of political economies, becomes all the more difficult. Certainly, 
the deliberative process of when to release buffers is influenced, and therefore 
complicated by, the fact that this judgement process may create an uneven playing field at 
the international level, thereby making decision-makers slow to act on signals. Indeed, 
Keynes reminds us that markets are subject to shifts in sentiment and may react negatively 
to a decision to release the buffer in worsening economic conditions. As a result, many 
analysts were left wondering whether authorities would be willing to take the unpopular 
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decision to raise capital requirements during boom times in ways that might curtail lending 
and reduce comparative advantages vis-a-vis countries electing not to do so (Helleiner, 
2014:107-108).   
Moreover, further potential sources of tension were observed in the Progress Report 
(2011:18) regards when to release counter-cyclical buffers down to reduce impediments to 
the flow of credit to the economy. Banking supervisors, generally oriented towards a MicPR 
approach, would prefer to keep the increased capital buffer to guard against heightened 
risks to individual financial institutions. Although it is clear that under such circumstances it 
is important to assign a clear demarcation of decision-making responsibilities, it is not clear 
how this relationship might actually function once established, how such tensions might be 
resolved, and what explicit mechanisms might be available to resolve this process.  
 
Basel 3 as a series of technical fixes 
The preceding discussion suggests there was no significant reform of financial regulation. 
Rather, the fundamental structure of the banking industry was unchanged and regulatory 
institutions were not significantly strengthened. In fact, although the edifice created in the 
preceding few decades has needed shoring up with vast quantities of taxpayer money, 
surprisingly, very little at all has been given in return (Wilson & Grant, 2011:249).  
In 2009 MCMD Director Jose Vinals questioned whether there was a need to throw out the 
old rule books for financial regulation, or whether it would be sufficient to change a few 
pages and add a couple of chapters. This chapter suggests it is the latter that has played 
out. 
As a result, reforms were clearly not as bold and imaginative as were initially envisaged 
because none of the proposals, including Basel 3, involved major regulatory change. 
Rather, drawing on the work of Best (2004:383) we can see how global economic 
governance institutions have sought to simply manage the failure brought about by 
banking and financial sector pathologies through the instantiation of a series of ‘technical 
fixes’ to an already-existing set of policies which were themselves initially conceived in an 
architecture of global economic governance characterised by an inherently neoliberal 
political economy.  
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As a result, eight years after the onset of the downturn, the content of global regulatory 
reforms are left looking remarkably tame in comparison to the predictions advanced, and 
promises made, in 2008. Indeed, rather than overturning the market-friendly nature of 
prior global financial standards, the IMF and others have simply advocated tweaking its 
content. 
Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010:10) of the OECD for example have noted that the aim 
of Basel 1 was to require banks to maintain enough capital to absorb losses without causing 
systemic problems as well as to provide a level playing field internationally. A revised Basel 
framework was introduced in 2004 after a series of concerns with Basel 1, most notable 
among which was that regulatory arbitrage was rampant and allowed banks to control the 
amount of capital they required by shifting between on-balance-sheet assets with different 
weights, and by securitising assets and shifting them off-balance-sheet.  
This notwithstanding, the revised Basel 2 retained many of the basic features of Basel 1 
which were shown to be wholly inadequate in the context of the current downturn. 
Similarly, with Basel 3 drawing on many of the assumptions of Basel 2 it is entirely plausible 
that, just as Basel 2 had proven insufficient, so too did there exist the possibility for Basel 3 
to be equally ineffective in its capacity to prevent future downturns of a similar magnitude. 
This minimal tinkering suggests the absence of fundamental restructuring of the regulatory 
architecture of the type proposed during the second phase. Rather, the IMF, and others, 
can be understood as having adopted a path of expediency through limited reforms. With 
this in mind, the global financial governance regulatory landscape can, despite the 
downturn, be characterised as a ‘status quo event’ (Helleiner, 2014:2) for the IMF. That is, 
despite the fact that there were some changes in the policy realm, the market-friendly 
character of financial standards, themselves a reflection of the neoliberal economic 
philosophy, were not significantly overhauled.  
This led Admati (2013:1) to suggest that ‘the world’s financial system remains dangerous 
and dysfunctional’, and perhaps more pertinently, ‘despite years of debate, no consensus 
about the nature of the financial system’s problems – much less how to fix them – has 
emerged’. Rather, the regulations in place when the downturn erupted, despite minimal 
alterations, continue to be inadequate in both their scope and enforcement potential. 
Rogoff (2012:1) similarly observed that ‘people often ask if regulators and legislators have 
fixed the flaws in the financial system that took the world to the brink of a second Great 
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Depression. The short answer is no’. Although Rogoff (2012:1) suggested that such was the 
severity of the downturn, investors and regulators would not allow recklessness to hit full 
throttle for a while, ‘little has fundamentally changed’ long-term. Rather, regulation simply 
served as a patch to preserve the status quo as politicians and regulators demonstrated a 
complete lack of political courage or intellectual conviction to move to an altered system.   
Indeed, it has been suggested that ‘several years beyond the height of the crisis, the 
financial reform agenda was still only half-baked at best’, with some reforms, despite 
gesturing in the right direction, 'did not go far enough or have not been implemented fully’ 
(Kodres and Claessens, 2014:31). Indeed, so sparse were reforms that Wilson & Grant 
(2011:7) observed that ‘someone losing contact with events in January 2009 and regaining 
it in 2011 would have been astonished by the disappearance of critiques of markets, 
corporate behaviour and weak regulation’.  
These points were broadly acknowledged in the October 2012 GFSR which observed that 
despite some improvements: the structure of intermediation was largely unchanged; the 
financial system remained overly complex; and the too-big-to-fail issues still unresolved, 
thereby leaving the financial system vulnerable to risks that prevailed prior to the 
downturn.  
By way of adjudicating what a safer financial system might look like, the GFSR (2012a:76) 
suggested that most people would envisage a system that: is less complex; in which 
institutions are more transparent; in which institutions are less dependent on leverage; are 
better capitalised; can better manage liquidity risk; would encourage all risks to be properly 
priced. Viewed in such a manner, and judging by its own standards, the financial system 
could not be characterised as being considerably safer than it was prior to the downturn.  
That this was the case however should not have been entirely surprising given the GFSR’s 
somewhat startling admission that the global regulatory reform agenda which the IMF had 
played a contributory part, had not been driven toward directly altering financial sector 
structures per se, but rather toward promoting safer behaviour in particular segmented 
areas, in which emphasis was placed on the shoulders of markets and businesses for 
delivery.  
This was undertaken on the assumption that reforms targeted at raising the costs of riskier 
activities means one can expect changes by the private sector to lower overall costs and 
move to more profitable activities. Hence, the response of institutions and investors to new 
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requirements, it was assumed, would produce new and altered structures which would 
then change the larger financial system and structure.  
So for example, capital and liquidity requirements under Basel 3 were aimed at improving 
banks’ resilience and ability to absorb losses. In responding to these requirements 
however, as well as to changing business conditions, banks, it was suggested, would decide 
what activities to keep and how to structure their funding and capital profiles. Investors 
would, in turn, decide how to participate and on what terms, decisions which would 
produce change, much of which was unpredictable as elements of reform were yet to be 
finalised, and many yet to be implemented. Alternatively, it could lead to no change at all 
(GFSR, 2012a:82-83).  
This reflected an assertion by Vinals et al (2010:6) that a fundamental principle underlying 
analysis is that ‘the private sector plays an important role – it is not up to regulators to 
“build” the financial system but to influence its direction by providing appropriate rules and 
incentives’. In doing so, it was suggested that ‘it is ultimately the industry that will translate 
rules into actual changes in industry practice. For reform initiatives to be successful, 
regulatory efforts should continue to be directed toward improving the internal operations 
of financial firms, including their risk management and governance. They should seek to 
restore the credibility of market discipline in the face of past failures’ (Vinals et al, 
2010:25).    
 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has suggested that, the apparent shift observed in the previous chapter 
notwithstanding, regulatory reforms were in fact characterised by a considerable degree of 
continuity as opposed to change. This was shown to be so for three reasons. 
Firstly, by tasking particular institutions and standard-setting bodies with coordinating the 
international response as they did (the IMF, FSB, and BIS), the potential for discursive 
battles in which competing conceptions of the downturn and appropriate responses are 
played out was inherently limited. That is, they all continued to be underpinned by a 
distinctively neoliberal economic philosophy.  
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Secondly, the manner in which economic problems were framed shifted from perceived 
regulatory failures during the second phase of the downturn to calls within the IMF for a 
more cautionary approach to the capital adequacy debate during its third phase.  
Thirdly, the preceding discussion suggests that there were important reasons to suggest 
that the quantity and quality of capital required under Basel 3 was not predicted to be 
substantially different from that held by financial institutions prior to the downturn. 
Moreover, the most important macro-prudential component of Basel 3, the counter-
cyclical capital buffer was left to domestic policymakers to decide on both the variable by 
which to judge risk, and the point at which it would be released, which was an inherently 
subjective endeavour. 
Taken together therefore, despite the potential for a significant shift in the prevailing 
economic philosophy, ‘no such dramatic change has occurred’ (Guven, 2012:870). That is, 
there has been no fundamental divergence from the pre-existing repertoire of problem 
definition or economic philosophy. Rather, the downturn has in fact been characterised by 
prescriptive continuity as what may have appeared to have been attitudinal shifts, have yet 
to trigger fundamental modifications in programme design. 
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Conclusion 
‘While it is always possible to wake a person who is sleeping, no amount of noise will wake 
a person who is pretending to be asleep’                                                                                       
(Jonathan Safran Foer) 
 
In 2008 the world witnessed what has been broadly contextualised as the worst financial 
and economic downturn since the Great Depression. As opposed to being the result of an 
exogenous event puncturing an otherwise relatively stable overall economic framework, 
this research has suggested that, inherent to the downturn, was a fundamental failure of 
the neoliberal economic ideas steering IMF actions. As a result, we would not be without 
justification in suggesting that, at a minimum, the consequences would be equally as 
damaging to dominant economic ideas as the Depression was to liberalism, and the Great 
Inflation had been to Keynesianism.  
In both instances, the failure of existing economic ideas was inter-subjectively interpreted 
by actors as a crisis which ultimately precipitated a shift to an alternative set of economic 
ideas characterised by an altogether different economic philosophy, problem definitions, 
and associated policy priorities. With this in mind, it was widely anticipated that the current 
downturn had the potential to exert a similarly transformative dynamic.  
Against this backdrop, and given the preceding research, we are suitably positioned to 
revisit, and provide satisfactory answers to the research questions posed in the 
Introduction, one of which is empirical, and the other theoretical. We begin first of all with 
the empirical question relating to the extent to which it is possible to talk of change or 
continuity in neoliberal economic ideas in the IMF. 
In answering this question, this research has advanced the simple assertion that economic 
ideas in the IMF are characterised by continuity as opposed to change. As a result, the 
downturn can be best described as what Helleiner (2014:3) has termed a ‘status quo event’ 
for the IMF.   
This finding runs contrary to a number of studies providing an analysis of continuity and 
change in the IMF. Babb (2011) for example has spoken of ‘productive incoherence’ (the 
proliferation of incoherent and/or contradictory statements from the IMF) and an 
interregnum characterised by new development opportunities, particularly in relation to 
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the gradual normalization of capital controls which ‘may represent the beginning of what 
may very well turn out to be the most significant expansion of policy space’ over the last 
few decades (Babb, 2011:807).  
In a broadly similar fashion Ban (2014), in questioning whether or not there is increased 
space to negotiate with the IMF on fiscal policy, suggests that there is, thanks by and large 
to the ‘Keynesian’ turn in the IMF. Although not citing this as a potential paradigm shift, 
Ban nevertheless observes the existence of a doctrinal shift in fiscal policy in which it is 
possible to find more arguments for less austerity, more growth measures, and a fairer 
social distribution of the burden of fiscal sustainability. 
This therefore begs the question of how we account for such differences in interpretation. 
It is here that this research takes as it point of departure the fact that although economic 
ideas are often held up as a single concept, they in fact reside at three levels of generality: 
economic philosophies; problem definitions; and policy priorities.  
When understood as such, we are able to distinguish, at one level of generality, the 
common theme among the preceding studies, that is, an analysis of continuity or change 
limited to an exploration of the policy realm. In doing so, and given the severity of the 
downturn, a series of policies were advocated by the IMF that was often experimental, and 
at times simply contradictory to extant orthodoxy. Consequently, it is not difficult find 
evidence of discontinuity in a range of policy areas, and therefore, to see why such 
conclusions were drawn. 
Indeed, such studies are consistent with much constructivist literature which draws 
attention to the fact that it is policies that change most rapidly when windows of 
opportunity open up in which to enact change. Chapters 4 and 6 of this research may 
appear, superficially at least, to support this approach by demonstrating how calls for 
substantial fiscal stimulus along with increased regulation of the banking and financial 
sectors, prevailed during the most acute phase of the downturn. 
Nevertheless, and contrary to such approaches, this research has advocated that the most 
appropriate means by which to adjudicate between change and continuity is by analysing 
the impact of the downturn on the underlying economic philosophy held by actors. That is, 
assumptions made regarding the perceived efficacy of states or markets in the functioning 
of the economy and accompanying problem definitions.  
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When altering our level of analysis, we can see how the ostensible change observed by 
Babb (2011) and Ban (2014) among others, was not in fact as profound as initially 
envisaged. Indeed, when we delve beyond the policy realm into an exploration of the 
deeper economic philosophy of the IMF, we see, consistent with Chapters 5 and 7 of this 
research, how the IMF never in fact abandoned its basic articles of faith, even during the 
most acute phase of the downturn.  
Therefore, although a range of policies advocated during the second phase of the 
downturn seemingly run contrary to those advocated even months prior, these were 
clearly not a carefully articulated response to the accumulated pathologies of neoliberal 
political-economic failure. Rather, they can be more accurately described as failure 
management techniques, the aims of which were not to significantly alter the neoliberal 
economic ideas steering IMF actions, but were rather an that attempt to save neoliberalism 
from its follies.  
What followed during the third phase of the downturn can therefore be more accurately 
interpreted as an attempt by the IMF, having stemmed the most immediate danger, to re-
establish the status quo ante. That it interpreted the downturn in such a manner leaves us 
well placed to talk, with some considerable degree of conviction, of continuity rather than 
change in economic ideas in the IMF. 
This assertion notwithstanding, by focusing on the underlying economic philosophy held by 
the IMF, and given that these are often held up as the slowest and most resistant to 
change, there exists the potential for assuming that because nothing fundamental has 
changed, that nothing at all has changed. This is not the case as there has been some 
modicum of change, notwithstanding the fact that this has remained limited to the policy 
realm. However, this does not entirely preclude the potential for future, more substantive 
change in economic philosophy and problem definitions in the IMF. This is so for two 
reasons.  
 
Potential sources of change  
Top-down 
Gamble (2014) and Payne (2014) have drawn attention to the fact that transformations in 
what have been referred to here as economic philosophies and problem definitions 
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typically take much longer to play out than is generally conceived, often in the order of 
fifteen years. Indeed, in the policy areas explored in this research, debate within the IMF, 
and beyond, is still very much a work in progress. 
On the one hand, of economic policy, discussion remains regarding the appropriate form 
and function of monetary policy. Namely, the extent to which central banks should, or 
should not attempt to counter asset bubbles (a re-emergence of the lean versus clean 
debate), and whether it should target a higher rate of inflation to give more flexibility to 
prevent rates quickly hitting the ZLB. Moreover, discussion remains on UMPs, particularly 
with reference to forward guidance on the policy rate, and whether they might become a 
more significant part of the future policy mix (IMF, 2013b). 
On the other hand, the regulatory reform agenda remains incomplete, with the IMF 
continuing to engage in discussions regarding reforms in a number of areas not subject to 
discussion in this research. These relate for example, to the regulation of the shadow 
banking system including hedge funds, the need to better regulate the markets for 
securities and derivatives, and the need to address the too-important -to-fail problem. 
Taken together, these areas might eventually alter the direction of the economic ideas 
steering the course of global economic governance in such a manner that it may become 
possible to talk of change as opposed to continuity (see for example Vinals, 2014:1). 
 
Bottom-up 
Moreover, the focus of this research has been on elite-elite interactions in the coordinative 
discourse and how economic ideas and accompanying policy priorities are subsequently 
diffused through the communicative discourse. However, in contrast to these 'top-down' 
considerations  it is not inconceivable that an alternative means by which change might yet 
come about is ‘bottom-up’. Here, although little may have currently changed in the IMF the 
potential exists for the neoliberal economic philosophy and problem definitions to fail to 
sufficiently address low growth, stubbornly high rates of unemployment, and in some 
instances, prolonged periods of austerity.  
Indeed, Schmidt (2008:308) draws our attention to the fact that the use of the philosophy 
of science can only go so far as whereas in science 'programmatic success is judged by 
scientists alone; in society, programmatic success is judged not only by social scientists but 
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also by citizens'. Indeed, in a similar vein, Widmaier et al (2007:755) remind us that 
everyday politics can matter more than elite debates.  
As a result, the success of a particular set of policies does not simply depend on the 
presence of cognitive ideas capable of satisfying policymakers that a given programme will 
provide robust solutions. ‘It also depends on the presence of complementary normative 
ideas capable of satisfying policymakers and citizens alike that those solutions also serve 
the underlying values of the polity’ (Schmidt, 2008:308, emphasis added).  
Nevertheless, elite ideas regarding the need for a particular course of action has the 
potential to clash with ideas about economic justice. It is therefore not inconceivable that 
elites fail in their ability to legitimise or naturalise the kind of arguments deployed in this 
research to successfully justify the efficacy of continuity. 
As a result, the fall-out from the downturn could yet lead a disaffected citizenry to seek an 
alternative political-economy to that provided by adherence to neoliberal economic ideas. 
Doing so may eventually contribute to changed perceptions regarding the relative efficacy 
of states and markets, the manner in which economic problems are interpreted and 
responded to, and therefore the kinds of policies considered both necessary and desirable 
from a social perspective.   
 
Continuity in neoliberal economic ideas as contributing to a potentially irrelevant IMF 
The preceding discussion suggests that there still exists the potential for change to be 
brought about by the downturn, and thereby an alternative political economy that 
envisages a privileged role for the state in the functioning of the economy. Moreover 
however, there are also important implications, and potential challenges to, the IMF if it 
elects to maintain its doctrinaire adherence to neoliberal economic ideas. 
Indeed, should we accept Skidelsky’s (2010:xvi) assertion that it is difficult to convey the 
harm done by the recent downturn to neoliberal economic ideas, yet the IMF chooses to 
do nothing in the face of such monumental falsification, its unwavering commitment to 
existing economic orthodoxy might yet result in an increasingly irrelevant IMF.  
Indeed, running parallel to, and further exacerbating this potential are broader structural 
changes taking place in the international political economy. Prior to the downturn the 
relevance of the IMF appeared to have diminished significantly. With only a limited number 
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of loans outstanding the IMF, for example, was labelled the "Turkish Monetary Fund" on 
reflection of Turkey’s position as main debtor country (Drezner, 2014:8). Additionally, the 
IMF had undergone a period of scaling back its activities, with much of its gold being sold, 
and a large number of staff cuts that had either been, or were due to be, implemented.   
Countries only approach the IMF for assistance during moments of political-economic 
failure. Given the relatively benign economic environment that characterised much of the 
global economy prior to the downturn, it might not be entirely inaccurate to suggest that 
this was the primary reason for the IMFs diminishing loan portfolio.  
What was happening however was arguably much more fundamental. It was not that 
developing countries were not borrowing. It is that they were not borrowing from the IMF. 
Indeed, many countries, acutely aware of the doctrinaire approach of the IMF were 
reluctant to access loans accompanied by stringent conditionality.  
The problem therefore exists, given the IMF’s continuing deference to neoliberal economic 
ideas, that despite their clear cognitive and normative falsification, and despite increasing 
its lending substantially during the current downturn, for the real potential for it to find its 
self in a similar, if not more isolated position, than it occupied prior to the downturn.  
In light of this potential, at its Washington summit the G20 group of state leaders stated 
that they were ‘committed to advancing the reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions so 
that they can more adequately reflect changing economic weights in the world economy in 
order to increase their legitimacy and effectiveness’ (G20, 2008a:4), by giving developing 
economies a greater voice and representation (see also G20, 2009a:3; G20, 2010:5).  
These calls notwithstanding, change has simply not been forthcoming (IMF, 2015:1-3). 
Indeed, in consistently failing to act on reforms, Lombardi (2014) has suggested that the 
IMF, and in particular the US, had broken the implicit contract underpinning G20 and IMF 
commitments to giving a greater voice to developing countries.  
The result, according to Lombardi (2014) is that the failure to implement reforms would 
give momentum to regional alternatives, thereby leading developing countries to look 
elsewhere for financial assistance. Similarly, the Economist (2014) has noted that delays in 
reforms have left a number of countries impatient for change, thereby leading them to 
take matters into their own hands, further contributing to the potential marginalization of 
the IMF.  
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Indeed, partly in response to the inability of the IMF to make progress on quota reforms 
this is exactly what has been happening. China has helped create the Asia Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) which a number of commentators suggest has been set up in 
response to the lack of substantive reform in the IMF (see for example Sands, 2015).  
Similarly, the BRICS group of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) have 
created the New Development Bank (NDB) which has stated explicitly that it operates ‘as 
an alternative to the US-dominated World Bank and International Monetary Fund’ (NDB, 
2015). Regardless of if, or which, of the preceding scenarios may eventually bear 
substantive fruition, we can nevertheless conclude that, in the absence of change in the 
IMF, there exists a real potential of it becoming an increasingly irrelevant monetary fund. 
The preceding discussion certainly raises a great many more questions than this research 
has answered, thereby suggesting the existence of considerable scope for further enquiry 
in this area. Despite the focus on the policy areas discussed in this research, arguably the 
most pertinent concerns the potential challenges to the IMF such as the creation of 
regional lending bodies and the creation of the New Development Bank created by the 
BRICS in particular. 
There are clearly no concrete guarantees at this juncture what the NDBs lending capacity 
might be, which countries might elect to borrow money, for what purposes, and crucially 
on what terms. All of these represent interesting avenues of inquiry.  
Crucial however are broader issues related to what has been termed here as the 
coordinative discourse, that is, the apex policy forums or state leaders steering the broad 
direction of the NDB. Questions arise as to how these key states would be ordered in terms 
of a hierarchy, implicit or otherwise, and what potential exists for tensions or biases as a 
result?  
Moreover, and just as important are questions related to the economic ideas steering the 
course of policy action. Namely, does such a grouping of what is an inherently eclectic mix 
of states with regards both their polities and economies actually exhibit a distinct political-
economy characterised by a coherent underlying economic philosophy, problem definitions 
and policy priorities? If yes, then the question is what do they look like, and in what ways 
do such economic ideas ‘hang together’ in such a manner as to steer policy actions.  
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Constructing continuity in economic ideas in the IMF 
Given the foregoing discussion, we can now revisit and provide satisfactory answers to the 
theoretical, and second, of the research questions posed in the Introduction: that is, why 
did the monumental failure of neoliberal economic ideas not result in altered structures 
(change)?  
The starting point for discussion is that, what has been referred to here as the second 
phase of the downturn, appeared to provide the necessary preconditions (the moment of 
political-economic failure) for a crisis narrative in which events were inter-subjectively 
interpreted by agents as requiring decisive intervention (change).  
Consistent with much constructivist work, it is here that windows of opportunity open up 
for the enactment of a range of alternative policies as existing policies, problem definitions 
and economic philosophies are interpreted by actors as being unable to account for new 
circumstances. During the current downturn however, not only were a range of policies 
deployed that had previously been off the table only months prior, but they also appeared 
to carry with them important implications for the manner in which the relative efficacy of 
states  as opposed to markets were once again understood in the IMF. 
Nevertheless, this research has demonstrated how change was ultimately not forthcoming. 
In addition to accounting for why, a key task has been to take up the challenge by Schmidt 
(2011:111) ‘to provide less deterministic and more dynamic ways of thinking about 
continuity’.  
In doing so, it is suggested that, during times of political-economic uncertainty, agents’ 
interests are radically open. At this juncture it has been suggested that persuasive practices 
come to the fore, with agents engaging in discursive battles over attempts to successfully 
interpret, define, and thereby frame the direction of action. Crucially however, this 
research has suggested that not only are agents motivated by change involved in this 
process, but so too are those motivated by continuity, and there is no logical reason to 
suggest that those motivated by change will be victorious.  
While this is almost self-evident, what is missing from existing constructivist literature is an 
adequate understanding of the mechanisms by which actors undertake such an endeavour. 
As a result, a key contribution of this research has been to demonstrate how agents seek to 
construct continuity by persuading others of the efficacy of continuing adherence to 
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existing economic ideas. Here we revisit the two concepts developed in this research, 
historical analogy and the politics of framing. 
 
Historical analogy 
On the one hand, this research has sought, drawing on the International Relations 
literature associated with foreign policy analysis, to posit the efficacy of the import of 
reasoning through historical analogy - a tool, implicitly or otherwise, used by actors in an 
attempt to reduce moments of political-economic uncertainty by postulating the broader 
environment as one of continuing risk - to the study of IPE. 
More specifically however, in addition to seeking to advance constructivist IPE generally, 
this research contributes towards one of the multiple ‘pathways’ to constructivism 
postulated by Abdelal et al (2010:10), in this particular instance, the path of cognition. This 
is an area of study typically associated with psychologists and cultural sociologists who 
‘have long argued that human beings depend on heuristics and shortcuts to organize action 
and choice’ (Abdelal et al, 2010:10).  
Nevertheless, it has been suggested here that historical analogy has the potential to play an 
especially important role in the study of IPE precisely because the international political 
economy is often held up as an arena characterised by a considerable degree of 
complexity, unpredictability and uncertainty rather than risk, a situation which is in 
principle calculable, and whose outcomes are quasi-normally distributed. Situations of 
uncertainty however suggest that past events are not necessarily a reliable guide to future 
probabilities, and it is these moments that are understood as a fundamental part of the 
contemporary political-economy (Knight, 1958; Taleb & Pipel, 2004). As a result, actors 
‘filter information from the environment via heuristics and biases and consider it in highly 
selective ways’ (Abdelal et al, 2010:10).  
The novelty and utility of the introduction of schemas and historical analogy to this 
research however, is that it shows precisely how agents attempt to reduce uncertainty 
during such moments (political-economic failure) in order to construct continuity and 
stability rather than change.  
Indeed, it has been suggested by a number of constructivists (see for example Blyth, 1997, 
2002; Hay, 1995, 1999; Widmaier et al, 2007) that during such moments, agents are unsure 
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of their interests, thereby leaving them open to persuasion that one particular course of 
action over a range of available alternatives, is consistent with their interests.  
It is here that, drawing on the concept of schema and historical analogy allow us to better 
understand how actors react to moments of political-economic failure and associated 
uncertainty. That is, they provide answers to the preliminary questions: how can we best 
explain the causes of our current predicament? And thereafter, what are the implications 
for it being defined as event A over event B?    
It is here that drawing on the notion of a ‘knowledge structure’ allows us to demonstrate 
how actors assimilate incoming information through existing schemas. This provides them 
with a means by which to interpret, and thereby make sense of, the vast amounts of 
incoming information.  
This leaves actors well placed to provide a definition of events and occurrences and, in 
doing so, shows how they do not unambiguously and automatically telegraph to agents 
their nature and appropriate remedies. Rather, they are differentially experienced and 
interpreted by actors, a reflection of their underlying economic philosophies and problem 
definitions.  
Moreover, by assimilating this information through the lens provided by existing schemas 
actors have been shown in this research to reason through historical analogy in order to 
present events as analogous to others, thereby making the political-economic environment 
knowable and more closely resembling a situation of risk as opposed to uncertainty. 
Indeed, accepting this premise, we can see how ‘when information about the environment 
is complex and poses a high level of uncertainty... argumentation by reference to history is 
a vital component’ precisely because it ‘serves as a means of persuading both self and 
others’ (Vertzberger, 1986:229).  
There are clear implications to reasoning through historical analogy and defining events in 
one particular manner as opposed to all of the available alternatives. That is, it allows 
actors to derive policy lessons from past experience which were shown to be successful, 
and which, particularly for the purpose of this research and consistent with the historical 
analogy more broadly, are shown to be consistent with existing economic philosophies and 
problem definitions. Crucially, these are subsequently drawn upon and advocated as tools 
of persuasion in order to convince other actors of their efficacy.   
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Framing 
Benford and Snow (2000:611) have observed that ‘the concept of frame has considerable 
currency in social sciences today’. This is especially so of the sociology literature and social 
movement theory in particular, where such approaches have sought to draw attention to 
the importance of the politics of framing as a means by which to assign meaning to events 
and occurrences. Nevertheless, making explicit its relevance and insights to the study of 
constructivist IPE has eluded those working within this approach so far. Yet the suggestion 
here is that given the complex nature of the international political economy, such a 
concept has considerable utility.  
Against this backdrop, this research contributes to a second pathway to constructivism 
identified by Abdelal et al (2010:8), the path of meaning, which the authors suggest, ‘is the 
foundation of most explicitly constructivist scholarship’. In doing so, this research builds 
upon the approach favoured by cognitive constructivists, thereby allowing us to illuminate 
yet another mechanism by which actors seek to construct continuity. 
At base, the concept of framing draws attention to the fact that the opening for socially 
constructed variation in action is not simply the result of the complexity of the material 
world, but how these surroundings are viewed in terms of the ideas, identities and 
symbols, that actors use to frame and prioritize their actions.  
Indeed, Abdelal et al (2010:9) suggest that the stronger version of meaning-oriented 
constructivism draws attention to the fact that actors, rather than interpreting the world 
around them in purely material terms, endow the political-economy with social purposes 
which are themselves embedded within a variety of collective identities. This helps us to 
explain both why some of even the most taken-for-granted assumptions are not entirely 
uncontested, and why policymakers and market participants discern a variety of meanings 
from similar events and occurrences. 
Should we accept these premises, that the international political economy is indeed 
uncertain, and characterised by a dynamic context of unpredictability, and that even the 
least uncertain environment is not free from potential variation in meaning, then we can 
see how the politics of framing has the potential to constitute an incredibly fruitful means 
by which to study how actors assign meaning to such events. 
In particular however, this research has drawn attention to the important role played by 
institutions and the performative function they play in their explicit attempts to fix 
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meanings. This is common to much meaning-oriented constructivism which highlights the 
role of institutions in, for example, defining the “taken-for-granted” status of good 
governance in development theory in the case of the World Bank (Weaver, 2010:48; see 
also Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). These show how institutions help to delineate between 
the acceptable (and in the process, unacceptable) boundaries of what can be considered 
politically and economically possible (Abdelal et al, 2010:10).  
This draws attention to the importance of the economic ideas held by institutions as it is 
through these that we understand which problems come to be defined and in which 
particular ways. In essence, economic ideas bring meaning to an event or object and it is to 
the meaning that they bring to bear to which agents react, not some purported material 
reality.  
Viewed in such a manner, we can see how the process by which meaning is assigned is an 
inherently political act of strategic social construction on the part of actors inasmuch as it is 
both deliberate and goal directed (Weaver, 2010:61-64). In contrast to existing meaning-
oriented constructivist research however, which makes little or no explicit reference, this 
research has sought to highlight the utility of the concept of framing. In the process of 
doing so, it has been show to perform two crucial functions.  
Firstly, framing plays a crucial diagnostic function inasmuch as they ‘seek to remedy or alter 
some problematic situation or issue’, indeed, ‘it follows that directed action is contingent 
on identification of the source(s) of causality, blame, and/or culpable agents’ (Benford & 
Snow, 2000:616). Understood as such, we can see how assigning meaning is essential as 
events in the political-economy are not simply obvious to the agents involved.  
Secondly, Jobert (1989:382) suggests that whoever is successful in their attempts to impose 
their interpretation of the problem will have a major influence in the stages that follow. In 
this regard we can see how framing plays an important prognostic role inasmuch as it 
involves the articulation of a solution to the problem so-defined, along with a strategy for 
carrying out that plan. As a result, the prognostic function of framing involves the critical 
question of what is to be done which is its self heavily influenced and/or constrained by the 
range of possible solutions and strategies to the problem so-defined. 
The preceding discussion notwithstanding, there may at any moment in time be a number 
of ways of framing a particular event or issue. This begs the question of how we gauge the 
success, or otherwise, of a particular frame. In answering this question, Chong and 
231 
 
Druckman (2007:109) have observed that 'there is disagreement about the best measure to 
use to gauge the magnitude of framing effects', but nevertheless suggest that 'one 
standard is the variance in preferences produced by alternative frames on an issue'. Should 
we accept this as a suitable metric, then we can see quite clearly that the IMF was indeed 
successful in framing the third phase of the downturn in such a manner as to construct 
continuity in economic ideas. 
This therefore pushes us to question how the IMF was able to so successfully contribute 
towards the reduction in the variance of frames, and are there lessons to be learned 
regarding how actors might successfully frame an event or object. It is here that we find the 
role of persuasion as being crucial in the process of helping to convince others of the 
benefits of particular courses of action.  
In doing so, this research has shown how the IMF sought to provide cognitive justification 
for assigning meaning to events, in this particular instance, the need for fiscal adjustment 
which was premised on technical research which demonstrated the negative consequences 
associated with excessive sovereign debt burdens. Doing so was an important means by 
which to validate claims with seemingly apolitical support. Moreover, and equally as 
important, this was supplemented with normative justification for adjustment. Indeed, it 
was here that the IMF suggested that many states had lived beyond their means in the 
period immediately preceding the downturn, and that fiscal retrenchment was a necessary 
penance to be paid for such profligacy.  
Together, this cognitive and normative justification combined to provide a simple yet 
compelling frame of the third phase of the downturn, and was a critical process by which 
the IMF sought to convey the efficacy, indeed necessity, of continuing adherence to the 
neoliberal economic philosophy, problem definitions and policy priorities. Doing so served 
an important means by which the IMF sought to ensure that the bubbles and frames 
through which economic problems were interpreted and responded to prior to the 
downturn did not go away despite its severity.  
Just as the empirical question raised the potential for further avenues of enquiry, so can 
the same principle be applied to our second, theoretical question which has potential 
benefits and applicability that extends beyond the scope of this research.  
First and foremost, a case has been made for a broader application of constructivist IPE as 
an approach to the international political economy that exceeds a concern with questions 
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of change in the context of crisis, and instead, opens up the potential for a more dynamic 
understanding of the methods by which actors attempt to affect continuity.  
Secondly, these methods, and the theoretical concepts explored here have applicability to 
a much broader range of empirical contexts than that discussed here. Indeed, when talking 
of constructing continuity in economic ideas despite their evident falsification, the UK 
perhaps offers the most strikingly obvious example.    
The current downturn has had an enormous impact on the UK given both its 
disproportionately large financial sector vis-a-vis its competitors, along with its enormous 
housing bubble that preceded it. Nevertheless, the banking and financial sectors of the UK 
have not only escaped the downturn largely unscathed, but have if anything emerged, 
despite calls for a fundamental rebalancing of the economy, to once again being advocated 
as a key driver of economic growth. Moreover, despite enormous state financed bank bail-
outs and other means of economic stimulus, the need for austerity and living within the 
country’s means has emerged, although not entirely uncontested, as the dominant 
narrative, evidenced by successive Conservative Party election victories.    
This raises a number of important questions. On the one hand, what role did existing 
schemas play in defining the unfolding downturn, and in what way, if at all, were historical 
analogies drawn upon to reduce the increasing uncertainty? On the other hand how has 
the downturn, despite its origins being specific to the banking and financial sectors, come 
to be framed, and therefore diagnosed, as a crisis of the profligate state requiring, 
according to the accompanying prognosis, an extended period of austerity? And crucially, 
what were the cognitive and normative arguments made that ultimately created such a 
successful frame? 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
233 
 
Bibliography 
Abdelal, R., (2010) ‘Constructivism as an approach to international political economy’, in M. 
Blyth, 'Handbook of International Political Economy', Routledge, London 
Abdelal, R., et al (2010) 'Introduction: Constructing the international economy', in R. 
Abdelal et al (eds) 'Constructing the international political economy', Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca 
Adler, E., (1997) ‘Seizing the middle ground: Constructivism in world politics’, European 
Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 3 
Adler, E., and Bernstein, S., (2005) 'Knowledge in power: The epistemic construction of 
global governance', in E. Adler and S. Bernstein (eds) 'Power in Global Governance', 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge  
Adler, E., and Haas, P., (1992) 'Conclusion: Epistemic communities, world order, and the 
creation of a reflective research programme', International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1  
Admati, A., (2013) ‘Five years of financial non-reform’, available at www.project-
syndicate.org, accessed 27th May 2014 
Admati, A., et al (2013) ‘Fallacies, irrelevant facts, and myths in the discussion of capital 
regulation: Why bank equity is not socially expensive’, available at www.project-
syndicate.org, accessed 27th May 2014 
Admati, A., and Hellwig, M., (2012) ‘The bankers’ new clothes: What’s wrong with banking 
and what to do about it’, Princeton University Press, Princeton 
Al-Darwish et al., A., (2011) ‘Possible unintended consequences of Basel III and Solvency II’, 
Working Paper WP11/187, available at www.imf.org, accessed 28th may 2013 
Amin, A., &Palan, R., (2001) ‘Towards a non-rationalist international political economy’, 
Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 8, No. 4 
Arregui, N., (2013) ‘Evaluating the net benefits of macro-prudential policy: A cookbook’, 
Working Paper, WP/13/167, available at www.imf.org, accessed 27th July 2013 
Aspinwall, M., & Schneider, G., (2000) 'Same menu, separate tables: The institutionalist 
turn in political science and the study of European integration', European Journal of 
Political Research, Vol. 38, No. 1 
234 
 
Axelrod, R., (1980) ‘Effective Choice in the Prisoners Dilemma’, The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol.24, No.1  
Axelrod, R., &Keohane, R.O., (1985) ‘Achieving cooperation under anarchy: Strategies and 
institutions’, World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 
Babb, S., (2007) 'Embeddedness, inflation, and international regimes: The IMF in the early 
post-war period', American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 113, No. 1 
- Babb, S., (2012) 'The Washington consensus as transnational policy paradigm: It's origins, 
trajectory and likely successor', Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 20, No. 2 
Baker, A., (2008) 'The Group of Seven', New Political Economy, Vol. 13, No. 1 
- Baker, A., (2013) ‘The new political economy of the macro-prudential ideational shift’, 
New Political Economy, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp122-139 
- Baker, A., (2015) 'Varieties of economic crisis, varieties of ideational change: How and why 
financial regulation and macro-economic policy differ', New Political Economy, Vol. 26, No. 
3  
Balaam, D., and Veseth, M., (2001) ‘Introduction to international political economy’, 
Prentice Hall, New Jersey 
Baldacci, E., and Gupta, S., (2009) ‘Fiscal expansions: What works’, Finance and 
Development, Vol. 46, No. 4 
Baldacci, E., et al (2009) ‘How effective is fiscal policy response in systemic banking crises?’, 
IMF Working Paper WP/09/160, available at www.imf.org, accessed 3rd August 2013 
Baldacci, E., et al (2009) ‘Assessing fiscal stress’, IMF Working Paper WP/11/100, available 
at www.imf.org, accessed 3rd August 2013 
Baldacci, E., et al (2010) ‘Restoring debt sustainability after crises: Implications for the fiscal 
mix’, IMF Working Paper WP/10/232, available at www.imf.org, accessed 3rd August 2013 
Baldwin, D., (eds) (1993) ‘Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The contemporary debate’, 
Columbia University Press, Columbia 
235 
 
Ban, C., (2013) ‘Give me a paradigm shift but not yet: Adaptive change on fiscal policy at 
the IMF’, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm7.abstract, accessed 6th 
March 2014 
-Ban, C., (2014) 'Austerity versus stimulus? Understanding fiscal policy change at the 
International Monetary Fund since the Great Recession', available at 
http://www.bu.edu/pardeeschool/files/2015/01/Austerity-vs.-Stimulus-Working-
Paper.pdf, accessed 9th September 2014  
Ban, C., & Gallagher, K., (2015) 'Recalibrating policy orthodoxy: The IMF since the Great 
Recession', Governance: An international journal of policy, administration, and institutions, 
Vol. 28, No. 2 
Barnett, M., and Duvall, R., (2005) ‘Power in global governance’, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge  
Barnett, M., &Finnemore, M., (2004) 'Rules for the world: International organizations in 
global politics', Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
BCBS (2014) 'A brief history of the Basel committee', available at 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf, accessed 23rd July 2015  
Beland, D., and Cox, R., (eds) (2010) 'Ideas and politics in social science research', Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 
Bello, W., (1998) ‘IMF’s role in the Asian Financial Crisis’, available at 
www.ifg.org/imf_asia.html, accessed 1st March 2013 
Benford, R., (1997) 'An insider's critique of the social movement framing perspective', 
Sociology Inquiry, Vol. 67, No. 4 
Benford, R., and Snow, D., (2000) 'Framing processes and social movements: An overview 
and assessment', Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 26 
Berry, C., (2007) ‘Rediscovering Robert Cox: Agency and the Ideational In Critical IPE’, 
Political Perspectives, Vol. 1 
Best, J., (2003) 'From the top-down: The new financial architecture and the re-embedding 
of global finance', New Political Economy, Vol. 8, No. 3 
236 
 
- Best. J., (2004) ‘Hollowing out Keynesian norms: How the search for a technical fix 
undermined the Bretton Woods regime’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 
- Best, J., (2010) 'The limits of financial risk management: or what we didn't learn from the 
Asian crisis', New Political Economy, Vol. 15, No. 1 
- Best, J., (2010a) 'Bringing power back in: The IMF's constructivist strategy in critical 
perspective', in R. Abdelal et al (eds), 'Constructing the international economy', Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca 
Bevir, M., (1999) ‘The logic of the history of ideas’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
Bevir, M., and Rhodes, R., (2002) ‘Interpretive theory’, in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds) 
‘Theory and methods in political science’, Palgrave MacMillan, London 
Bevir, M., and Trentmann, F., (2003) ‘Markets in historical context’, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge  
Bieler, A., and Morton, D., (2001) ‘The deficits of discourse in IPE: turning base metal into 
gold?’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp103-128 
Bieler, A., & Morton, D., (2004) ‘A critical theory route to hegemony, world order and 
historical change: neo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations, Capital and Class, 
Vol. 18, No. 4 
Bird, G., (1999) 'Crisis averter, crisis lender, crisis manager: The IMF in search of a systemic 
role', The World Economy, Vol. 22, No. 7 
- Bird, G., (2007) ‘The IMF: A bird’s eye view of its role and operations’, Journal of Economic 
Surveys, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp 683-745 
Blanchard, O., (2008) ‘Cracks in the system: repairing the damaged global economy’, 
Finance and Development, December, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp 8-10 
-Blanchrd, O., (2009) ‘The crisis: basic mechanisms and appropriate policies’, IMF Working 
Paper 09/80 
Blanchard, O., and Cottarelli, C., (2010) ‘Ten commandments for fiscal adjustment in 
advanced economies’, iMFdirect blog, available at http://blog-
imfdirect.imf.org/bloggers/olivier-blanchard/, accessed 30th October 2013 
237 
 
Blanchard, O., and Leigh, D., (2013) ‘Growth forecast errors and fiscal multipliers’, IMF 
Working Paper WP/13/1, available at www.imf.org, accessed 1st October 2013 
Blanchard , O., et al (2010) 'Rethinking macro-economic policy', IMF Staff Position Note, 
SPN/10/03, available at www.imf.org, accessed 1st September 2011  
Blanchard, O., et al (2013) ‘Rethinking macro policy II: Getting granular’, IMF Staff 
Discussion Note, SDN/13/03, available at www.imf.org, accessed 1st October 2013   
Bloomberg (2012) ‘Rules for bank capital still broken after four years’, available at 
www.project-syndicate.org/comments, accessed 27th May 2014 
Blundell-Wignall, A., and Atkinson, P., (2010) ‘Thinking beyond Basel III: necessary solutions 
for capital and liquidity’, OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, Volume 2010, Issue 1 
Blyth, M., (1997) ‘”Any more bright ideas?” The ideational turn of comparative political 
economy’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 1 
-Blyth, M., (2001) 'The transformation of the Swedish model: Economic ideas, distributional 
conflict, and institutional change', World Politics, Vol. 54 
-Blyth, M., (2002) 'Great transformations: Economic ideas and institutional change in the 
twentieth century', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
-Blyth, M., (2002a) 'The political power of financial ideas: Transparency, risk, and 
distribution in global finance', in J. Kirshner (eds) 'Monetary orders: The political 
foundations of twenty-first century money', Cornell University Press, Ithaca  
-Blyth, M., (2003) ‘Structures do not come with an instruction sheet: Interests, ideas and 
progress in Political Science’, available at http://www.markblyth.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/Blythperspectives.pdf, accessed 21st April 2013 
-Blyth, M., (2007) 'Powering, puzzling, or persuading? The mechanisms of building 
institutional orders', International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 51 
-Blyth, M., (2009) ‘Routledge handbook of International Political Economy: IPE as a global 
conversation’, Routledge, Oxon 
-Blyth, M., (2012) 'Paradigms and paradox: The politics of economic ideas in two moments 
of crisis', Governance: An international journal of policy, administration, and institutions, 
Vol. 26, No. 2 
238 
 
- Blyth, M., (2013) 'Austerity: The history of a dangerous idea', Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 
-Blyth, M., (2013a) ‘The austerity delusion’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 3 
Borg, A., and Lagarde, C., (2012) ‘How to get the balance right: Fiscal policy at a time of 
crisis’, http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2012/05/06, accessed 2nd May 2013 
Boughton, J., (2000) 'The IMF and the Silent Revolution: Global Finance and Development 
in the 1980s', available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/history/2001/, accessed 
21st January 2013 
- Boughton, J., (2012) 'Tearing Down Walls: The International Monetary Fund 1990-1999', 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/history/2012/, accessed 21st January 
2013 
Brandwein, P., (2006) ‘Studying the careers of knowledge claims’, in Yanow, D., and 
Schwartz-Shea, P., (eds) ‘Interpretation and method: Empirical research methods and the 
interpretive turn’, ME Sharpe, London  
Brassett, J., et al (2010) 'The political economy of the sub-prime crisis: The economics, 
politics and ethics of response', New Political Economy, Vol. 15, No. 1 
Broome, A., (2010) ‘The International Monetary Fund, crisis management and the credit 
crunch’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp 37-54 
Broome, A., and Seabrooke, L., (2012) 'Seeing like an international organization', New 
Political Economy, Vol. 17, No. 1 
Broome, A., et al, (2012) ‘Global governance and the politics of crisis’, Global Society, Vol. 
46, No. 1 
Brown, C., (2005) ‘Understanding International Relations’, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 
Buira, A., (2003) 'An analysis of IMF conditionality', available at http://g24.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/Session-1_63.pdf, accessed 13th February 2013 
Burnham, P., (1991) ‘Neo-Gramscian Hegemony’, Capital and Class, Vol. 45   
239 
 
Cameron, D., speech delivered at the Bloomberg Offices, London, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2008/oct/17/davidcameron-economy, accessed 24th 
March 2016 
Cammack, P., (2002) ‘The Mother of all Governments: The World Bank’s Matrix for Global 
Governance’, in D. Held and A McGrew, (eds.), Governing Globalization: Power, Authority, 
and Global Governance, Polity Press, Cambridge 
Campbell, J., (1998) 'Institutional analysis and the role of ideas in political economy', Theory 
and Society, Vol. 27 
Carmassi, J., et al (2009) 'The global financial crisis: Causes and cures', Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 47, No. 5 
Caruana, J., (2007) ‘Remarks at Institute of International Bankers’ seminar on Basel II’, 
available at www.imf.org, accessed 30th May 2014 
-Caruana, J., (2007a) 'Global financial market risk - Who is responsible for what?', available 
at www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2007/053007.htm, accessed 19th May 2012 
- Caruana, J., (2008) 'Dealing with downturn - Lessons and opportunities', available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2008/060508.htm, accessed 19th may 2012 
-Caruana, J., (2010) ‘Basel III: towards a safer financial system’, available at www.bis.org, 
accessed 30th May 2014 
Carvajal, A., et al (2009) 'The perimeter of financial regulation', IMF Staff Position Note 
SPN/09/07, available at www.imf.org, accessed 1st May 2013 
Cecchetti, S., et al (2011) ‘The real effects of debt’, available at 
www.bis.org/publ/work352.htm, accessed 5th February 2014 
Chong, D., & Druckman, J., (2007) 'Framing theory', Annual Review of Political Science', Vol. 
10 
Chwieroth, J., (2010) ‘How do crises lead to change? Liberalizing capital controls in the early 
years of new order Indonesia’, World Politics, Vol. 62, No. 3 
Cihak and Tieman (2008) ‘Quality of financial sector regulation and supervision around the 
world’, Working Paper 08/190, available at www.imf.org, accessed 28th April 2013 
240 
 
Claessens, S., and Kodres, L., (2014) 'The regulatory responses to the global financial crisis: 
Some uncomfortable questions', IMF Working Paper, WP/14/46 
Claessens, S., et al (2010) ‘Lessons and policy implications from the global financial crisis’, 
IMF Working Paper, WP/10/44, available at www.imf.org, accessed 23rd March 2013 
Cohen, B., (2007) 'The transatlantic divide: Why are American and British IPE so 
different?',Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 14, No. 2 
- Cohen, B., (2009) ‘The multiple traditions of American IPE’, in Mark Blyth (ed) ‘Routledge 
handbook of International Political Economy: IPE as a global conversation’, Routledge, Oxon 
Cosimano, T., and Hakura, D., (2011) ‘Bank behaviour in response to Basel III: A cross-
country analysis’, IMF Working Paper, WP/11/119, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd 
June 2013 
Cottarelli, C., (2009) ‘Post-crisis: What should be the goal of a fiscal exit strategy?’, 
iMFdirect – The IMF blog, available at http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2009/11/16, accessed 
30th October 2013 
- Cottarelli, C., (2009a) 'Fiscal rules - anchoring expectations for sustainable public finances', 
available at www.imf.org, accessed 1st May 2013 
-Cottarelli, C., (2012) ‘Fiscal policy in advanced economies: fiscal adjustment, efficiency and 
growth’, available at www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2012/031312.htm, accessed 1st 
December 2013 
-Cottarelli, C., (2012a) ‘Beyond the austerity debate: the deficit bias in the post-Bretton 
Woods era’, available at http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2012/05/21/, accessed 30th October 
2013 
-Cottarelli, C., (2012b) ‘The austerity debate: festinalente!’, available at 
www.voxeu.org/article/, accessed 30th October 2013 
-Cottarelli, C., (2013) ‘Panel on “stimulus or stymied? The macro-economics of recessions’, 
available at www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/, accessed 1st December 2013 
-Cottarelli, C., (2013a) ‘Mountains of debt: the cliffs, slopes and uncharted territories of 
today’s public finances in advanced economies’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/, accessed 1st December 2013 
241 
 
-Cottarelli, C., (2013b) ‘From here to eternity: The outlook for fiscal adjustment in advanced 
economies’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 8th December 2013  
Cottarelli, C., and Jaramillo, L., (2012) ‘Walking hand in hand: Fiscal policy and growth in 
advanced economies’, IMF Working Paper WP/12/137, available at www.imf.org, accessed 
1st August 2013 
Cox, R., (1981) ‘Social forces, states and world orders: beyond International Relations 
theory’, Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 
-Cox, R., (1987) ‘Production, Power, and World Order’, Columbia University Press, New York 
-Cox, R., (1992) ‘Towards a post-hegemonic conceptualisation of world order: reflections on 
the relevancy of Ibn Khaldun’, in Cox, R., & Sinclair, T., ‘Approaches to world order’, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
- Cox, R., (2009) 'The 'British School' in the global context', New Political Economy, Vol. 14, 
No. 3 
Cox, R., and Bleland, D., (2013) ‘Valence, policy ideas, and the rise of sustainability’, 
Governance, Vol. 26, No. 2 
Crotty, J., (2008) ‘Structural causes of the global financial crisis: A critical assessment of the 
‘New Financial Architecture’, available at 
http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=econ_workingp
aper, accessed 21st April 2013 
Crowe, C., (2006) ‘Goal-independent central banks: Why politicians decide to delegate’, 
IMF Working Paper WP/06/256, available at www.imf.org, accessed 16th February 2014 
Crowe, C., and Meade, E., (2008) ‘Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution 
and effectiveness’, IMF Working Paper, WP/08/119, available at www.imf.org, accessed 
16th February 2014 
Cukierman, A., (2013) 'Monetary policy and institutions before, during, and after the global 
financial crisis', available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2013.02.002, accessed 10th 
February 2015 
242 
 
Dagher, J., and Fu, N., (2011) ‘What fuels the boom drives the bust: regulation and the 
mortgage crisis’, IMF Working Paper, WP/11/215, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd 
June 2013 
Daniel, J., et al (2006) ‘Fiscal adjustment for stability and growth’, IMF Pamphlet Series, No. 
55 
De Goede, M., (2003) 'Beyond economism in international political economy', Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 29 
- De Goede, M., (2006) 'Introduction: International political economy and the promises of 
post-structuralism', in M. De Goede (eds) 'International Political Economy and Post-
structural Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 
Demirguc-Kunt, A., et al (2010) ‘Bank capital: Lessons from the financial crisis’, IMF Working 
Paper WP/10/286, available at www.imf.org, accessed 30th May 2013 
De Nicolo, G., et al (2012) ‘Capital regulation, liquidity requirements and taxation in a 
dynamic model of banking’, IMF Working Paper WP/12/72, available at www.imf.org, 
accessed 30th May 2013 
De Nicolo, G., et al (2012a) ‘Externalities and macro-prudential policy’, Staff Discussion 
Note, SDN/12/05, available at www.imf.org, accessed 27th July 2013 
Dickens, A., (2006) ‘The evolution of international political economy’, International Affairs, 
Vol. 82, No. 3  
Dodd, R., & Mills, P., (2008) ‘Outbreak’, Finance & Development, Vol. 45, No. 2,  
Drezner, D., (2014)'The system worked: How the world stopped another Great Depression', 
Oxford University Press, Oxford  
Eagleton, T., (1991) ‘Ideology: An introduction’, Verso, London 
Ebeke, C., and Olcer, D., (2013) ‘Fiscal policy over the election cycle in low-income 
countries’, IMF Working Paper WP/13/153, available at www.imf.org, accessed 16th 
February 2014 
Economist (2014) ‘Why China is creating a new “World Bank” for Asia’, available at 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/11/economist-explains-6, 
accessed 15th September 2015 
243 
 
Elliott, D., et al (2012) ‘Assessing the costs of financial regulation’, IMF Working Paper 
WP/12/233, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd June 2013 
Epstein, C., (2008) 'The power of words in International Relations: Birth of an anti-whaling 
discourse', MIT Press, Massachusetts  
Espinosa-Vega, M., (2010) ‘Systemic risk and the redesign of financial regulation’, in ‘Global 
Financial Stability Report’, April 2010 
FAD (2009) ‘Fiscal rules – anchoring expectations for sustainable public finances’, available 
at www.imf.org, accessed 12th August 2013 
-FAD (2009a) ‘Fiscal implications of the global economic and financial crisis’, IMF Staff 
Position Note SPN/09/13, available at www.imf.org, accessed 13th August 2013 
-FAD (2010) ‘Strategies for fiscal consolidation in the post-crisis world’, available at 
www.imf.org, accessed 7th February 2014 
-FAD (2011) ‘Modernising the framework for fiscal policy and public debt sustainability 
analysis’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 12th August 2013 
-FAD (2012) ‘Fiscal transparency, accountability, and risk’, available at www.imf.org, 
accessed 12th August 2013 
Farrell, H., and Finnemore, M., (2009) 'Ontology, methodology and causation in the 
American school of international political economy', Review of International Political 
Economy', Vol. 16, No. 1 
Figerado, R., (2004) ‘The IMF at 60- Evolving challenges, evolving role’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2004/061404.htm, accessed 1st march 2013 
Fine, B., and Milonakis, D., (2009) ‘From economics imperialism to freakonomics’, 
Routledge, Oxon. 
Finlayson, A., et al (2004) ‘The interpretive approach in political science: A symposium’, 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 2 
Finnemore, M., &Sikkink, K., (1998) ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, 
International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, 887-917 
244 
 
Fiscal Monitor (2009) ‘The state of public finances: A cross-country fiscal monitor’, IMF 
Staff Position Note, SPN/09/21, available at www.imf.org, accessed 1st August 2013 
-Fiscal Monitor (2009a) ‘The state of public finances cross-country fiscal monitor: 
November 2009’, IMF Staff Position Note, SPN/09/25, available at www.imf.org, accessed 
1st August 2013 
-Fiscal Monitor (2010) ‘Navigating the fiscal challenges ahead’, Fiscal Monitor, May 2010, 
available at www.imf.org, accessed 21st December 2013 
-Fiscal Monitor (2010a) ‘’, Fiscal Monitor, May 2010, available at www.imf.org, accessed 
21st December 2013 
-Fiscal Monitor (2011) ‘Shifting gears: tackling challenges on the road to fiscal adjustment’, 
available at www.imf.org, accessed 7th January 2014 
-Fiscal Monitor (2011a) ‘Addressing fiscal challenges to reduce economic risks’, available at 
www.imf.org, accessed 7th February 2014 
-Fiscal Monitor (2012) ‘Balancing fiscal policy risks’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 7th 
February 2014  
-Fiscal Monitor (2012a) ‘Taking stock: A progress report on fiscal adjustment’, available at 
www.imf.org, accessed 7th February 2014 
-Fiscal Monitor (2013) ‘Fiscal adjustment in an uncertain world’, available at www.imf.org, 
accessed 7th February 2014 
-Fiscal Monitor (2013a) ‘Taxing times’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 7th February 
2014 
-Fiscal Monitor (2014) 'Public expenditure reform: Making difficult choices', available at 
www.imf.org, accessed February 1st 2015 
'Fischer, S., (1998) ‘The IMF and the Asian Crisis’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/032098.HTM accessed 19/02/2013 
- Fischer, S., (1998a) 'The Asian crisis: A view from the IMF', Journal of International 
Financial Management and Accounting, Vol. 9, No. 2 
Foucault, M., (1969) 'The archaeology of knowledge', Routledge, London 
245 
 
Freedman, C., (2009) ‘Fiscal stimulus to the rescue? Short-run benefits and potential long-
run costs of fiscal deficits’, IMF Working Paper WP/09/255, available at www.imf.org, 
accessed 3rd August 2013 
Freedman, C., et al, (2010) 'The case for global fiscal stimulus', IMF Staff Position Note 
SPN/09/03, available at www.imf.org, accessed 1st  May 2013 
Friedman, H., and Friedman, L., (2008) ‘The global financial crisis of 2008: What went 
wrong?’, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1356193, accessed 8th August 2012 
Freedman, C., and Laxton, D., (2009) ‘Why inflation targeting?’, IMF Working Paper, 
WP/09/86, available at www.imf.org, accessed 1st February 2015 
Freedman, C., et al (2009) ‘The case for global fiscal stimulus’, IMF Staff Position Note, 
SPN/09/03, available at www.imf.org, accessed 1st May February 2013 
FSAP Handbook (2005) ‘Financial Sector Assessment Programme: A handbook’, available at 
www.imf.org, accessed 3rd July, 2012 
FSB (2014) ‘To G20 finance ministers and central bank governors: Financial reforms – 
progress and challenges’, available at 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2014/FSB_Chair_letter_to_G20_Mins_and_Govs_17-Feb-
2014.pdf, accessed 1st July 2014 
FSF (2008) 'Report of the Financial Stability Forum on enhancing market and institutional 
resilience', available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_0804.pdf?page_moved=1, accessed 1st May 2013 
Gamble, A., (1995) ‘The New Political Economy’, Political Studies, XLIII 
- Gamble, A., (2009) 'British politics and the financial crisis', British Politics, Vol. 4, No. 4 
- Gamble, A., (2014) 'Crisis without end?': The unravelling of western prosperity', Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke 
Gill, S., & Law, D., (1988) ‘The global political economy: Perspectives, problems, and 
policies’, harvester Wheatsheaf, Trowbridge 
Gilpin, R., (1987) ‘The Political Economy of International Relations’, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton 
246 
 
- Gilpin, R., (2005) ‘A realist perspective on International Governance’, in Held, D., and 
McGrew, A., ‘Governing Globalisation’,  
GFSR (2005) ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd April 
2013 
-GFSR (2005a) ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd 
April 2013 
-GFSR (2006) ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd April 
2013 
-GFSR (2006a) ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd 
April 2013 
-GFSR (2007) ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd April 
2013 
-GFSR (2007a) ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd 
April 2013 
-GFSR (2008) ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd April 
2013 
-GFSR (2008a) ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd 
April 2013 
-GFSR (2009) ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd April 
2013 
-GFSR (2009a) ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd 
April 2013 
-GFSR (2010) ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd April 
2013 
-GFSR (2010a) ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd 
April 2013 
-GFSR (2011) ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd April 
2013 
247 
 
-GFSR (2011a) ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd 
April 2013 
-GFSR (2012) ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd April 
2013 
-GFSR (2012a) ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd 
April 2013 
-GFSR (2013) ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd June 
2013 
-GFSR (2013a) ‘Global Financial Stability Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 22nd 
November 2013 
Glynos, J., & Howarth, D., (2008) ‘Structure, Agency, and Power in Political Analysis: Beyond 
Contextualised Self-Interpretations, Political Studies Review, Vol. 6, No. 2 
Goddard, C.R., et al (2003) ‘International Political Economy: State – market relations in a 
changing global order’, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 
Gofas,. A., and Hay, C., (eds) (2012) 'The role of ideas in political analysis: A portrait of 
contemporary debates', Routledge, London 
Goldstein, J., and Keohane, R., (1993) ‘Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions, and 
political change’, Cornell University Press, Cornell 
Goodin, R. And Tilly, C., (2006) ‘The Oxford Handbook of Contextual, Political Analysis’ 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Gorges, M., (2001) 'New institutionalist explanations for institutional change: A note of 
caution', Politics, Vol. 21, No. 2 
Grabel, I., (2011) 'Not your grandfather's IMF: Global crisis, 'productive incoherence' and 
developmental policy space', Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 35 
Greenspan, A., (2009) 'The age of turbulence', Penguin, London 
Guba, E., and Lincoln, Y., (1994) 'Competing paradigms in qualitative research', in N. Denzin 
and Y. Lincoln (eds) 'Handbook of qualitative research', Sage, Thousand Oaks  
248 
 
Guven, A., (2012) ‘The IMF, the World Bank, and the global economic crisis: Exploring 
paradigm continuity’, Development and Change, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp869-898  
Guzzini, S., (1998) ‘Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy’, 
Routledge, London 
G20 (1999) ‘Communique’, available at www.g20.com, accessed 1st July 2014 
-G20 (2008) ‘Communique’, available at www.g20.com, accessed 1st July 2014 
-G20 (2008a) ‘Declaration: Summit on financial markets and the world economy’, available 
at www.g20.com, accessed 1st July 2014 
-G20 (2009) ‘London Summit – Leaders’ Statement’, available at www.g20.com, accessed 
1st July 2014 
-G20 (2009a) ‘Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit’, available at www.g20.com, 
accessed 1st July 2014 
-G20 (2010) ‘The G20 Toronto Summit Declaration’, available at www.g20.com, accessed 1st 
July 2014  
-G20 (2010a) ‘The Seoul Summit Document’, available at www.g20.com, accessed 1st July 
2014  
-G20 (2011) ‘Cannes Summit Final Declaration’, available at www.g20.com, accessed 1st July 
2014 
-G20 (2011a) ‘Communique’, available at www.g20.com, accessed 1st July 2014   
-G20 (2013) ‘Communique’, available at www.g20.com, accessed 1st July 2014   
-G20 (2013a) ‘G20 5th anniversary vision statement’’, available at www.g20.com, accessed 
1st July 2014   
-G20 (2014) 'Communique', available at www.g20.com, accessed 1st July 2014 
Haas, P., (1992) ‘Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy 
coordination’, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 
Hall, P., (1989) ‘The political power of economic ideas: Keynesianism across nations’, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton 
249 
 
-Hall, P., (1993) ‘Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: The case of economic 
policymaking in Britain’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3 
-Hall, P., (2013) ‘Commentary: Brother; can you paradigm?’, Governance, Vol. 26, No. 2 
Hall, P., and Taylor, C., (1996) ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, 
Political Studies, Vol. 44, No. 4 
Hall, R., (2009) 'Inter-subjective expectations and performativity in global financial 
governance', International Political Sociology, Vol. 3, No. 4 
Harvey, (2005) ‘A brief history of neoliberalism’, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Hasenclever, A., et al (1997) ‘Theories of International regimes’, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 
Hay, C., (1995) ‘Rethinking crisis: Narratives of the New Right and constructions of crisis’, 
Rethinking Marxism, Vol. 8, No. 2 
-Hay, C., (1999) ‘Crisis and the structural transformation of the state: Interrogating the 
process of change’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 3 
-Hay, C., (2002) ‘Political analysis: A critical introduction’, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 
-Hay, C., (2006) ‘Constructivist Institutionalism’, in R. Rhodes et al (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Institutions, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
-Hay, C., (2009) 'Constructivist institutionalism applied: Crises, paradigm shifts, and 
uncertainty', in S. Binder et al, 'The Oxford handbook of political institutions', Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 
-Hay, C., (2010) 'Chronicles of a death foretold: the winter of discontent and construction 
of the crisis of British Keynesianism', Parliamentary Affairs 
-Hay, C., (2011) 'Pathology without crisis? The strange demise of the Anglo-Liberal growth 
model', Government and Opposition, Vol. 46, No. 1 
-Hay, C., (2013) 'The British growth crisis', SPERI Paper No. 1, available at 
http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/SPERI-Paper-No.-1-
%E2%80%93-The-British-Growth-Crisis-FINAL1.pdf, accessed 9th July 2014 
250 
 
-Hay, C., (2013a) 'Treating the symptom not the condition: Crisis definition, deficit 
reduction and the search for a new British growth model, British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, Vol. 15 
Hayek, F., (1944) ‘The Road to Serfdom’, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, London 
-Hayek, F., (1960) ‘The constitution of Liberty’, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 
Held, D., and McGrew, A., (eds) (2002) ‘Governing globalization: Power, Authority, and 
Global Governance’, Polity 
Helleiner, E., (2014) ‘The status quo crisis’, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Helleiner, E., and Pagliari, S., (2009) 'Crisis and the reform of international financial 
regulation', in E. Helleiner et al (eds) 'Global finance in crisis: The politics of international 
regulatory change', Routledge, London 
Hentz, J., (2003) 'The power of ideas: Across the constructivist/realist divide', in R. Jolly et al 
'Global institutions and development: Framing the world', Routledge, Abingdon 
Herndon, T., et al, (2013) ‘Does high public debt consistently stifle economic growth?: A 
critique of Reinhart and Rogoff’, Working Paper Series, Number 332, available at 
www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_301-
350/WP322.pdf, accessed 19th March 2013  
Hewson, M., & Sinclair, T. J., (1999) ‘The Emergence of Global Governance Theory’ in T.J. 
Sinclair, ‘Global Governance: Critical Concepts in Political Science’, Routledge, London 
- Hewson, M., and Sinclair, T., (1999a) ‘Approaches to Global Governance Theory’, State 
University of New York Press, Albany 
Hollis, M., & Smith, S., (1991) Explaining and Understanding International Relations, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford  
Ilzetzki, E., et al (2011) ‘How big (small?) are fiscal multipliers?’, IMF Working Paper 
WP/11/52, available at www.imf.org, accessed 20th July 2013 
IMF (1971) ‘Annual Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 23rd April 2014 
-IMF (1972) ‘Annual Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 23rd April 2014 
-IMF (1973) ‘Annual Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 23rd April 2014 
251 
 
-IMF (1974) ‘Annual Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 23rd April 2014 
-IMF (1975) ‘Annual Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 23rd April 2014 
-IMF (1976) ‘Annual Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 23rd April 2014 
-IMF (1977) ‘Annual Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 23rd April 2014 
-IMF (1978) ‘Annual Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 23rd April 2014 
-IMF (1979) ‘Annual Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 23rd April 2014 
-IMF (1980) ‘Annual Report’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 23rd April 2014 
- IMF (2007) ‘Globalization, Financial Markets, and Fiscal Policy’, available at www.imf.org, 
accessed 20th April 2013 
-IMF (2008) ‘The Fund’s response to the 2007-08 financial crisis – Stocktaking collaboration 
with the Financial Stability Forum’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 28th April 2013 
-IMF (2008a) ‘Structural reforms and economic performance in advanced and developing 
countries’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 5th December 2013 
-IMF (2008b) ‘The recent financial turmoil – Initial assessment, policy lessons, and 
implications for Fund surveillance’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 1st March 2012 
- IMF (2008c) ‘IMF Executive Board discusses the Fund’s response to the 2007-08 financial 
crisis and collaboration with the Financial Stability Forum’, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2008/pn08132.htm, accessed 26th September 
2015 
-IMF (2010) ‘IMF executive board approves major overhaul of quotas and governance’, 
available at www.imf.org, accessed 9th November 2010 
-IMF (2013) ‘Standards and codes: The role of the IMF’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts, accessed 27th July 2013 
-IMF (2013a) ‘Global impact and challenges of unconventional monetary policies’, IMF 
Policy Paper, available at www.imf.org, accessed 1st November 2013 
-IMF (2013b) ‘Re-assessing the role and modalities of fiscal policy in advanced economies’, 
IMF Policy Paper, available at www.imf.org, accessed 1st November 2013  
252 
 
-IMF (2013c) ‘Transcript of a conference call on the release of the IMF paper on ‘The role 
and modalities of fiscal policy in advanced economies’ with a senior IMF official’, available 
at www.imf.org, accessed 16th February 2014 
-IMF (2013d) ‘Crisis offers preliminary lessons on fiscal policy’, IMF Survey Magazine: Policy, 
available at www.imf.org, accessed 16th February 2014 
- IMF (2013e) ‘IMF membership in the Financial Stability Board’ available 
athttp://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/022213.pdf, accessed 25th September 
2015 
 - IMF (2015) ‘IMF quotas’, available at www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/quotas.pdf, 
accessed 15th September 2015 
IMF and FSF (2008) ‘Joint IMF/FSF Statement on Strengthening Coordination, November 
13, 2008’, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/2008/eng/pdf/111308.pdf, 
accessed 25th September 2015  
IMF/FSB/BIS (2011) ‘Macro-prudential policy tools and frameworks: Progress report to 
G20’, available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/102711.pdf, accessed 3rd 
August, 2014 
-IMF/FSB/BIS (2011a) ‘Macro-prudential policy tools and frameworks: Update to G20 
finance ministers and central bank governors’ available 
athttps://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/021411.pdf, accessed 3rd August, 2014 
Jabko, N., (2013) ‘The political appeal of austerity’, Comparative European Politics, Vol. 11, 
No. 6 
Jeanne, O., et al (2008) ‘A theory of international crisis lending and IMF conditionality’, IMF 
Working Paper WP/08/236, available at www.imf.org, accessed 1st May 2013 
Jervis, R., (1976) 'Perception and misperception in international politics', Princeton 
University Press, Princeton 
Karunatilleka, E., (1999) ‘The East Asian economic crisis’, Research paper 99/14 
Keen, M., (2011) ‘The taxation and regulation of banks’, IMF Working Paper, WP/11/206, 
available at www.imf.org, accessed 28th May 2013 
253 
 
Keohane, R. O., (1984) ‘After Hegemony Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy’, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 
Keohane, R. O., & Martin (1995) ‘The Promise of Institutionalist Theory’, International 
Security, Vol.20, No.1 
Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S., (2001) ‘Power and Interdependence’, Longman, London  
Kessler, O., (2012) 'Sleeping with the enemy? On Hayek, constructivist thought, and the 
current economic crisis', Review of International Studies, Vol. 38 
Khong, Y., (1992) 'Analogies at war: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam 
decisions of 1965', Princeton University Press, Princeton 
Kiersey, N., (2011) 'Everyday neoliberalism and the subjectivity of crisis: Post-political 
control in an era of financial turmoil', Journal of critical globalization studies', Vol. 4 
Kindleberger, C. P., (1973) ‘The World in Depression 1929-1939’, Penguin Press, London 
Kjaer, A.M., (2004) ‘Governance’, Polity, London 
Knight, F., (1958) ‘Risk, uncertainty and profit’, Riverside Press, Cambridge 
Kodres, L., (2008) ‘A crisis of confidence... and a whole lot more’, Finance and 
Development, Vol. 45, No., 2 
Kodres, L., and Claessens, S., (2014) ‘The regulatory response to the global financial crisis: 
Some uncomfortable questions’, IMF Working Paper WP/14/46, available at www.imf.org, 
accessed 5th July 2014  
Kodres, L., &Narain, A., (2009) ‘What is to be done?’, Finance and Development, Vol. 46, 
No. 1 
-Kodres, L., &Narain, A., (2010) ‘Redesigning the contours of the future financial system’, 
Staff Position Note SPN/10/10, available at www.imf.org, accessed 28th May 2013 
-Kodres, L., &Narain, A., (2012) ‘Fixing the system’, Finance and Development, Vol. 49, No. 2 
Koenig-Archibugi, M., (2002) ‘Mapping Global Governance’, in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds) 
‘Governing globalization: Power, Authority, and Global Governance’, Polity 
254 
 
Koremenos, B., et al (2001) 'The rational design of international institutions', International 
Organization, Vol. 55, No. 4 
Kotz, D., (2008) ‘The financial and economic crisis of 2008: A systemic crisis of neoliberal 
capitalism’, Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 41, No. 3 
Krueger, A., (1997) 'Whither the World Bank and the IMF', NBER Working Paper, No. 6327 
- Krueger, A., (1997a) 'Trade policy and economic development: How we learn', available at 
www.law.wisc.edu/gls/documents, accessed 21st April 2013 
- Krueger, A., (2003) 'Market discipline and public policy: The role of the IMF', available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/103103.htm, accessed 19th April 2012 
- Krueger, A., (2004) ‘Crisis resolution: what the Fund is doing’, Speech delivered to the 
central bank of Austria conference, available at www.imf.org, accessed 20th April 2014 
Krueger, A., et al (2003) 'IMF stabilization programmes', available at 
www.nber.org/chapters/c9777.pdf, accessed 23rd April 2013 
Krugman, P., (2009) 'Reagan did it', available at 
www.nytimes.com/2009/06/01/opinion/01krugman.html?, accessed 4th June 2009 
Kumar, M., and Woo, J., (2010) ‘Public debt and growth’, IMF Working Paper WP/10/174, 
available at www.imf.org, accessed 5th December 2013 
Lagarde, C., (2011) ‘Global economic challenges and global solutions: An address at the 
Woodrow Wilson Centre’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2011/091511.htm, accessed 8th December 2013 
-Lagarde, C., (2011a) ‘The path forward – act now and act together’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2011/092311.htm, accessed 8th December 2013 
-Lagarde, C., (2011b) ‘Challenges and opportunities for the world economy and the IMF’, 
available at www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2011/072611.htm, accessed 15th May 
2014 
-Lagarde, C., (2012) ‘Global financial sector reform: An unfinished agenda’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2012/102512.htm, accessed 8th December 2013 
255 
 
-Lagarde, C., (2012a) ‘Seizing the moment – thinking beyond the crisis’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2012/041212.htm, accessed 8th December 2013 
-Lagarde, C., (2012b) ‘Banque de France financial stability review’, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2012/042112.htm, accessed 8th December 2013 
-Lagarde, C., (2012c) ‘Completing the task: Financial sector reform for stability and growth’, 
available at www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2012, accessed 8th December 2013 
Larrain, J., (1994) ‘Ideology and cultural identity: modernity and the third world presence’, 
Polity Press, Cambridge 
Lehmbruch, G., (2001) ‘The institutional embedding of market economies: The German 
“model” and its impact on Japan’, in W. Streeck and K. Yamamura, ‘The origins of non-
liberal capitalism, Germany and Japan in comparison’, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 
Leigh, D., and Stehn, S., (2009) ‘Fiscal and monetary policy during downturns: Evidence 
from the G7’, IMF Working Paper, WP/09/50, available at www.imf.org, accessed 1st May 
2013 
Levin, I., et al (1998) 'All frames are not created equal: A typology and critical analysis of 
framing effects', Organizational behaviour and human decision processes, Vol. 76, No. 2 
Lipsky, J., (2008) ‘The global economy and financial crisis’, Speech at the UCLA Economic 
Forecasting Conference on September 24th, available at 
www.imf.org/exdternal/np/speeches/2008, accessed 10th December 2013 
- Lipsky, J., (2008a) 'Towards a post-crisis world economy', available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2008, accessed 13th February 2011 
-Lipsky, J., (2011) ‘Fiscal policy and structural fiscal challenges’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2011/032011.htm, accessed 5th May 2013 
Little, R., (2001) ‘International Regimes’, in Bayliss, J., & Smith, S., ‘The Globalization of 
WorldPolitics’, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Lombardi, D., (2014) ‘US fails to approve IMF reforms’, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8d4755ee-7d43-11e3-81dd-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3nLZQFPZn, accessed 15th September 2015 
256 
 
Lowndes, V., (2002) ‘Institutionalism’, in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds) Theory and Methods 
in Political Science, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Lukes, S., (2005) 'Power and the battle for hearts and minds', Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies', Vol. 33, No. 3 
Lustig, N., (1995) ‘Coping with austerity: Poverty and inequality in Latin America’, 
R.R.Donndley and Co., Virginia 
Maliniak, D., & Tierney, M., (2009) 'The American school of IPE', Review of International 
Political Economy, Vol. 16, No. 1 
Manasse, P., (2007) ‘Deficit limits and fiscal rules for dummies’, IMF Staff Paper, Vol. 54, 
No. 3 
March, J., and Olsen, J., (1984) ‘The new institutionalism: Organised factors in political life’, 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 78 
- March, J., and Olsen., (2006) ‘Elaborating the ”New Institutionalism”’, in R. Rhodes et al 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, Oxford University Press, Oxford  
Marquand, D., (2011) ‘Towards a realignment of the mind’, available at , accessed 13th 
February 2013 
Marshall, D., (1996) ‘National development and the globalisation discourse: confronting 
‘imperative’ and ‘convergence’ notions’, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 5 
McAnulla, S., (2005) ‘Making Hay with actualism? The need for a Realist concept of 
structure’, Politics, Vol. 25, No. 1  
McKinley, T., (2010) ‘Has the IMF abandoned neoliberalism?’, available at 
www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr, accessed 1st August 2013 
MCMD (2009) ‘Lessons of the financial crisis for future regulation of financial institutions 
and markets and for liquidity management’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd April 
2013 
Mehta, J., (2010) 'The varied roles of ideas in politics: From "whether" to "how"', in D. 
Beland and R. Cox (eds) (2010),Ideas and politics in social science research, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 
257 
 
Mishkin, F., (2008) 'Is monetary policy effective during financial crises?', available at 
http://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6586531.pdf, accessed 8th April 2015 
Moschella, M., (2010) ‘Governing risk: The IMF and global financial crises’, Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke 
Mudge, (2008) ‘What is neoliberalism?’,Socio–economic Review, Issue 6 
Muldoon Jr, J., (2004) ‘The architecture of global governance: An introduction to the study 
of international organizations’, Westview Press, Boulder 
Murphy, C. N., (2000) ‘Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly Understood’, in R. 
Wilkinson (eds), The Global Governance Reader, Routledge, Oxon  
Murphy, C., and Tooze, R., (1991) ‘The New International Political Economy’, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Boulder 
NDB (2015) ‘About the NDB’, available at http://ndbbrics.org/, accessed 15th September 
2015 
Nesvetailova, A., (2015) 'A crisis of the overcrowded future: Shadow banking and the 
political economy of financial innovation', New Political Economy, Vol. 20. No. 3 
North, D., (1990) ‘Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance’, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 
Nsouli, S., (2008) ‘Lessons from the recent financial crisis and the role of the fund’, available 
at www.imf.org/external/speeches/2008/062608.htm, accessed 29th April 2013 
O’Brien, R., and Williams, M., (2010) ‘Global Political Economy: Evolutions and Dynamics’, 
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 
Oliveira, S., and Elliott, D., (2012) ‘Estimating the costs of financial regulation’, available at 
www.imf.org, accessed May 11th 2014 
Oliver, P., and Johnston, H., (2000) 'What a good idea! Frames and ideologies in social 
movement research', available at 
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~oliver/PROTESTS/ArticleCopies/Frames.2.29.00.pdf, accessed 
3rd May 2015 
258 
 
Osinski, J., et al (2013) ‘Macro-prudential and micro-prudential policies: Towards co-
habitation’, Staff Discussion Note, SDN/13/05, available at www.imf.org, accessed 27th July 
2013 
Ostry, J., et al (2010) ‘Fiscal space’, IMF Staff Position Note SPN/10/11, available at 
www.imf.org, accessed 1st August 2013 
Otker-Robe, I., et al (2010) ‘Impact of regulatory reforms on large and complex financial 
institutions’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 29th May 2014 
Oxfam (2013) ‘A cautionary tale’, Oxfam Briefing Paper, No. 174 
Palan, R., (2000) 'The constructivist underpinnings of the new international political 
economy', 'Global Political Economy: Contemporary theories', Routledge, London 
Pan, Z., & Kosicki, G., (1993) 'Framing analysis: An approach to news discourse', Political 
Communication, Vol. 10 
Pastor Jr., M., (1989) ‘Latin America, the debt crisis, and the International Monetary Fund’, 
Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 1 
Pauly, L., (2007) 'the group of seven: Finance ministers, central banks and global financial 
governance', New Political Economy, Vol. 12, No. 4 
Payne, A., (2005) ‘The Study of Governance in a Global Political Economy’, in Phillips, N., 
‘Globalizing International Political Economy’, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 
Payne, A., (2014) 'The global governance of global crisis', SPERI Paper No. 17, available 
athttp://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Paper-17-Global-Goverance-
G20-Summit.pdf, accessed 21st October 2014  
Peet, R., (2003) ‘Unholy trinity: the IMF, World Bank, and the WTO’, Zed Books, London 
Pernia, E., and Knowles, J., (2003) ‘Assessing the social impact on the financial crisis in Asia’, 
EDCRB Briefing Note, No. 6, available at http://aric.adb.org/pdf/cdrobn/edrobno6.pdf 
Perotti, E., et al (2011) ‘Capital regulation and tail risk’, IMF Working Paper, WP/11/188, 
available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd June 2013 
Pescatori et al, A., et al (2014) ‘Debt and growth: Is there a magic threshold?’, IMF Working 
Paper WP/14/34, available at www.imf.org, accessed 16th February 2014 
259 
 
Peters, B., (1998) ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science’, Pinter, London 
Pleasants, N., (2009) ‘Structure, agency and ontological confusion: Response to Hay’, 
Political Studies, Vol. 57, No. 4 
Polak, J., (1957) 'Monetary analysis of income formation and payments problems', IMF Staff 
Papers, Vol. 6, No. 1, available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3866128?origin=pubexport,accessed 21st 
January 2013 
Porter, T., (2010) ‘Risk models in trans-national governance in the global financial crisis: The 
case of Basel II and credit rating agencies’ in E.Helleiner et al (2010), Global finance in crisis, 
Routledge, London 
Prakash, A., and Hart, J., (1999) ‘Globalization and governance’, Routledge,  
Radelet, S., & Sachs, J., (2000) ‘The onset of the East Asian financial crisis’, Working Paper 
6680, available at www.nber.org/papers/w6680 
Reinhart, C., and Rogoff, K., (2008) ‘Is the 2007 US sub-prime financial crisis so different? 
An international historical comparison’, American Economic Review, Vol. 98, No. 2 
-Reinhart, C., and Rogoff, K., (2010) ‘Growth in a time of debt’, available 
athttp://www.nber.org/papers/w15639.pdf, accessed 5th December 2013 
-Reinhart, C., and Rogoff, K., (2013) ‘Financial and sovereign debt crises: Some lessons 
learned and those forgotten’, IMF Working Paper WP/13/226, available at www.imf.org, 
accessed 14th February 2014 
Repullo, R., and Saurina, J., (2011) ‘The countercyclical capital buffer of Basel III: A critical 
assessment’, CEMFI Working Paper No. 1102 
Roache, S., &Rousset, M., (2013) ‘Unconventional monetary policy and asset price risk’, IMF 
Working Paper, WP/13/190, available at www.imf.org, accessed 14th February 2014  
Roger, S., and Vlcek, J., (2011) ‘Macroeconomic costs of higher bank capital and liquidity 
requirements’, IMF Working Paper, WP/11/103, available at www.imf.org, accessed 2nd 
June 2013 
260 
 
-Roger, S., and Vitek, F., (2012) ‘The global macroeconomic costs of raising bank capital 
adequacy requirements’, IMF Working Paper, WP/12/44, available at www.imf.org, 
accessed 28th May 2013 
Rogoff, K., (2012) ‘Ending the financial arms race’, available at www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary, accessed 27th May 2014 
Romer, D., (2011) ‘What have we learned about fiscal policy from the crisis?’, available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2011/res/pdf/DR3presentation.pdf, 
accessed 23rd July 2014 
Rosenau, J., (1997) ‘Along the domestic – foreign frontier: Exploring governance in a 
turbulent world’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
Rueschemeyer, D., (2006) ‘Why and how ideas matter’, in R. Goodin and C. Tilly (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Ruggie, J.G., (1998) ‘Constructing the world polity: Essays on international 
institutionalisation’, Routledge, London 
Sacasa, N., (2008) ‘Preventing future crises’, Finance and Development, Vol. 45, No. 4 
Sands, D., (2015) ‘Democratic titans say Obama ‘screwed up’ and gave rise to China’s new 
bank’, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/1/efforts-to-head-
off-china-development-bank-called-/, accessed 19th September, 2015  
Schaechter, A., et al (2012) ‘Fiscal rules in response to the crisis – toward the “next 
generation” rules. A new dataset’, IMF Working Paper WP/12/187, available at 
www.imf.org, accessed 1st August 2013 
Schechter, M., (1999) ‘Our global neighbourhood: Pushing problem-solving theory to its 
limits and the limits of problem-solving theory’, in Hewson, M., and Sinclair, T., ‘Approaches 
to global governance theory’, State University of New York Press, Albany 
Schmidt, V., (2002) ‘Does discourse matter in the politics of welfare state adjustment?’, 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2  
-Schmidt, V., (2002a) 'The politics of economic adjustment in France and Britain: Does 
discourse matter?', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 9, No. 6 
261 
 
- Schmidt, V., (2003) 'How, where, and when does discourse matter in small states' welfare 
state adjustment?', New Political Economy, Vol. 8, No. 1 
-Schmidt, V., (2006) ‘Institutionalism’, in C. Hay et al (eds) ‘The state: Theories and issues’, 
Palgrave, Basingstoke 
-Schmidt, V., (2008) ‘Discursive institutionalism: The explanatory power of ideas and 
discourse’, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 11, pp 303-326 
-Schmidt, V., (2010) ‘Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining change through 
discursive institutionalism as the fourth ‘new institutionalism’, European Political Science 
Review, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp1-25 
-Schmidt, V., (2011) ‘Discursive institutionalism: Scope, dynamics, and philosophical 
underpinnings’, in J. Fischer & J. Forester eds, ‘The argumentative turn revisited: Public 
policy as communicative practice’, Duke University Press, Durham 
-Schmidt, V., (2011a) 'Speaking of change: Why discourse is key to the dynamics of policy 
transformation', Critical Policy Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 
-Schmidt, V., (2012) ‘A curious constructivism: A response to Professor Bell’, British Journal 
of Political Science, Vol. 42, No. 3 
-Schmidt, V., (2013) ‘Speaking to the market or the people? A discursive institutionalist 
analysis of EU leaders’ discourse during the EU sovereign debt crisis’, British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations, Vol. 23,No. 2 
Schmidt, V., and Thatcher, M., (eds) (2013) 'Resilient liberalism in Europe's political 
economy', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
- Schmidt, V., and Thatcher, M., (2014) 'Why are neoliberal ideas so resilient so resilient in 
Europe's political economy?', Critical Policy Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3 
Shah, A., (2009) 'Global financial crisis', available at 
www.globalissues.org/article/768/global-financial-crisis, accessed 4th June 2009 
Shin, H., (2010) 'Macro-prudential policies beyond Basel III', Policy Memo, available at 
https://www.princeton.edu/~hsshin/www/MacroprudentialMemo.pdf, accessed 1st 
October 2014 
Skidelsky, R., (2009) 'The return of the master', Allen Lane, London 
262 
 
Skidelsky, R., (2011) ‘The relevance of Keynes’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 35, 
Issue 1 
Smith, S., (2002) ‘International theory: Positivism and beyond’, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 
Snidal, D., (1996) 'Political economy and international institutions', International Review of 
Law and Economics, Vol. 16 
Snow, D., (2004) 'Framing processes, ideology, and discursive fields', in D. Snow et al (eds), 
'The Blackwell companion to social movements', Blackwell, London 
Snyder, G., and Diesling, P., (1977) 'Conflict among nations', Princeton University Press, 
Princeton 
Soros, G., (2009) 'The crash of 2008 and what it means: The new paradigm for financial 
markets', Public Affairs, London 
Spilimbergo, A., et al (2008) ‘Fiscal Policy for the Crisis’, IMF Staff Position Note SPN/08/01, 
available at www.imf.org, accessed 21st August 2013 
Steart, F., (1987) ‘Back to Keynesianism: Reforming the IMF’, World Policy Journal, Vol. 4, 
No. 3 
Steinberg, M., (1998) 'Tilting the frame: Considerations on collective action framing from a 
discursive turn', Theory and Society, Vol. 27 
Stiglitz, J., (2002) 'Globalization and its discontents', Penguin, London 
- Stiglitz, J., (2004) 'The post Washington consensus consensus', available at 
https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/download/2004_Post_Washington_Conse
nsus.pdf, accessed 21st April, 2014 
Strange, S., (1988) ‘States and markets’, Pinter, London 
Strauss-Kahn, D., (2008) ‘Lessons from the financial market crisis: Priorities for the world 
and for the IMF’, available at www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2008/021308.htm, 
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2008a) ‘Remarks to the Board of Governors of the IMF at the joint 
annual discussion, 2008’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2008/021308.htm, accessed 19th December 2013 
263 
 
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2008b) ‘Addressing global economic challenges’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2008/121008.htm, accessed 19th December 2013  
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2008c) ‘The Euro at 10: The next global currency?’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2008/101008.htm, accessed 19th December 2013  
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2008d) ‘The IMF and its future?’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2008/121508.htm, accessed 19th December 2013 
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2008e) 'Addressing global economic challenges', available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2008/121513.htm, accessed 10th December 2013 
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2008f) 'National, European, or Global? The future of bank regulation', 
available at www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2009/112409.htm, accessed 18th May 
2014 
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2009) ‘A mandate for action’, speech at the National Press Club, 
Washington D.C, April 16th, available at www.imf.org, accessed 10th December 2013 
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2009a) ‘A mandate for action’, speech at the 44th SEACEN Governors’ 
Conference, available at www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2009/020709.htm, accessed 
10th December 2013 
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2009b) ‘Crisis management and policy coordination: Do we need a new 
global framework?’, speech at the OesterreichischeNationalbank, Vienna, May 15th, 
available at www.imf.org, accessed 10th December 2013 
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2009c) ‘Beyond the crisis: Sustainable growth and a stable international 
monetary system’, available at www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2009/090409.htm,  
accessed 10th December 2013 
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2009d) ‘Making the most of an historic opportunity: Three principles for 
reshaping the global economic and financial framework’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2009/100209.htm,  accessed 10th December 2013 
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2009e) ‘Taking off or holding pattern? Prospects for the global 
economy’, available at www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2009/112309.htm,  accessed 
10th December 2013 
264 
 
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2009f) ‘National, European, or Global? The future of bank regulation’, 
available at www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2009/112409.htm,  accessed 10th 
December 2013 
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2009g) ‘Opening remarks at the 10th Jacques Polak Annual research 
conference’, available at www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2009/110509.htm,  accessed 
10th December 2013 
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2010) ‘A new globalization for a new world’, Opening address to the 
2010 annual meetings of the board of governors of the World Bank group and the IMF, 
available at www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2010/100810.htm, accessed 10th 
December 2013 
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2010a) ‘International policy cooperation: Essential for securing the 
global economic recovery and modernizing the global financial architecture’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2010/031710.htm, accessed 10th December 2013 
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2010b) ‘Economic policy challenges in the post-crisis period’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2010/041010.htm, accessed 10th December 2013 
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2010c) ‘Concluding remarks at the high level conference on the 
international monetary system’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2010/051110.htm, accessed 10th December 2013 
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2010d) ‘The triple comeback – The impact of the financial crisis on 
global economic governance’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2010/120810.htm, accessed 10th December 2013 
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2010e) ‘2010-A year of transformation for the world and Asia’, available 
at www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2010/12010.htm, accessed 10th December 2013 
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2011) ‘Financial crisis and sovereign risk: Implications for financial 
stability’, available at www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2011/031811.htm, accessed 10th 
December 2013  
-Strauss-Kahn, D., (2011a) ‘Macro and growth policies in the wake of the crisis’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2011/030711.htm, accessed 10th December 2013  
Tagaki, S., (2009) ‘Managing economic crises: What did the IMF learn from Asia?’,The 
Journal of Social Science, Vol. 68, pp115-131 
265 
 
Taleb, N., (2007) ‘The black swan’, Penguin, London 
Taylor, L., (1997) 'Editorial: The revival of the liberal creed - the IMF and World Bank in a 
globalised economy', World Development, Vol. 25, No. 2 
Tsingou, E., (2010) ‘Reactions to the global credit crisis’, in E.Helleiner et al (2010), Global 
finance in crisis, Routledge, London 
UNCTAD (2014) 'Towards a sustained economic recovery: Review of policy options', 
available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/tdr2014ch2_en.pdf, accessed 21st 
October 2014 
Underhill, G., (2000) ‘State, market, and global political economy’, International Affairs, Vol. 
76, No. 4 
Van Dijk, T., (1998) ‘Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach’, London, Sage 
Vayrynen, R., (ed) ‘Globalization and global governance’, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 
Inc., Oxford  
Vazquez, F., and Federico, P., (2012) ‘Bank funding structures and risk: evidence from the 
global financial crisis’, IMF Working Paper, WP/12/29, available at www.imf.org, accessed 
13th June 2013 
Vinals, J., (2009) 'Lessons learned from regulatory and supervisory responses to the crisis', 
available at www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2009/111109.htm, accessed 30th May 
2013 
-Vinals, J., (2009a) 'Financial stability and the design of a new rule book', Lessons learned 
from regulatory and supervisory responses to the crisis', available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2009/051509a.htm, accessed 30th May 2013 
-Vinals, J., (2010) ‘Lessons from the crisis for central banks’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2010/052710.htm, accessed 10th December 2013  
-Vinals, J., (2011) ‘The do’s and don’ts of macro-prudential policy’, available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2011/050211.htm, accessed 8th December 2013 
-Vinals, J., (2011a) 'Seeing both the forest and the trees - Supervising systemic risk', 
available at www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2011/060211.htm 
266 
 
Vinals, J., et al (2010) ‘Shaping the new financial system’, available at www.imf.org, 
accessed 30th May 2014  
Wade, R., &Veneroso, F., (1998) ‘The Asian crisis: The high-debt model versus the Wall 
street-Treasury-IMF complex’, New Left Review, Vol. 228 
Waever, O., (2002) ‘The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate’, in Smith, S., et al (ed) 
‘International theory: Positivism and beyond’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
Waltz, K., (1979) ‘Theory of International Politics’, Addison-Wesley, Reading 
- Waltz, K., (1986) ‘Political Structures’, in Keohane, R., ‘Neorealism and its critics’, 
Columbia University Press, New York 
Watson, M., (2005) ‘Foundations of International Political Economy’, Palgrave MacMillan, 
Basingstoke 
Weldes, J., (2006) ‘High politics and low data’, in Yanow, D., and Schwartz-Shea, P., (eds) 
‘Interpretation and method: Empirical research methods and the interpretive turn’, ME 
Sharpe, London  
Wendt, A., (1987) ‘The agent / structure problem in International Relations’, International 
Organisation, Vol. 41, No. 3 
Wendt, A., (1992) ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics’, International Organisation, Vol. 46, No. 2 
WEO (2008) ‘World Economic Outlook’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 18th June 2012 
-WEO (2008a) ‘World Economic Outlook’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 18th June 
2012 
-WEO (2009) ‘World Economic Outlook’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 18th June 
2012 
-WEO (2009a) ‘World Economic Outlook’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 18th June 
2012 
-WEO (2010) ‘World Economic Outlook’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 18th June 
2012 
267 
 
-WEO (2010a) ‘World Economic Outlook’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 18th June 
2012 
-WEO (2011) ‘World Economic Outlook’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 18th June 
2012 
-WEO (2011a) ‘World Economic Outlook’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 21 January 
2013 
-WEO (2012) ‘World Economic Outlook’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 21 January 
2013 
-WEO (2012a) ‘World Economic Outlook’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 21 January 
2013 
-WEO (2013) ‘World Economic Outlook’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 9th July 2014 
-WEO (2013a) ‘World Economic Outlook’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 9th July 2014 
-WEO (2014) ‘World Economic Outlook’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 9th July 2014 
-WEO (2014a) ‘World Economic Outlook’, available at www.imf.org, accessed 3rd February 
2015 
Widmaier, W., (2004) 'Thesocial construction of the "impossible trinity": The inter-
subjective bases of monetary cooperation', International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48 
- Widmaier, W., (2005) 'The meaning of an inflation crisis: steel, Enron, and macro-
economic policy', Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics, Summer 2005, Vol. 27, No. 4 
- Widmaier, W., (2007) 'The Keynesian bases of a constructivist theory of the International 
Political Economy', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1 
Widmaier, W., et al, (2007) ‘Exogenous shocks or endogenous constructions? The meanings 
of wars and crises’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 51, 747-759 
Wilson, G., and Grant, W., (2012) 'The consequences of the global financial crisis', Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 
Wolf, M., (2008) 'Keynes offers us the best way to think about the financial crisis', available 
at www.ft.com/cms/s/be2dbf2c-d113-11dd-8cc3-000077b07658,dwp_uuid, accessed 12th 
December 2008 
268 
 
Woo, J., et al (2013) ‘Distributional consequences of fiscal consolidation and the role of 
fiscal policy: What do the data say?’, IMF Working Paper, WP/13/195 
Woods, N., (2006) ‘Bretton Woods Institutions’, in Weiss, T., and Daws, S., (eds), Oxford 
Handbook on the United Nations, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Wyplosz, C., (2008) ‘Fiscal rules: Theoretical issues and historical experiences’, NBER 
Working Paper 17884, available at www.nber.org/papers/17884, accessed 1st March 2014  
Yanow, D., (2006) ‘Thinking interpretively: Philosophical presuppositions and the human 
social sciences’, in Yanow, D., and Schwartz-Shea, P., (eds) ‘Interpretation and method: 
Empirical research methods and the interpretive turn’, ME Sharpe, London 
Yanow, D., and Schwartz-Shea., P., (2006) ‘Doing social science in a humanistic manner’, in 
Yanow, D., and Schwartz-Shea, P., (eds) ‘Interpretation and method: Empirical research 
methods and the interpretive turn’, ME Sharpe, London  
Yates, S., (2003) 'Doing social science research', Sage, London 
You, J., (2002) 'The Bretton Woods institutions: Evolution, reform, and change', in D. 
Nayyar (eds), 'Governing Globalization', Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Zimmermann, H., (2010) ‘Conclusion: Whither global financial regulation’, in E.Helleiner et 
al (2010), ‘Global finance in crisis’, Routledge, London  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
